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ARTICLES
“QUOUSQUE TANDEM, QUOUSQUE 
TANDEM …”
RECHERCHES SUR LA NOTION DE 
PATIENTIA DANS LA VIE POLITIQUE  
A ROME (DE CESAR A HADRIEN)
Yasmina Benferhat*
“Quousque tandem, quousque tandem”, disait un occupant du Domaine des dieux en 
entendant le barde chanter … Uderzo et Goscinny s’étaient bien amusés, sans doute, 
en parodiant ainsi dans un des volumes d’Asterix le célèbre début de la Première 
Catilinaire, prononcée par Cicéron en septembre 63. Bien avant eux, nombreux 
furent les esprits marqués par cette foudroyante entrée en matière, in medias res: 
citons Salluste qui, vingt ans après environ, choisit d’utiliser cette expression dans 
le discours de Catilina1 à ses partisans au début de la conjuration. Plus tard, Pline le 
Jeune marque gentiment son impatience devant un ami poète à ses heures qui ne se 
décidait pas à faire lire en public ses vers,2 en jouant sur l’intertextualité. 
1 Cf Salluste, CC 20 9: Quae quousque tandem patiemini, o fortissumi uiri?
2 Cf Pline le Jeune, Epist 2 10 1-2: Hominem te patientem uel potius durum ac paene crudelem, 
qui tam insignes libros tam diu teneas! Quousque et tibi et nobis inuidebis, tibi maxima laude, 
nobis uoluptate? On pourrait peut-être ajouter Sénèque qui décrit Cicéron comme aduersarum 
impatiens, cf Breu 5 1. 
*  Maître de conference habilitée, Université de Lorraine. 
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Mais pourquoi évoquer la patientia des sénateurs? La question n’a pas suscité 
beaucoup d’études.3 À dire vrai, c’est la notion même de patience dans le monde 
gréco-romain païen qui n’a guère été fouillée avant sa transformation en vertu 
chrétienne.4 A fortiori, la patientia en tant que qualité d’un homme politique ou d’un 
peuple n’a pas fait l’objet de recherches.5 Pourtant on la trouve sur une monnaie 
d’Hadrien,6 datant des années 128-132, et bien avant elle apparaît dans un contexte 
politique dans les œuvres de Cicéron, Salluste, César … Mais de quelle patientia 
parle-t-on alors? De l’endurance physique propre aux grands généraux ou de la 
vertu morale proche de la constantia? Le début même de la première Catilinaire est 
construit sur un jeu entre ces deux types de patience. Mais n’y a-t-il pas un troisième 
sens possible à donner au mot patientia?
Nous verrons dans un premier temps l’opposition entre deux types de patientia, 
telle qu’elle apparaît à la fin de la République dans les écrits de César, de Cicéron 
et de Salluste en particulier. Puis nous nous intéresserons à un autre échange, entre 
Pline le Jeune qui loue la patientia du Prince, et Tacite qui dénigre celle des peuples 
vaincus. Il ne s’agit pas de proposer une synthèse complète sur cette notion, mais 
bien plutôt de jeter de petits cailloux sur le chemin pour tenter de cerner la patientia 
afin d’offrir un premier bilan, provisoire et partiel. Notre corpus sera principalement 
composé des auteurs de la fin de la République et du premier siècle de notre ère, la 
limite étant le règne d’Hadrien et donc l’œuvre de Tacite qui est probablement mort 
peu après l’arrivée au pouvoir du successeur de Trajan.
1.*  *  *
1 1 De quelle patientia parlait Cicéron dans ce fameux temple de Jupiter Stator 
au jour de son premier discours contre Catilina? Assurément, de la patience morale 
des sénateurs, celle que J Hellegouarc’h évoque à l’occasion en étudiant des notions 
proches comme la fortitudo ou la constantia. Mais il y a fort à parier que beaucoup 
des présents ont dû songer à un autre type de patientia, celui que revendiquait 
3 On peut citer J Christensen “A note on patientia as a political term in Cicero’s In Catilinam 
1 1” in K Ascani, V Gabrielsen, K Kvist & AH Rasmussen (eds) Ancient History Matters. Studies 
Presented to Jens Erik Skydsgaard on His Seventieth Birthday (Rome, 2002) 242-243.
4 Voir à cet égard la synthèse de M Spanneut sv “Geduld” in Real Lexikon für Antike und Christentum 
9 (1976) 243-294: l’auteur écrit en introduction “Eine monographische Behandlung der G. steht 
noch aus. Das ist verwunderlich, weil diese Tugend doch sowohl in der griech.-röm Welt des 
Altertums wie im Christentum dieser Periode eine bedeutende Rolle gespielt hat.” Le constat est 
toujours valable à ce jour dans l’état actuel de nos connaissances. 
5 L’article de R Kaster “The taxonomy of patience, or when is patientia not a virtue”? (2002) 97 
Classical Philology 133-144, porte surtout sur les aspects moraux, quand nous nous intéresserons 
à la valeur de patientia en politique. 
6 Cf Roman Imperial Coinage 2 365 var; British Museum Coins Emp III 306, 525; et Lexicon 
Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae 202-203. Pour avoir une idée, voir en ligne http://
www.fredericweber.com/articl_dieux/article_patientia.htm et http://www.sacra-moneta.com/
Numismatique-romaine/L-image-de-la-Patience-sur-les-monnaies-romaines.html.
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Catilina justement: la résistance physique. D’autant que Cicéron multiplie les jeux 
de mots avec le verbe patere ensuite,7 avant d’inviter explicitement son adversaire 
à quitter Rome pour prouver ses qualités de général:8 Habes ubi ostentes illam tuam 
praeclaram patientiam famis, frigoris, inopiae rerum omnium … Le démonstratif 
ille et l’adjectif praeclarus, ici avec une nuance ironique évidente, tendent à prouver 
qu’il s’agissait là de choses connues de tous.
Prenons ses différents portraits pour nous en assurer: Salluste souligne son 
endurance physique dès le début,9 avec l’expression corpus patiens inediae, algoris, 
uigiliae, renforcée par le superlatif supra quam cuiquam credibile est. Dans un 
Etat militaire comme Rome, il était somme toute logique que la première qualité 
d’un homme destiné à diriger soit sa résistance à la faim, au froid, au manque de 
sommeil, tout ce qui était fréquent lors d’une campagne. Cicéron, dans le fameux 
portrait ambigu du Pro Caelio, rappelait déjà dès 54 cette qualité reconnue par tous 
à Catilina:10 quis in laboribus patientior? 
Nous pensons qu’il y a là comme une sorte d’écho à un thème de la propagande 
en faveur de Catilina qui mettait en avant sa résistance physique. Dans le fond, la 
vie politique à Rome avait ceci de commun avec la nôtre que les hommes politiques 
devaient mettre en avant des qualités personnelles justifiant leurs prétentions à se 
retrouver au sommet de l’Etat et permettant de se distinguer des concurrents: en 
64-63 Pompée était loin en Orient et César encore dans l’ombre. Catilina avait eu 
comme concurrent au consulat Cicéron: il n’allait pas mettre en avant sa probité, ce 
qui aurait provoqué des fous rires. Il n’allait pas se vanter de son génie intellectuel 
face à un Cicéron consacré comme le plus grand orateur à Rome depuis les Verrines. 
En revanche, il pouvait justement jouer sur le contraste en soulignant ses qualités 
exceptionnelles de soldat et de général.
La réponse de Cicéron dans ces conditions était assez prévisible: il avait tout 
intérêt à faire passer cette patientia pour la caractéristique d’une bête sauvage. 
L’opposition était exagérée, mais loin d’être artificielle: elle reflétait selon nous 
deux façons de voir Rome, et d’envisager son avenir, soit comme un Empire en 
perpétuelle extension et donc en guerre permanente avec le besoin d’hommes d’Etat 
qui seraient d’abord des soldats, soit comme un Etat proche de la stabilité territoriale 
ayant désormais besoin de civils nourris de droit et de philosophie. De ce point de 
vue, il y a une cohérence parfaite de Cicéron quand on songe au célèbre cedant arma 
togae: de son point de vue, l’âge des cavernes où l’on passait son temps à se battre 
contre les voisins était révolu. Et ce choix d’une patientia morale se trouve dès le De 
Inuentione avec une première définition de cette qualité.11 
7 Cf Cicéron, Cat 1 1: Patere tua consilia non sentis? Et plus loin, cf Cat 1 5 10: patent portae … 
8 Idem 26.
9 Cf Salluste, CC 5 3.
10 Cf Cicéron, Cael 13.
11 Cf Cicéron, Inu 2 163: Patientia est honestatis aut utilitatis causa rerum arduarum ac difficilium 
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Si l’on songe au portrait d’Hannibal au livre XXI de l’histoire romaine de Tite-
Live, on y voit à la fois la défaite de Cicéron et sa victoire: sa défaite, parce que ce 
sont des généraux qui se sont imposés à la tête de l’Etat et que la patientia au sens 
physique l’a emporté,12 mais sa victoire également parce que cette qualité est restée 
ambiguë. Hannibal est une bête féroce, une belua, un monstre: il n’appartient plus au 
règne humain, il est dans l’infra-humain ou le supra-humain, selon le point de vue, 
mais sa résistance exceptionnelle le rend inhumain. Cicéron a donc réussi à rendre 
suspects ceux qui mettaient en avant leur endurance, c’est-à-dire leurs qualités 
d’homme de guerre. 
1 2 Voilà pour un premier niveau de sens, mais il y en avait probablement un 
autre: en effet, comme on peut le constater chez Salluste, la patientia au sens moral 
était la qualité du peuple romain, de la plèbe face aux Optimates hautains et cruels. 
Le tribun Memmius oppose ainsi la patientia de la plèbe aux défauts immenses de 
la nobilitas.13 C’est une vertu plutôt passive, mais qui a permis à l’Etat romain de 
fonctionner en évitant d’autres sécessions. Or, cette patientia se retrouve dans le 
discours de Catilina lorsqu’il encourage ses partisans à se révolter:14 ce passage 
est extraordinaire, parce que Catilina s’adresse surtout à des nobles déclassés de 
son espèce en détournant des arguments utilisés contre la noblesse par la plèbe. Or 
Catilina joue les illusionnistes en transformant les descendants des Cornelii et Sergii 
en pauvres plébéiens victimes de la morgue et de la cruauté d’une nouvelle oligarchie 
emmenée par un homo nouus, Cicéron. 
Ainsi donc, les effets d’échos entre l’auteur de la Première Catilinaire et celui 
de la Conjuration ne sont pas que le résultat d’une volonté d’intertextualité un peu 
ironique, mais confirment surtout que Catilina se servait très probablement de la 
rhétorique des Populares contre le Sénat. De fait, on se souvient que certains chefs 
du parti des Populares furent accusés d’avoir participé à cette conjuration, comme 
Crassus … ou César. Revenons alors à l’incipit de la Première Catilinaire: il y a 
de bonnes chances pour que Cicéron ait joué sur ce second niveau de sens pour 
renverser la situation et attribuer la patience aux sénateurs victimes de Catilina. 
Il n’est pas certain d’ailleurs que son intention ait été ironique: il s’agissait 
bien plutôt de montrer au peuple de Rome que les vertus revendiquées par un camp 
uoluntaria ac diuturna perpessio. On trouve une autre définition de la patientia chez Cicéron, cf 
Part 77. 
12 A titre d’exemple l’adjectif patiens chez Salluste est utilisé dans presque tous les cas dans un 
sens physique: patiens laborum. De même chez Tite-Live, la patientia est d’abord l’endurance 
physique. Chez Velleius, on trouve deux fois l’expression patientia periculorum (2 41 et 2 78) 
pour désigner la qualité physique. Puis chez Valère Maxime (six occurrences), tous les exemples 
choisis au livre III pour illustrer la rubrique consacrée à la patientia concernent l’endurance 
physique. 
13 Cf Salluste, BJ 31 1.
14 Cf Salluste, CC 20 9.
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appartenaient en fait à l’autre auquel il valait mieux se rallier, de ce fait, en cessant 
d’approuver la conjuration. Cicéron tentait de provoquer une désillusion dans la plèbe 
de Rome suspectée de sympathies pour Catilina, et jouait à son tour les illusionnistes 
en présentant le Sénat de Rome comme garant des qualités de son peuple. Néanmoins, 
si Diderot considérait qu’un acteur, illusionniste par excellence, n’est jamais aussi 
bon que lorsqu’il ne croit pas du tout à son texte et en reste à distance, nous pensons 
que Cicéron comme Catilina croyaient en partie au moins à ce qu’ils disaient. A force 
d’avanies et d’échecs dans sa carrière politique, Catilina avait fini sans doute par 
s’identifier aux plébéiens des historiens, tout comme Cicéron était convaincu que le 
Sénat représentait le peuple de Rome et donc possédait sa patience morale.15 
L’ennui était que finalement, aussi bien dans la bouche de Catilina que dans 
celle du consul Cicéron, la patientia a un petit goût désagréable: c’est une qualité à la 
limite du défaut, parce que le terme indique que l’on subit des injustices, depuis trop 
longtemps et en trop grand nombre pour que cela puisse encore durer. En d’autres 
termes, il désigne une passivité qui ne pouvait guère être bien vue. Il faut se tourner 
vers le corpus césarien pour mesurer la difficulté réelle qui résidait dans l’emploi de 
ce terme. 
1 3 César s’est lui aussi présenté comme un général endurant, mais son génie fut 
de mettre en avant cette résistance comme étant celle de son armée. Il est intéressant 
de relever que la patientia n’apparaît pas dans les premiers livres du De bello Gallico: 
il faut attendre le livre VI pour que le terme soit employé, et encore à propos des 
Germains ou de Quintus Cicéron assiégé par les Gaulois.16 Au livre VIII, qui fut 
revu par Hirtius, la patientia apparaît au sens d’endurance à propos des soldats de 
César qui avaient supporté les rigueurs d’une campagne en hiver par des chemins 
très difficiles,17 ce qui leur vaut une récompense. On voit donc que dans les années 
50 César évite de reprendre un thème cher aux Populares. 
C’est l’arrivée de la guerre civile qui change tout: face aux Optimates qui 
soutiennent Pompée contre lui, César n’a guère d’autre choix que de reprendre la 
rhétorique des Populares à son avantage. Il réutilise donc le thème de la patientia, en 
jouant sur ses deux sens. Il met en avant sa propre patience au sens moral face aux 
injustices que lui font subir Pompée et ses alliés, comme on peut le constater au livre 
I du Bellum ciuile,18 poussant ainsi à une identification de la plèbe romaine – n’a-t-on 
15 Nous avions essayé de montrer ailleurs comment il utilise le thème de la lenitas, la douceur chère 
aux Populares, dans l’ensemble des Catilinaires et dans les discours qui ont suivi cette crise, pour 
mieux la revendiquer comme sienne, cf “D’iniuria à lenitas dans le Bellum ciuile de César” Vita 
Latina 173 (2005) 11-25 et “Les grandes illusions: Catilina, Cicéron et César dans la Conjuration 
de Catilina” Vita Latina 175 (2006) 104-118.
16 Cf César, BG 6 24 (Germains) et 36 (Cicéron frère). 
17 Ibid 8 4 1.
18 Cf César, BC 1 32 et 85. 
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pas d’ailleurs menacé les deux tribuns de la plèbe qui agissaient en sa faveur? − à sa 
propre cause. 
Mais il va également souligner la résistance physique de son armée, avec laquelle 
il ne fait qu’un: on le voit dans le récit de la bataille d’Ilerda,19 puis surtout dans la 
dernière phase de la guerre civile en Grèce. L’acmé se situe là en effet,20 lorsque 
les césariens souffrent du manque de vivres mais le supportent en se souvenant de 
leurs épreuves passées, en Espagne et avant cela en Gaule. La patientia est alors 
l’endurance physique; elle est aussi un témoignage de confiance des soldats envers 
César qui souffre de la même manière et les sortira de là; elle est la vertu du peuple de 
Rome sous les drapeaux, dont César est le représentant et le chef évident, partageant 
le même sort. 
Du coup, César fait coup double puisqu’il réunit symboliquement autour de 
lui la plèbe en toge et la plèbe en armes. Loin de la sécession sur le Mont Sacré, la 
plèbe fait corps avec César et se bat pour lui dans les conditions les plus difficiles 
parce que, si l’on suit toujours la propagande césarienne, leurs deux sorts ne font 
qu’un. Face à eux se trouvent les Pompéiens dont le camp une fois pris ne fait que 
révéler l’orgueil et le goût du luxe en contraste complet avec les misères endurées 
par l’armée de César,21 summa cum patientia. 
L’appropriation de la patientia comme qualité personnelle de César est opérée 
dans le récit de la guerre en Afrique: la patience de César est d’abord une tactique 
militaire face aux provocations ennemies, passivité qui provoque le mépris d’un roi 
barbare ou l’inquiétude des Républicains22 qui connaissent leur adversaire à sa juste 
valeur et se méfient. Le plus intéressant est alors la construction directe de patientia 
avec complément du nom qui renvoie à César directement et non plus à son armée. 
Le sens moral de patientia apparaît dans un discours du général à ses soldats:23 il met 
en avant sa patience face aux exactions et aux actes d’indiscipline de certains. On a 
donc une personnalisation achevée de cette qualité, et une disjonction entre César 
et les mauvais soldats, au rebours de ce que l’on avait pu observer dans le Bellum 
ciuile, ce qui prouve au passage que l’auteur anonyme du Bellum Africum était loin 
de maîtriser les codes de la propagande césarienne mis au point par César lui-même, 
ou que les temps avaient changé en quelques mois. 
2 1 À l’autre bout de la période qui nous intéresse, il y a Pline le Jeune qui se 
fait thuriféraire de la patientia du Prince et Tacite qui joue les grincheux en donnant 
à ce terme une valeur négative. Quand et comment la patientia est devenue vertu 
du Prince ne sont pas questions aisées. Ce qui est certain, c’est que les choses sont 
19 Idem 45.
20 Idem 3 47 où le terme est d’ailleurs répété comme pour être mieux martelé. 
21 Idem 3 96: miserrimus et patientissimus exercitus Caesaris.
22 Cf B-Afr 30 et 35. 
23 Idem 54. 
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en place dès le règne de Tibère,24 puisque l’édit de Cn. Pisone patre retrouvé en 
Espagne25 nous parle de la patientia de cet empereur, avant de louer la patience du 
Sénat: de nouveau, il s’agit de la qualité de celui qui a supporté le plus longtemps 
possible le mauvais caractère d’une autre personne, en l’occurrence l’irascible Cn 
Pison,26 avant de sévir à juste titre. 
Il est curieux de constater que dès cette époque la patience est en même temps 
la qualité des opposants politiques soumis à la torture – comme on peut le voir chez 
Valère Maxime – et une vertu princière. Autrement dit, la patientia caractérise à la 
fois les opposants et les dirigeants. Cela n’est pas aussi étonnant qu’on pourrait le 
croire: c’est l’héritage des débats politiques des dernières années de la République, 
quand l’auteur du Bellum Africum présentait la patientia comme une qualité de 
César alors que, quelques années plus tard, Cicéron l’attribuait à Brutus, le chef 
de file de l’opposition au “tyran”. Il en fit l’homme de la patientia dans la dixième 
Philippique, en particulier.27 A dire vrai, ce faisant il reprenait les termes de la 
correspondance de la même époque quand Brutus semblait accorder grand crédit à 
cette qualité, en l’attribuant au fils de Cicéron à Athènes,28 par exemple. Il était facile 
d’opposer la patience des “Libérateurs” aux excès de Marc Antoine, et cette capacité 
autoproclamée à encaisser les affronts participait d’une image de douceur bien utile 
après le meurtre de César.29 
Par la suite, sous le règne de Claude, c’est la constantia qui est plutôt à l’honneur 
comme en fait foi le monnayage de ce Prince,30 mais comme l’a bien souligné J. 
Hellegouarc’h,31 ces deux qualités ont partie liée, la patientia représentant un pas de 
plus que la constance. Et ces deux vertus ne sont que des facettes de la douceur en 
politique, parmi d’autres: de même que la modération ou la clémence, la patience est 
capacité à se maîtriser sans céder à la colère. On le voit dans le De Ira de Sénèque en 
particulier, lorsqu’il fait l’éloge de la patientia de Philippe II de Macédoine comme 
de celle d’Auguste pour avoir supporté des propos injurieux.32 
24 Cela nous semble confirmé par le choix de patientia pour ce Prince dans la Consolatio ad 
Marciam, quand Sénèque évoque l’attitude de Tibère à la mort de son fils Drusus: cf Marc 15 3. 
Et nous verrons plus loin l’usage détourné de ce terme que fait Tacite pour mieux dénoncer les 
prétentions, sans doute affichées, de Tibère à se montrer patiens. 
25 Voir W Eck, A Caballos & F Fernandez Das senatus consultum de Cn. Pisone patre (Munich, 
1996) 15-18 et 26-27.
26 RE 70.
27 Cf Cicéron, Phil 10 9 et 23.
28 Cf Cicéron, Ad Br 2 3 6.
29 Cette tradition perdure chez Sénèque, qui cite Caton comme exemple de patientia, cf Const 14 3 
pour ne citer que cet exemple. 
30 Cf Roman Imperial Coinage I 2, 13, 31, 42, 55, 65, 95 et 11 (114-130). 
31 Voir J Hellegouarc’h Le vocabulaire latin op cit, 283 sqq.
32 Cf Sénèque, De Ira 3 23.
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Néanmoins, la patientia ne concerne pas que les relations humaines: cette vertu 
stoïcienne concerne aussi les coups du sort comme les accidents, la mort de proches, 
la maladie, les catastrophes naturelles, les changements brutaux de situation ... Elle 
est donc une réponse de l’individu à ce qui l’entoure, les autres hommes comme 
l’univers. Pour un Tibère exilé, puis adopté, comblé d’héritiers puis les voyant tous 
mourir, ensuite pour un Claude dédaigné de tous, survivant dans la domus impériale 
parce que jugé trop bête pour avoir une chance de régner un jour, puis devenant 
Prince après avoir eu la frayeur de sa vie en étant emmené plus mort que vif au camp 
des prétoriens, la capacité à subir et à encaisser les coups du sort avait sans doute un 
intérêt particulièrement vif. Néanmoins, Claude préféra parler de constantia, plus en 
accord avec la majesté impériale.
2 2 La patientia s’impose à nouveau comme vertu du Prince à la fin du premier 
siècle de notre ère dans l’œuvre de Pline le Jeune. Comment expliquer son intérêt 
pour cette qualité? On peut considérer que sa formation intellectuelle joua un grand 
rôle: la patientia est très présente dans les déclamations de Quintilien, même si 
l’étudier ici de façon approfondie nous entraînerait trop loin. Ensuite, Pline le Jeune 
a été formé en philosophie par le Stoicien Musonius Rufus: or, la patience est une 
vertu stoïcienne. Enfin, ne négligeons pas l’influence de l’œuvre de Cicéron, le 
modèle par excellence. 
La patientia du Prince apparaît dans trois contextes différents chez Pline le Jeune: 
d’abord, dans la correspondance à caractère “privé”, il évoque la patience de Claude 
devant les caprices de ses affranchis comme le fameux Pallas. La contemplation 
du monument funéraire de celui-ci l’amène à dénoncer les excès des ministres de 
Claude: 
Tanta principis, tanta senatus, tanta Pallantis ipsius … quid dicam nescio, ut uellent in 
oculis omnium figi Pallas insolentiam suam, patientiam Caesar, humilitatem senatus!33
La patientia est ici l’autre visage de la constantia, lorsque l’on est trop passif, trop 
patient en somme, et le terme renvoie à la faiblesse de cet empereur face à ses femmes 
et à ses affranchis, avec un beau chiasme entre insolentiam et patientiam pour mieux 
opposer les deux conduites. Le sens n’est donc peut-être pas complètement positif.
En revanche, dans le Panégyrique en l’honneur de Trajan, Pline fait intervenir 
la patientia à plusieurs reprises: il est vrai que ce n’est pas toujours celle du 
Prince. De fait, pour décrire l’entrée du nouvel empereur à Rome,34 l’orateur joue 
sur l’opposition stéréotypée de la patientia du peuple romain face à l’arrogantia 
de ses dirigeants, en l’occurrence les prédécesseurs de Trajan et très probablement 
Domitien dans ce cas précis. Cette opposition se retrouve plus loin35 lorsque Pline 
33 Cf Pline le Jeune, Epist 8 6.
34 Cf Pline le Jeune, Pan 22 2.
35 Idem 68 2.
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souligne le contraste entre la tranquillité dont jouit Trajan, certain de l’affection de 
son peuple, et les mauvais empereurs inquiets à l’idée que la patience des Romains 
puisse s’être émoussée à force d’excès de pouvoir. 
Mais cette patience se retrouve dans le Prince, qui ne fait donc qu’un avec son 
peuple. Ainsi, Trajan se montre d’une patientia exemplaire lors du procès de Marius 
Priscus: 
Iam quam antiquum, quam consulare quod triduum totum senatus sub exemplo patientiae 
tuae sedit, cum interea nihil praeter consulem ageres!36
Il siège comme un magistrat ordinaire pendant trois jours entiers sans s’offrir de 
régime de faveur. De même, il supporte le départ au loin d’un ami qui renonçait à 
ses charges sans chercher à l’obliger à demeurer à Rome.37
Cependant, après les élans rhétoriques du Panégyrique, force est de constater 
que la patientia ne réapparaît quasiment plus dans la correspondance officielle 
du livre X: on ne la trouve que dans une des dernières lettres du gouverneur de 
Bithynie, à propos de la requête du centurion Publius Accius Aquila qui demandait 
la cité romaine pour sa fille. Le texte de cette lettre est très bref:
Rogatus, domine, a P. Accio Aquila, centurione cohortis sextae equestris, ut mitterem tibi 
libellum, per quem indulgentiam pro statu filiae suae implorat, durum putaui negare, cum 
scirem quantam soleres militum precibus patientiam humanitatemque praestare.38
Nous la citons en entier parce qu’on y trouve trois facettes de la douceur en politique: 
l’indulgentia renvoie en fait au pouvoir absolu du Prince père de ses concitoyens39 
qui décide d’accorder ou non ce qui lui est demandé. La patientia nous semble avoir 
un petit goût amer ici de la part d’un sénateur qui doit constater, avec un peu de 
regret sans doute, que Trajan se montre particulièrement plus réceptif aux demandes 
de ses officiers qu’à celles des autres. Et pour tempérer cette pincée d’amertume, 
Pline associe la patientia à une autre qualité beaucoup plus positive, l’humanitas. 
Cela posé, l’humanitas renvoie à un sentiment d’appartenance au même corps: cela 
pourrait donc avoir deux sens, Trajan se sentant membre de la communauté humaine 
comme ses soldats, ou Trajan se rappelant qu’il a été soldat d’abord et de ce fait 
privilégiant des compagnons d’armes. 
On notera également, dans le même ordre d’idées, un emploi du verbe pati qui 
pourrait renvoyer à la notion de patientia, lorsque Trajan autorise son gouverneur à 
élever une statue en son honneur.40 Mais la moisson est bien maigre, on en conviendra. 
36 Idem 76 1.
37 Idem 86 5.
38 Cf Pline le Jeune, Epist 10 106 (107). 
39 Là-dessus nous nous permettons de renvoyer le lecteur à notre étude Du bon usage de la douceur 
en politique dans l’œuvre de Tacite, Belles Lettres, Paris, 2011, en particulier 204-230.
40 Idem 10 9 (25).
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Pourquoi? C’est que dans les lettres officielles entre Pline et son empereur patientia 
est complètement supplantée par indulgentia qui a un sens actif et pose Trajan en 
Prince père omnipotent. Pati est en concurrence avec indulgere sans l’emporter. La 
patience était trop connotée négativement: et son meilleur adversaire était Tacite 
qu’il nous reste à étudier à présent. 
2 3 Le terme patientia est très présent dans son œuvre, avec plusieurs sens 
et dans plusieurs contextes, mais presque toujours il est connoté négativement. 
C’est d’abord l’endurance physique: on ne la retrouve à propos des généraux et de 
manière positive que pour Corbulon,41 façon d’indiquer que Rome avait avec lui un 
commandant digne des anciens temps à l’image d’un César, et pour Germanicus 
quand ses soldats en train de veiller dressent de lui un portrait très élogieux.42 Mais 
dans les autres cas, Tacite annule la valeur positive de ce terme en l’associant à une 
négation pour mieux refuser cette résistance physique aux barbares par exemple et 
en particulier aux Germains.43 Une autre façon de déconsidérer la patientia est de lui 
donner un sens obscène: cela devient la capacité du corps à se plier à toutes sortes de 
plaisirs sexuels.44 Tibère avec ses spintries devient l’homme de la patientia,45 à la fin 
de son règne, mais une patientia complètement dévoyée qui montre l’avilissement 
du pouvoir impérial. 
La patience au sens de qualité morale subit le même traitement: cela se voit dès 
le début de la biographie d’Agricola où Tacite l’associe à la servitude.46 Les élites 
romaines, les sénateurs ont subi les mesures révoltantes de Domitien sans se révolter 
… Cette assimilation de la patience à l’acceptation de la servitude se retrouve dans 
les Annales sous le règne de Tibère, qui en est écoeuré d’ailleurs: 
Scilicet etiam illum qui libertatem publicam nollet tam proiectae seruientium patientiae 
taedebat.47
Mais surtout Tacite la dénonce dans les derniers livres des Annales, qui décrivent les 
dernières années de Néron. Ainsi, juste après la mort d’Octavie l’historien fait une 
allusion aux débordements de servilité de certains sénateurs:
41 Cf Tacite, Ann 14 24. 
42 Cf Ann 2 13.  
43 Idem 2 14 et Germ 4 3.
44 Ce sens se trouvait déjà chez Sénèque, cf Quaest Nat 1 16. 
45 Cf Ann 6 1. Le terme est d’ailleurs utilisé à nouveau par Tacite à propos des derniers moments 
de Tibère, lorsqu’il feint d’être en bonne santé: cf Ann 6 46. De même, l’historien dénonce la 
patientia simulée du Prince qui fait lire les écrits critiques d’un sénateur dénonçant les turpitudes 
de son règne, cf  idem 6 38. Le mot se trouve donc symboliquement à l’ouverture et à la clôture de 
ce livre. 
46 Cf Agr 2 3: dedimus profecto grande patientiae documentum … 
47 Cf Ann 3 65.
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Neque tamen silebimus, si quod senatus consultum adulatione nouum aut patientia 
postremum fuit.48
Le livre XVI qui n’en finit pas d’égrener les suicides forcés et autres disparitions de 
sénateurs contient la même critique contre la patientia seruilis49 qui aboutit à un tel 
flot de sang et à une si grande perte d’hommes utiles à l’Etat. 
Cette servilité est-elle le propre de mauvais règnes de tyrans comme Tibère ou 
Néron? Il est assez clair que pour Tacite c’est une question de faiblesse humaine; il 
est également clair que la patientia est une conséquence du pouvoir monarchique, 
particulièrement nette avec de mauvais Princes mais inévitable de toute façon. On 
peut le constater avec les dirigeants barbares venus à Rome: eux aussi, pourtant 
habitués à régner dans leur pays, sont contraints à se faire esclaves de l’empereur 
pour survivre à la cour. Ainsi Tigrane, qui est élevé comme otage à Rome, est amené 
à devoir faire preuve de servilité, usque ad seruilem patientiam demissus,50 malgré 
ses origines royales. 
Le sort de ce prince nous amène à aborder un dernier aspect de la patientia, qui 
est propre à Tacite: c’est la soumission à Rome des peuples barbares vaincus. Le lien 
avec la servitude est encore plus éclatant. Passons sur une remarque concernant les 
Arméniens, peuple pourtant habitué à servir mais qui se révolte devant les excès de 
Radamiste,51 ce qui n’est pas sans évoquer une théorie des climats bien présente dans 
l’Antiquité déjà:52 patientia désigne presque toujours la condition de soumission 
à Rome.53 On le voit dans les toutes les parties de l’Empire, quand les Bretons 
décident de se révolter en avançant que la servilité ne sert à rien sinon à devoir 
supporter toujours plus d’abus,54 ou quand les habitants de Judée se révoltent sous le 
gouvernement de Gessius Florus.55 Patientia a alors, selon nous, le double sens de 
patience et de soumission au pouvoir romain. 
*  *  *
On a donc vu comment la notion de patientia évolue en près de deux siècles, passant 
d’un sens positif à la fin de la République, qu’elle soit endurance physique ou patience, 
48 Cf Ann 14 64. 
49 Cf Ann 16 16. Il est permis de penser que la cible de Tacite était l’opposition stoïcienne nourrie 
des exemples de Brutus et de Caton: l’historien s’élève ici avec force contre Cicéron et Sénèque. 
50 Cf Ann 14 26.
51 Cf Ann 12 50: cet exemple de révolte est en opposition criante avec la passivité des Romains 
subissant les excès d’Agrippine et de Claude au même moment. 
52 Voir ainsi le bref historique de M Pinna “Un aperçu historique de la ‘théorie des climats’”, (1989) 
547 Annales de Géographie 322-325: le panorama qui commence avec un traité fameux du corpus 
hippocratique est un peu incomplet puisqu’il manque le discours de Manlius Vulso au livre 38 de 
Tite-Live. 
53 Cf Agr 16 2 pour la Bretagne qui revient à sa uetus patientia après la révolte. 
54 Idem 15 1: nihil profici patientia nisi ut grauiora tamquam ex facili tolerantibus imperentur ...
55 Cf Hist 5 10. 
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à une connotation négative sous Trajan. Les changements qui affectèrent Rome n’y 
furent pas pour rien, assurément: l’opposition entre les deux aspects de la patientia 
était le fruit de l’histoire d’un Etat qui s’était imposé en ne cessant pas ou presque de 
faire la guerre. Surtout la patientia, comme d’autres notions liées à l’idée de douceur, 
tend à devenir la vertu d’un homme qui est à la tête d’un peuple personnifiant cette 
qualité et suit donc le passage d’un régime républicain oligarchique à une monarchie 
plus ou moins déguisée. 
Seulement voilà, la patientia n’a pas eu le succès d’autres notions: elle est restée 
une étoile de taille secondaire dans l’univers des vertus princières. Et pourtant le fait 
qu’il s’agisse d’une qualité éminemment stoïcienne aurait pu et dû lui garantir un 
brillant avenir sous le Haut-Empire quand la Stoa devint l’école philosophique la plus 
importante pour penser le pouvoir et lui offrir des habits sur mesure. Mais elle est 
restée marquée par un parfum de servitude, de servilité qui empêchait complètement 
d’en faire une qualité de l’empereur, malgré tous les efforts de Pline le Jeune. 
Alors pourquoi Hadrien l’a-t-il choisie pour une de ses monnaies? Certains ont 
même nié que cela pût être, en considérant que ce Prince n’avait rien eu de patient, 
oubliant ce faisant que le choix des légendes est affaire de propagande, donc d’image 
et non de réalité. Que dirait-on avec le même raisonnement du choix des légendes des 
monnaies de Néron? Revenons à Hadrien: nous aurions tendance à penser que son 
choix procédait de deux logiques complémentaires. Peut-être a –t-il voulu d’abord 
puiser dans un fond commun à la manière d’un historien: son monnayage est très 
original qui revient à des qualités princières négligées par ses prédécesseurs comme 
la clementia ou qui innove avec l’hilaritas56 par exemple. 
Mais nous croyons qu’il a choisi la patientia surtout par goût de la philosophie 
grecque, en se référant cependant à la capacité de subir les coups du sort sans se 
révolter inutilement, comme la mort d’Antinous par exemple qui survient en octobre 
130. Or la monnaie portant la légende patientia date de ces années-là: elle porte la 
mention du troisième consulat d’Hadrien, ce qui place la frappe entre 128 et 132. 
Loin de nous l’idée d’y voir une allusion à cet événement en particulier: c’est un 
exemple de ces malheurs qui pouvaient toucher un Prince et l’amener à faire preuve 
de patientia … 
56 Nous nous étions intéressée à cette légende plus tôt: voir “Y’a d’la joie. Etude sur la place d’hilaritas 
dans la propagande politique romaine de la fin de la République à Hadrien”, communication 
présentée au 64e congrès de la SIHDA (Barcelone, oct 2010), (2010) 57 Revue Internationale 
des droits de l’Antiquité 193-202. L’hilaritas est à associer à la patientia: non seulement le sage 
accepte ce qui arrive, mais il offre même un visage radieux au sort, idée stoïcienne très présente 
chez Sénèque, cf par exemple Const 9 3. 
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ABSTRACT
This paper is an attempt to underline the importance of patientia in the political 
life of ancient Rome, especially during the late Republic and the first century BC. 
Although the Christian notion of patientia has been well studied, the political quality 
it could represent is still a new field. The main problem is first to decide what kind 
of quality it was: in the late Republic, it was the physical endurance a general would 
need, which explains why Catilina based his propaganda on patientia, but it could 
also be a moral virtue. Patientia was a plebeian virtue against the pride and cruelty 
of the Patricians: this contrast was reaffirmed in the Civil War, when Caesar applied 
it against the Optimates who were acting arrogantly. Under the Julio-Claudians, 
patientia was a virtue with very much the same meaning as constantia, but it never 
attained the same importance because it was sometimes connected with servility. 
Patientia, which was a positive notion in the late Republic, whether physical or 
moral, came to be employed in a negative context by Tacitus. This study does not 
pretend to be exhaustive – it would be necessary, for instance, to consider the Stoic 
influence – but is merely a first step towards a better understanding of patientia 
before the Christian era. 
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1 Introduction
Recently the journal Ars aequi, edited by students from various legal faculties in the 
Netherlands, published a series of articles dealing with institutions and concepts that 
have their origin in Roman law or legal history and are still relevant in contemporary 
law. It was entitled Rode draad “Historische wortels van het recht”. My contribution 
to this series concerned the doctrine of iustum pretium and proportionality of 
performances, in other words the idea that all merchandise has a fair price and that 
not every deviation from that price is acceptable.1 In Western legal thinking this 
1 See Jan Hallebeek “De iustum pretium-leer en het evenredigheidsbeginsel” (2013) 62 Ars Aequi 
59-64. The articles were collected into one volume; see Lukas van den Berge et al Historische 
wortels van het recht (Nijmegen, 2014).
* Professor, Department of Legal Theory and Legal History, Faculty of Law, VU University 
Amsterdam.
** I would like to thank Niels de Bruijn, Wim Decock and Boudewijn Sirks for their useful comments 
on the draft version of this paper. 
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principle has played, and still plays, a predominant role, which was, for example, 
acknowledged in Roman-Dutch law.2 In the Dutch Civil Code of 1838, however, 
the principle was rejected (art 1486), as it was in the French Code civil of 1804 (art 
1118), although the latter did acknowledge an exception. The seller of immovable 
property was protected when the selling price was lower than five-twelfths (5/12) 
of the fair price (arts 1674-1685 Code civil). The Dutch legislature decided not to 
adopt this exception. According to the government, there was no need to do so, 
since considerable prejudice would anyway include deceit.3 In the nineteen thirties, 
some jurists nevertheless defended the proposition that an approximate equivalence 
of performances should be a cornerstone of the Dutch law of contract.4 This opinion 
remained a minority view, while the new Civil Code of 1992 did not make any 
substantive changes. The principle of proportionality is not acknowledged in the 
Code and, according to the prevailing view, is no longer in force.5
The reason for returning so promptly to the subject is that my conclusions in 
respect of Roman-Dutch law seemed to be incompatible with some sources referred 
to and interpreted in an article on the role of Roman law in early modern commerce. 
This article, entitled “The moral menace of Roman law and the making of commerce: 
Some Dutch evidence”, was published in 1996 by James Whitman (b 1957) of the 
Yale Law School.6 In this contribution, I would like to make a more intensive study 
of the material canvassed in this article and of Whitman’s suggestion that there might 
have been a clash between two approaches to fair pricing, namely the traditional 
Christian one on the one hand, and that of the jurists and clergymen of the Dutch 
Republic on the other. Before turning to the early modern period, we must briefly 
outline the earlier development of the concepts of iustum pretium and proportionality 
of performances in Roman law and the continental ius commune of the Middle Ages.
2 Cf for an outline of the presence of the principle of laesio enormis in the present-day codes of civil 
law: Piet Abas Benadeling van de medecontractant (Deventer, 2003) and Thomas Finkenauer 
“Zur Renaissance der laesio enormis beim Kaufvertrag” in Lutz Aderhold et al (eds) Festschrift 
für Harm Peter Westermann zum 70. Geburtstag (Cologne, 2008) 183-207.
3 JC Voorduin Geschiedenis en beginselen der Nederlandsche wetboeken, volgens de 
beraadslagingen deswege gehouden bij de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, V. Deel Burgerlijk 
Wetboek, art. 1269-2030 (Utrecht, 1838) 141-158 at 147.
4 PW Kamphuisen “De leer van het iustum pretium herleefd” (1933) 3314-3316 Weekblad voor 
privaatrecht, notariaat en registratie 273-275, 281-283, 289-290; CMO van Nispen tot Sevenaer 
“De herleving van de leer van den rechtvaardigen prijs en haar rechtswijsgerige grondslag” (1937) 
98 Themis. Verzameling van bijdragen tot de kennis van het publiek en privaat recht 1-22. 
5 J Hijma Mr. C. Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5-I 
(Deventer, 2007) 220-221. For a discussion of the role of proportionality in contemporary Dutch 
law see, in general, Hallebeek (n 1) and Igor van Loo Vernietiging van overeenkomsten op grond 
van laesio enormis, dwaling of misbruik van omstandigheden (Rotterdam, 2013).
6 James Q Whitman “The moral menace of Roman law and the making of commerce: Some Dutch 
evidence” (1996) 105 Yale Law J 1841-1889. I thank Konstantin Tanev (Faculty of Law, Sofia) 
who at the 67th session of the Société international Fernand de Visscher pour l’Histoire des 
Droits de l’Antiquité (Sept 2013, Salzburg, Austria) called my attention to this article.
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2 The iustum pretium rule: Origin and ius commune of 
the Middle Ages
2 1 Origin
The iustum pretium rule originates in the Corpus iuris civilis. On the one hand, 
Roman law acknowledged that buyer and seller were free to agree on a certain 
price. In negotiations, it was permissible to be guided by self-interest. Parties might 
even “circumvent” each other.7 On the other hand, the fourth book of Justinian’s 
Code contains provisions limiting the possible discrepancy between the value 
of the merchandise and the selling price. The most important of these for later 
developments is C 4 44 2, a rescript of Emperor Diocletian (ca 244-316) dating from 
the year 285. The original meaning and purport of the text and the circumstances 
prompting Diocletian to issue the constitution are disputed, and depend largely 
on the assumption of interpolations.8 In all probability, the compilers of the Code 
partially interpolated the original text and subsequently adopted it in a title dealing 
with rescission of sale contracts. According to some scholars, the reason for adopting 
the text in its Justinianic form would have been that, as a result of the tax policy 
of Justinian (ca 482-565), many small farmers were compelled to sell their land 
and had to be protected economically against the wealthy urban merchants who 
desired to purchase their land as cheaply as possible. However, this view has been 
questioned.9 The constitution of Diocletian, in its Justinianic wording, ruled that if 
the selling price of a plot of land was less than half the “fair price” (iustum pretium), 
the magistrate might rescind the sale on the ground of extreme prejudice (laesio 
enormis). In such a case, the buyer was entitled to uphold the contract by making an 
additional payment, namely the shortfall between the selling price and the fair price.
Impp. Diocletianus et Maximianus AA. Aurelio Lupo. Rem maioris pretii si tu vel pater 
tuus minoris pretii distraxit, humanum est, ut vel pretium te restituente emptoribus fundum 
venditum recipias auctoritate intercedente iudicis, vel, si emptor elegerit, quod deest iusto 
7 D 4 4 16 4 speaks about circumvenire; D 19 2 22 3 about circumscribere.
8 See, eg, HT Klami “Laesio enormis in Roman law?” (1987) 33 Labeo 48-63; AJB Sirks 
“Diocletian’s option for the buyer in case of rescission of a sale. A reply to Klami” 
(1992) 60 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 39-47.
9 For a survey, see AJB Sirks “La laesio enormis en droit romain et byzantine” (1985) 53 Tijdschrift 
voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 291-307, who merely considers C 4 44 2 as allowing the buyer to make 
a supplementary payment in case of restitutio in integrum; AJB Sirks “Laesio enormis und die 
Auflösung fiskalischer Verkäufe” (1995) 112 Savigny Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte Rom Abt 
411-422; Martin Pennitz “Zur Anfechtung wegen laesio enormis im römischen Recht” in Martin 
Schermaier et al (eds) Iurisprudentia Universalis, Festschrift für Theo Mayer-Maly (Cologne etc, 
2002) 575-589; AJB Sirks “Laesio enormis again” (2007) 54 Revue Internationale des Droits de 
l’Antiquité 3e s 461-469.
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pretio recipies. minus autem pretium esse videtur, si nec dimidia pars veri pretii soluta sit. 
PP v.k. Nov. Diocletiano A. II et Aristobulo conss.10
2 2 Iustum pretium and the doctrine of restitution
The medieval scholars of Roman law, the civilians, believed the Corpus iuris civilis 
should be what Justinian had intended it to be in his introductory constitutions. 
His legislation should be coherent and consistent and contain no contradiction 
whatsoever.11 For this reason, the civilians interpreted the constitution of C 4 44 2 
apart from both the context in which Diocletian issued it and the socio-economic 
circumstances which may have prompted the compilers to adopt it in the Code. In 
their approach, it was a provision in a code of law like all other provisions in the 
Digest and Codex. This approach is reflected in the Accursian Gloss, for example. 
In D 45 1 36 it was stated that the exception of fraud (exceptio doli) might even be 
brought if there was no fraud (dolus) on the part of the stipulator, but the matter 
itself was intrinsically fraudulent (sed ipsa res in se dolum habet) and a claim was 
subsequently brought on the basis of this stipulation. The Accursian Gloss explained 
this kind of “fraud”, which is present in the matter itself (dolus re ipsa) as follows: 
gloss dolum habet ad D. 45 1 36: Qui proprie non potest dici dolus, sed ipsa res iniqua est, 
ut si sine causa promiserit totum, uel pro parte stipulatus sum rem quam minus emi dimidia 
iusti pretii, superueniente ut supra de excepione doli Apud Celsum § Labeo (D. 44 4 4 7) et 
l. ii § Item quaeritur (D. 44 4 2 4).12
Now, this gloss to D 45 1 36 clearly refers to the rule incorporated in C 44 4 2. 
From the perspective of the Gloss, considering D 45 1 36 and C 44 4 2 simply as 
provisions of one and the same code of law, promulgated approximately at the same 
time by Justinian, this makes sense. However, from the more historical perspective 
of the humanist jurists, the constitution issued by Diocletian in the year 285 could 
certainly not have featured in an opinion of the jurist Ulpian († 223) who must have 
died about sixty years before that. A fine example of such criticism may be found 
10 Translation: The illustrious emperors Diocletian and Maximian to Aurelius Lupus. If you or 
your father alienated something of a lower value at a higher price, it is human that you will 
either through intercession of the authority of the court and after restoring the price to the buyers, 
recover the tenement sold, or, if the buyer would prefer this, will receive what is lacking in the 
true value. The price, however, is considered to be too low, if not even half the true value has been 
paid. Promulgated on 28 October, during the second consulate of the emperor Diocletian and the 
consulate of Aristobulus.
11 Constitution Deo auctore § 8. 
12 Translation: Which you actually cannot call fraud, but the matter itself is iniquitous, as when 
someone without a cause promised the whole or I stipulated for a part the thing which I bought 
for  less than half of the fair price or give the example of the later occurring fraud, as in D 44 4 4 7 
and D 44 4 2 4.
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in a monograph on laesio enormis by the Portuguese humanist jurist Arias Piñel 
(1515-1563). He maintained that the Accursian Gloss and the commentators had 
been talking gibberish.
Arias Piñel, Commentarii ad rub. et l. II Cod. de rescindenda venditione, Prima pars legis 
secundae, caput 1, n. 8.
Putarunt hucusque glossa et omnes Vlpianum in dicto paragrapho respexisse ius huius legis et 
inde apud omnes inualuit frequentissima allegatio dictae legis qua laesionem ultra dimidiam 
appellant dolum re ipsa, ad differentiam doli ex machinatione. Ego uerius puto doctores 
cum glossa ad uerbos iurisconsulti hallucinatos fuisse, nihilque minus iurisconsultum in lege 
ea (D. 45 1 36) sensisse quam de remedio huius legis quod euincitur ex eodem Vlpiano et 
aliis iurisconsultis in locis supra citatis, dum aperte et indistincte tradunt, laesis in precio 
nullatenus succurrri, nec dolum ex sola laesione censeri.13
Below, we shall return to the distinction that the medieval scholars drew between 
two categories of fraud; and especially to the concept of dolus re ipsa, which is also 
discussed in the gloss quoted. By now, it will be clear that the civilians, glossators 
and commentators, interpreted the constitution of C 4 44 2 as if independent of any 
historical context, but in reality could not dissociate themselves from the socio-legal 
environment of their own time, which was largely determined by canon law and 
the competence dispute between secular and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. From the 
beginning of the thirteenth century, canon law was influenced by the theological 
teachings on restitution, although this doctrine was primarily intended for the forum 
internum, that is the realm of conscience.
The Church taught that every infringement of the natural order should be 
rectified by restitution. Infringement was a broad notion. In human intercourse, 
not only did it cover all extra-contractual damage or enrichment at the expense of 
another, but also upsetting the balance in contractual relationships, for example by 
13  Translation: Thus far the Gloss and all the doctors were of the opinion that Ulpian in this paragraph 
(the last lines of D. 45 1 36) is referring to the right set out in this provision (C. 4 44 2) and hence 
among all of them the frequent allegation of this provision gathers weight. On the ground of which 
provision, they call the prejudice amounting to more than half (of the fair price) fraud in the matter 
itself (dolus re ipsa) as distinct from fraud resulting from slyness (dolus ex machinatione). I think, 
more correctly, that the doctors together with the Gloss talk gibberish as regards the words of the 
jurist and that the jurist in this provision (D. 45 1 36) pronounces upon nothing else but the remedy 
of this provision, which is elucidated from the same Ulpian and other jurists in the texts quoted 
above, while they maintain clearly and without any distinction, that there is no rescue whatsoever 
for those prejudiced in the price and they do not consider something to be fraud solely because 
of prejudice. See Arius Pinellus Ad rubricam et legem II Codicis de rescindenda venditione ... 
commentarii (Frankfurt, 1614) 141-142. See, on these teachings of Arias Piñel, also Justo García 
Sánchez Arias Piñel, Catedrático de Leyes en Coimbra y Salamanca durante el siglo XVI, La 
rescisión de la compraventa por laesio enormis (Salamanca, 2004) and Wim Decock Theologians 
and Contract Law. The Moral Transformation of the Ius Commune (ca. 1500-1650) (Leiden/
Boston, 2013) 572-581.
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breach of contract or enforcing unjust agreements. Initially, the duty of restitution 
was based on an extensive interpretation of the Biblical commandment not to steal, 
but from the thirteenth century onwards, it was increasingly connected with the 
concept of commutative justice, derived from Aristotle’s Ethics, which by that time 
had become known in the West in its Latin translation. Commutative justice required 
that in reciprocal agreements the performances should balance each other. If the 
balance was disturbed, it had to be restored.
There were clear differences between the legal rule of C 4 44 2 and the theological 
doctrine of restitution which was in force in the forum of the conscience. The iustum 
pretium rule related only to prejudice (laesio) suffered by a seller, which had to be 
considerable (enormis). The doctrine of restitution related to disproportion in all 
mutual performances and deemed any prejudice, even if it did not comply with the 
standard established by Roman law, to be illicit. The theologians referred to both the 
coherence and the difference between the two principles. According to human law 
(lex humana) and the law applied by the court (ius fori), it is permissible to prejudice 
the other party to the extent of half the fair price, although not deliberately or by 
using tricks, the so-called dolus ex proposito (see below). According to divine law 
(lex divina) and the law applied in the celestial court (ius poli), any deviation from 
the fair price is a sin and should be rectified by restitution. In this regard, we may 
refer to the Summa de animae consiliis of Peter the Chanter (ca 1150-1197)14 and 
the Summa aurea of William of Auxerre (ca 1145-1231).15 The difference between 
the legal standard of Roman law and the moral standard of divine law was clearly 
depicted by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), but from the perspective of medieval 
scholarship, the difference is one of degree. It is not fundamental. In the case of 
malicious intent, the forum externum will demand restitution no matter what the 
extent of the prejudice. If there is only a slight deviation from the fair price, the 
forum internum will not demand restitution:
Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae Secunda secundae q. 77 art. 1 ad 1
(…) Sic igitur habet quasi licitum, poenam non inducens, si absque fraude venditor rem suam 
supervendat aut emptor vilius emat, nisi sit nimius excessus, quia tunc etiam lex humana 
cogit ad restituendum, puta si aliquis sit deceptus ultra dimidiam iusti pretii quantitatem. Sed 
lex divina nihil impunitum relinquit quod sit virtuti contrarium. Unde secundum divinam 
legem illicitum reputatur si in emptione et venditione non sit aequalitas iustitiae observata. 
Et tenetur ille qui plus habet recompensare ei qui damnificatus est, si sit notabile damnum. 
Quod ideo dico quia iustum pretium rerum quandoque non est punctaliter determinatum, 
sed magis in quadam aestimatione consistit, ita quod modica additio vel minutio non videtur 
tollere aequalitatem iustitiae.16
14 See Karl Weinzierl Die Restitutionslehre der Frühscholastik (Munich, 1936) at 144.
15 See Herbert Kalb Laesio enormis im gelehrten Recht. Kanonistische Studien zur Läsionsanfechtung 
[Kirche und Recht 19] (Vienna, 1992) 123. Cf Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae II II q 77 arts 
1 and 4.
16 Thomas Aquinas Opera omnia (editio leonina) IX (Rome, 1897) 148. Translation: (…) Thus in 
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2 3 Ecclesiastical practice
Was the doctrine of restitution also applied in the legal practice of the ecclesiastical 
forum externum?17 As stated above, the duty to make restitution was primarily a matter 
of conscience. Augustine (AD 354-430) had taught that sin would not be forgiven 
unless what had been taken away was restored (restitutio). Otherwise, repentance 
would be feigned. This rule was adopted in Gratian’s Decree of 1140/45 (C 14 q 6 c 
1), but it was not originally applied in ecclesiastical litigation. From two decretals, it 
appears that the papal chancery preferred to apply Roman law. The first decretal was 
Cum dilecti of Alexander III († 1181), dating from 1170; the second was Cum causa 
of Innocent III (c 1160-1216), dating from 1208, and both were eventually adopted 
in the Liber Extra (X 3 17 3 and X 3 17 6). The cases and decisions show similarities. 
In the first case, the canons of Beauvais had sold part of a stretch of woodland to 
a monastery for less than half the fair price. In the second case, the steward of the 
monastery of San Martino del Monte had sold certain feudal estates to citizens of 
Viterbo for less than half the fair price. The wording “for less than half the fair price” 
was reminiscent of C 4 44 2, and the constitution’s influence was clearly perceptible 
in the two papal decisions. The buyers were permitted to uphold the contract by 
making an additional payment up to the amount of the iustum pretium. It was not 
uncommon for the papal chancery to apply Roman law, as it did here; the reason 
being the lack of proper canon law standards. Apparently, the doctrine of restitution 
was not yet considered fit to be applied directly in the forum externum.
However, from the thirteenth century onwards it began to infiltrate ecclesiastical 
litigation. A decretal of Innocent III, dating from 1204 (decretal Novit ille, in the Liber 
Extra X 2 1 13), authorised ecclesiastical courts to deal with anyone committing a 
sinful act. For this purpose, a specific proceeding was instituted, the denuntiatio 
evangelica. The doctrine of restitution, which related primarily to the realm of 
conscience, could consequently infiltrate the forum externum. The ecclesiastical 
this way it is considered permissible and no punishment is imposed if a seller without any fraud 
sells his goods for more or the buyer buys it for less, unless the difference is disproportionate, 
because then human law also requires restoration, for example when someone is “deceived” into 
paying more than half the fair price. However, Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is 
contrary to virtue. Hence, according to Divine law it is considered unlawful when in buying and 
selling the consistency of justice is not observed. And the one who has too much should restore 
to the prejudiced party in a case where the loss is significant. The reason I say this, is that the 
fair price of things can sometimes not be exactly determined, but rather consists, in a certain 
assessment, of such a nature that a moderate gain or loss does not seem to cause an imbalance in 
justice.
17 James W Baldwin The Medieval Theories of the Just Price. Romanists, Canonists, and Theologians 
in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries [Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 
New series vol 49, part 4] (Philadelphia, 1959); KS Cahn “Roman and Frankish origins of the just 
price of medieval Roman and Canon law” (1969) 6 Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 
3-52.
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courts were thus able to assist the prejudiced party in more instances of unbalanced 
performance than secular courts using the iustum pretium rule of C 4 44 2.
2 4 The ius commune: From the iustum pretium rule to the 
principle of proportionality
The civilians were in a quandary: Should they admit that Roman law had no means 
of coming to the aid of the prejudiced party except when immovable property was 
sold for less than half the fair price, while the ecclesiastical courts with their doctrine 
of restitution were able to do so? Alternatively, should they misinterpret the Roman 
texts and so demonstrate that the Corpus iuris civilis could also offer the desired 
remedy? They often chose the latter option without, however, disclosing their 
underlying motives. In the secondary literature, this approach is aptly described as 
“saving the face of Roman law”.18 From the outset, Roman-law scholarship was no 
academic Spielerei. Long before the large-scale reception of Roman law, the Corpus 
iuris civilis was already being interpreted with a view to adopting the texts as living 
law.
The extensive interpretation of the Roman iustum pretium rule in medieval legal 
scholarship was in truth a transformation of this rule into a principle of proportionality 
of mutual performances. It may be seen as an attempt to bring Roman law into line 
with what were then the standards of canon law. It should be noted, however, that this 
did not result in identical standards. The differences so meticulously described by 
the early scholastic theologians mentioned above were only partially eliminated. The 
Roman iustum pretium rule still tolerated moderate prejudice, at least as long as there 
was no malicious intent on the part of the party concerned, whereas the obligation 
of restitution would always demand full recovery. The interpretation of the Roman 
rule was extended in various ways. Firstly, the text of C 4 44 2 was interpreted so 
as to provide a remedy not only to the underpaid seller, but also to the buyer who 
had paid too much. The remedy was by now named after the opening words of the 
constitution, namely condictio ex lege rem maioris. Obviously, the question arose by 
how much the price paid should exceed the fair price. The Corpus iuris civilis did not 
answer this question, and the glossators were divided in their views. Eventually they 
agreed that the buyer should have paid at least fifty per cent more than the fair price. 
Secondly, C 4 44 2 was applied to the sale of not only immovable property, but also 
movables. In the third place, the rule of C 4 44 2 was applied to contracts other than 
sale, initially those resembling sale, such as lease and barter, and in the thirteenth 
century to all contracts of good faith and subsequently even to those of strict law.19
18 Gero Dolezalek “The moral theologians’ doctrine of restitution and its juridification in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries” (1992) Acta Iuridica (Essays in Honour of Wouter de Vos) 
104-114 at 105.
19 See, also, Reinhard Zimmermann The Law of Obligations. Roman Foundations of the Civilian 
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2 5 Dogmatic distinction and terminology
From the gloss dolum habet ad D 45 1 36 and the fragment of Arias Piñel, both 
quoted above, it appears that medieval scholarship distinguished between two kinds 
of fraud (dolus). On the one hand, there was fraudulent behaviour on the part of 
the other party, thus an act of deceit with malicious intent. This was subjective, 
intentional fraud, namely fraud in the proper sense of the word. It was termed dolus 
ex proposito or dolus ex machinatione. On the other hand, there was the “fraud” 
inherent in the merchandise itself, which disadvantaged the one party, but was 
not necessarily caused by an act of deceit on the part of the other party. This was 
objective, factual “fraud”, in the Gloss termed dolus re ipsa. D 45 1 36 provided the 
proof of the existence of such a category of dolus, and the gloss dolum habet to this 
text explained the improper use of the term: “in a proper sense this cannot be called 
fraud (qui proprie non potest dici dolus).” The remedy of C 4 44 2 was believed to 
provide protection against such a type of “fraud” (dolus re ipsa). The “fraud” in case 
of laesio enormis, which merely comprised a considerable deviation from the just 
price, was nevertheless termed dolus. In English it is difficult to describe this type 
of dolus in terms of deceit or fraud, but in other languages it can be easier. In Dutch 
we speak about “een deceptie”, in Afrikaans one speaks of “bedroë uitgekom”. 
Neither expression presupposes active fraud by a wrongdoer. Accordingly, the use 
of terms such as “fraud” (dolus), “to deceive” (decipere) and “deceived” (deceptus) 
in the writings of the ius commune can be misleading. The context should always 
show whether they refer to subjective, intentional dolus (ex proposito) or objective, 
factual dolus (re ipsa).
This having been said, it should be noted that the “circumventing”, which was 
allowed according to D 19 2 22 3, was not interpreted in the Gloss as an act of 
intentional fraud (dolus ex proposito) but as “fraud” in the matter itself (dolus re 
ipsa). According to the Gloss, the “circumventing” that Roman law allowed in trade 
was not a type of active deception.
gloss quemadmodum circumscribere ad D. 19 2 22 3 (…) Item hoc intellige dolo non 
interueniente ab aliqua parte et sic improprie dicitur circumuentio uel deceptio (…).20
Similarly, the Gloss interpreted very narrowly the statement in D 4 4 16 4 that 
“circumventing” is permitted according to nature (naturaliter). Firstly it stated that 
“according to nature” means “according to the law of nations”, since despite the 
“circumventing” the contract is not void. Subsequently a distinction was drawn 
between dolus ex proposito and dolus re ipsa. The two kinds of “fraud” had different 
consequences. In dolus re ipsa, that is, “fraud” without malicious intent on the part 
Tradition (Cape Town, 1990) 259-270.
20 Translation: Likewise, understand this as without any fraud coming from one of the parties, and 
thus  improperly called circumvention or deceit.
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of the one party, the “circumventing” was not absolutely prohibited but severely 
restricted. Minors were fully protected, while those who had reached majority 
were protected to a certain extent, namely whenever the “fraud” exceeded half the 
fair price. In the case of dolus ex proposito, where fraud comprised malicious acts 
by one party, the wrongdoer could be sued on the contract, when the fraud was 
incidens, namely when the error concerned certain incidental features of the contract 
(accidentalia), thereby leaving the contract intact (dolus incidens). The case of error 
concerning the essentials (essentialia) of the contract (dolus dans causam contractui) 
was not addressed in this gloss, but it would render contracts of good faith null and 
void and invalidate contracts of strict law by means of a defence.
the gloss naturaliter licere ad D. 4 4 16 4 id est de iure gentium (...); tenet enim contractus 
nihilominus; sed deceptus, si quidem re ipsa, minor restituitur pro leui damno etiam, non 
pro minimo (...) maior non, nisi ultra dimidiam iusti pretii sit deceptus (...). Si autem ex 
proposito, incidenter tamen agitur ex ea contractu (...).21 
3 Roman-Dutch law 
In early modern times there was a fairly general reception of the iustum pretium 
concept, commonly with a broad application of C 4 44 2, as defended by the 
medieval civilians. This also holds good for Roman-Dutch law. In his Inleidinge tot 
de Hollandsche rechtsgeleerdheid (published 1631), Hugo de Groot (1583-1645) 
acknowledged the existence of the iustum pretium rule in the Province of Holland. 
In an “historical” exposition, he explained that the rule was introduced by positive 
law (the borgherlicke wetten). He argued that the phenomenon of barter had emerged 
because some people had too much, and others too little, of certain things. As the 
population grew, some made it their task to collect and redistribute all kinds of goods, 
thus placing themselves at the service of others. It was therefore reasonable for them 
to gain a certain profit as a reward for their work. Subsequently, positive law allowed 
parties to a contract freely to stipulate a certain quid pro quo. After all, it was not 
easy to place an exact value on the efforts of the merchants, while the value of the 
merchandise often fluctuated. However, when the merchants’ greed started to exceed 
all moderation and reasonableness, this freedom had to be restricted by protection of 
the seller through the iustum pretium rule. Practice further extended this protection 
to the buyer and to other contracts, with the exception of judicial and testamentary 
sale and sale with the intention of donating.22
21 Translation: allowed according to nature this means according to the law of nations (...), because 
the contract nevertheless holds; but “deceived”, at least in the matter itself, a minor will be 
compensated, also for a small loss, not for a marginal loss (...), but not the one of age, unless he is 
“deceived” for more than half the fair price (...). However, deceived by intention not affecting the 
essential terms, one can nevertheless sue on the contract (...).
22 Hugo de Groot Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid 3 52 1-5.
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That the iustum pretium rule of C 4 44 2 was received in the various provinces 
of the Dutch Republic, is also made clear in the lecture notes of Jacobus Voorda 
(1698-1768) on the law of his time. For Gelderland, he referred to provisions of the 
Statutes, mentioned by Johan Schrassert (1687-1756) in his Practicae observationes. 
For Holland he referred, apart from the Inleidinge, to De legibus abrogatis (1649) 
of Simon Groenewegen van der Made (1613-1652)23 and the Censura forensis of 
Simon van Leeuwen (1626-1682), and for Utrecht to the Practyk judicieel of Gerard 
van Wassenaer (1589-1664). The Decisiones Frisicae of Johan van den Sande 
(1568-1638) made it clear that the rule was accepted in Friesland. For the validity 
of the rule in Overijssel and Groningen he referred to various Statutes. This does 
not mean, however, that there were no differences at all between the provinces. The 
limitation period of the remedy was not the same everywhere, and there were also 
differences in exceptions to the rule, namely the types of contracts where appeal to 
laesio enormis was sometimes not allowed, such as sale at auctions and sale by order 
of the court.24 Scrutiny of the considerations underlying judgments of the Hoge Raad 
van Holland, Zeeland en West-Friesland, pronounced between 1704 and 1787,25 
also shows that the concept of iustum pretium survived into the legal practice of the 
eighteenth century. Moreover, we also find it even in the very last handbook on civil 
law edited before the era of codified law, namely the Regtsgeleerd, practicaal en 
koopmans handboek (1806) of the Amsterdam practitioner Johannes van der Linden 
(1756-1835) which later served as Code of Commerce in the Transvaal Republic 
(Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek) for some time.26
Although all this may indicate a strong continuation of the medieval principle 
of proportionality, Whitman is of the opinion that vernacular books on Roman-
Dutch law show a different approach. According to him, they declared active fraud, 
denounced by the Christian tradition, to be permissible, thus appealing to Roman law. 
They relied on Roman law to justify moral behaviour that was otherwise condemned 
as “unbrotherly”. Moreover, this tendency would be part of a revolutionary change 
in a critical area of Dutch commercial law, which consisted in the abandonment 
of the long-standing fair-price principles.27 In order to demonstrate this, Whitman 
referred to a treatise on legal practice, entitled Nederlandtsche Practycke, which was 
written by Bernhard van Zutphen († 1685), an attorney at the Provincial Court of 
Utrecht. One fragment from this work shows Van Zutphen informing his readers that 
23 Simon a Groenewegen van der Made De legibus abrogatis et inusitatis in Hollandia vicinisque 
regionibus Pars 3 (Nijmegen, 1663) 151-152 (ad C 4 44 2).
24 Jacobus Voorda Dictata ad ius hodiernum (ed Margaret Hewett vol 1 654) ad D 18 5 § 1.
25 Christian Brom Urteilbegründungen im „Hoge Raad van Holland, Zeeland en West-Friesland“ 
am Beispiel des Kaufrechts im Zeitraum 1704-1787 [Rechtshistorische Reihe, 377] (Peter Lang, 
Frankfurt am Main etc, 2007) 234-246.
26 Joannes van der Linden Regtsgeleerd, practicaal en koopmans handboek (Amsterdam, 1806) at 
160.
27 Whitman (n 6) at 1844, 1853-1854.
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they were permitted to trick others in any measure. Moreover, this fragment, just like 
other vernacular literature on legal practice, breathed an “air of chill immorality”.28
Bernhard van Zutphen Nederlandtsche practycque van verscheyden daghelijcksche soo 
civile als criminele questien (Utrecht, 1636) 42:
V. Parthyen contrahenten moghen malcander wel bedriegen in het handelen als maer het 
bedroch niet en zy boven de helfte van de rechte weerde: Dan so yemandt bedrogen is in 
de quantiteyt van het goedt alsdan mach hy ageren tot supplement alhoewel het bedroch is 
beneden de helfte van de rechte prijse (...).29
VI. Den vercooper wordt geseydt in bedroch te wesen indien hy verswijght eenige qualiteyt 
van het goet dewelcke soo hy gheexpresseert hadde den cooper niet en soude gecontraheert 
ghehadt hebben; ende wort daeromme sodanigen coper ghesuccurreert (...).30
The quoted fragment starts with the statement that “circumventing” in trade is allowed. 
This is more or less what is stated in D 4 4 16 4 and D 19 2 22 3. Subsequently three 
exceptions are mentioned. The first consists in observing the rule on laesio enormis 
(C 4 44 2). The prejudiced party has a remedy where the detriment exceeds half the 
fair price. Secondly, there is the prejudice resulting from error regarding the quantity 
of the merchandise. Here the prejudiced party can claim additional performance 
irrespective of the scope of the detriment. This seems to be the principal rule in 
the Digest.31 The third exception has to do with error concerning the quality of the 
merchandise. The words “dewelcke soo hy gheexpresseert hadde de cooper niet en 
soude gecontraheert ghehadt hebben” indicate two things: A malicious concealment 
of defects and a mistake concerning the essentials of the transaction. In terms of the 
ius commune the malicious concealment implies a dolus ex proposito. Because the 
buyer’s mistake concerns essential contractual terms the deceit is dolus dans causam 
contractui.32 
But did Bernard van Zutphen concede that parties to a contract might generally 
use tricks? Firstly, we have to realise that his discussion of “circumventing” and 
“fraud” was not exhaustive. He did not discuss the situation where there was only 
dolus incidens on the part of the buyer of defective merchandise. He did not refer 
28 Idem at 1870-1871.
29 Translation: V. Parties to the contract may hoodwink each other in their negotiations, as long as 
the deceit does not exceed half the fair value. If such a person is deceived in the quantity of the 
thing, he may claim supplement up to the just value, although the “deceit” does not exceed half of 
the just price.
30 Translation: VI. The seller is said to be deceiving if he conceals a quality of the thing, which 
would have prevented the buyer from entering into the contract, had he mentioned it. For this 
reason such a buyer is rescued. (...). 
31 Cf D 18 1 40 2; D 19 1 2pr; D 19 1 4 1; and D 21 2 69 6. 
32 For the origin of the concepts dolus dans causam contractui and dolus incidens in Roman law see 
Andreas Wacke “Circumscribere und dolus” (1977) 94 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung Rom Abt 
184-246 at 236-245. For the meaning in the civilian tradition, see Zimmermann (n 19) at 670-677. 
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to the limitation period of the remedy for laesio enormis or the exceptional cases 
where the rule for laesio enormis did not hold. It is clear, however, that he recognised 
three major exceptions to the permissibility of “malcander bedriegen”. Secondly, 
his account of exceptions may not be exhaustive, since nothing is said, for example, 
about the protection of minors. Beyond any doubt, we may say that “malcander 
bedriegen” was not generally acknowledged here as permissible behaviour. 
Moreover, it certainly did not set aside the remedy for laesio enormis.
More indications about what the permissible “circumventing” or “malcander 
bedriegen” may imply may be found in the Censura forensis (1678) of Simon van 
Leeuwen, one of the few “Old Authorities” who discussed the question specifically.
Simon van Leeuwen Censura forensis (Leiden, 1662) 689 (Pars 1 liber 4 caput 44 n 1) 
Quamvis communiter et naturaliter liceat contrahentibus in justo rei pretio se invicem 
circumuenire, l.16 § 4 ff. De minorib. (D 4 4 16 4) l.37. ff. De dolo. (D 4 3 37) &, quod pluris 
est, minoris emere, aut quod minoris est, pluris vendere, l.22. §. ult. ff. locat. (D 19 2 22 3) 
l.8. Cod. De Rescind. vend. (C 4 44 8). Si nempe sine aperto dolo & fraude contingat: qui 
toto jure reprobatur, l. 1. (D 4 3 1) & tot. tit. ff. De dolo malo (D 4 3). Si tamen immodica 
sit laesio, ut, si ultra dimidiam justi pretii in dando aut accipiendo alteruter fuerit deceptus, 
potest is adversus alterum agere, ut vel recepto pretio rem restituat, vel id quod justo pretio 
deest, suppleat aut restituat.33 
What is said in this fragment reveals the meaning of “permissible circumventing”, 
namely recommendations not intended to deceive the buyer (D 4 3 37), and selling 
for more than the actual value of the merchandise (D 19 2 22 3 and C 4 44 8); but 
certainly no slyness (calliditas), lies (fallacia) or tricks (machinatio) (D 4 3 1) – 
fraudulent acts that Van Leeuwen lumped together as “clear fraud and deceit” (dolus 
apertus et fraus). Accordingly, “se invicem circumvenire” was only permissible when 
parties abstained from these fraudulent acts.34 Such a kind of “fraud” comes close to 
the dolus re ipsa of the Accursian Gloss. Moreover, permissible “fraud” is anyhow 
restricted by the general prohibition of fraudulent behaviour as recorded in title 
D 4 3.
33 Translation: Although it is for parties to a contract generally and according to nature allowed to 
circumvent each other as regards the fair price, see D 4 4 16 4 and D 4 3 37, and to buy for less 
what is worth more or sell for more what is worth less, see D 19 2 22 3 and C 4 44 8. As long, 
of course, as this happens without clear fraud and deceit, which is disapproved by all law, see 
D 4 3 1 and the entire title D 4 3. However, where there is an immoderate prejudice, as when one 
of the parties is “deceived” for more than half the fair price in giving or receiving, he may sue the 
other, so that either the thing is restored when the price is paid back or the shortfall in the fair price 
is supplemented or made good.
34 See, also, the next line where van Leeuwen used the term “deceived” (deceptus), where the 
“deceit” simply comprised the selling price deviating immoderately from the just price (dolus re 
ipsa).
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Van Zutphen’s treatment of “permissible circumventing” in contracts is less 
distinct and clear in this respect, but we should not exclude the possibility that in van 
Zutphen’s view, permissible “fraud” was restricted by the general prohibition against 
fraudulent behaviour as much as in van Leeuwen’s treatise. Extolling the virtues of 
the merchandise and commercial persuasiveness are allowed; ruse and guile are not. 
It is certainly not possible to read into van Zutphen’s fragment a general licence to 
use tricks in trading; nor did he devalue or discount the iustum pretium rule. The fact 
that references to the virtue of justice and deliberations of a moral nature are lacking 
should not surprise us, for we are dealing here with a legal manual. However, this 
does not mean that this text exudes an “atmosphere of immorality”.
4 Fair-price principles and Calvinistic ethics
In support of his conclusion that the Dutch abandoned the long-standing fair-
price principles, Whitman also turned to handbooks on ethics, written in Dutch 
by Calvinistic clergymen and intended for mercantile practice. These books dealt 
with practical legal questions and provided ethical guidelines from a Calvinistic 
perspective. Before I consider material from these handbooks that Whitman 
considered, some preliminary remarks are appropriate. We are dealing here with a 
category of writings which, as a genre, differed fundamentally from the works of the 
Old Authorities, since these writings did not describe legal norms, but what ought to 
be done according to moral standards. In that respect they somewhat resembled the 
confessors’ manuals and the handbooks of early modern scholasticism, used in the 
Catholic regions of Europe, which describe the rules of the forum of conscience. At 
the same time, there were important differences. In commercial behaviour, Catholics 
could rely on the expertise of moral theologians and could put their trust in the pastoral 
care of the Church, which was supposed to hold the power of the keys. Calvinists, on 
the other hand, had to use their moral handbooks primarily as guidelines. What their 
conscience dictated was a matter to be determined by their personal relationship with 
God. This also explains why the Calvinist manuals concentrated on general principles 
and deliberations on the proper attitude in commercial intercourse. They spoke only 
briefly of acts that were to be avoided, whereas the Catholic handbooks provided 
detailed casuistry, prescribing what had to be done in every possible situation and 
leaving hardly any room for personal reflection. Moreover, in seeking answers to 
moral questions, the Calvinists primarily looked for biblical starting points and no 
longer relied extensively on concepts of natural law or the ius commune, as their 
Catholic predecessors had. What was also absent from the Calvinist manuals was 
a distinct legal approach towards moral questions, something the Jesuit moral 
theologians in particular developed from the end of the sixteenth century onwards.
The longstanding fair-price principles might seem to have been rejected in three 
Dutch commercial handbooks. The first is the “Vrye jaer-merckt voor den volcke 
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Zion”, published in Amsterdam (1628) by the Frisian reformed minister Adam 
Westerman († 1634). The second is “‘t Geestelijck roer van‘t coopmans-schip”, 
published in Dordrecht (1638) by Godefridus Cornelisz Udemans (1581/82-1649), 
who was a reformed minister at Zierikzee. The third is the “Oeconomia christiana, ofte 
christelicke huyshoudinge, bestiert near den reghel van het suyvere Woordt Godts” 
by the Amsterdam minister Petrus Wittewrongel (1609-1662). It was published in 
1655 and reprinted in 1661. We should firstly study the passages from these writings 
to which Whitman referred, in order to establish whether these clergymen did indeed 
reject the fair-price principles, and so deviate considerably from the Catholic moral 
theologians of their time. These are the relevant fragments. 
Adam Westerman Vrye jaer-merckt voor den volcke Zion (Amsterdam, 1628) 70-71 Als 
nu dese in de Marckten ghecomen zijn vergeten wort by haer de spreucke Pauli dit is de 
wille Godts, namelijck uwe heylichmaeckinge, dat niemant synen Broeder verdrucke, 
noch en bedrieghe. Ghelijck alser ghene handelinghen onder den Menschen ghepleecht en 
werden sonder dat de zonde sich mede daer onder vertoont soo ist dat dat ooc mede in den 
Coophandel de zonde geoefent wert (...) ofte in den prijs malcanderen te becoopen (...).35
Godefridus Udemans ’t Geestelyck roer van ’t coopmans schip (Dordrecht, 1640) 20 (…) 
Dese ongherechtigheydt (…) wordt oock ghepleecht (…) met Monopolie, dat is wanneer de 
Coopluyden tsamen couten om de waren te houden op eenen onbillicken prijs tot last van de 
goede Gemeynte (…).36
Petrus Wittewrongel Het tweede boeck van de oeconomia christiana (Amsterdam, 1661), 
605 Daer by wy oock op den gemeenen merckt-gangh moeten letten; also nochtans dat een 
wijs ende verstandigh oordeel naer gelegentheyt van tijdt ende plaetse de schaersheyt ofte 
overvloet der selven dese koopmanschappen sal konnen schatten; near het welcke oock het af 
of op-slaen van den selven prijs rechtveerdelicken magh gematight worden. Dit zijnde near 
het gemeene spreeck-woort, voor een rechtveerdigen prijs te houden als men sijne waren soo 
veel als die near het gemeene oordeel waerdigh zijn verkoopt ende datse soo veel waerdigh 
zijn als sy in ‘t gemeen verkocht worden. De genegentheyt van dese of gene gierigaert en 
magh hier niet onbepaelt gevolght worden.37
35 Translation: If they reach the market, they forget the statement of the apostle Paul “this is the will 
of God, namely your salvation, that nobody will oppress or deceive his brother”. Just as no acts 
between human beings take place without including sins, also in commerce sin is committed (...) 
or by deceiving each other as regards the price (...).
36 Translation: Such an injustice (...) is also committed (...) through monopoly, i.e. when merchants 
agree to preserve for their merchandise an unjust price level to the detriment of the common good 
(…). 
37 Translation: Because we should also consider the common trade intercourse, yet also, that a 
sensible and prudent judgement will be capable of assessing the shortage or redundancy of the 
merchandise itself according to the time and place, which may also justly restrict the increase or 
decrease of the price. According to the common saying, this means that we consider it to be a 
fair price, when a person sells his goods for the amount which according to the common opinion 
corresponds with the value and that these goods have the value they are commonly sold for. The 
tendency of some miser or other should not be followed indiscriminately.
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These three texts contributed to the discussion of rules that a decent Christian 
merchant is morally bound to obey. In that context a series of objectionable acts were 
mentioned, such as tampering with measures and weights and culpably concealing 
defects, but also selling merchandise at too high a price. 
Adam Westerman, physician and minister, was an early representative of the 
Further Reformation (Nadere Reformatie), a movement that emphasised the enduring 
influence of the Gospel in all aspects of life. He wrote pietistic manuals, aimed at 
the spiritual salvation of sailors and merchants. In the fragment quoted above, he 
referred to the text of 1 Thessalonians 4 verses 3 and 6, which says it is forbidden 
to oppress or circumvent one’s brother. When explaining the meaning of forbidden 
circumventing in this text, Westerman mentioned, but did not emphasise, unfair 
pricing which was just one of the many reprehensible acts a merchant should avoid. 
From this Whitman comprehended that Westerman understood “circumventing”, 
used in 1 Thessalonians 4:6 (Whitman speaks of overreaching), to mean “using 
tricks”, and so did not emphasise fair-price principles. Those principles would 
accordingly recede into the background, before being discarded.38
Earlier in his article Whitman had pointed out that there was a tradition 
of viewing the text of 1 Thessalonians 4:6 as being in conflict with the text of 
D 4 4 16 4. Both the Latin Vulgate text of 1 Thessalonians 4:6 and D 4 4 16 4 used the 
verb circumvenire.39 The former stated that circumvenire was prohibited, the latter 
that it was allowed. Some Catholic authors indeed referred to this contradiction. 
The Spanish Jesuit Luis de Molina (1535-1600), for example, clearly contrasted 
the circumvenire of D 4 4 16 4 with that of 1 Thessalonians 4:6 in its Vulgate 
translation.40 It could well be that Westerman no longer adhered to this tradition. 
It seems unlikely that the Vulgate Text of the New Testament could have been his 
starting point. He studied theology at the University of Franeker41 and quoted the text 
of 1 Thessalonians from the Deux Aes Bible of 1562, which was commonly used by 
the members of the Reformed Church until the middle of the seventeenth century. 
The translation of the New Testament in this Bible was based on that of Johannes 
Dyrkinus († before 1592), whose own revision of the text was based on the original 
38 Whitman (n 6) at 1864-1865. 
39 However, circumvenire is not the translation of the Greek ὑπερβαίνειν, but of the verb πλεονεκτεῖν. 
Cf Whitman (n 6) at 1859 n 62. Moreover, it is not clear why the circumvenire in the Vulgate text 
was said to have been used as “a technical Roman contract law term for ‘overreaching’”. Cf 
Whitman (n 6) at 1859.
40 Ludovicus Molina De justitia et jure Tom II (Geneva, 1733) at 235 (Tractatus II disputatio 350 n 
5).
41 At the Dutch Universities the Latin Vulgata was no longer used in the study of the New Testament. 
Calvinist ministers were expected to be able to read the Greek text. See HJ de Jonge De bestudering 
van het Nieuwe Testament aan de Noordnederlandse universiteiten en het Remonstrants Seminarie 
van 1575 tot 1700 (Amsterdam, 1980) passim. 
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Greek.42 However, this does not mean that Westerman no longer regarded the text of 
1 Thessalonians 4:6 as in conflict with fair-price principles.
Godefridus Udemans, who studied theology in Leiden, is regarded as one of the 
fathers of the Further Reformation and Calvinistic Work Ethic, according to which 
working hard is agreeable to God and profiting from trading a sign of God’s blessing, 
but profits should be used to honour God. In listing the things a merchant should 
avoid, Udemans, as regards fair-price principles focused primarily on monopoly. 
This may be seen in the fragment quoted above and on the following pages, where 
Udemans’ aversion to monopoly is further elaborated. In this fragment, he based his 
view on two authoritative texts. The first is Isaiah 5:18, again quoted from the Deux 
Aes Bible: “Wee den ghenen die hen te samen koppelen, met loosen stricken om 
onrecht te doen, ende met waghenseelen te sondighen.”43 The second text is C 4 59 1, 
the Roman-law prohibition of monopoly. Whitman believed that because in this text 
fair pricing was discussed with reference to the issue of monopoly only, it showed 
that the Dutch were discarding the concept of proportionality in contract law and 
trading.
Petrus Wittewrongel, the third author, also belonged to the Further Reformation. 
He studied philosophy in Leiden and, compared to the other two, paid greater and 
more explicit attention to proportionality. He stated that Christian merchants, as a 
principal rule, should usually contract for a fair price. In addition to the fragment 
quoted above, Wittewrongel argued that in exceptional cases some deviation from 
the fair price would be justifiable. Namely, if the seller had to go to great trouble to 
be able to deliver certain merchandise, or if the seller had to store the merchandise 
carefully for a considerable period. Whitman suggested that we should read the 
Wittewrongel fragment with “some literary sensitivity” and compare it to “the 
fulminations of the non-Dutch literature on price”. Then we would see that a critical 
change was underway.44 
5 Conclusions
There are no grounds to assume that in early modern times legal thinking in Western 
Europe faced a conflict between the strict standards of traditional Christian morality 
and the liberal principles of Roman law. It was in its Christianised, Justinianic form 
that Roman law had penetrated the Western world, and during the Middle Ages, 
through interpretation and misinterpretation, it had become even more strongly 
permeated by Christian values. According to the Scripture people ought not to deceive 
each other in commercial intercourse, and the few scattered texts of Roman law that 
seemingly stated the opposite were interpreted in a restrictive sense. The permissible 
42 Thereby using the Editio Regia (1550) of Robert Estienne (1503-1559).
43 Translation: Woe to those who draw iniquity with false cords, and sin as with cart ropes.
44 Whitman (n 6) at 1866.
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“circumventing” of the Digest was supposed to be considerably limited by various 
general provisions, such as those concerning fair price, error as regards quantity and 
quality, protection of minors and, last but not least, the general prohibition against 
the act of fraud itself. This was the legacy that the “Old Authorities” of Roman-
Dutch law had received from the medieval ius commune. In some ways they may 
have further adapted this legacy to the world of early modern capitalism, but there is 
no evidence that in some way they discarded the protection against laesio enormis, 
based on C 4 44 2, in favour of a more liberal commercial approach.
Like the “Old Authorities” who had their precursors in the jurists of the 
medieval ius commune, the Calvinistic ministers who wrote manuals for Christian 
merchants had their predecessors in the early modern scholastics who wrote about 
the forum of the conscience. The ministers followed in their footsteps by adhering 
more strictly to the doctrine of restitution, holding that as a fundamental rule the 
fair price had to be upheld. In so doing, they did not deviate significantly from 
their catholic contemporaries.45 A comparison of Catholic and Calvinistic writings 
shows differences, but more in approach than in stringency in upholding norms on 
fair pricing. The main difference is that the ministers relied almost exclusively on 
biblical arguments to substantiate their views, and did not discuss moral issues in 
legal terms. Another difference was that in the case of the Catholic authors their 
extensive casuistry (are these the “fulminations on price” Whitman spoke of?) almost 
eliminated the need to consult one’s own conscience. At the same time the Catholic 
authors accepted, as Wittewrongel did, that in certain situations a deviation from the 
fair price was justifiable. 
On the basis of the evidence presented by Whitman it is difficult to construe a 
clash between traditional Christian ethics on the one hand and Roman law on the 
other. In addition, we cannot say that vernacular handbooks on Roman-Dutch law and 
those on commercial ethics show the same tendency of abandoning the longstanding 
just price-principles. The two differed, but on closer examination, neither displays 
the suggested tendency. The legal works emphasised the technicalities of legal 
doctrine and practice, whilst the moral handbooks emphasised biblical provisions 
and deliberations of a more moral nature. However, that does not mean that the legal 
works favoured immorality, or that the moral handbooks discarded traditional views 
on fair pricing. To ensure fair prices, legal works largely followed the traditional 
legal doctrine on laesio enormis, and moral works the stricter standard of the forum 
of the conscience. Nevertheless the standards are compatible. The law determined 
the standard required for peaceful and efficient coexistence, and Calvinistic morality 
a standard that was in accord with the will of God. It is not surprising that the latter 
45 Cf, the treatment of the just-price requirement in the commercial manuals of Juan de Hevia 
Bolaño (c 1570-c 1623) and Sigismondo Scaccia (1564-1634). See, too, Juan de Hevia Bolaños 
Curia Philipica (Madrid, 1790) tom II lib 1 cap 12 n 35 (312) and Sigismundus Scaccia Tractatus 
de comerciis et cambio (Cologne, 1738) § 1 q 7 par 2 ampl 10 n 41 (226-227).
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set a slightly higher standard. Unfortunately, my findings invalidate Whitman’s 
arguments to some extent. In my view, it is impossible to accept either that in early 
modern times Roman law was a threat to the moral standards of the time, or that the 
Dutch, with reference to Roman law, rejected longstanding principles of fair price.
The real attack on concepts of fair price and proportionality was to come from 
the Schools of Natural Law with their concept of “freedom of contract”, which 
suggested that parties should be free to determine the content of contracts, and not be 
subject to various restrictions.46 At a later stage, this idea culminated in the writings 
of Christian Thomasius (1647-1713) specifically. This is, however, a new chapter, 
going beyond the scope of this contribution. 
ABSTRACT
This contribution contains a continuation of an earlier article dealing with the 
concepts of iustum pretium and proportionality in Roman law and the ius commune. 
Its findings for Roman-Dutch law, however, appear to be incompatible with the 
conclusions expounded by James Whitman in an article on the role of Roman law in 
early modern commerce. Whitman maintained that the traditional Christian rule on 
fair pricing was no longer upheld by the jurists and clergymen of the Dutch Republic. 
By appealing to Roman law, the Dutch would have abandoned the longstanding just-
price principles and would have considered active fraud by malicious salesmen to 
be permissible. This would appear from vernacular books on Roman-Dutch law, 
which, as a consequence, exuded an atmosphere of immorality. Moreover, the new 
commercial attitude was said to be supported by a number of moral handbooks 
written by Calvinistic clergymen. However, when reinvestigating the sources quoted 
from the wider perspective of the civilian tradition, other “Old Authorities” of 
Roman-Dutch law and the true nature and purpose of the Further Reformation, there 
is no choice other than to query Whitman’s findings.
46 Vera Langer Laesio enormis. Ein Korrektiv im römischen Recht (Marburg, 2009).
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STELLUNG DES GRIECHISCHEN 
RECHTS IN DER ANTIKEN 
RECHTSGESCHICHTE
Joachim Hengstl*
1 Betrachtet man das Entstehen, Blühen und Vergehen antiker Kulturen, 
deren Kontakte untereinander und den damit verbundenen kulturellen Austausch 
sowie die Vielfalt der wechselseitigen Einflüsse, so drängt sich unter juristischem 
Blickwinkel schnell der Eindruck auf, daß an diesem Wechselspiel auch das Recht 
teilgenommen haben muß. Das Bild eines fließenden und wachsenden Stroms 
rechtlicher Entwicklung, tradiert von Epoche zu Epoche, über die Kulturgrenzen 
und über die Zeiten hinweg, vielleicht bis heute wirkend, ist ebenso eindruckvoll 
wie überwältigend. Der Gedanke einer zusammenhängenden Geschichte wenigstens 
der antiken Rechtsordnungen ist nicht neu. Vor allem L Wenger hat diese These 
entwickelt, bereits in seiner Wiener Antrittsvorlesung 1904, „Römische und antike 
* Akademischer Oberrat aD, Universität Marburg. Siehe H Barta „Graeca non leguntur“? Zu den 
Ursprüngen des europäischen Rechts im antiken Griechenland. Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschafts- 
und Kulturgeschichte des Rechts. Bd 1 (Wiesbaden, 2010) ISBN 978-3-447-06121-6 gr 8; XIX 
683 S; 23 Ill; Bd II1/II² Archaische Grundlagen (Wiesbaden, 2011) ISBN 978-3-447-06278-7 gr 
8; XVIII 765 S mit 12 Abb, bzw ISBN 978-3-447-06587-0 gr 8; XVIII 522 S mit 8 Abb – Zu 
Bd I des Werks vgl ferner (durchweg kritisch) S Günther in (2011) 12 Bryn Mawr Classical 
Review 61, sowie Th Finkenauer in sehepunkte (2012) 12 Nr 12 [15-12-2012], URL: http://www.
sehepunkte.de/2012/12/18091.html. Die Besprechungen der Bände sind nacheinander entstanden. 
Der Versuch einer Angleichung hätte die Fertigstellung unabsehbar verzögert. Es wird daher um 
Nachsicht bei stilistischen und inhaltlichen Ungleichheiten gebeten.
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Rechtsgeschichte“‚1 und sein ebenso umfassendes wie umfangreiches Meisterwerk 
Die Quellen des römischen Rechts2 ist von dieser Auffassung geprägt. Andere 
Rechthistoriker haben aus unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln den gleichen Gedanken 
vertreten. Die in der Neuzeit ständig zunehmende Flut an Quellen vor allem aus 
dem Alltag der verschiedenen antiken Rechtsordnungen scheint die These von 
Übernahmen und Abhängigkeiten erst recht zu bestätigen. Die Untersuchungen 
zu den „internationalen“ kulturellen Beziehungen nehmen gleichfalls zu3 und 
untermauern den Gedanken, daß das Recht dabei nicht unbeeinflußt geblieben sein 
kann.4 In dieser Weise gestärkt, sollte die Idee eines sich ständig entwickelnden 
Rechtswesens überzeugen – über die Zeiten hinweg, selbst das Rechtsdenken der 
Römer und die Institutionen des Römischen Rechts nachhaltig beeinflußend und 
folglich auch noch heutige Rechtssysteme zumindest der westlichen Welt.5 Der 
Gedanke einer derartigen, wechselseitigen Beeinflussung in der Rechtsmaterie und 
einer epochen- und grenzenübergreifenden, stetigen Rechtsentwicklung ist in den 
letzten Jahrzehnten allerdings nicht mehr artikuliert worden.
Barta, emeritierter Zivilrechtslehrer an der Universität Innsbruck, greift diesen 
Gedanken auf, erweitert ihn und sucht ihn in einem auf vier Gesamtbände angelegten 
monumentalen Werk zu verifizieren. Sein Blickwinkel wie seine durchgängig 
tragende These sind mit dem Titel Graeca non leguntur bestens beschrieben: Man 
habe die literarische Überlieferung der Griechen nicht hinreichend beachtet und 
deren rechtsgeschichtliche Tragweite folglich völlig verkannt und übergangen. Das 
griechische Recht habe zwar nicht als Rechtsordnung des Alltags überlebt, wohl 
aber hätten griechische Rechtsvorstellungen und Rechtseinrichtungen Einfluß auf 
und über die römische Epoche hinaus gehabt. Darüber hinaus ist Barta bemüht, 
Verbindungslinien zwischen den griechischen Rechtsinstitutionen und dem Alten 
Orient einschließlich des Pharaonischen Ägypten zu ziehen. Sein Unterfangen, 
die zeitlichen und räumlichen Distanzen zwischen den verschiedenen Kulturen 
zu überbrücken, ist ebenso anspruchsvoll wie weit gespannt. Eine nicht minder 
schwierige Aufgabe ist es freilich, ein derart umfangreiches und ehrgeiziges Werk 
angemessen zu beschreiben und zu bewerten, noch dazu, bevor es vollständig 
vorliegt.
1 Graz, 1905.
2 L Wenger Die Quellen des römischen Rechts (Wien, 1953) passim.
3 Siehe beispielsweise und vor allem W Burkert Die Griechen und der Orient. Von Homer bis 
zu den Magiern (München, 2003). Das maßgebliche altorientalische Textmaterial findet sich in 
Umschrift und Übersetzung bei KA Kitchen & PJN Lawrence Treaty, Law and Covenant in the 
Ancient Near East 3 Bde Pt 1: The Texts; Pt 2 Text, Notes and Chronograms; Pt 3: Oral Historical 
Survey (Wiesbaden, 2012).
4 Zum altorientalischen, altägyptischen, jüdischen Recht uam siehe R Westbrook (ed) A History of 
Ancient Near Eastern Law 2 Bde (Leiden / Boston, 2003).
5 Vgl dazu beispielsweise R David & G Grasmann Einführung in die großen Rechtsysteme der 
Gegenwart. Rechtsvergleichung (München / Berlin, 1966) (Barta bekannt, zB S 191 Anm 830).
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Es erscheint sinnvoll, vorab die rechtshistorischen Gegebenheiten zu resümieren, 
innerhalb deren sich Bartas Darstellung bewegt. Damit läßt sie sich besser einordnen. 
Die Graeca, auf die Barta sich bezieht, sind nämlich im Wesentlichen literarische 
Quellen aus dem klassischen und hellenistischen Athen. Athen war damals Teil der 
griechischen Polis-Welt, die ihren Ursprung mitsamt all ihren geistigen Strömungen 
und Auswirkungen im 8 / 7 Jahrh v Chr gehabt hat. Das ist übrigens auch die Zeit 
der griechischen Kolonisierungsbewegung gewesen. Die Alltagsquellen dieser wie 
der späteren Zeit bestehen weitgehend aus Inschriften aus den verschiedenen poleis 
und hernach aus den Papyri des griechisch-römischen Ägypten. Auf dieses Material 
geht Barta bislang kaum ein. 
Das rechtshistorische Umfeld ist rasch skizziert. Die Schrift ist um 3000 v Chr 
erfunden und alsbald in Ägypten und in Mesopotamien auch zur Aufzeichnung 
rechtlicher Vorgänge benützt worden. Während Ägypten über die nächsten drei 
Jahrtausende zumeist isoliert geblieben ist, entwickelten sich in Mesopotamien und 
seiner Umgebung bis zur Zeitenwende eine Reihe an Reichen, oder diese übernahmen 
die Herrschaft über mehr oder minder große Regionen. Die Schrift waren in Ägypten 
die Hieroglyphen, und hieraus wurden die hieratische und von dieser die demotische 
Schrift abgeleitet. Letztere ist bis in nachchristliche Zeit benutzt und nach kurzer 
Unterbrechung vom Koptischen abgelöst worden. Man wird nicht fehl gehen, wenn 
man diese Entwicklung neben Anderem als Manifest ägyptischer Selbstbehauptung 
ansieht. An Quellen wie an Untersuchungen zum Recht des pharaonischen Ägypten 
mangelt es nicht, und es liegen sogar Gesamtdarstellungen vor.6 All das genügt 
freilich nicht, um Anhaltspunkte für rechtliche Einflüsse zu bieten, die über die 
Grenzen Ägyptens hinausreichen. Das ist nicht zuletzt durch die Quellenlage bedingt. 
Rechtlich relevantes Alltagsmaterial gibt es nämlich in nennenswertem Maße erst 
aus dem Neuen Reich und nur aus einem einzigen Ort, der Siedlung der Arbeiter 
an den Königsgräbern bei dem heutigen Deir el-Medineh (Oberägypten). Von hier 
liegen reichlich 10000 hieratische Ostraka und Papyri vor.7 Verallgemeinern lassen 
sich die Aussagen der aus einer derartigen Siedlung stammenden Texte nicht.
Aus der Zeit vor dem Neuen Reich fehlt es keineswegs an zahlreichen 
Rechtsquellen. Sie sind jedoch zeitlich, örtlich und inhaltlich zerstreut und nicht 
leicht heranzuziehen. Das Bild des Justizwesens muß aus Funktionärstiteln 
6 Siehe zuletzt SL Lippert Einführung in die altägyptische Rechtsgeschichte (Münster ua, 2008) 
passim, und vgl dazu T Mrsich „Methodisches zur altägyptischen Rechtsgeschichte“ I, II, in 
(1913) 130 Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte Rom Abt S 507-526; (1914) 131 
Rom Abt S 349-369.
7 Siehe dazu ua W Helck Die datierten und datierbaren Ostraka, Papyri und Graffiti von Deir 
el-Medineh, bearbeitet von A Schlott (Wiesbaden, 2002); A Dorn & T Hofmann (eds) Living and 
Writing in Deir el-Medine. Socio-historical Embodiment of Deir el-Medine Texts (Basel, 2006); 
S Allam „Recht im pharaonischen Ägypten“ in Die Rechtskulturen der Antike. Vom Alten Orient 
bis zum Römischen Reich hrsgg von U Manthe (München, 2003) S 15-54. Vgl ferner <www.uni-
muenchen.de/dem-online> oder www.lmu.de/dem-online.
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und den diversen Urkunden einer Administration herausgearbeitet werden, die 
die Gewaltentrennung noch nicht kennt.8 Einem Rechtstransfer fehlt damit die 
Voraussetzung eines umfassend durchgebildeten, vorbildhaften Rechtswesens mit 
entsprechenden Institutionen. Rechtlich relevantes Material bieten ab der ägyptischen 
Spätzeit um 700 v Chr die bis ins 2. Jahrh n Chr reichenden demotischen Urkunden.9 
Von diesem Material an Alltagsurkunden lassen sich gleichfalls keine Einflüsse 
erwarten, die sich auf andere Rechtsordnungen erstreckt haben könnten. Man 
wird sie grundsätzlich verneinen dürfen. Sachlich liegt das an der geographischen 
Isolierung des Pharaonenreiches. Kulturelle und gedankliche Strömungen haben 
diese Schwelle durchaus überwunden. Sowohl archäologische Funde wie das 
Alte Testament belegen das. Rechtsvorstellungen aber haben sich schwerlich auf 
vergleichbare Weise zur Kopie angeboten. An dieser Bewertung ändern weder die 
„persische Reichsautorisation“ noch die demotischen Rechtsbücher etwas. Unter der 
„Reichsautorisation“ wird eine ausdrückliche und billigende Anerkennung lokaler 
Normen unter achämenidischer Herrschaft verstanden.10 Sie kann also nur nach 
Ägypten hinein, nicht aber als Vorlage fremder Rechtsordnungen gewirkt haben. 
Die demotischen Rechtsbücher belegen zwar ein hohes Maß an Jurisprudenz;11 eine 
über Ägypten hinausreichende Wirkung ist jedoch nicht zu erkennen und auch nicht 
zu erwarten.
In Mesopotamien und in seiner Umgebung ist die Keilschrift benützt worden. Der 
Quellenreichtum der rechtlichen Überlieferung in Keilschrift ist hoch, und die Zahl 
der dadurch belegten Epochen, Reiche und Regionen ist nicht gering. An literarischen 
oder philosophischen Äußerungen zum Recht mangelt es gänzlich. Die verschiedenen 
Rechtsordnungen sind lediglich durch Alltagsurkunden, Herrscherer lasse; Briefe 
und Ähnliches mehr dokumentiert. Zu erwähnen sind ferner die keilschriftlichen 
Rechtssammlungen, deren Gesetzescharakter umstritten ist.12 Merkbar sind lokal 
8 Siehe beispielhaft A Philip-Stéphan Dire le droit en Égypte pharaonique. Contribution à l’étude 
des structures et mécanismes juridictionnels jusqu’au Nouvel Empire (Bruxelles, 2008) passim 
(vgl dazu die eingehende Besprechung von J Hengstl in (2014) 131 Zeitschrift der Savigny 
Stiftung der Rechtsgeschichte Rom Abt S 424-429).
9 Siehe J Manning „Demotic Law“ in Westbrook (o Anm 4) S 819-862.
10 Hierunter ist der Gedanke an eine ausdrückliche und billigende Anerkennung lokaler Normen 
zu verstehen, grundlegend P Frei „Zentralgewalt und Lokalautonomie im Achämenidenreich“ 
in Reichsidee und Reichsorganisation im Perserreich (Freiburg / Göttingen, ²1996) S 5-31; Dies 
„Die persische Reichsautorisation. Ein Überblick“ in (1995) 1 Zeitschrift für altorientalisches und 
biblisches Recht 1-35, jeweils mwN Darauf einzugehen besteht hier kein Anlaß.
11 Siehe SL Lippert Ein demotisches juristisches Lehrbuch. Untersuchungen zu Papyrus 
Berlin P 23757 rto (Wiesbaden, 2004); Dies aaO (o Anm 6); dazu ferner J Hengstl „Gab es 
Rechtswissenschaft in der außerrömischen Antike?“ in R van den Bergh et al (eds) Libellus ad 
Thomasium. Essays in Roman Law, Roman-Dutch Law and Legal History in Honour of Philip J 
Thomas ((2010) 16(1) Fundamina editio specialis) S 164-183 (180-182).
12 Vgl dazu die Sammlungen in R Haase Die keilschriftlichen Rechtssammlungen in deutscher 
Fassung (Wiesbaden, ²1979); oder M Roth Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor 
(Atlanta, 1995), siehe ferner Kitchen / Lawrence aaO (o Anm 3).
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oder zeitlich bedingte Eigenheiten. Die Überlieferungslage erlaubt jedoch keine 
weitergehenden Schlüsse, da nur selten größere Urkundengruppen vorliegen oder 
sich zusammenfügen lassen. Für die Annahme, irgendwelche keilschriftlich belegten 
Rechtsinstitute hätten sich über den keilschriftlichen Bereich ausgewirkt, gibt es 
keinen zweifelsfreien Anhaltspunkt.
Ein Blick muß an dieser Stelle auch der israelitischen Rechtsüberlieferung gelten, 
die vor allem das Alte Testament enthält. Die Eigenständigkeit des israelitischen 
Gedankenguts, aber auch die Verflochtenheit mit den Israel umgebenden 
Hochkulturen ist überdeutlich. Von einem Einfluß israelitischen Rechtsdenkens 
oder israelitischer Rechtsinstitute auf die Rechtsordnungen der Umgebung oder der 
nachfolgenden Zeit ist jedoch zumindest bislang nichts festzustellen. 
 Mit den Rechtszeugnissen des pharaonischen Ägypten, dem keilschriftlichen 
Bereich und dem im Alten Testament manifesten Judentum liegt ein über 2000 Jahre 
umfassendes Quellenmaterial rechtlicher Natur vor. Nicht erfasst sind mit diesen 
umfangreichen Quellenbeständen mannigfache Kultur- und Rechtsordnungen. Von 
ihnen gibt es nur geringfügige Quellenbestände, die sich aber ständig vermehren. 
Beispiele hierfür sind nabatäische oder früharabische Zeugnisse.
Dennoch überlappen sich die Zeugnisse der antiken Hochkulturen lediglich 
in ihren Endphasen mit den Zeugnissen der frühen griechischen und der frühen 
römischen Rechtsordnung. Die griechische Poliswelt hat ihre Anfänge im 8. 
und 7. Jahrh v Chr, und das sagenhafte Gründungsdatum Roms ist 753 v Chr. In 
Mesopotamien herrschte zu dieser Zeit eine Gemengelage. Seit der Mitte des 2. Jahrt 
v Chr war nämlich die ethnische Gruppe der Aramäer aus der arabischen Wüste 
allmählich nach Nordsyrien und Mesopotamien vorgedrungen und hatte dort um die 
Wende zum 1. Jahrt v Chr verschiedene Kleinstaaten gebildet. Das neuassyrische 
Reich unterwarf diese Kleinstaaten im 9. und 8. Jahr v Chr. Obgleich das Reich 
bereits damals durch aramäische Deportierte und Einwanderer aramäisch geprägt 
gewesen ist, und obgleich es auch anderweitige aramäische Zeugnisse gibt, ist es 
doch nicht möglich, das Bild einer „aramäischen Rechtsordnung“ zu entwerfen – es 
hat sie vermutlich nie gegeben.13 Nicht besser ist es um die Einflußmöglichkeiten 
einer „ägyptischen Rechtsordnung“ bestellt. In 656 v Chr beginnt die Spätzeit 
des pharaonischen Ägypten und damit die – bis in das 20. Jh n Chr währende – 
Fremdherrschaft über das Land. Bereits in der vorausgehenden „3. Zwischenzeit“ 
(1070-656 v Chr) hat sich Ägyptens politische Lage stark verändert; das Land hatte 
seine Außenbesitzungen verloren und war in seine eigentlichen geographischen 
Grenzen zurückgedrängt. Weiterreichende rechtliche Einflüße kann man für die 
Folgezeit lediglich in zwei Momenten vermuten. Beide sind bereits oben erwähnt 
worden – die „persische Reichsautorisation“ und die demotischen Rechtsbücher, und 
beiden ist dort jede außerägyptische Wirkung abgesprochen worden.
13 Zu den Aramäern siehe vor allem E Lipinski The Aramaeans. Their Ancient History, Culture, 
Religion (Leuven / Paris, 2000) mwN.
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Diese Feststellung muß auf den ersten Blick erstaunen. An Handelsbeziehungen 
und kulturellen Einflüssen zwischen den verschiedenen Kulturen und über große 
Entfernungen hinweg hat es bereits in den vorgeschichtlichen Zeiten nicht gemangelt 
und erst recht nicht in der Folgezeit. Barta erwähnt und erörtert sie immer wieder, 
mit weiterführenden Nachweisen. Es ist also unnötig, auf dieses Thema hier weiter 
einzugehen. Eine andere Frage verlangt aber Beachtung: Weshalb und auf welche 
Weise sollen Rechtsordnungen unterschiedlicher und zeitlich verschiedener Kulturen 
auf einander einwirken? Vollends verfehlt und anachronistisch ist es, ein Streben 
nach Rechtsvereinheitlichung in antiken Rechtsordnungen anzunehmen.14
2 Der erste Band von Bartas Werk enthält neben den üblichen Präliminarien 
und einer „Einleitung“ (S 1-56) lediglich das 1. Kapitel „Perspektiven“ (S 57-
561), welches in zehn Unterkapitel unterteilt ist: „1. Zum Buchtitel“; „2. Zum 
Wert humanistischer Bildung“; „3. Europa und griechisches Recht“; „4. Phasen der 
römischen Rechtsentwicklung“; „5. ‛Andersheit’ der griechischen Rechtskultur?“; 
„6. Gab es ein ‛gemeines’ griechisches Recht?“; „7. Olympische Religion und 
Heroenkulte“; „8. Rechtskollisionen im archaischen Griechenland“; „9. Anfänge des 
Völkerrechts“;  und „10. Rezeption durch Rom?“. 
Richtungsweisende Weichen werden bereits in der Einleitung dargestellt. Vor 
allem ist es der Begriff „Rechtsdenken“, den Barta vertritt (S 11-13). „‘Rechtsdenken’ 
umfaßt (für ihn) alle Facetten der Beschäftigung mit dem Recht (S. 11).“ Die 
Fortsetzung definiert Bartas Blickwinkel zweifelsfrei: „(Zum Rechtsdenken) gehört 
die Rechtspraxis (Gesetzgebung, materielle und formelle Rechtsanwendung aller 
Art, Vertragspraxis und Kautelarjurisprudenz, Rechtsberatung, rechtspolitische 
und rechtsethische Diskurse und Dialoge, Gerichtsreden, Urkunden, Schriftsätze) 
ebenso wie der Beginn einer Rechtstheorie und von Methodenfragen (Lehre von der 
Rechtsanwendung, Hermeneutik, Lückenfüllung uam.); die Rechtsphilosophie, die 
Lehre von der Gesetzgebung und den Rechtsquellen ebenso wie das Nachdenken 
über Billigkeit/Epieikeia und Naturrecht.“ Ob sich ein heutiger Richter, Rechtsanwalt 
oder Verwaltungsbeamter auf Grund dieser Definition zum „Rechtsdenker“ geadelt 
fühlen mag? Bartas Sichtweise ist völlig modernistisch. Das muß kein Schade sein, 
denn irgendeiner Lupe oder Brille muß sich der heutige Rechtshistoriker bedienen, 
um vergangene Rechtsordnungen zu ergründen. 
Vor dem Hintergrund der weiteren Ausführungen fällt bereits in diesem 
Abschnitt Bartas vorwiegend deskriptive Vorgehensweise auf. Dem entspricht 
zudem die Art, in der Barta ständig irgendwelche Phänomene zwar umreißt und 
ihnen Fortwirkungen beimißt, ohne diese aber weiter zu belegen. Ein Beispiel ist 
14 So S 61 bei Anm 226. Vgl dazu J Hengstl „Zur Frage von Rechtsvereinheitlichung im 
frühaltbabylonischen Mesopotamien und im griechisch-römischen Ägypten – Eine 
rechtsvergleichende Skizze“ in 3e série (1993) 40 Revue Internationale des Droits de l‘Antiquité 
S 27-55.
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sein Gedanke, „die griechische Dichtung und auch die Geschichtsschreibung (hätten) 
immer wieder grundlegende Fragen von Recht und Gerechtigkeit aufgegriffen“ (S 
12). Wohl wahr, aber wie hat sich das auf die jeweilige Rechtsordnung ausgewirkt?15 
In entsprechender Weise pauschal und der exegetischen Begründung entbehrend sind 
Bartas Monita, ältere Literatur sei von den neueren Rechtshistorikern weitgehend 
oder völlig übergangen worden, und letztere hätten sich so deren Sichtweise entzogen. 
Der Gedanke taucht nicht auf, daß neue Quellen und Methoden vielleicht erst der 
eigenständigen Sichtung und Auswertung bedürfen, ehe Altes auf einer neuen Basis 
bewertet und nötigenfalls integriert werden kann. Soweit vorab!
Die „Einleitung“ gibt im Weiteren einen „Kapitelüberblick“ (S 13-21), informiert 
„Über Zitate, Zitier weise, Gliederung“ (S 21-25), geht unter dem Titel „Troje ‘Europa 
und griechisches Recht’“ vor allem mit HJ Wolff ins Gericht (S 25-29),16 rügt den 
Verzicht auf „Neue Disziplinen für Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtsgeschichte“ [S 
29-31; zB Soziobiologie: „Eine richtig verstandene Rechtsgeschichte wäre in der 
Lage (gewesen), rechtliche Probleme der Antike, insbesondere auch Griechenlands, 
in einen antik-gegenseitigen und einen Bezug zur Gegenwart zu bringen“ (S 30)] 
und die „Neubewertung des griechischen und orientalischen Einflusses“ (S 31-34) zu 
berücksichtigen, wobei „bereits Erkanntes … systematisch mit dem geltenden Recht 
in Verbindung zu setzen (wäre)“ (S 33). Eine Auflistung von Topoi, bei denen Barta 
einen „interkulturellen Vergleich“ vermißt (zu welchem Zweck bleibt unerörtert) 
und mehrere „Griechische Rechtsfälle“ bilden den nächsten Abschnitt (S 34-49). 
Die Schilderung der Fälle ist anekdotisch und trägt zur Rechtsgeschichte so wenig 
bei wie der Rest der Einleitung. 
So viel Worte über die 56 Seiten der Einleitung müssen erstaunen. Die Einleitung 
ist freilich beispielhaft für Bartas (bisheriges) Vorgehensweise insgesamt. Barta 
agiert vor allem deskriptiv; er resümiert oder zitiert eine Fülle an Lesefrüchten, 
die seine Belesenheit erweist und sich in dem umfangreichen Literaturverzeichnis 
spiegelt.17 Das erfolgt nicht ohne Schärfen zu vorgeblichen Versäumnissen der 
15 Zum Verhältnis von Dichtung und Recht vgl zB R Schmitz-Wiegand in Handwörterbuch zur 
deutschen Rechtsgeschichte hrsgg von A Erler / E Kaufmann (Berlin, 1990) Bd 4 Sp 232-249 sv 
„Recht und Dichtung“ (Sp 240ff zu Dichtung als Rechtserkentnisquelle); Dies in Handwörterbuch 
zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte hrsgg von A Cordes / H Lück / D Werkmüller / R Schmitz-Wiegand 
(Berlin, 22008) Bd 1 Sp 1034-1943, sv „Dichtung und Recht“ (Sp 1035-1038 zu Dichtung und Recht 
in ihrem Wechselbezug; Sp 1038-1041 zu Dichtung als Rechtserkentnisquelle). Allgemeingültiger 
Grundgedanke ist dabei, daß Recht kein abgesondertes, vom Alltag fein säuberlich geschiedenes 
Sonderdasein führt, sondern daß die Rechtsvorstellungen das alltägliche Verhalten und eben auch 
die literarischen Schöpfungen prägen. Naturgemäß vermag jede geistige Entwicklung wiederum 
das Rechtsdenken zu beeinflussen, aber das Maß ist jeweils nachzuweisen.
16 Siehe HE Troje Europa und griechisches Recht (Frankfurt, 1971). Trojes Gedanken scheinen für 
B nach allem den maßgeblichen Leitfaden – darf man sagen „Evangelium“? – auf seinem Weg in 
die antike Rechtsgeschichte gebildet zu haben.
17 Der ungewöhnlich Umfang des Literaturverzeichnisses dürfte sich daraus erklären, daß Barta 
alles Gelesene aufführt und nicht nur das Verwendete.
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heutigen antikrechtlichen Disziplin, der Barta die Vernachlässigung sowohl früherer 
rechtshistorischer Erkenntnisse wie auch neuerer rechtlicher wie außerrechtlicher 
Methoden vorwirft. Der alte Grundsatz cui bono bleibt dabei völlig außer 
Betracht. Nirgendwo wird nämlich profund, detailliert und anhand sorgsamer 
Exegesen sowie ausgeführter Beispielen analysiert, in welcher Weise denn jene 
Erkenntnismöglichkeiten die aktuelle antikrechtliche Forschung fördern könnten. 
So anschaulich, wenn auch weitschweifig Bartas Darstellung ist, so gerät sie doch 
nur zu einer Gesamtschau vor allem der antikrechtlichen Sekundärliteratur. Dieses 
Beginnen ist von einem letztlich anerkennenswerten Eifer getragen: Barta will mit 
anachronistischer Beweisführung den Lebenswert der antiken Rechtsgeschichte 
selbst für das heutige Recht nachweisen. Diese Sichtweise ist verfehlt, denn die 
antike Rechtsgeschichte ist vorrangig Teil der Geschichte, obgleich ihre Erforschung 
unbedingt auf juristisch fundierter Methodik beruhen muß. Glaubt man freilich, 
die Geschichtswissenschaft sei, wie vielleicht mehr oder minder die gesamten 
Geisteswissenschaften, entbehrlich, weil ökonomisch ineffektiv, so gibt es auch für 
die antike Rechtsgeschichte keine Existenzberechtigung. Selbst die Rechtsprechung 
läßt sich, wie der Blick auf das spätrömische „Zitiergesetz“ zeigt, ohne Rücksicht 
auf den Gehalt ökonomisieren.18
Bereits die Einleitung läßt den weiteren Gang der Darstellung erkennen: Barta 
will keine Geschichte des griechischen Rechts oder dessen Institutionen schreiben, 
sondern eine Ideengeschichte mit dem Anspruch, die Fortwirkung der geschilderten 
Ideen nachzuweisen. Bartas Werk ist sehr anschaulich angelegt. Das detaillierte 
Inhaltsverzeichnis (S XI-XIV) übernimmt einen guten Teil der zahlreichen 
Zwischentitel; das Abkürzungsverzeichnis (S XV-XVIII) löst auch Abkürzungen 
auf, die gewöhnlich unbemerkt benützt werden;19 23 Abbildungen illustrieren 
(Verzeichnis S XIX); ein „Glossar“ (S 563-575) erläutert eine Vielzahl an Begriffen; 
das „Literaturverzeichnis“ (S 578-669) ist fast schon eine Bibliographie zur antiken 
Rechtsgeschichte geworden;20 der Sachindex („Stichworte“ S 671-683) umfaßt 
Personen, Orte und Begriffe. 
18 Nach dem 426 n Chr von Valentinian 3 erlassenen und von Theodosius 2 in CTh 1 4 3 eingefügten 
so genannten „Zitiergesetz“ durften in Rechtsstreitigkeiten nur noch die Rechtsmeinungen 
von Papinian, Paulus, Ulpian, Modestinus und Gajus berücksichtigt werden, so zu sagen aus 
„ökonomischen Gründen“.
19 ZB (auch hier unaufgelöst benützt) „vgl“ = „vergleiche“. Nachweis ausgefallen zu „ZÄS“ = 
Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde (Berlin).
20 Man vermißt allerdings beispielsweise L Rosetti „Materiali per una storia della letteratura 
giuridica attica“ in Nomos. Direito e sociedade na Antiguidade Clássica / Derecho y sociedade en 
la Antigüedad Clàsica ed por DF Leão / L Rosetti / M Céu Fialho (Coimbra / Madrid, 2004) S 51-
73; E Volterra Diritto Romano e diritti orientali (Napoli, 1983) (Nd d Ausgabe Bologna, 1937); 
ferner J Hengstl „Ex oriente lux in der Rechtsgeschichte?“ in Timai J. Triantaphylopoulou (Athen, 
2000) S 39-57 (peripher gelegentlich und ablehnend zitiert in BII). Nicht aufgenommen ist ferner 
beispielsweise H Stilett Montaigne für Lehrer (Frankfurt/M, 2004) [nv] (zit S 96, Anm 385: korr 
„Stilettt“  „Stilett“). Leider finden sich in dem an sich so nützlichen Literaturverzeichnis immer 
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    Ungeachtet all dieser durchdachten und nützlichen Hilfen ist Bartas Werk 
jedoch didaktisch, inhaltlich und in der Gestaltung keineswegs gelungen. Bereits in 
der Einleitung finden sich Exzerpte, die da wie auch in Kapitel 1 die fachgerechte 
Analyse und die explizite Argumentation ersetzen. Zwar ist es für den Leser bequem, 
anderweitige Sekundärbelege auf diese Weise an der Hand zu haben, in extensivem 
Maße dient es jedoch nicht der Übersicht, und vielfach ist es schlicht entbehrlich. 
Das gilt auch für die Vielzahl an Zwischentiteln, die keineswegs hierarchisch 
gegliedert sind. Auch hierin ist Bartas Vorgehensweise anekdotisch – Barta offeriert 
Alles in Allem eine Menge an (Lese- und Gedanken-)Früchten, ohne daraus aber ein 
gelungenes Kompott zu fertigen.
    Graeca non leguntur ist ein Werk, welches bei künftigen Arbeiten zum 
griechischen und römischen Recht unbedingt herangezogen werden muß. Dafür 
bürgt bereits das umfangreiche Literatur-Verzeichnis (S 571-669), das fast zu einer 
Bibliographie zur griechischen Rechtsgeschichte geraten ist. Die Auswertung 
des reichlich herangezogenen Materials läßt freilich zu wünschen übrig. Die 
Quellenanalyse unterbleibt weitgehend, und es findet auch keine eingehende 
Auseinandersetzung mit der Sekundärliteratur statt. Bartas Argumentationsweise ist 
rein deskriptiv. Sie beschränkt sich im Wesentlichen auf Zitate und Textübernahmen, 
deren Zusammenstellung offenkundig dank verbindender Sätze hinreichend 
aussagekräftig sein soll.
    Vor allem aber übersieht Barta bei all seinen Versuchen, über Räume und 
Zeiten hinweg, rechtliche Verbindungslinien zu ziehen, eine von Th Mayer-Maly 
vor Langem aufgestellte Prämisse:21 Es kann für vergleichbare Falllagen nur 
eine begrenzte Zahl an rechtlich sinnvollen Lösungen geben, und es hat daher 
Ähnlichkeiten und Gleichheiten in den verschiedenen Rechtsordnungen gegeben, 
ohne daß sich daraus ein Einfluß erweisen ließe. Ein fremder Einfluß muß also 
nachgewiesen werden, und dafür genügen Ähnlichkeiten und Gleichheiten durchaus 
nicht.
3 Auf das Kapitel I „Perspektiven“ näher einzugehen, scheint angesicht der 
vorstehenden Ausführungen entbehrlich zu sein. Eigentlich ist mit ihnen bereits alles 
Wesentliche gesagt. Bartas Anspruch, sein enzyklopädisches Anliegen, die Fülle 
seiner Exzerpte und die umfassende Anlage seines Werks drohen jedoch, gerade 
Außenstehende in eine falsche Richtung zu weisen, weil ihnen die Kenntnis der realen 
Hintergründe fehlt. Was Bartas Meinung ist, könnte angesichts des monumentalen 
Charakters seines Werkes durchaus zu einer über Zitieren weiterwirkende 
wieder Mängel, beispielsweise werden Abdrucke mal notiert, mal nicht. – S 511-561 sind allein 
die Titel der Unterabschnitte in die Kopfzeile übernommen worden; dies verwirrt. Siehe 184 Anm 
795 ist eingangs offenbar „Vinogradoff“ (zit bereits Anm 793) ausgefallen. Ungut ergeht es Blass: 
II² zitiert als „Blaas“, und im Literaturverzeichnis auf 19793 statt auf 1979 datiert.
21 Th Mayer-Maly „Die Wiederkehr von Rechtsfiguren“ in Juristenzeitung (1971) S 1-3.
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antikrechtliche Darstellung werden. Das freilich ist weder Bartas Anliegen noch – 
bei allem Respekt vor seiner Arbeit – seinen Ergebnissen angemessen. 
„Kapitel I ist bestrebt – die Ausführungen in der Einleitung fortsetzend und 
vertiefend – auf weitere Grundlagen einzugehen“ (S 57). Dieser einleitende Satz 
beschreibt den Inhalt von Kapitel I bestens. Es begegnet eine Fülle an Namen von 
Rechtshistorikern, Zitaten, Exzerpten und ausführlichen Textübernahmen. Jeder 
Gedanke, der eine Brücke vom griechischen zum römischen Recht auszudrücken 
oder auch nur anzudeuten scheint, wird in extenso vorgetragen; die Zeitgebundenheit 
vieler Auffassungen der Sekundärliteratur wird nicht hinterfragt. Viel wird dabei vor 
Augen geführt, was zur griechischen Rechtsgeschichte wenig bis nichts beiträgt. 
Ein Beispiel ist der kleine Unterabschnitt zur „Periodisierung der griechischen 
Rechtsentwicklung“ (S 75-77). Da werden verschiedene Zeitraster vorgestellt, ohne 
daß Barta Rechtsgeschichtliches über einzelne Schlagwörter hinaus berührte. Wenn 
man aber schon die Zeit vor 800 v Chr erwähnt, so hätten auch die Linear B-Schrift 
und deren Zeugnisse erwähnt werden sollen. Dabei handelt es sich vorwiegend um 
Notizen im Rahmen der zentralisierten Güterverwaltung in frühgriechischer Sprache, 
die zwar keine Rechtsurkunden enthalten, die aber vielfältige Details zu Wirtschaft 
und Gesellschaft erkennen lassen und folglich durchaus nicht völlig rechtsfern sind.22 
   Statt dessen konstruiert Barta „Einflußphasen des griechischen auf das 
römische Recht“ (S 77-84), die sich über rund 1000 Jahre hinweg und auf nahezu 
alle Gebiete der römischen Rechtsordnung erstreckt haben sollen. Wiederum wird 
mehr behauptet als bewiesen. Die von Barta als „große und frühe griechische 
Gesetzgebungen“ bezeichneten Gesetze des Zaleukos und des Charondas hätten 
statt eines wenig aussagekräftigen Exzerpts aus einem 90 Jahre alten Werk von GM 
Calhoun23 und den Verweis auf Bartas spätere Erörterung doch wohl bereits hier 
einen wenigstens kursorischen Vermerk zu Historizität, Inhalt und Sekundärliteratur 
verdient.24 Barta übersieht übrigens durchaus nicht die Existenz und die Leistung der 
griechischen Kautelarjurisprudenz. Er thematisiert sie aber (bislang?) nicht eigens, 
sondern begreift sie als Teil seines oben bereits erwähnten, nahezu grenzenlosen 
Begriffs des griechischen Rechtsdenkens und mißt ihr „nicht nur hervorragende 
praktische, sondern immer wieder auch theoretisch wichtige“ Bedeutung bei 
22 Auf einen Nachweis der bislang nur vereinzelten Beiträge zum Thema wird hier verzichtet. 
Einen zweckgebundenen Überblick gibt beispielsweise BFr Steinmann Die Waffengräber der 
ägäischen Bronzezeit. Waffenbeigaben, soziale Selbstdarstellung und Adelsethos in der minoisch-
mykenischen Kultur (Wiesbaden, 2012).
23 Siehe GM Calhoun „Greek law and modern jurisprudence“ in (1923) 9(5) California Law Review 
S 295-312 (302) [nv].
24 Vgl zur Gesetzgebung des Charondas und des Zaleukos K-J Hölkeskamp sv „Charondas“ 
in Der Neue Pauly Bd 2 (Stuttgart, 1996) Sp 1109/10; Ders Schiedsrichter, Gesetzgeber und 
Gesetzgebung im archaischen Griechenland (Stuttgart, 1999) S 130-144 uö (mwN) R Wolters 
sv „Zaleukos“ in Der Neue Pauly Bd 12/2 (Stuttgart, 2002) Sp 690. Siehe ferner M Mühl Die 
Gesetzgebung des Zaleukos und des Charondas (Leipzig, 1929); A Szegedy-Maszak „Legends of 
the Greek lawgivers“ (1978) 19 Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies S 199-209.
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(vgl S 89). Subjektive Sichtweise und Empfinden charakterisieren auch den 2. 
Hauptabschnitt „Zum Wert humanistischer Bildung“ (S 93-122), der voll von 
Lesefrüchten ist, als Essay anregend zu lesen, aber ohne substantiellen Beitrag 
zur Fortwirkung des griechischen Rechts. Bezeichnend für eine wiederkehrende 
Unschärfe in der Argumentation ist der Unterabschnitt „Heinrich Mitteis und der Wert 
der Rechtsgeschichte“ (S 106-109). Lediglich die ersten Sätze reflektieren H Mitteis 
für den Stellenwert der Rechtsgeschichte wesentliche Studie „Vom Lebenswert der 
Rechtsgeschichte“.25 Der Rest besteht aus Assoziationen Bartas – Schwerlich zu 
billigen ist übrigens die mehrfache, unreflektierte, aber auch kritisierte Übernahme 
des Begriffs „primitives Recht“. Es gibt kein „primitives Recht“. Jede Kulturordnung 
besitzt vielmehr die ihr gemäße Rechtsordnung, und die jeweilige Kulturordnung 
als „primitiv“ zu bezeichnen entspringt einem kulturellen Überlegenheitsgefühl und 
spiegelt folglich Chauvinismus.
Nicht wesentlich weiter führt auch der folgende Abschnitt 3 „‘Europa und 
griechisches Recht’“ (S 122-129). Wiederum findet sich eine Fülle an gedanklichen 
Zuordnungen zum „griechischen Rechtsdenken“, ohne daß über die Behauptungen 
hinaus sachlich belastbare Ausführungen gemacht würden. Bezeichnend ist 
beispielsweise der Vorwurf, die römische Klassik habe nicht danach gefragt, „ob 
ein Rechtsinstitut nicht auch anders sinnvoll und gerecht gestaltet werden, oder ob 
es eine solche Gestaltung verdiente und der Korrektur bedurft hätte.[26] Ganz anders 
der Zugang bei Platon, Aristoteles und Theophrast und überhaupt im griechischen 
Rechtsdenken, zu dem wesentlich sowohl die Rhetoren und Logographen als auch 
die Kautelarjurisprudenz beigetragen hat (sic!). Ihr Rechtsdenken beachtetet den 
gesellschaftlich-politischen und den wirtschaftlichen Zusammenhang des Rechts“ 
(S 124). Wohl wahr, und an dieser Stelle hätte Barta zwei einschlägige und ihm 
durchaus bekannte Arbeiten von E Klingenberg anführen können, welche bezeugen, 
daß den griechischen Philosophen das Recht des Alltags keineswegs fremd gewesen 
ist.27 Das gilt auch für andere Aspekte. So berichtet Diogenes Laertios, Aristoteles 
habe bei seiner Arbeit an der Athenaion Politeia 158 Verfassungen griechischer 
poleis herangezogen.28 Den Bezug zwischen Philosophie und Rechtsdenken 
haben J Triantaphyllopoulos und E Wolf umfassend aufgezeigt.29 Das ist letztlich 
25 H Mitteis Vom Lebenswert der Rechtsgeschichte (Weimar, 1947).
26 Das muß man nicht so sehen, siehe beispielsweise die Beiträge in J-J Aubert / B Sirks (eds) 
Speculum Iuris. Roman Law as a Reflection of Social and Economic Life in Antiquity (Ann Arbor, 
2002) (vgl dazu, allerdings höchst kritisch, J Hengstl in (2006) 88 Klio S 287-289).
27 Siehe E Klingenberg Platons ΝΟΜΟΙ ΓΕΩΡΓΙΚΟΙ und das positive griechische Recht (Berlin, 
1976); dens „Bemerkungen zum platonischen Bienenrecht“ in Symposion 1971. Vorträge zur 
griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte, in Gemeinschaft mit J Modrzejewski und D 
Nörr hrsg von HJ Wolff (Köln / Wien, 1973), S 347-354 (vgl das vorstehend angeführte Werk S 
40-49).
28 S Diog Laert, Vita Arist 27.
29 J Triantaphyllopoulos Das Rechtsdenken der Griechen (München, 1985); E Wolf Griechisches 
Rechtsdenken 4 in 6 Bdn (Frankfurt/M, 1950-1970) (beides bei Barta verzeichnet).
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nicht anders als der oben bereits erwähnte Bezug zwischen Dichtung und Recht. 
Den umgekehrten Nachweis, daß Philosophen, Rhetoren und Logographen die 
Rechtspraxis beeinflußt haben, bleibt B. zumindest einstweilen schuldig. Das ist 
auch nur schwer vorstellbar: Urkundenschreiber – Kautelarjuristen – hatten weder 
Zeit noch Anlaß, sich in theoretische Schriften zu vertiefen. Es gilt für den Alltag 
heutiger Rechtspraktiker nicht minder.
      Die Abschnitte, „4. Die Phasen der römischen Rechtsentwicklung“ (S 129-
139), „5. ‘Andersheit’ der griechischen Rechskultur“ (S. 139-158) und „6. Gab es ein 
‘gemeines’ griechisches Recht?“ (S 159-215) bringen noch einmal eher theoretische 
Reflexionen, während „8. Rechtskollisionen im Archaischen Griechenland“ (S 345-
441); „9. Anfänge des Völkerrechts“ (S 442-511) dem geübten Recht gewidmet sind. 
„7. Olympische Religion und Heroenkulte“ (S 215-344) ist ein Griff auf 
philosophisch-theologische Aspekte und deren Verbindung mit dem Recht. Dem 
einleitenden und auch weiter tragenden Gesichtspunkt, Recht lasse sich von den 
gesellschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen („religiöse Welt; Wert- und Moralmaßstäbe; 
Welt- und Menschenbild“, S 218) nicht abschichten, kann man nicht widersprechen. 
Allerdings: Wer Gras betrachtet, muß der ständig repetieren, wie weit die Sonne 
entfernt ist, die dieses Gras beleuchtet? Allein enzyklopädische Darstellungen 
erfordern eine derart umfassende Betrachtungsweise, und dazu gehört eine alltägliche 
Rechtsordnung durchaus nicht. Wieder einmal erstaunt hingegen Bartas Rückgriff auf 
ältere Literatur zu einer Problemstellung, zu der es an neueren Ausführungen durchaus 
nicht fehlt. Zur Entwicklung des Tötungsrechts und dem Verdrängen der Blutrache 
muß sich Barta zwar später noch eingehend äußern, die vielfach als diesbezüglicher 
Schlüsselaspekt erörterte Schildszene Il. 18.478-508 hätte Barta an dieser Stelle aber 
nicht stillschweigend übergehen dürfen.30 Zu blaß bleiben die Bemerkungen zum 
delphischen Sakralrecht (S 224/5). Im übrigen zeigt gerade dieser religions- und 
rechtshistorisch geprägte Abschnitt die Problematik von Bartas Vorgehensweise. 
An handfesten Belegen mangelt es nämlich, und Barta muß sich daher weitgehend 
darauf beschränken, Meinungen zu referieren und zu addieren. In aller Regel handelt 
es sich um „Einzelstücke“. An einander gereiht ergeben sie durchaus ein plastisches 
Bild, aber noch lange keinen Beweis. Der läßt sich naturgemäß für die Frühzeit 
schwerlich erbringen. Allerdings ist zu fragen, ob wirklich alles einen überirdischen 
Kontext haben muß: Sollte den Menschen der Frühzeit wirklich entgangen und erst 
„dank göttlicher Hilfe“ bewußt geworden sein, daß Räuchern Fleisch konserviert? (S 
231). Die Beispiele ließen sich mehren und auch auf andere Komplexe erstrecken. 
Der gesamte Abschnitt besteht aus kulturhistorisch interessanten Beobachtungen 
30 Grundlegend HJ Wolff „Der Ursprung des gerichtlichen Rechtsstreits bei den Griechen“ in 
Beiträge zur Rechtsgeschichte Altgriechenlands und des hellenistisch-römischen Ägypten 
(Weimar, 1961) S 1-90; ferner ua E Ruschenbusch „Der Ursprung des gerichtlichen Rechtsstreits 
bei den Griechen“ in Symposion 1977 (Köln-Wien, 1982) S 1-7 (= Ders Kleine Schriften zur 
griechischen Rechtsgeschichte (Wiesbaden, 2005) S 135-140).
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und Exzerpten. Sie tragen über das Kulturhistorische hinaus zur Rechtsentwicklung 
aber wenig bis nichts Substantielles bei. Zudem finden sich auch in diesem Abschnitt 
Mancherlei nicht Ausgeführtes, nur Erwähntes oder nicht weiter Belegtes. Der 
(philosophische) „Derveni-Papyrus“ ist als in Griechenland gefundener Papyrus 
selbst außerhalb der papyrologischen Welt sehr wohl bekannt, aber ein Eingehen 
auf die Fund- und Publikationsgeschichte im vorliegenden Rahmen zweifellos 
entbehrlich. Wenn der Papyrus jedoch (überflüssigerweise) schon erwähnt wird, 
sollte wenigstens eine Fundstelle angegeben werden.31 An gleicher Stelle (S 279) 
führt die Bemerkung zu „frauenfeindlichen Werten“ nicht weiter. Es trifft zu, daß die 
Stellung der Frau in den verschiedenen Kulturen unterschiedlich gewesen ist. Das ist 
mit einem Hinweis auf das pharaonische Ägypten freilich keineswegs erledigt. Barta 
zeigt hierfür wenigstens an dieser Stelle weder Einzelheiten noch Gründe auf. Dabei 
wäre Vieles zumindest in aller Kürze erwähnenswert gewesen. Jeder Meister vor 
100-150 Jahren, bei dem die Gesellen am Tisch der „Meisterin“ verköstigt worden 
sind, hätte da eine andere Meinung gehabt, und kein Bauer der Moderne kann auf die 
kluge Mitwirkung der Bäuerin verzichten. Dem entsprechend sagt ein Sprichwort 
„Was der Mann in Leiterwagen in die Scheuer fährt, trägt die Frau in der Schürze 
hinaus“. Sollte das früher wirklich anders gewesen sein? Außerhalb der jeweiligen 
Oberschicht konnte auf die Mitwirkung der Ehefrau nur schwerlich verzichtet werden 
und das gilt nicht nur für das pharaonische Ägypten.32 Die Ehefrau ist beispielsweise 
ein unabdingbarer Wirtschaftsfaktor im Erwerbsleben der altassyrischen Kaufleute 
gewesen. Sie hat nämlich das Haus mitsamt den Geschäftsurkunden gehütet, während 
der Mann auf Geschäftsreisen unterwegs gewesen ist.33 Auch im klassischen Athen 
haben die Frauen nicht nur hinter dem Herd verborgen gelebt,34 und Frauen der 
römischen Oberschicht fehlte es durchaus nicht an wirtschaftlichem Spielraum.35 
Die Beispiele ließen sich unschwer mehren. Nicht zuletzt in diesem Abschnitt macht 
B. erneut deutlich, daß und wie sehr es ihm um Rechtsdenken, nicht um Rechtsleben 
und Rechtspraxis geht. Er mischt all das freilich in Eins. Das Schwergewicht 
seiner Ausführungen bleibt aber das Rechtsdenken. Sein letztlich unentschiedene 
Vorgehensweise erlaubt freilich nur, nicht ohne Mühen sein unausgesprochenes 
31 Erwähnt S 279. Siehe vor allem The Derveni Papyrus (ed with introd and comm by Th 
Kouremenos, GM Parássoglou & K Tsantsanoglou (Firenze, 2006)).
32 Siehe S 279 unter Hinweis auf S Allam. Zum papyrologisch belegten Ägypten siehe beispielsweise 
Emanzipation am Nil Frauenleben und Frauenrecht in den Papyri hrsgg von H Froschauer & H 
Harrauer (Wien, 2005).
33 Siehe J Hengstl „Zur Stellung der Frau nach den altassyrischen Urkunden“ in Antike Lebenswelten. 
Konstanz – Wandel – Wirkungsmacht. Festschrift für Ingomar Weiler zum 70. Geburtstag, hrsgg 
von P Mauritsch ua (Wiesbaden, 2008) S 243-263.
34 Siehe Chr Schnurr-Redford Frauen im klassischen Athen. Sozialer Raum und reale 
Bewegungsfreiheit (Berlin, 1996) passim. Siehe ferner zB E Ruschenbusch Untersuchungen 
zur Geschichte des athenischen Strafrechts (Köln / Graz, 1968) (abgedruckt in E Ruschenbusch 
Kleine Schriften [so Anm 30, S 75-123]).
35 SK Ermete Terentia und Tullia – Frauen der senatorischen Oberschicht (Frankfurt/M, 2003).
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Hauptanliegen zu verfolgen. Die Art seiner Gliederung erleichtert das keineswegs. 
Eben den Abschnitt 7 scheint nämlich eine „Zusammenfassung“ zu beschließen, 
deren Anfang zwar feststeht (S 297), nicht aber deren Ende. Ist es, wie man 
eigentlich vermuten muß, das Abschnittsende, das dann freilich erst 48 Seiten später 
kommt? Wie hat man die unbezifferten Unterabschnitte dieser Sequenz gedanklich 
einzuordnen?
Die dem Abschnitt 7 vorausgehenden Abschnitte 4-6 führen kaum weiter. 
Abschnitt 4, „Die Phasen der römischen Rechtsentwicklung“ (S 129-139) hebt zum 
einen auf das römische Fremdenrecht ab, zum anderen auf den Konservativismus 
der römischen Juristen, der sich mit dem römischen Fremdenrecht und erst recht 
mit griechischen Rechtsinstitutionen nicht leicht verbinden läßt. Was hat die 
(griechische) Proxenie,36 so läßt sich beispielsweise fragen, denn mit dem römischen 
„Fremdenrecht“ zu tun? Unschärfen ergeben sich da nahezu zwangsläufig; 
beispielsweise kennt das attische Recht keine „Einreden“.37 „Platon und andere 
Philosophen arbeiteten nicht nur als Philosophen, sondern auch juristisch“ – wie 
denn, hatten sie Anwaltskanzleien oder betrieben sie Repetitorien? So einfach ist 
der Nachweis juristischer Tätigkeit nicht zu machen.38 Vieles bleibt dabei auf der 
Strecke, und das kann hier nicht nachgetragen werden. Ein Beispiel ist der Verzicht 
auf jeglichen Nachweis zu den artes liberales.39 B.unterscheidet vor allem nicht 
zwischen historisch Verbürgtem und aus unterschiedlichen Gründen tradiertem 
Erzählgut. Beides hat seine Berechtigung oder Erklärung, besitzt aber einen höchst 
unterschiedlichen Quellenwert. 
Die Abschnitte „5. ‘Andersheit’ der griechischen Rechtskultur?“ (S 139-158) 
und „6. Gab es ein ‘gemeines’ griechisches Recht?“ (S 159-215) bringen noch 
einmal eher theoretische Reflexionen. Vor allem setzt sich Barta mit F Pringsheim 
auseinander. ME schafft Barta hier eine Art Feindbild, welches er dann mit großem 
Aufwand ausbaut. In der Tat stellt Pringsheim fest, es habe im alten Griechenland keine 
privatrechtliche Literatur gegeben.40 Wem hätte sie denn genützt? Das Rechtsdenken 
der Philosophen41 haben die Urkundenschreiber gar nicht erst zur Kenntnis genommen; 
36 Siehe S 132. Zur Institution siehe ua C Marek Die Proxenie (Frankfurt/M, 1984) passim – bei 
Barta aufgeführt, nicht aber S 132 Anm 517.
37 So aber Barta S 134 ohne weitere Ausführung.
38 Im Sommersemester 2012 habe ich eine Lehrveranstaltung zum Thema „Waren sie Juristen? 
Zu den attischen Gerichtsrednern“ durchgeführt, bei der ein Rechtsanwalt während einer 
Doppelstunde seine Tätigkeit geschildert hat. Vier Studierende erlangten den Grundlagenschein 
für das 1. Juristische Staatsexamen anhand von Referaten mit Noten von „befriedigend“ bis „sehr 
gut“ und dem Ergebnis „Sie waren keine Juristen“. Mein Dank bzw meine Anerkennung gelten 
Herrn RA Zimmermann (Marburg) sowie stud iur L Bappert, L Boecking, A Dursun & S Otte.
39 SK Visky Geistige Arbeit und die „artes liberales“ in den Quellen des römischen Rechts 
(Budapest, 1977); ferner J Christes Bildung und Gesellschaft. Die Einschätzung der Bildung und 
ihrer Vermittler in der griechisch-römischen Antike (Darmstadt, 1975).
40  Siehe Barta S 142 sowie F Pringsheim The Greek Law of Sale (Weimar, 1950) S 2-5.
41  Vgl vor allem E Klingenberg aaO (o Anm 27).
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sie hatten mit dem Recht des Alltags genügend zu tun, und das betraf erstrangig 
die Beziehungen zwischen Privatpersonen. Ein „Gleichsetzen von Privatrecht und 
‘Rechtswissenschaft’“ (S 143) läßt sich darin nicht sehen – wahr ist freilich, daß 
die alltägliche Rechtsordnung vor allem durch Rechtsakte unter Privatpersonen 
repräsentiert worden ist. „Alle anderen Bereiche, also das gesamte öffentliche Recht, 
das Verfahrensrecht oder das Strafrecht wurden beiseite geschoben.“ (S 143). Das 
ist aus heutiger Sicht ein zutreffendes Urteil. Der Polisbürger jener Zeit hätte es 
wohl schwerlich verstanden und schon gar nicht zu teilen gewußt. Zudem ist diese 
Feststellung ebenso schwerwiegend wie ungenau. Wie definiert Barta die genannten 
Bereiche? Ist Strafrecht beispielsweise, was die Rechtsordnung Östereichs, Bartas 
Heimatland, dem Strafrecht zuordnet? Oder bestimmt die Sanktion, was Strafrecht 
ist, wie R Haase es für die altorientalischen Rechtssammlungen angenommen hat?42 
Für das pharaonische Ägypten legt R Müller-Wollermann einen anderen Maßstab 
an, indem sie auf „abweichendes Verhalten“ abstellt.43 Einen modernen Blickwinkel 
benutzt W Boochs bei seinen diversen Darstellungen zum pharaonischen Recht. Das 
macht Definitionen entbehrlich, kann aber nur ob der Anschaulichkeit willkommen 
sein.44 Auch zum athenischen wie zum römischen Recht sowie zu den gräko-
ägyptischen Verhältnissen liegen entsprechende Arbeiten sehr wohl vor.45 Die 
Beispiele ließen sich mehren, führen aber ohne sachgerecht entwickelte Grundlage 
nicht weit. So nämlich bezeugen sie höchstens eine alltägliche Gewaltbereitschaft 
und deren Bekämpfung durch die Staatsgewalt. Ein Grundkonzept, ein Anspruch des 
Staates auf alleinige Ausübung der ordnenden Gewalt in seinem Gebiet ist dem nicht 
zu entnehmen. „Strafrecht“ ist demnach inhaltlich nicht einfach vorauszusetzen, 
sondern bedarf der Definition.
42 Siehe R Haase „Körperliche Strafen in den altorientalischen Rechtssammlungen“ in (1963) 10 
Revue Internationale des Droits de l‘Antiquité S 55-75; ferner H Neumann „Zum Strafrecht in 
den ältesten Gesetzen Mesopotamiens“ (1989) 15 Das Altertum S 13-22; U Sick Die Tötung eines 
Menschen und ihre Ahndung in den keilschriftlichen Rechtssammlungen unter Berücksichtigung 
rechtsvergleichender Aspekte (Jur Diss, Tübingen, 1984).
43 R Müller-Wollermann Vergehen und Strafen: Zur Sanktionierung abweichenden Verhaltens im 
Alten Ägypten (Leiden / Boston, 2004).
44 W Boochs Die Finanzverwaltung im Altertum (St Augustin, 1985) (keineswegs nur zu 
Ägypten); Ders Strafrechtliche Aspekte im altägyptischen Recht (Sankt Augustin, 1993); 
Ders Altägyptisches Zivilrecht (St Augustin, 1999) (Überblick über Quellen, Grundsätze und 
Institutionen des „Zivil“rechts der Pharaonenzeit samt den Grundzügen einer Urkundenlehre und 
des Gerichtsverfahrens).
45 Siehe E Ruschenbusch „Das Vergehen und dessen Ahndung nach griechischem Recht“ in (1988) 
95 Gymnasium S 369-374 (abgedruckt in E Ruschenbusch Kleine Schriften [so Anm 30] S 188-
192); B Baldwin „Crime and criminals in Graeco-Roman Egypt“ in (1963) 42 Aegyptus: Revista 
italiana di Egittologia e di Papirologia S 256-263; W Kunkel Kleine Schriften. Zum römischen 
Strafverfahren und zur römischen Verfassungsgeschichte (Weimar, 1974). Th Mommsen’s 
Alterswerk Römisches Strafrecht (Leipzig, 1899) ist noch immer von großem Wert, in der 
Sichtweise aber vielfach überholt. 
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Entsprechendes gilt für die „Andersheit“ des griechischen Rechts wie der Frage, 
in wie weit man von einem „gemeingriechischen Recht“ sprechen darf oder gar 
sprechen muß. Geht man nämlich von der Annahme aus, daß jede Kulturordnung 
das ihr angemessene Recht besitzt, so entbehrt der Gedanke an eine „Andersheit“ 
des griechischen Rechts, an einen „griechischen Sonderweg“ von vorn herein der 
Überzeugungskraft. Irgendwie muß die griechische Rechtsordnung ja anders gewesen 
sein als andere Rechtsordnungen, sofern nicht die Gegebenheiten übereinstimmten 
und vergleichbare Rechtsfolgen hatten. „Andersheit“ und „Sonderweg“ sowie 
„gemeingriechisches Recht“ sind die diesbezüglichen Begriffe, denen Barta 
folgerichtig nachgeht und seinen Ausführungen ist daher zu folgen. Dazu gehört 
die Frage, in wie weit es ein „griechisches Recht“ gegeben hat – „‘gemeines’ 
griechisches Recht“ drückt Barta es bewußt altertümelnd aus. Kriterium kann nur 
sein, wie man „Gemeinsamkeit“ versteht. Hier ist zweifellos Bartas Hinweis auf die 
moderne Rechtskreislehre angemessen (S 161). Der Gedanke sollte mE dennoch 
zurückhaltend verwendet werden, denn die antiken „Rechtskreise“ entsprechen nun 
einmal nicht den modernen Gegebenheiten. Barta sieht das und negiert es dann doch 
(S 162), offenbar weil er eine bestimmende Leitlinie annimmt (S 160: „Leitpoleis“). 
Wiederum taucht die Schimäre eines alles umfassenden Rechtsdenkens auf, obgleich 
Barta Abweichungen (in Maßen) in Rechnung stellt.46 Eine jede Rechtsordnung, 
insbesondere eine kulturell entwickelte, muß gesellschaftliche Werte, 
Familiengliederung, familiäre Vermögensbestimmungen, Erbfolgeregelungen und 
Anderes mehr kennen – Ähnlichkeiten und Gleichheiten können daher in diesem 
Bereich wie auch in Wirtschaft, Handel und sonst kein besonderes Merkmal sein. 
Viele der von Barta in diesen Abschnitten vorgetragenen Beobachtungen sind 
unbelegt. ME macht Barta gerade hier die wesentliche, zweifache Schwäche seiner 
Betrachtungsweise deutlich. Er „verwirkt“ zum einen im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes 
die rechtskulturellen Aspekte so, daß er im Wechselspiel der Argumentation mal den 
einen, mal den anderen anspielen kann. Zum anderen compiliert Barta die von ihm 
als einschlägig erachteten Meinungen der Sekundärliteratur derart, daß das von ihm 
angestrebte Bild entsteht. Dieses ist ein in vielfältiger Beziehung von griechischen 
Vorgaben abhängiges römisches Recht. Bartas Argumente können hier nicht im 
Einzelnen zusammengestellt und widerlegt werden. Einige Beispiele müssen 
genügen und sollen folgen.
Bezeichnend für Bartas anspielenden statt argumentierenden Vortrag ist 
beispielsweise (S 174): „Der Freundschaftsvertrag zwischen Ephesos und Sardes 
‘aus der Zeit des Prokonsulats des jüngeren Scaevola, Q. Mucius Scaevola P. Fil., 
aus dem Jahre 98 v. Chr.’ enthielt internationales Strafrecht: forum rei, forum 
comprehensionis: ‘Solche Vergünstigungen begegnen auch in anderen griechischen 
46 Zum syrisch-römischen Rechtsbuch, zit Anm 682, ist der Hinweis auf E Weiss (1923) 
bibliographisch durch W Selb & H Kaufhold Das syrisch-römische Rechtsbuch (Wien, 2002) zu 
ergänzen. 
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Staatsverträgen und erinnern an die Fälle, in denen in Rom der Praetor die im 
Zivilrecht auf den Bürger zugeschnittene Klage ficta civitate den Peregrinen 
zugesteht.’ [Anm 737: Gaius IV 37]“. Schreibt so Gaius, und ist jener Vertrag nach 
Inhalt und Fundstelle einsichtig? Polisgründungen in Ägypten gibt es nur drei 
bzw vier (Naukratis; Alexandria; Ptolemais, Antinoupolis);47 dennoch steht Milet 
als Mutterstadt für „zahlreiche (etwa 80?) Tochterstädte im Schwarzmeergebiet 
und in Ägypten“ (S 174). Von der Rechtsordnung des im pharaonischen Ägypten 
gegründeten Naukratis ist zwar nahezu nichts bekannt – immerhin: „Eine Facette des 
kulturellen Hegemoniestrebens einzelner griechischer Poleis – etwa auch Athens – 
bildete ihr Rechtssystem“ (S 175).
Der letzte Abschnitt, „10. Rezeption durch Rom?“ (S 511-561), ist offensichtlich 
die Quintessenz des ersten Bandes. Barta schreibt in diesem Abschnitt, für seine 
Auffassung und Methodik höchst bezeichnend „Weshalb haben gerade im 
Rechtsbereich immer wieder Transfers und Rezeptionen stattgefunden?“(S 516). 
Haben sie wirklich stattgefunden? Barta behauptet das immer wieder, bleibt 
stichhaltige Nachweise aber letztlich schuldig. Die Möglichkeit der Übernahme 
ersetzt nicht deren Beweis, und in so weit ist wie so oft in der antiken Rechtsgeschichte 
auf die von Th Mayer-Maly aufgestellte und oben bereits wiedergegebene Prämisse 
zu verweisen: Es kann für vergleichbare Falllagen nur eine begrenzte Zahl an 
rechtlich sinnvollen Lösungen geben. Barta übersieht darüber hinaus, daß eine 
ganze Reihe von Gegebenheiten, welche der rechtlichen Gestaltung bedurft haben, 
letztlich überall wenigstens in der Welt des antiken östlichen Mittelmeeres mehr 
oder minder vergleichbar vorgelegen haben. Das gilt für die Subsistenzwirtschaft, 
die den Alltag der meisten Menschen bestimmt hat. Es gilt aber auch für die 
überregionalen Gegebenheiten. Seit vorgeschichtlicher Zeit hat es umfangreiche 
Handelsbeziehungen gegeben, und die ließen sich keineswegs mit dem Schwert 
in der Hand durchführen. Selbst kriegerische Auseinandersetzungen bedurften 
letztlich gewisser Regularien, um zu einem zukunftsfähigen Ende zu gelangen. 
Die Notwendigkeit eines geregelten Miteinanders hat also in jedem Bereich zu 
allen Zeiten bestanden. All das bietet hinreichend Spielraum für die Erklärung, es 
könne für vergleichbare Falllagen nur eine begrenzte Zahl an rechtlich sinnvollen 
Lösungen geben. Gemeinsame Herkunft, Sprache und Religion begründen zweifellos 
gemeingriechische Übereinstimmungen, führen aber doch nicht zwingend zur 
Schaffung eines gemeinsamen Rechts. Die Betonung hier liegt auf „Schaffung“ (vgl 
S 179); die Existenz überkommener gemeingriechischer Rechtsinstitutionen soll 
damit keineswegs geleugnet werden. Das Gedankenspiel mit Einflüssen der über 
47 Allgemein zum Recht der poleis im ptolemäischen Ägypten siehe vor allem J Modrzejewski „La 
règle de droit dans l’Égypte ptolemaïque (État des questions et perspectives de recherches)“ in 
Essays in Honor of C. Bradford Welles (New Haven, 1966) S 67-77, sowie Ders Loi et coutume 
dans l’Egypte grecque et romaine (Paris, 1970) S 92-113. Zu Naukratis siehe zB W Helck sv 
„Naukratis“ in Der Kleine Pauly Bd 4 (München, 1972) Sp 10.
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zweitausend Jahre umfassenden ägyptischen bzw. keilschriftlichen Rechtsordnungen 
ist im Übrigen weder fundiert noch überzeugend (zB S 189). Barta übersieht dabei 
immer wieder gänzlich, daß die von ihm erwähnten kulturellen Kontakte und von 
ihm referierten Meinungen der Sekundärliteratur eines nicht belegen, nämlich 
eine praxiswirksame, zeiten- und länderübergreifende „Rechtspolitik“ – die hat es 
eben nicht gegeben. Es fällt übrigens auf, daß Barta bei all’ seinen diesbezüglichen 
Reflexionen fast nur auf Nichtjuristen zurückgreift. Bartas Fülle an Beobachtungen 
ist jedoch immer wieder beeindruckend. Im Ergebnis leidet sie aber an der weit 
weniger analytischen als assoziativen Vorgehensweise.
„8. Rechtskollisionen im Archaischen Griechenland“ (S 345-441) und „9. 
Anfänge des Völkerrechts“ (S 442-511) geben eher als die übrigen Abschnitte die 
tatsächlichen Gegebenheiten wieder. Exzerpieren, Referieren und Katalogisieren 
beherrschen allerdings auch diese Abschnitte. Quellenwiedergaben oder eigenständige 
Quellenexegesen sucht man vergeblich. Immerhin sind die Schilderungen der 
Kolonisation und der Beziehungen zwischen Metropolis und Apoikie sowie damit 
zusammenhängender Fragen anschaulich, tragen zur Rechtsordnung freilich nicht 
viel bei, vor allem kaum Substantiertes. So bleibt beispielsweise dunkel, inwiefern 
die Koloniegründungen „schon die kautelarjuristische Phantasie in den Mutterstädten 
gefördert, ja beflügelt hatte“ (sic). Beachtenswerte Bemerkungen von Barta gehen 
unter diesen Umständen (nicht nur hier) unter. Die Verwendung modernrechtlich 
geprägter Terminologie hilft zudem kaum weiter. An anachronistischen Wertungen 
fehlt es in diesem Zusammenhang nicht. „Kollisionsrecht zwischen Mutter- und 
Tochterstadt ist eine Vorstufe des modernen ‘nationalen Privatrechts’“ (S 366). Eine 
derartige Rubrifizierung bringt rechts-ideengeschichtlich ebensowenig weiter wie 
Bartas Differenzierung in „innerstaatliches“ beziehungsweise „intermunizipales“ 
„Kollisionsrecht“ (S 348). Daß municipium ein Begriff einer außergriechischen 
Rechtsordnung ist, soll hier nicht thematisiert werden. Wohl aber ist zu fragen, in 
wie weit derartige Kollisionen tatsächlich gefühlt geworden sind. Schwerlich im 
ptolemäischen Ägypten, denn da sind die Verträge mal griechisch, mal demotisch 
abgefaßt worden, bar jeder „Kollision“, denn die hat gewöhnlich bereits die Wahl 
der Sprache vermieden.Und wenn nicht, dann die Kunst der Urkundenschreiber. Das 
heißt nicht, daß es keine wechselseitigen Einflüsse gegeben haben mag. Nur sind diese 
erst zu entdecken, und bei Barta findet sich dazu nichts. Bartas Ausführungen unter 
dem Gesichtspunkt „Kollisionsrecht“ müssen nicht nur hier mit Bedacht betrachtet 
werden. Dies gilt nicht minder für Bartas Ausführungen in den Unterabschnitten 
„Das ‘Internationale Privatrecht’ der Antike“ (S 368-376) und „‘Intermunizipales’ 
Kollisionsrecht zwischen Mutter- und Tochterstadt“ (ab S 377; das Abschnittsende ist 
nicht sicher zu bestimmen). Die denkbaren Möglichkeiten sind umfassend dargestellt. 
In welchem Maße es eines solchen „Kollisionsrechts“ überhaupt bedurft hat, wird 
jedoch nicht erörtert. Man stelle sich vor: Menschen einheitlichen Herkommens und 
politischer Überzeugung trennen sich räumlich aus ökonomischen Gründen. Wie tief 
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wird dann auf absehbare Zeit die rechtliche Trennung sein? An unterschiedlichen 
Auffassungen und am Bedürfniss, diese beizulegen, wird es nicht gemangelt haben. 
Aber darf man deren Regelung wirklich als „Kollisionsrecht“ bezeichnen, während 
es im Privatrecht der „Dissenz“ ist? Daß es an „internationalen“ Konflikten nicht 
gemangelt hat, belegt wohl die Beiziehung auswärtiger Richter, die vielfach in 
Inschriften zu ihren Ehren belegt sind.48 Die – von Barta nicht erörterte – Rolle 
solcher externer Richter bedarf zweifellos noch eingehenderer Erhellung. Auch 
sonst benötigt in diesem Zusammhang noch Vielerlei der genauen Analyse. Eine 
wesentliche Frage kann nur sein, in wie weit das gelebte Recht all’ dem entsprochen 
hat. Aus dem außerägyptischen Bereich lassen uns die Quellen dazu weitgehend im 
Stich. Besser ist es nur um die Gegebenheiten im ptolemäischen Ägypten bestellt. 
Aber um die geht es hier kaum.
Schwerlich folgen läßt sich Bartas apodiktischen Feststellungen „Kolonisation 
fördert Rechtsvereinheitlichung und autochthone Kautelarpraxis“ (S 353) 
oder die Koloniegründungen hätten „schon die kautelarjuristische Phantasie in 
den Mutterstätten gefördert, ja beflügelt“ (S 362). Die „Kautelarjuristen“, die 
Urkundenschreiber, werden an dem Geschehen gedanklich nur teilgenommen haben, 
sofern sie einen entsprechenden Vertrag aufzusetzen hatten. „Das ‘Internationale 
Privatrecht’ der Antike“ (S 368) ist gleichfalls eher Schlagwort als weiterführend. 
„Internationales Privatrecht“ bezeichnet im heutigen Recht die Gesamtheit der 
nationalen Rechtssätze, die bei Auslandsberührung bestimmen, welche von 
mehreren möglichen internationalen Privatrechtsordnungen anzuwenden ist. Für die 
griechisch-hellenistischen Gerichte ist das freilich ohne Belang gewesen, denn die 
Parteien hatten die rechtlichen Bestimmungen, auf die sie sich beriefen, als Beweise 
vorzulegen. Es blieb dann vor allem dem Geschick der Partei überlassen, was als 
Recht zur Anwendung kam.
Abschnitt 8 ist wiederum von einer anachronistischen Betrachtungsweise geprägt. 
Die Kolonisierung scheint – nach Barta – von amtlicher Planung bestimmt gewesen 
zu sein, und die Ausführungen zum Internationalen Privatrecht vernachlässigen völlig 
die Beweispflicht der Parteien. Diese Bemerkungen sollen hierzu denn genügen. Ein 
letzter Blick gilt noch Abschnitt 9 „Anfänge des Völkerrechts“. Er enthält eine Fülle 
an Informationen zum Thema seit den ältesten Zeiten.49
4 Es fällt schwer, ein Votum über Bartas Werk anhand des ersten Bandes 
abzugeben. Fachlich ist es leider leicht. Bartas ständiges Bemühen, jegliche selbst 
48 Vgl dazu (ua) K Harter-Uibopuu Das zwischenstaatliche Schiedsverfahren im achäischen Koinon. 
Zur friedlichen Streitbeilegung nach den epigraphischen Quellen (Köln / Weimar / Wien, 1998); 
D Nörr „‘Richter aus der Fremde’ und römische Provinzialgerichtsbarkeit. Bemerkungen zu IG. 
XII 5.722 (IG. XII Suppl p 127)“ in (1998) 26 Index S 71-87; Ch V Crowther „Aus der Arbeit der 
‘Inscriptiones Graecae’ IV. Koan Decrees for Foreign Judges“ in (1999) 29 Chiron S 251-319.
49 Bartas Ausführungen zu den „Kodifikationen sumerischer Stadtstaaten“ (S 458-461) sollte man 
nicht kritiklos übernehmen.
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nur mögliche griechische Spur über Zeit und Raum hinweg mit der römischen Welt 
zu verbinden, vermag in aller Regel nicht zu überzeugen. Barta unterscheidet zudem 
nicht zwischen Rechtsdenken, Rechtsanwendung durch Logographen und Praktikern 
des Alltags. Entsprechendes gilt für die Durchführung. Barta zitiert und paraphrasiert 
in einem höchst ungewöhnlichen Maße, verzichtet aber darauf, seine Lesefrüchte 
inhaltlich zu analysieren. Er stellt sie mit verbindenden Worten nebeneinander 
und geht offenkundig davon aus, daß sie auf diese Weise überzeugen. Gedanklich 
vergleichbar sind seine ständig wiederkehrenden Vorwürfe, selbst Koryphäen der 
Altertumswissenschaften hätten ihm, Barta, wichtig dünkende Aspekte übergangen. 
Barta übersieht dabei, daß es in der wissenschaftlichen Diskussion eben nicht um 
„Rundumschläge“, sondern um Konzentration auf das Wesentliche geht. Dazu gehört 
auch, daß eine sich ständig mehrende Fülle an neuen Zeugnissen und Erkenntnissen 
aufgearbeitet werden muß, ehe man sich an neue Synthesen machen kann. Seine 
Belesenheit und seinen Gedankenreichtum möchte man freilich ungern missen. 
Bartas Werk liest sich, da es keine tragende Linie außer dem im Titel ausgedrückten 
Gedanken gibt, wie eine Fülle an Essays – so sollten sie vielleicht auch künftig 
veröffentlicht werden! Und Mancherlei hat Barta dem entsprechend anderwärts 
publiziert.
5 Der zweite Band ist ob seines Umfangs zweigeteilt; er enthält Kapitel II von 
Bartas umfangreichem Werk. Barta bezeichnet Kapitel II im Titel mit „Archaische 
Grundlagen“ und hat es im Text mit „Drakon, Solon und die Folgen“ bezeichnet.50
Der Titel „Archaischen Grundlagen” verwirrt zunächst, denn mit „Archaischen 
Grundlagen“ verbindet nicht jeder Leser die Gesetzgeber der beginnenden 
(athenischen) polis Solon und Drakon, sondern eher die Zeit der Schriftgewinnung 
(8. Jh v Chr), der vorausgehenden, sich zunehmend erhellenden „dunklen“ Epoche 
und der Linear-B-Zeit. In der Anlage entsprechen die beiden Teile dem ersten 
Band, enthalten also insbesondere Glossar, Literaturverzeichnis und Stichwörter; 
das Quellenverzeichnis hingegen ist neu und willkommen. Nicht recht befriedigen 
will, daß die beiden Teilbände völlig getrennt angelegt sind, einschließlich der 
Paginierung. Da hätte eine Aufteilung in zwei selbständige Bände der Übersicht und 
der Handhabbarkeit wohl eher gedient, zumal Barta sich ohnedies genötigt gesehen 
hat, den letzten Abschnitt, Abschnitt 23 „Rezeption und Kulturtransfer aus dem 
Alten Orient“, in Band III zu verweisen, um das Erscheinen von Band II nicht zu 
50 Band III soll mit den Kapiteln III-VI („Die ‘Eumeniden’ des Aischylos“; „Der ‘Melierdialog’ des 
Thukydides“; „Euripides und das Naturrecht“ sowie „Gab es eine griechische Jurisprudenz“) den 
zweiten Teil („Recht, Dichtung und Geschichte“) sowie das erste Kapitel des dritten Teils („Praxis 
und Theorie griechischen Rechtsdenkens“) enthalten; der vierte Band die restlichen drei Kapitel 
des dritten Teils („Gab es eine griechische Jurisprudenz?“; „Platon“; „Aristoteles und Recht“) 
sowie die Teile vier und fünf (Recht, Religion und Gerechtigkeit“; „Ausblick und Ergebnisse“); 
die Kapitel IX („Recht und Religion“) beziehungsweise X („Epilog“; „Zusammenfassung und 
Thesen“) (siehe die detaillierte Inhaltsübersicht S XIII/XIX). 
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verzögern (BII², S 375). Die übrige Gestaltung entspricht ebenfalls dem ersten Band: 
eine Vielzahl an Exzerpten und Literaturreferaten sowie umfangreiche Ausführungen 
in zahlreichen Fußnoten. Auch der zweite Band zeugt von Bartas Belesenheit, 
seinem enzyklopädischen Wissen und seinem Bemühen, vor allem anhand der in 
der Sekundärliteratur vertretenen Meinungen assoziativ Verbindungen über das 
griechische Recht hinaus zu ziehen. Die Quellenlage ist dabei mitunter kärglich, 
und Barta muß daher vielfach mit Hypothesen arbeiten, deren hypothetischer 
Charakter freilich oftmals nicht ohne Weiteres zu erkennen ist. Allerdings spiegeln 
sie zweifellos Bartas Überzeugung.
Vor der inhaltlichen Vorstellung des Bandes II soll zunächst der Blick auf Bartas 
Sichtweise, Aufbau und Vorgehensweise vertieft werden. Sie entsprechen Band I: 
B. sammelt Befunde, Lesefrüchte und Exzerpte aus der Sekundärliteratur und 
verbindet sie derart, daß das Bild einer von der Antike, sogar der vorgriechischen 
Zeit, bis heute reichenden, zumindest bis heute fortwirkenden Entwicklung entsteht. 
Bd II1 umfaßt 10 Abschnitte, Bd. II² die Abschnitte 11-22. Es liegt auf der Hand, 
daß diese Abschnitte weder dem Umfang noch dem Inhalt nach in vertretbarer 
Zeit von einem Einzelnen detailliert zu würdigen sind. Der Band wird daher im 
Folgendenden lediglich vorgestellt, und dabei oder im Anschluß daran werden 
einzelne Schwerpunkte näher gewürdigt. Barta betont die mit seinem Thema gerade 
in diesem Band verbundenen Schwierigkeiten in seiner Einleitung (S 1-14) mit 
Recht. Zugleich unterstreicht diese Einleitung wiederum Bartas Vorgehensweise in 
positiver wie in negativer Weise.
Revidiert man die beiden ersten Bände, so fällt immer wieder auf, in welch’ 
starkem Maße Barta bemüht ist, Verbindungslinien über das griechische Recht hinaus 
herauszuarbeiten, so als bedürfe die griechische Rechtsordnung einer Rechtfertigung 
– einer Rechtfertigung, die vor allem Bartas Werk liefern soll, indem Barta einer 
Fortwirkung des griechischen Rechts das Wort redet. Ein wichtiges Moment ist, daß 
Barta – wie bereits erwähnt – alle denkbaren Aspekte in Eins gießt und so nahezu 
unbeschränkten Manövrierraum hat. Alle denkbaren Aspekte von Was ist zu fragen, 
und die Antwort kann nur lauten: von Allem, was sich nur irgendwie mit dem Begriff 
„Recht“ in Verbindung bringen läßt. Beispiele drängen sich bereits ab den ersten 
Seiten immer wieder auf. So beginnt der Persönlichkeitsschutz mit Solon, setzt sich 
über Kleisthenes und das perikleische Athen fort, um von dort nach Alexandria zu 
dringen und danach das römische Rechtsdenken zu beeinflussen (BII1, S 3). Das 
Gedankenspiel ist reizvoll und theoretisch sogar möglich. Fakten, es zu untermauern, 
sind jedoch nicht ersichtlich. 
Barta scheint freilich weniger bloß Verbindungslinien aufzeigen zu wollen, 
sondern immer wieder den Fortbestand und das Weiterwirken eines einmal gefaßten 
und von ihm erkannten Rechtsgedankens. An Beispielen ist kein Mangel, und Barta 
unterstreicht sie ständig mit Hinweisen auf das moderne, meist österreichische Recht51 
51 ZB Bd II² S 172: „Die Hybrisklage ist rechtlicher Ur- und Quellgrund des Persönlichkeitsschutzes; 
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– teilweise auch als Desiderat.52 Ein Beispiel sind seine Ausführungen zur ἐπιείκεια 
„Billigkeit (o.ä.)“ (BII² 13). Barta betrachtet diesen außerhalb der Primäliteratur 
offenbar nicht besonders oft verwendeten Begriff53 als weiterwirkendes Urbild eines 
umfassenden Korrektivs fester Regeln der Rechtsordnung. Entsprechendes kann 
man zu Bartas Ausführungen zur Hybris erkennen, die im Persönlichkeitsschutz 
münden (BII² 146).
Der zweite Band bestätigt ferner eine Sichtweise auf die Sekundärliteratur, 
die einmal mehr Bartas Belesenheit bezeugt, nicht aber irgendein Verständnis 
dafür, daß Wissenschaftler wie Literaten in ihrer Zeit wie in ihrer Kenntnis zeit- 
und sachgebunden schreiben. Die von Barta gewünschte Gesamtschau läßt sich 
nicht einmal in einem derart monumentalen Werk erreichen, wie Barta es bietet 
beziehungsweise mit den Folgebänden anstrebt. Immer wieder bemängelt Barta 
die Äußerungen anderer, vorausgehender Vertreter der Antiken Rechtsgeschichte, 
da diese irgendwelche von Barta als wichtig erachtete Aspekte seiner Meinung 
nach nicht hinreichend berücksichtigt haben. Bartas Methode, Exzerpte aus der 
Sekundärliteratur mit verbindenden Worten aneinander zu reihen, um so seine 
Anschauungen zu entwickeln und zu belegen, ist zudem alles Andere als klar und 
überzeugend. Um die wiedergegebenen Stellen kritisch zu bewerten, müßte der 
originale Zusammenhang eingesehen werden. Das wäre zu vermeiden gewesen, 
wenn Barta die Gedanken der Vorlage in seine Erwägungen eingearbeitet und auf 
Primär- und Sekundärbelege lediglich verwiesen hätte. Es hätte zudem den Umfang 
von Bartas Darlegungen stark verringert.
Bartas Umgang mit Primärquellen dürfte gleichfalls in seiner Vorgehensweise 
begründet sein. Barta zitiert und analysiert bislang keinen Quellentext in extenso, 
sondern bringt Meinungen und Analysen der Sekundärliteratur, gewöhnlich ohne 
exakte Textbezeichnungen anzugeben. Das ist mitunter bloß frustrierend, etwa wenn 
„das Beispiel aus dem Fayum im ptolemäischen Ägypten“ (Bd I, S 348) über die 
Anm 1677 auf die Anm 1786 und Meinungen von H Lewald und E Schönbauer 
verweist, bar eines jeden Beleges. Gravierender ist Bartas Darstellung der Inschrift 
SEG XXXIII 690 (S 22). Barta gibt den Kommentar einer Inschriftensammlung 
wieder. Die Inschrift ist inzwischen allerdings textlich erweitert und erneut publiziert 
und zwar des Menschenrechts- und Grundrechtsschutzes, wie des straf- und privatrechtlichen 
(durch ein allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht; siehe die §§ 16 und 17 AGBGB[,] die diesem Vorbild 
am nächsten kommen und noch mehr zu leisten imstande wären als bisher)Anm 1065: „So könnte aus 
§ 17 AGBGB die fehlende Popular-Klagslegitimation in Fällen wie jenem der mißbräuchlichen 
Verwendung des Namens ‘Einstein’ abgeleitet werden; siehe mein Zivilrecht 2004, I 258. – …“.
52 Siehe beispielsweise zum „Allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrecht“: „Selbst die dem Wortlaut 
nach vorhandene Anerkennung durch § 16 [österreichisches] AGBG (das dtBGB kennt einen 
solchen Schutz bis heute nicht), wurde erst in den späten 1960er und den 1970er Jahren von 
der Rechtsprechung fruchtbar gemacht und österreichische Rechtsdogmatiker haben sich bis zur 
jüngsten Jahrtausendwende gegen eine solche Annahme gewehrt“ (BII² S 149 Anm 913).
53 Vgl zB A Greek-English Lexikon hrsgg von HG Liddel & R Scott (Oxford, 1996) S 632; Fr 
Preisigke Wörterbuch der griechischen Papyrusurkunden (Heidelberg, 1922 ff) Bd 1 Sp 552/3.
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und auf die 2. Hälfte des 5. Jahrh v Chr herunterdatiert worden.54 Des Weiteren sind 
fehlende Textbezeichungen wie „Graeca Halensis und Dikaiomata-Papyrus“ (S 3) 
oder „Fayumtexte“ (Bd I, S 436) schlicht unbrauchbar. Im ersten Fall handelt es 
sich um P Hal I 1; „Graeca Halensis“ bezeichnet die Herausgeber,55 und dikaioma 
„1) Rechtsanspruch; Rechtstitel; 2) Beweisurkunde“ ist ein Terminus, welcher 
keineswegs allein in P Hal I 1, 38 erscheint.56 Die Großoase Fayum, der antike 
nomos Arsinoites, ist das Herkunftsgebiet einer Unzahl griechischer Papyri aller 
papyrologisch einschlägigen Entstehungszeiten. Ein unspezifischer Hinweis auf von 
dort stammende Texte ist daher belanglos. Völlig überflüssig ist ferner die (beleglose) 
Schilderung der Entnahme von Papyrus-Füllmaterial aus Krokodilmumien 
(Bd 1, S 375), und Bemerkungen zur Verwendungen von Mumienkartonnage hätten 
zum Thema ebenso wenig beigetragen, denn gewöhnlich kommt es nicht auf die 
Fundsituation, sondern auf den Inhalt der Quellen an.
Bartas Umgang mit den Primärquellen ist nicht minder befremdlich. Barta 
zitiert sie gewöhnlich nur anhand von Sekundärliteratur, ohne den griechischen Text 
wiederzugeben und vielfach ohne aktuelle Textbezeichnung. Eine nachvollziehende 
Textkritik oder Bewertung von Bartas Ausführungen ist daher nicht möglich, sofern 
man sich nicht schlicht an den wiedergegebenen Wortlaut halten will.
6  Auf den Inhalt von Band II = Kapitel 2 soll, wie bereits angekündigt, hier 
nur kürzer eingegangen werden. Die inhaltliche Darstellung des zweiten Bandes ist 
wie bei Band I nicht leicht dank der zahlreichen Verweise auf die Folgebände wie 
auf das Vorausgehende. Barta knüpft insgesamt an Person und Werk von Drakon und 
Solon, im Wesentlichen an Letzteren.
Im ersten Abschnitt („Von Solon bis Kleisthenes“; BII1 S 13/15-58)
ordnet Barta zunächst Solon in den Kreis der Sieben Weisen ein, sammelt 
Biographisches und schildert Solons Bedeutung und Wirken.57 Dabei geht er auch 
54 Siehe MN Tod (ed) A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions (Oxford, 1933) Nr 1, Kommentar 
aaO S 2. Zum Text siehe nunmehr JH Oliver „Text of the so-called Constitution of Chios from the 
first half of the sixth century B.C.“ in (1959) 80 The American J of Philology S 296-301.
55 Dikaiomata: Auszüge aus alexandrinischen Gesetzen und Verordnungen in einem Papyrus des 
Philologischen Seminars der Universität Halle mit einem Anhang weiterer Papyri derselben 
Sammlung Graeca Halensis (ed) (Berlin, 1913). In Bd II² S 174-181 paraphrasiert Barta allerdings 
P Hal I 1 unter dem Gesichtspunkt, der Papyrus enthielte eine „Generalklausel für Hybris“. Das, 
wie bei Barta üblich, nur in Übersetzung wiedergegebene Exzerpt (BII² S 176-177) betrifft freilich 
nicht die Hybris, sondern ist wohl beispielshalber gemeint. Bartas Ausführungen zur Hybris in 
P Hal I 1 (BII² S 178-181) sind auf eine „Entwicklung eines allgemeinen Persönlichkeitsrechts 
und eines Schutzes der Menschenwürde im griechischen Rechtskreis“ gerichtet.
56 Vgl (ua) Fr Preisigke (so Anm 53), Sp 382/3. Bezeichnend ist, daß HJ Wolff Das Justizwesen der 
Ptolemäer (München, ²1970) den Begriff nicht verzeichnet.
57 Vgl zu diesem Abschnitt DF Leão Sólon. Ética e Política (Lisboa, 2001) der in seinem ersten 
Hauptteil (S 19-212) ua auf die Wirkungsgeschichte von Attitographen und Logographen eingeht, 
aber auch unter „A formação do conceito de Patrios Politeia“ (S 43-72) zu den politischen, 
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auf „Frühe Polissatzungen“ ein, ferner auf „Solons staatsrechtliche Reformen“. Den 
Unterabschnitt „Entstehung des Rechtssubjekts“ (BII1 S 37-44) wünschte man sich 
kürzer und prägnanter. Solons Wirken unter allen nur denkbaren Aspekten gelten die 
meisten Abschnitte dieses Kapitels. „2. Die Polis – Hüterin des sozialen Ausgleichs“ 
(BII1 S 59-76) bezieht sich ebenfalls auf Solon: Barta sieht in Solons Wirken „das 
Bemühen, einen Ausgleich zwischen den Polisbürgern herbeizuführen, ob reich 
oder arm, hochgestellt oder nicht“ (S 59). Dieser Feststellung kann man schwerlich 
widersprechen. Hinzu treten – nach Barta – weitere Momente, welche die klassische 
Polis ergäben. „Vorbilder für das von den Griechen früh und häufig eingesetzte 
Instrument ‘Gesetz’ und seine gesellschaftliche Funktion lieferten den Griechen 
wahrscheinlich Ägypten und Mesopotamien, vermittelt meist über den Vorderen 
Orient“ (S 61). Naturgemäß hat es allerorten an Rechtssetzung in Form königlicher 
Dekrete nicht gemangelt, denn Vielerlei bedurfte der Regelung. Hieraus auf 
allgemeinverbindliche, also gesetzliche Regelungen im heutigen Sinne zu schließen, 
wäre zweifellos verfehlt. Die Frage, inwieweit es in den Keilschriftrechten oder 
im pharaonischen Ägypten Gesetze gegeben hat, welche der griechischen Welt als 
Vorbild hätten dienen können, wird von Barta nicht eigens thematisiert. Eine andere, 
soweit ersichtlich anderwärts von Niemandem behandelte Frage hätte Barta bei 
seinem Vergleich vielleicht stellen können: Trat die inschriftliche Publikationsform 
der griechischen Gesetze als Autorisation an die Stelle der göttlichen Berufung der 
außergriechischen Herrscher? 
Abschnitt 3 ist Drakon gewidmet (BII1 S 77-129) mit Unterabschnitten zur 
Person, zur Frage nach möglichen Vorbildern Drakons, dem möglichen Anlaß zu 
Drakons Tätigwerden, zu frühem Rechtsgang und Selbsthilfe, zur Entstehung des 
Schuldbegriffs und Einiges mehr. Die folgenden Abschnitte knüpfen daran an. B. 
umreißt die Entwicklung des Verschuldensprinzips und behandelt dazu Antiphon, 
Aristoteles und Anaximenes von Lampsakos sowie wiederum Drakon („4. Das 
Entstehen der Rechtskategorie ‘Zufall’, S 130-212; „5. Vom sakralen Sühnerecht zur 
säkularen Schuldlehre“, S 213-264; „6. Drakons Gesetz über die Blutrache“, S 265-
292). „7. Wegweiser zur ‘Eunomia’“ wendet sich wieder Solon zu und damit einem 
Thema, auf das B. dann in Abschnitt 17 (BII² S 217-277) weiter eingeht. Solons 
Rechts- und Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen sind hier ein vorrangiger Gegenstand der 
Erörterung. Unter „8. Menschliche Gerechtigkeit und göttliches Gesetz“ (BII1 S 
311-317) verbindet Solons Wirken mit Gedanken von Hesiod. „9. Rechtssubjekt 
und Demokratie“ (BII1 S 318-441) weist die Entstehung des „Rechtssubjekts“ den 
wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Gegebenheiten jener Epoche. Der zweite Hauptteil (S 213-464) 
ist Solons Leben und Wirken gewidmet. Siehe ferner JA Almeida Justice as an Aspect of the 
Polis Idea in Solon’s Political Poems. A Reading of the Fragments in Light of the Reasearches 
of New Classical Archaeology (Leiden / Boston, 2003) [nv]; sowie neuerdings E Ruschenbusch 
Solon: Das Gesetzeswerk – Fragmente. Übersetzung und Kommentar (hrsgg von K Bringmann) 
(Stuttgart, ²2014).
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Griechen (mit bleibendem Nachwirken) zu. Hieran knüpft Barta seine eingehende 
Darstellung der damit veranlassten (oder diesbezüglich von Barta erörterten) 
gesellschaftlichen, wirtschaftlichen und demokratischen Verhältnisse. Hierzu gehört 
sE auch der Vertrag, und umfangreiche Erörterungen betreffen unter anderem das 
Synallagma, Schuld und Haftung, den griechischen Vertrag (S 374-438; su). Die 
meisten der folgenden Abschnitte dieses Kapitels gelten Solons Wirken unter weiteren 
denkbaren Aspekten. Teilweise drücken das bereits die Abschnittstitel aus: „10. 
Solons Gesetzgebung“ (BII1 S 442-606; mit Ausführungen zu frühen Gesetzgebern); 
„15. Solons Bild in der Geschichte“ (BII² S 182-189) – „16. Solons Reformdenken“ 
(BII² S 190-216; enthält viele durch Solon veranlaßte rechtspolitische Gedanken.) 
und weitere knüpfen an Solon an. Dies gilt sowohl für Bartas bereits erwähnte 
Ausführungen zu „13. Epieikeia“ (BII² S 70-145) wie auch für „14. Hybrisklage 
und Persönlichkeitsschutz“ (BII² S 146-189). Wiederum bietet Barta eine Fülle 
an Lesefrüchten, um zu zeigen, daß die griechische ἐπιείκεια beziehungsweise 
die Klage wegen Hybris Ansatzpunkte für bis heute wirksame Entwicklungen in 
Sachen „Billigkeit“ beziehungsweise „Persönlichkeitsrecht“ gewesen seien. Und 
wiederum verbieten es der hier verfügbare Raum wie Bartas detaillierter Inhalt, auf 
Bartas Darlegungen an dieser Stelle im Einzelnen einzugehen. In „17, ‘Eunomia’ 
und ägyptische ‘Ma’at’“ (BII² S 217-277) trägt B. seine Gedanken zum Thema 
vor, ob Solons Konzept der „Eunomia“ (εὐνομία „gesetzlich geregelte Ordnung“ 
oä) ägyptisch beeinflußt sei. Nun könnte man freilich einwenden, daß die Belege 
zum ägyptischen Rechtsalltag der Pharaonenzeit von einer gelebten „Ma’at“ nichts 
erkennen lassen, aber das ist für philophische Gedanken der Normalfall, und falls 
für Solons Denken altägyptische Vorbilder in Betracht kämen, so entstammten diese 
keinesfalls dem Alltag. Über ein (wohlwollendes) non liquet kann man ungeachtet von 
Bartas Bemühen nicht hinauskommen.58 Auch in diesem Abschnitt exzerpiert Barta 
in hohem Maße Literaturmeinungen. Das gilt ebenso für die folgenden Abschnitte. 
„18. Das Stadtrecht von Gortyn“ (BII² S 278-295) gibt einen unselbständigen 
Überblick über diese dem 5. Jahrh v Chr entstammende, höchst umfangreiche 
Inschrift mit rechtlichen Regelungen (um den Begriff „Gesetz“ zu vermeiden). Wie 
Barta Dokumentieren versteht, zeigt seine Erläuterung zur Auswahl der von ihm 
angegebenen Monographien und Darstellungen „die wenigstens Ausschnitte des 
Stadtrechts bringen“ (S 279). Damit bleibt Vielerlei unerwähnt, wie Ausgaben des 
„Codex Gortyn“ zeigen, ebenso dessen Abdruck in einer anderweitigen neueren 
Inschriftensammlung und selbst Monographien.59 Zwischenzeitliche Inschriftenfunde 
bleiben gleichfalls unberücksichtigt.
58 Vgl dazu allerdings die BII² S 1420 Anm 1419/20 mit zugehörigem Text wiedergegebene Meinung 
von S Lippert aaO (oben Anm 6) S 2/3. Darauf kann hier nicht eingegangen werden.
59 SM Guarducci Inscriptiones Creticae, 1935-1950, Vol 4 (Rome, 1950); RF Willets The Law Code 
of Gortyn (Berlin, 1967); Nomima. Recueil d’inscriptions politiques et juridiques de l’archaïsme 
grec I; II (hrsgg von H van Effenterre & F Ruzé (Rom, 1994 bzw 1995)); CE Gorlin The Gortyn 
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In „12. Entstehung des Rechtssystems“ (S 46-69) skizziert Barta seine 
Sicht der Entwicklung der griechischen Rechtsordnung – detailreich und bei 
aller Kürze umfassend sowie losgelöst vom solonischen Wirken, allerdings mit 
vielen Verweisungen auf seine eigenen anderweitigen Ausführungen.60 In den 
Abschnitten „19. Vom Totenteil zum Individualeigentum“ (BII² S 298-316), „20. 
Die Seelgerätestiftung“ (BII² S 317-334) und „21. Hellenistische Totenkultstiftung 
– Römische Stiftungen – Germanisch-christliches ‘Seelgerät’“ (BII² S. 335-343) 
sucht Barta anhand diverser Thesen des Rechtshistorikers EF Bruck die Entstehung 
des Privateigentums zu entwickeln. Seine Ausführungen enden folgerichtig in „22. 
Erwerb und Schutz von Individualeigentum“ (BII² S 344-374), ein Abschnitt, der 
vor allem auf dem einschlägigen Werk von A Kränzlein beruht.61 Brucks Bedeutung 
für die Rechtsgeschichte aus Bartas Sicht machen eine Abbildung (341) und ein 
Unterabschnittstitel „Bruck – Mentor moderner Rechtsgeschichte“ (S 342) deutlich.
7 Einige weitere Beobachtungen sind anzuschließen. „Mit dem Entstehen des 
Rechtssubjekts ist … die Fähigkeit verbunden, Träger eigener Rechte und Pflichten zu 
sein: Rechtsfähigkeit.“ Hierzu zählt Barta auch die Vertragsfreiheit (II1, S 360), und das 
rechtfertigt ihm, rechtsdogmatische Grundgedanken zum griechischen Vertragsrecht 
zu entwickeln (II1, S 360/374-440). Barta betont, „unverzichtbare Grundlage des 
Vertragsschlusses“ war auch in frühen Rechtsordnungen die Willenseinigung der 
Parteien … (II1, S 376). Barta nimmt also an, daß ein Vertrag bereits mehr oder minder 
durch schlichten Konsens zustande gekommen ist. Selbst für das römische Recht 
trifft das so nicht zu, wie die Libralakte zeigen, und für andere Rechtsordnungen 
kann es nicht einfach vorausgesetzt werden. Natürlich bedarf es für den Abschluß 
eines Rechtsgeschäfts eines Grundkonsenses zwischen den Parteien, denn es kann 
zum Zustandekommen eines Vertrags nicht die eine Seite eine Eheschließung, 
die andere eine Pacht wollen. Dieser Grundkonsens besagt freilich nicht, daß ein 
Vertrag bei Übereinstimmung wirksam zustande kommt. Und hieraus ergibt sich 
die grundlegende Divergenz der Thesen Bartas beziehungsweise von HJ Wolff. 
Barta verficht den Vertragsschluß durch einen, ggf bezeugten Konsensualvertrag, 
der in durchaus modernem Sinn ein Leistungsversprechen bedeutet. Die von HJ 
Wolff entwickelte „Theorie der Zweckverfügung“ hingegen verneint ein solches 
Law Code and Roman Crete (Diss PhD, Brown University, 1991); und Andere mehr.
60 Sie sind oft wenig hilfreich, vgl zB Anm BII² 333 „Es ist bekannt, dass sich Rhetoren/Logographen 
früh spezialisiert haben; siehe bei Anm 417 mwH“ – Anm 417 „Rhetoren und Sophisten fördern 
neben erster Spezialisierung auch bereits Schulenbildung“ – Text dazu „Antiphon war ein 
Spezialist für Mord- und Totschlags-, Isaios für Erbrechtsfälle.“ – Das kann natürlich nur für die 
erhaltenen Reden gelten! – Gegen sich selbst spricht die Formulierung zu Verfügungen auf den 
Todesfall: „… als erster Schritt zu ihrer Entstehung dient die homerische donatio mortis causa 
iminente periculo …“ (BII² S 65).
61 A Kränzlein Eigentum und Besitz im griechischen Recht des fünften und vierten Jahrhunderts 
vChr (Berlin, 1963).
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verbindliches Leistungsversprechen.62 Um an Wolffs Wortwahl anzuknüpfen, aber 
eine eigene Formulierung zu wählen: Eine – naturgemäß einverständliche – auf 
den Vertragszweck gerichtete (dingliche) Verfügung schafft eine Bindung zwischen 
den Parteien, kraft der der Verpflichtete haftet, sofern er das Zugesagte nicht leistet; 
seine Leistung ist also nicht die Erfüllung einer Schuld, sondern vermeidet die 
Realisierung der Haftung. Die Verfügung bringt die Verbindlichkeit zustande, sagt 
selbst aber über die Wirkung nichts aus; der Begriff „Verfügung“ spiegelt übrigens – 
allerdings, soweit ich weiß, durchaus unbeabsichtigt – das von Wolff vorausgesetzte 
reale Element.63 Es überstiege den Rahmen jeder Besprechung, Bartas Einwände 
gegen Wolffs Vertragsthese hier widerzugeben und im Einzelnen zu würdigen oder 
auch nur gewisse Weiterentwicklungen der These zu schildern. Es ist ferner kein 
Argument, daß Wolffs Thesen von der heutigen juristischen Gräzistik allgemein 
akzeptiert sind – die Menge macht es nicht, aber auch nicht die Argumente früherer 
gräzistischer Rechtsliteratur. Wolffs „Theorie der Zweckverfügung“ entspricht 
offenbar dem Quellenbefund bestens. Bezüglich der Homologie (BII² S 383-388) 
und der δίκη βλάβης (Bd II² S 405-407) lassen sich zwei – allerdings bei HJ Wolff 
entstandene Untersuchungen – anführen.64 Wert legt Barta des Weiteren auf eine 
Dissonanz zwischen A Biscardi und HJ Wolff (BII² S 383-388). Eine gelegentliche 
Diskussion mit A Biscardi hat freilich seinerzeit ergeben, daß da offenbar ein 
sprachliches Mißverständnis vorgelegen hat.65
Barta erwähnt mehrfach das Verlöbnis. Als Zivilrechtler ist ihm bekannt, daß 
das Verlöbnis ein Vorvertrag ist, gerichtet auf das Eingehen des Hauptvertrags, der 
Eheschließung. Einen derartigen Vorvertrag hat es, soweit ersichtlich; weder in den 
Keilschriftrechten noch im ägyptischen, jüdischen oder griechischen Recht gegeben. 
Auch hier sei auf Nachweise verzichtet.
62 Grundlegend HJ Wolff „Die Grundlagen des griechischen Vertragsrechts“ in (1957) 74 Zeitschrift 
der Savigny Stiftung für Rechstgeschichte Rom Abt S 26-72 (abgedruckt in Zur griechischen 
Rechtsgeschichte (hrsg von E Berneker (Darmstadt, 1968) S 483-533).
63 Ein reales Element setzt auch E Seidl mit seinem „Prinzip der notwendigen Entgeltlichkeit“ 
voraus. Es hat zwar in der Tat wenig Befürworter gefunden. Das darf aber nicht der Anlaß sein, 
es mit diesem Hinweis abzutun und nicht einmal eine Fundstelle zu nennen; so aber BII² S 381 
Anm 2294. Zu dem genannten Prinzip siehe beispielsweise E Seidl Aegyptische Rechtsgeschichte 
der Saiten- und Perserzeit (Glückstadt / Hamburg / New York, ²1968) S 45-50. Vgl dazu T Mrsich 
aaO (I, o Anm 6) S 513/4 mit Anm 14.
64 Zur Homologie (siehe BII² S 376, Anm 2259) siehe H von Soden Untersuchungen zur Homologie 
in den griechischen Papyri Ägyptens bis Diokletian (Köln / Wien, 1973); vgl dazu (ua) die 
Besprechung von J Hengstl in (1973) 24 Iura S 319-329. Zur δίκη βλάβης siehe H Mummenthey 
Zur Geschichte des Begriffs βλάβη im attischen Recht (Jur Diss, Freiburg, 1971).
65 Siehe J Hengstl, Besprechung von Symposion 1974, Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen 
Rechtsgeschichte (Gargnano am Gardasee, 5.-8. Juni 1974) in Gemeinschaft mit HJ Wolff, J 
Modrzejewski & P Dimakis herausgg von A Biscardi (Köln / Wien, 1979) in (1980) 97 Zeitschrift 
der Savigny Stiftung für Rechstgeschichte Rom Abt S 348-355 (349-350).
FUNDAMINA_21_1_15.indb   59 2015/06/10   13:26:02
60
JOACHIM HENGSTL
Methodisch nicht zu befriedigen vermag die Verwendung der attischen 
Gerichtsreden. Barta behandelt sie gewöhnlich als statische Belege des griechischen 
Rechtsdenkens. Tatsächlich aber sind die erhaltenen Gerichtsreden weniger Zeugnisse 
der Rechtsordnung als der rhetorischen Kunst. Die überlieferten Reden entsprechen 
einem Kanon, der vor der Mitte des 1. Jahrh v Chr erstellt worden ist und die als die 
zehn Besten ihrer Zeit erachteten Redner auflistet. Keineswegs alle stammen von 
den Redenschreibern, denen sie zugeschrieben sind. Doch hierauf kommt es für die 
Rolle der Reden als Rechtszeugnisse nicht an. Die Gerichtsreden waren zum Vortrag 
vor dem dikasterion bestimmt und entsprachen dessen Verfahren. Die Richterbänke 
waren allein mit Laienrichtern besetzt, welche ohne Abstimmung ihr Urteil abgaben. 
Es galt, diese Richter durch den Vortrag zu überzeugen. Diesen prägten daher vor 
allem rhetorische Mittel. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt ist auch die Interpretation von 
Gesetzen im attischen Prozeß zu sehen, und das ist zu berücksichtigen, wenn man 
attische Gerichtsreden als Rechtsquellen heranzieht.66
8 Bartas monumentales Werk ist entgegen allem Anschein weder eine 
Geschichte des griechischen Rechts noch eine Geschichte der griechischen 
Rechtsgeschichte als Wissenschaftsdisziplin. Sein wesentliches Anliegen, den 
Fluß der Rechtsentwicklung von der Antike bis nachgerade heute zu schildern, 
entspricht keinem von Beidem. Seine Darstellungsweise verdeckt eine Fülle an 
bemerkenswerten Gedanken und Anregungen. Nur: Wie soll man diese unter der 
Unzahl an übernommenen Texten finden? Sie verdecken zudem Bartas eigene 
Gedankengänge. Diese sind nämlich oftmals kaum von den die Textübernahmen 
verbindenden Worten zu unterscheiden oder diesen zu entnehmen. Immer wieder 
gibt es eine Vielzahl an Ausführungen, Textübernahmen und Entwicklungs-
Schilderungen, die einer eingehenderen Diskussion und der Darstellung von 
Gegenmeinungen bedürften – zu viele als daß sie hier auch nur aufgezählt werden 
könnten. Die graphische Gestaltung (Wechsel von Normal zu Petit) trägt dazu 
keinesfalls bei. Es liegt schließlich ferner auf der Hand, daß die Fülle der wörtlichen 
Übernahmen die eigene Analyse und Exegese nicht zu ersetzen vermag. Reduziert 
auf das dem Thema Wesentliche, bar aller fremder Texte, die eigenen Gedanken 
anhand der exegierten und analysierten Primär- und Sekundärquellen vortragend, 
66 Siehe dazu M Hillgruber Die zehnte Rede des Lysias: Einleitung, Text und Kommentar mit einem 
Anhang über die Gesetzesinterpretationen bei den attischen Rednern (Berlin / New York, 1988) 
S 105-120; ferner HJ Wolff „Methodische Grundfragen der rechtsgeschichtlichen Verwendung 
attischer Gerichtsreden“ in La critica del testo. Atti del II Congresso Internazionale della Società 
Italiana di Storia del Diritto, Venezia, 18 - 22 Settembre 1967 (Florenz, 1971) Vol 2 S 1123-1135 
(abgedruckt in HJ Wolff Opuscula dispersa (Amsterdam, 1974) S 27-39); Dens Demosthenes als 
Advokat. Funktionen und Methoden des Prozesspraktikers im klassischen Athen. Vortrag gehalten 
vor der Berliner Juristischen Gesellschaft am 30 Juni 1967 (Berlin, 1968) und abgedruckt in 
Demosthenes hrsgg von U Schindel (Darmstadt, 1977) S 376-402.
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STELLUNG DES GRIECHISCHEN RECHTS ...
hätte Barta ein für die antike Rechtsgeschichte außerordentlich wichtiges Werk 
geschaffen.
Nachtrag
H Barta hat mit seinem monumentalen, auf vier Bände angelegten Werk „Graeca 
non leguntur“ wichtige, aber oft anfechtbare Denkanstöße zum griechisch-
hellenistischen Recht und zu dessen Auswirkungen gegeben. Nunmehr legt er das 
erste Buch des wiederum zweifach unterteilten Bandes III (BIII1) vor.67 Der Band 
irritiert auf den ersten Blick. Seine Gliederung ist mit „Zweiter Teil: Dichtung, 
Geschichte, Philosophie und Recht“ überschrieben. Ein „Erster Teil“ ist nirgendwo 
ausgewiesen und kann wohl nur den Inhalt von Band 1 und/oder Band 2 meinen. 
Darüber hinaus vermißt man den laut BII², S 375 aus zeitlichen Gründen nach 
Band 3 verwiesenen letzten Abschnitt von Kapitel 2, Abschnitt 23 „Rezeption und 
Kulturtransfer aus dem Alten Orient“. Aufbau und Vorgehensweise von Band 31 
entsprechen den vorausgegangenen Bänden. Den üblichen Präliminarien (S I-XXI) 
folgen die Einleitung (S 1-25) und die Kapitel 3 („Die ‘Eumeniden’ des Aischylos“; S 
34-164), 4 („Der ‘Melierdialog’ des Thukydides“; S165-219) und 5 („Euripides und 
das Naturrecht“; S 220-326). Glossar (S 327-393); Literaturverzeichnis (S 395-522), 
Stellenregister (S 523-529) und Stichwörter (S 530-547) beschließen den Band. Die 
Tatsache, daß ein mit jedem Band wachsender Anteil dieser Anhänge nicht nur Platz, 
sondern auch Aufmerksamkeit des Benutzers beansprucht, läßt Barta’s bandweisen 
Aufbau der Nachweise verwerfen.
Der Inhalt von Band 3 ist mit dem Untertitel des Bandes bestens umrissen: Es 
geht um „Das griechische Recht in seinem kulturhistorischen Umfeld – Beispiele 
aus Dichtung, Geschichtsschreibung, Philosophie und (Kautelar) Jurisprudenz“. 
Zur Kautelarjurisprudenz, also zu Alltagsurkunden, findet sich, wie auch das 
Stellenregister ausweist, nichts. Die in den Kapitelüberschriften Genannten – 
Aischylos, Thukydides und Euripides – sind auch von E Wolf in seiner Darstellung 
des griechischen Rechtsdenkens berücksichtigt worden.68 Es ist bezeichend für die 
unterschiedlich Betrachtungsweise von Barta und Wolf, daß Barta auf Wolf (den 
Anmerkungen nach zu schließen) überhaupt nicht eingeht. Bartas Vorgehensweise 
entspricht der in den vorausgehenden Bänden: Barta referiert allzu viel Lesefrüchte, 
statt in eigenen Ausführungen auf andere Meinungen als Belege zu verweisen; seine 
Fußnoten sind voll von Bemerkungen und Anspielungen, die zum Thema mal mehr, 
67 H Barta ‘Graeca non leguntur’? – Zu den Ursprüngen des europäischen Rechts im antiken 
Griechenland. Band III/1: Das griechische Recht in seinem kulturhistorischen Umfeld – Beispiele 
aus Dichtung, Geschichtsschreibung, Philosophie und (Kautelar) Jurisprudenz (Wiesbaden, 
2014) ISBN 978-3-447-10036-6 Gr 8; XXI 547 S.
68 E Wolf Griechisches Rechtsdenken 4 in 6 Banden (Frankfurt/M, 1950-1970). Zu Aischylos siehe 
besonders Bd 1 S 340-424; zu Euripides siehe besonders Bd 2 S 373-481. Als Geschichtsschreiber 
findet Thukydides bei Wolf keine besondere Berücksichtigung.
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mal gar nichts beitragen. Allerdings ist zu vermerken, daß Barta stärker als in den 
vorhergehenden Bänden seine eigene Meinung zu Wort kommen läßt. Es scheint, als 
habe Barta hier eine ihm besonders wesensnahe Thematik behandelt. Das umfaßt eine 
Fülle an eher rechtsphilosophisch einzustufenden Ausführungen. Sie sind ebenso 
interessant wie diskussionswürdig und enthalten immer wieder rechtshistorisch 
relevante Topoi. Allerdings macht Barta es dem Leser selbst in diesem Band schwer, 
das rechtshistorisch Wesentliche nachzuvollziehen. Zu vermischt sind seine diversen 
Gesichtspunkte und Argumentationen. Man muß sie lesen, und das gilt auch für die 
zahllosen Anmerkungen. Aber die Lektüre ist zweifellos ein Gewinn, wenn auch 
weniger für die rechtsgeschichtliche Darstellung und Diskussion.
Abstract
The ancient world saw the rise and fall of many cultures, with accompanying 
cultural exchanges and reciprocal influences. It seems that such reciprocal influences 
and exchanges extended to the law as well, and affected legal evolution. Old legal 
institutions were preserved for future generations but were influenced by newer 
cultures. This concept is not new, but Barta has revived it. He has embarked on 
a publication comprising four volumes, of which volumes 1, 2 (pt1/2) and 3 (pt 
1) have appeared. The author has set out to prove that the influence of Greek law 
on Roman law was greater than has been acknowledged up until now, that Greek 
law was likewise influenced by the Old Orient, and that Roman law also influenced 
later legal systems. The one concern of this article is to show that Barta’s theory 
is invalid. The other concern is to criticise Barta’s approach. He does not cite the 
extensive literature on which he relies, but quotes it. He fills page after page with 
texts by other authors but does not discuss nor analyse their content. Thus the reader 
is provided with a wide range of legal literature of the past, but not with any critical 
analysis of it. Newer writing is often neglected. Barta himself has interesting ideas, 
but it is difficult to detect them, hidden as they are amongst the cited literature. This 
approach is followed in all volumes but is scientifically unacceptable and merits the 
strongest criticism.
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REMARKS ON THE METHODOLOGY 
OF PRIVATE LAW STUDIES: THE USE 
OF LATIN MAXIMS AS EXEMPLIFIED BY 
NEMO PLUS IURIS
Franciszek Longchamps de Bérier*
1 Using Roman rules and maxims
Honouring the spoken word was deeply embedded in the Roman mentality and 
played a significant role in the building of relationships among citizens. The Quirites 
took pride in fides Romana, which distinguished them from the proverbial perfidy 
of the Carthaginians or fickleness of the Greeks, who considered themselves bound 
only by the written word, if at all. Keeping one’s word, remaining true to one’s 
promises has become part of our legal culture which is rooted in Latin antiquity. 
This is as valid today as it was then, and is an expression of the constant diligence 
required when building mutual trust − within the legal order as in other spheres. 
Indeed, the law as a whole − both that of Rome and of our times − is based on 
goodwill and a presumption of good intentions on the part of others, since it is a 
fundamental expectation in interpreting human behaviour. It is words that are first 
interpreted. We pick our words with great care and, particularly in public discourse, 
often like to use Latin dicta. We do so not only to make our arguments sound more 
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sophisticated, but also to support our theses not merely with elegantly worded, 
classical maxims, but also with well tested, established concepts based on the 
experience of people who lived in ancient Rome, a consummately practical society, 
very well versed in the practice of law. The Roman findings have been tested in a 
variety of social and economic conditions throughout the centuries of legal history 
and the various epochs during which the European legal tradition has been formed. 
Indeed, that tradition has never stopped drawing liberally upon Roman law, and still 
does so, even today. Latin expressions and phrases invoked in legal parlance find 
their way into written works, including studies on private law. In research works, 
Latin expressions, whether sentences, maxims, rules, proverbs, or sayings, seem to 
play the role of topoi. Sometimes the sentences denote the topoi themselves; at other 
times, the sentences refer to the topoi as the place and substance of interpretation: as 
elements or premises used in reasoning, developing an argument, and adding depth 
to analysis.
In the European legal tradition, it is a matter of pride that the foundations of 
Europe’s laws were laid down by the ancients. The best-known quotation expressing 
such pride may be found in Montesquieu’s Je me trouve fort dans mes maximes 
lorsque j’ai pour moi les Romains (I am strongly confirmed in my sentiments upon 
finding the Romans on my side).1 The everyday use of Latin legal maxims is a 
symbolic acknowledgement of the Roman legacy that laid the foundations of our law, 
especially private law. However, the dicta play a far more important role than that: 
they are a means of communication and mutual understanding. They express values 
protected by law, and are a sign of universal acceptance of the concepts they express.2 
Some Latin phrases and expressions involve common topoi – loci communes, which 
refer to matters of general concern. They are the points of departure providing the 
grounds for all persuasive discourse − for instance audiatur et altera pars (let the 
other side be heard too), or ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (the burden 
of proof is on the one who declares, not the one who denies). Most of the dicta used 
in legal practice refer to special topoi – loci specifici, related to our specialised legal 
knowledge.3 We like to use them because they are a meaningful addition to legal 
discourse; by supplementing our arguments, they fill the gap between general rules 
of argumentative discourse and the applicable regulations. 
1 Ch-L de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu De l’esprit de lois Bk 6 Ch 15 (http://
classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/montesquieu/de_esprit_des_lois/partie_1/esprit_des_
lois_Livre_1.pdf at 105 (accessed 20 Jan 2014); trl into English by Thomas Nugent The Spirit of 
Laws (New York, 1899) at 87.
2 F Longchamps de Bérier “‘Audiatur et altera pars.’ Szkic o brakującej kolumnie Pałacu 
Sprawiedliwości” in W Uruszczak, P Święcicka & A Kremer (eds) ‘Leges sapere.’ Studia i prace 
dedykowane Januszowi Sondlowi w 50 rocznicę pracy naukowej (Krakow, 2008) 271-283 at 272.
3 Cf J Stelmach & B Brożek Sztuka negocjacji prawniczych (Warsaw, 2011) at 77-78.
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But how can we best use Latin maxims and sentences? After all, they are used by the 
contemporary legislator who incorporates them into legal regulations, and are invoked 
by judges and parties to proceedings. They are bandied about by prosecuting attorneys, 
solicitors, politicians and publicists in periodicals and newspapers. Here Roman law has 
proven to be very much alive today, becoming a more or less recognized element of the legal 
knowledge of contemporary societies, a permanent component of their legal culture.4 
We should endeavour to use that knowledge in a competent manner, and not only on 
isolated occasions. As an example of how Latin dicta could be used, let us look at 
nemo plus iuris, a phrase that we may recall not only from Roman-law classes.
Today, nemo plus iuris is useful in legal deliberations covering a multiplicity 
of topics. Years ago, Krzysztof Amielańczyk demonstrated its usefulness when 
answering the following question: 
If a share purchase agreement is concluded for shares in a limited liability company 
which are in fact non-existent, because they were created as a result of a legal act 
performed in violation of the formal provisions, thus resulting in an unlawful increase 
in the company’s share capital, whereby the number of rights (shares) in that company 
did not in fact increase, can such agreement be deemed invalid in view of the nemo plus 
iuris rule?5 
The seller did not, in fact, have the rights he claimed he had. After an in-depth 
analysis, Amielańczyk came up with an answer in the negative.
Nemo plus iuris may be invoked in a variety of contexts. A more recent example 
related to the question whether a legal person has rights if the legal persons that 
conferred those rights do not themselves have such rights. The Constitutional 
Tribunal of Poland had to decide whether a constitutional complaint could be 
brought by a company incorporated by entities not having such capacity, for example 
local government bodies, or business entities whose activities were funded out of 
the assets of the State Treasury or local government bodies. Such public entities 
perform public tasks in the spheres of both imperium and dominium. Assets are the 
fundamental criterion differentiating public entities from private entities.
Pursuant to Article 79 paragraph 1 of the Constitution, everyone whose constitutional 
freedoms or rights have been violated shall have the right to challenge the Constitutionality 
of the statute or another normative act on whose basis a court or public administration 
body has made a final decision on his freedoms or rights or on his obligations specified 
in the Constitution.6 
4 H Kupiszewski Prawo rzymskie a współczesność 2 ed (Krakow, 2013) at 155.
5 K Amielańczyk “Zastosowanie rzymskiej zasady ‘nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest 
quam ipse habet’ do oceny skuteczności zbycia nie istniejących udziałów w spółce z ograniczoną 
odpowiedzialnością” in M Mozgawa, M Nazar, J Stelmasiak & T Bojarski (eds) Materiały z 
konferencji ‘Polska lat dziewięćdziesiątych. Przemiany państwa i prawa’. Lublin–Kazimierz, 
28–30 kwietnia 1997 r. vol 3 (Lublin, 1997) 355-362 at 356.
6 Ts 13/12 (18.12.2013, otk.trybunal.gov.pl/orzcznictwo/otk.html (accessed 28 Feb 2015).
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Can the above-mentioned company therefore be considered an entitled entity within 
the meaning of the term “everyone” as used by the legislator? While leaving the 
answer to the Polish Tribunal, which came up with a positive answer, we should add 
that because a matter relates to public law it does not preclude invoking nemo plus 
iuris. In Roman public law it was already a rule, which is particularly visible with 
reference to the delegation of power and its acquisition. The famous second century 
AD jurist, Julian, wrote in the first book of his Digest, D 2 15: More maiorum ita 
comparatum est, ut is demum iurisdictionem mandare possit, qui eam suo iure, non 
alieno beneficio habet (It has been provided by ancestral custom that a person may 
delegate the administration of justice to another only where he has it by his own right 
and not through the favour of another). By referring to mos maiorum, Julian was 
stressing the ancient roots of the rule that the scope of delegated power depended on 
the power held by the delegating party.7 In referring to the latter as having the power 
by right, he was emphasising the structural impossibility of delegating power that 
had been delegated.8
From the point of view of legal theory, nemo plus iuris is a classic example of 
the reconstruction of a legal rule by induction, namely by means of an analysis and 
generalisation of particular regulations, sometimes relating to narrowly defined legal 
situations. In Polish law, it is not a codified rule: “while never expressed in general 
terms, it is founded on an analysis of particular solutions which shape the mechanism 
for transferring various types of individual rights.”9 To establish whether a rule such 
as one found in current legislation applies at a particular time, it is necessary to 
establish why it is considered legally binding. And when one resorts to such a rule 
and wishes to make efficient use of it, it is advisable to invoke not only dogma but 
also its historical development; not so much to determine whether or not it was 
binding, but rather how it was understood and perceived at different times in history 
and under various legal systems.
2 Use maxims competently
When determining how to make competent use of the Latin maxim beginning with 
the words nemo plus iuris, we should first answer the question: what precisely is 
nemo plus iuris – a principle, a rule, a maxim, a definition or an adage? The answer 
will, above all, help us to introduce the phrase itself properly, for without further 
clarification nemo plus iuris sounds a little awkward. Secondly, particularly when 
writing, we may need to find a semantically equivalent phrase, so that we do not need 
7 D 1 16 4 6 Ulpian On the Duties of the Proconsul Bk 1; cf D 1 16 5 Papinian Questions Bk 1; 
D 1 16 6 1 Ulpian On the Duties of the Proconsul Bk 1.
8 D 1 21 5pr Paul On Plautius Bk 18; D 1 21 1 1 Papinian Questions Bk 1.
9 M Safjan “Zasady prawa prywatnego” in M Safjan (ed) System Prawa Prywatnego. Prawo 
cywilne – część ogólna vol 1 (Warsaw, 2007) 261-308 at 265-266.
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to keep repeating nemo plus iuris several times in the same sentence or paragraph. 
Thirdly, we need to determine the meaning of words such as “principle”, “rule”, 
“maxim”, “adage”, so that we know when it is appropriate to use them. For instance, 
Greek παροιμία – paroimia, is a proverb, maxim, saw, and digression.10 But are these 
meanings interchangeable?
Another preliminary issue concerns the correctness of the Latin phrase and its 
origins. Sometimes we may have the impression that a Latin dictum we remember 
or have stored somewhere in the recesses of our mind may reinforce our legal 
argument. However, before using it we should firstly be sure of the exact wording; 
secondly, that we understand what it truly means or may mean; and finally, whether 
it is appropriate to use it in a particular context to support our argument. We must 
be sure of understanding the entire context and the extent to which we may rely on 
it to develop our line of reasoning. We certainly do not want to expose ourselves to 
ridicule, so we need to ensure that using certain expressions will not lead to unpleasant 
surprises, especially baffling ones. If our adversary is better prepared than we are, he 
may accuse us of superficiality, or − even worse − refute our arguments by invoking 
the same Latin phrase in a broader or different meaning. There is nothing worse than 
having your own weapon turned against you; the easiest way to silence people is to 
turn their own words against them.
Nemo plus iuris is only part of a maxim of which even the writings on Roman 
law give different versions: nemo plus iuris transferre potest, quam ipse habet;11 
nemo plus iuris in alium transferre potest quam ipse habet;12 nemo plus iuris in alium 
transferre potest quam ipse haberet;13 and nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest 
quam ipse haberet.14 The phrases differ in length; we see the forms ad alium and in 
alium, then habet or haberet running parallel to one another. We should therefore 
endeavour to find the original. Origo means the beginning, the origin, the source; 
we should, therefore, try to establish when this Latin phrase first appeared. To do 
this, we first need to look at ancient legal sources, for even if nemo plus iuris did not 
derive from them, we are interested in the phrase from a legal point of view and in 
a legal context.
Let us begin with the last and fiftieth book of Justinian’s Digest, and last and 
seventeenth title De diversis regulis iuris antiqui. It is here that the compilers 
collected passages from works by Roman jurists, summarising the legal solutions 
adopted in ancient pre-classical and classical law. In the fifty-fourth passage, we 
find the memorable sentence: nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest, quam ipse 
10 HG Liddell & R Scott A Greek-English Lexicon 9 ed (Oxford, 1961) at 1342.
11 F Schulz Principles of Roman Law (Oxford, 1936) at 259.
12 A Stelmachowski “Nabycie i utrata własności” in T Dybowski (ed) System Prawa Prywatnego. 
Prawo rzeczowe vol 3 (Warsaw, 2003) 303-412 at 315.
13 Kupiszewski (n 4) at 220.
14 A Kacprzak, J Krzynówek & W Wołodkiewicz ‘Regulae iuris.ʼ Łacińskie inskrypcje na kolumnach 
Sądu Najwyższego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Warsaw, 2001) at 117.
... THE USE OF LATIN MAXIMS ...
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haberet. So now we know it is ad alium and haberet! Justinian’s commission in a 
prescription indicated the author of the maxim and the work from which it derives: 
Ulpian, Book 46 ad edictum (Commentary on the Edict). Now we are certain of 
our sentence’s original wording, and we should keep to it. The compilers treated 
quotations with respect; we should definitely follow suit. So when quoting the words 
nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest, quam ipse haberet, we need to provide an 
appropriate footnote referring to “D” or “Dig” for the Digest of Emperor Justinian, 
and to passage 54 in Title 17 of Book 50, as follows: 50 17 54.
3 Be aware of the context of your quotation
The essence of Romanist training includes not only consistent quotation of original 
sources, but also an in-depth study of the context in which a particular thought 
appeared. No quotations or collections of thoughts are of any value unless we know 
exactly who is being quoted and the origin of the quotation. We cannot delight in 
a quotation if we are uncertain of the accuracy of the wording. In addition, if the 
source of a passage has been scrupulously recorded, it is mandatory to check the 
original and thus avoid the errors that may arise if we quote references “second 
hand.” These errors more usually comprise wrong numbers than misspelt words, 
resulting in a variety of distortions.
We may not always be able to identify the author, the work, or even the period 
when a particular Latin phrase was formulated. Some dicta reflect the Roman-law 
doctrine or “are substantiated by the legal view as expressed by the Roman jurists”.15 
In such cases, even if we are unable to find a particular phrase or expression in ancient 
legal, or even non-legal sources, we may rely on ancient lore to authenticate our 
theses by saying: “The Romans used to ...” However, not all Latin dicta necessarily 
come from Roman law. Frequently repeated, they may occur in parallel and equally 
valid versions.16 The use of different words in a maxim may result from the author’s 
personal preferences, or the stylistic requirements imposed by the context. The jurist 
Paul wrote on one occasion: confessus pro iudicato est (the confessed is as judged), 
and on another: confessus pro iudicato habetur (the confessed is held to have been 
judged). Justinian’s compilers cited both maxims at the beginning of the same title 
15 K Amielańczyk “O rzymskim pochodzeniu zasady ‘nemo plus iuris…’ i jej aktualności we 
współczesnym prawie polskim” in W Witkowski (ed) W kręgu historii i współczesności polskiego 
prawa. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana profesorowi Arturowi Korobowiczowi (Lublin, 2008) 
503-517 at 503.
16 This comes as no surprise, but should not make us negligent. At a time when our knowledge of 
Latin is rather superficial, we should be uncompromisingly faithful to the original wording. In 
ancient Rome, of course, but also in the Middle Ages and during the Renaissance or Baroque 
periods, it was more legitimate to attempt to formulate one’s own rule or definition in Latin.
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of the Digest.17 There is no point in debating which one is correct, since the content 
is the same.18
Sometimes it is unclear whether a sentence that could not be traced to ancient 
sources appeared in the Middle Ages, or was formulated much later. Modern 
thoughts expressed in Latin are usually easy to recognise, and it is even easier to 
ascertain who authored them. Such was the case with the maxim lex retro non agit 
thought up by Stanisław Wróblewski.19 A more puzzling example is the old saying 
fiat iustitia, pereat mundus, attributed to either St Augustine or the Holy Roman 
Emperor Ferdinand I,20 or to Pope Adrian VI.21 As the embodiment of ideas held 
by persons fanatical about justice, it was popular in the sixteenth century. It may be 
translated as follows: “Let there be justice though the world perish.” If mundus is 
understood as meaning the great of this world, the thought sounds very reasonable 
and timeless, expressing a rather different postulate: “Let justice be served and 
overcome the haughtiness and pride of the great of this world.” The sentence tells 
us to focus on what is good and just, regardless of what the wealthy and powerful 
think or are demanding.
Justinian’s compilers had the good habit of citing sources: “Ulpian, Book 46 of 
his Commentary on the Edict”. Such prescriptions (placed, as the word suggests, at 
the beginning) before the quoted text showed their respect for the authority being 
quoted and hid their own thoughts behind his words. Indeed, the whole of the Digest 
is “written with a pair of scissors”: this hefty volume came into being by combining 
fragments of passages, sometimes even interwoven with one another, selected from 
the works of pre-classical and classical Roman jurists. Like the works of classical 
jurisprudence in Justinian’s compilation, in the post-classical codes the passages 
from selected imperial constitutions were also arranged thematically. When we 
realise that a work compiled in the sixth century AD includes materials dating from 
between the first century BC and the third century AD, whose legally binding force 
was thus confirmed, we should ask the serious question what did nemo plus iuris 
ad alium transferre potest, quam ipse haberet mean when Ulpian first used it at 
the beginning of the third century, and what did it mean in Justinian’s time, more 
specifically in the Digest? This quotation is not the only one which, taken out of 
context, gives the impression of eloquence and timelessness. The Romans were 
also aware of that phenomenon. The works and style of Ulpian’s peer, the jurist 
17 D 42 2 1 Paul On the Edict Bk 56; D 42 2 3 Paul On Plautius Bk 9.
18 Cf C 7 59 1 (Caracalla in AD 211): Confessos in iure pro iudicatis haberi placet.
19 W Wołodkiewicz, “‘Lex retro non agit’” in W Wołodkiewicz & J Krzynówek (eds) Łacińskie 
paremie w europejskiej kulturze prawnej i orzecznictwie sądów polskich (Warsaw, 2001) 153-192 
at 153.
20 C Michalunio ‘Dicta.’ Zbiór łacińskich sentencji, przysłów, zwrotów, powiedzeń (Krakow, 2005) 
at 181.
21 According to D Liebs Lateinische Rechtsregeln und Rechtssprichwörter (München, 1998) at 84 
the quotation originally comes from I diarii 33 of Marino Sanuto.
... THE USE OF LATIN MAXIMS ...
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Paul, made it very easy indeed: his phrases conveyed the meaning perfectly and 
succinctly. He was not particularly insightful or creative in legal terms, but some of 
his sentences are so succinct and clear that a separate collection has been compiled, 
under the telling title Pauli Sententiae.22 The maxim nemo plus iuris must have been 
“living a life of its own” ever since it was included in the Commentary on the Edict. 
However, its independent existence was ensured after Justinian’s commission chose 
it in the sixth century AD and entered it in the Digest under a special title on the rules 
of ancient law.
The prescription that provides information on the origin of a particular passage 
– more particularly by entering the number of the book in the Commentary on the 
Edict – makes it easier to find the palingenetic context in which the phrase nemo plus 
iuris appeared in Ulpian. Palingenesis (from the Greek words: palin – again, and 
genesis – creation) is an attempt to reconstruct a text that has been lost.23 To judge by 
the passages found in thematically ordered groupings in the Digest, Otto Lenel made 
such an attempt in the second half of the nineteenth century. Not only did he group 
the texts by author and by that author’s particular books, but he also suggested the 
order in which they may have originally appeared in each book. In the case of works 
discussing a number of issues, such as the many volumes of the Commentary on the 
Edict, passages from the works of jurists were separated according to the compilers’ 
annotations found in the prescriptions. This made it possible to establish which 
issues a particular jurist discussed in a particular book. Thus, even a cursory glance 
at all eleven passages24 in Book 46 of Ulpian’s Commentary on the Edict shows 
he was discussing issues related to intestate inheritance under the praetor’s edict 
(bonorum possessio).25 This shows that the comment “no one can transfer greater 
rights to someone else than he himself possesses” was made in the context of the 
law of succession, or more precisely in that branch of the law of succession that was 
developing dynamically as a result of the activities of the jurisdictional magistrate. 
This should come as no surprise to us, because the law of succession was a driver of 
progress in Roman law. It avoided theoretical solutions when there was no practical 
need for them; however, we do find a number of theoretical solutions in the Roman 
law of succession, which resulted from the complexity and diversity of the issues 
concerned, as well as the detailed nature and comprehensive scope of the solutions 
adopted.
Ulpian’s short commentary nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest, quam ipse 
haberet acquired a general meaning when the compilers highlighted one sentence that 
22 F Longchamps de Bérier L’abuso del diritto nell’esperienza del diritto privato romano (Torino, 
2013) at 149.
23 Cf, eg, M Zabłocka Ustawa XII tablic. Rekonstrukcje doby renesansu (Warsaw, 1998) at 10.
24 O Lenel Palingenesia iuris civilis 2 vols (Leipzig, 1889) vol 2 col 720-723 Ulpianus 1193-1203.
25 Cf O Lenel Das ‘Edictum perpetuum.’ Ein Versuch zu seiner Wiederherstellung (Leipzig, 1927) at 
355-359.
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merely defined the scope of transferred rights. According to Lenel, Ulpian’s comment 
may have referred to in iure cessio hereditatis,26 that is, cession of (relinquishing) 
an inheritance before a praetor. It took place before an heir accepted an intestate 
inheritance under civil law.27 “Since hereditas is intangible, it can be transferred only 
in the form of in iure cessio. The cessionary of in iure cessio hereditatis becomes 
a universal successor of the testator.”28 This resulted in transmitting eligibility to 
inherit from one living person to another, providing that while only the cedens had 
been eligible to inherit, the cessionary became the heir with immediate effect.29 
Deliberations on the content and scope of the transferred right related to succession 
under ius civile, which, in the praetorian order, appeared in the second class of 
intestate eligibility to inheritance, called unde legitimi, probably from the first words 
of that part of the edict. Otto Lenel placed the passage D 50 17 54 at the end of the 
section devoted to unde legitimi, that is, after two other texts concerning that class. 
There is no further evidence that could help identify the location of nemo plus iuris 
more specifically in that part of Book 46 of the Commentary on the Edict.30 Fritz 
Schulz went even further and suggested that Ulpian may in fact have worded the 
phrase a little differently: Heres non plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse 
haberet si hereditatem adisset (an heir may not transfer greater rights to someone 
else than he would himself have if he had accepted the inheritance). This phrase was 
reworded by the compilers who replaced the subject heres by the more general nemo, 
while forgetting to change the conjunctive haberet into the indicative mood – habet; 
after all, the original text must have had a hypothetical form,31 which the rule did not 
need. Henryk Kupiszewski summed it up as follows: “Ulpian wanted to say that if 
the heir accepted venditio hereditatis, this could not encompass anything more than 
he would inherit on aditio.”32
26 Lenel (n 24) vol 2 col 722 n 1.
27 G 2 35; cf F Longchamps de Bérier Il fedecommesso universale nel diritto romano classico 
(Warsaw, 1997) at 90ff.
28 W Dajczak, T Giaro & F Longchamps de Bérier Prawo rzymskie. U podstaw prawa prywatnego 
2 ed (Warsaw, 2014) at 353.
29 G 3 85.
30 It is only on rare occasions that a maxim is found in its original context and then repeated 
elsewhere as an existing rule. One example is provided by res iudicata pro veritate accipitur (for 
the judgment of the court is deemed true). Cited in a longer passage D 1 5 25 from Ulpian On the 
Lex Julia et Papia Bk 1, it was then recorded by Justinian’s compilers as a rule of ancient law – 
D 50 17 207. Prescriptions before both passages prove the compilers were quoting from the same 
source. This made the job easier for the author of the palingenesis; cf Lenel (n 24) vol 2 col 940 
Ulpianus 1978.
31 F Schulz Classical Roman Law (Oxford, 1951) at 352. The suggestion that they forgot to change 
the mood of the verb is doubtful. Would the compilers, working on a passage in order to establish 
it as a rule, neglect to give it the finishing touches, and ignore a rather simple issue in their mental 
processes? Ordinary negligence in a chapter as important as D 50 17 amounts to inattention or 
carelessness on the part of the editors, at the very least.
32 Kupiszewski (n 4) at 226.
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The context in which nemo plus iuris appeared in the law of succession is 
confirmed by other passages from the Commentary on the Edict. In Book 76 – D 50 
17 160 2, Ulpian wrote: absurdum est plus iuris habere eum, cui legatus sit fundus, 
quam heredem aut ipsum testatorem, si viveret, thus finding it “absurd for someone 
to whom an estate has been bequeathed to have a better right than the heir or the 
testator himself if he were still living.” His contemporary, the jurist Paul, mentioned 
in Book 12 of his Commentary on the Edict – D 50 17 120: nemo plus commodi 
heredi suo relinquit, quam ipse habuit, meaning “no one leaves a greater benefit to 
his heir than he himself had”. Another regula stemming from the law of succession 
was quoted by the compilers in passage 175: non debeo melioris condicionis esse, 
quam auctor meus, a quo ius in me transit (I ought not to be in a better position 
than the person from whom the right passes to me). The passage we refer to today 
as D 50 17 175 1 comes from Paul’s Book 11 of the Commentary on Plautius of 
which only two passages have survived.33 Otto Lenel believed the book referred to 
wills and legacies, and suspected that the jurist was simply discussing lex Iulia et 
Papia,34 that is, Augustus’ regulations relating to marriage. The emperor sanctioned 
the regulations in the law of succession by depriving the unmarried or childless of 
their capacitas to inherit. To sum up our deliberations on Ulpian’s original context, 
on the basis of the cited sources it has been established beyond doubt that the rule 
nemo plus iuris originates from classical Roman law. 
It may have been formulated by Sabinus,35 and referred to by Ulpian as an aside on in 
iure cessio hereditatis and mancipatio. The compilers gave the statement a universal 
value. The law of later times and today has assumed it was only an argument, without 
giving it an absolute meaning.36 
The third century jurist invoked nemo plus iuris in relation to the transfer of an 
entire estate to another person by means of the formal and abstract act of in iure 
cessio hereditatis: after all, there must have been some questions about the scope of 
universal succession. Little wonder, therefore, that the phrase was formulated in the 
context of the law of succession. The nemo plus iuris rule “most likely expressed the 
principle that both the assets and liabilities of an estate were transferred to the acquirer 
of an inheritance”.37 We know now that eventually it became one of the fundamental 
principles of property law. This means that in any derivative acquisition, the rights of 
the acquirer may not exceed those of the transferor. The right passes to the acquirer 
33 The other is D 30 85.
34 Lenel (n 24) vol 1 col 1165 Paulus 1182 n 5.
35 Ulpianus provided the disputed rule in a slightly different lexical form in D 41 1 20pr, coming 
from his Commentary on Sabinus, which gives rise to the speculation that in the first century AD 
he had already formulated the idea that one cannot transfer to another more rights than he himself 
has.
36 Kupiszewski (n 4) at 227.
37 Kacprzak, Krzynówek & Wołodkiewicz (n 14) at 117.
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together with all its possible limitations. In Prawo rzymskie a współczesność (Roman 
Law and Modernity), a book that has been a constant source of inspiration and has 
not lost its relevance over the past twenty-five years, Henryk Kupiszewski gave an 
example of how part of a statement may be subject to reinterpretation in the history 
of ancient Roman law as a result of legal development: 
The regula talks about ius transferre. This phrase had different meanings in classical and 
Justinian law. Classical jurisprudence did not yet know the concept of dominium or of 
ius proprietatis transferre, and used the flexible term rem mancipare, rem in iure cedere, 
rem transferre, the res to jurists at that time meaning res incorporalis. Post-classical law 
used the more general terms dominium, proprietatem transferre, when the view that the 
ownership of an object could be transferred gradually became a fixed concept.38 
And this concerns only one, though crucial, element of nemo plus iuris.
What meaning was attributed to the rule by Justinian’s compilers? Firstly, it 
is not surprising they took it out of its original context. It is true that “the original 
wording does not provide grounds for assigning to it any far-fetched generalisations. 
The jurist does not seem to be pointing to a universal application, beyond what is 
to be found within the framework of the law of succession.”39 Because the sentence 
nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet “expresses a rational 
obviousness”,40 not only was it a good generalisation, but it simply attracted the 
attention of Justinian’s commission when it was working on the chapter in which 
legal rules are stated. The chapter summarised the Digest. Indeed, “the obviousness 
of the idea expressed in Ulpian’s statement is so striking that one may feel a more 
detailed, legal commentary would be superfluous”.41 In this way, the compilers helped 
save the maxim itself, because had it been limited to its original, narrow context, it 
would have sunk into oblivion despite its apt and succinct wording. Secondly, earlier 
on in the same Book 50, Title 17, the compilers cited, as passage 11, an excerpt 
from Pomponius − a lawyer living in the mid-second century AD: Id quod nostrum 
est sine facto nostro ad alium transferri non potest. Passage D 50 17 11 quoted 
here comes from Book 5 of the Commentary on Sabinus, comprising comments on 
civil law. Pomponius seems to be saying in more general terms than nemo plus iuris 
that what is ours cannot be transferred to another without any action on our part. 
The above quotation leads us to the principles of property law. In the post-classical 
period, a combined reading of the passages from Pomponius and Ulpian gave rise to 
a phrase that English jurists found more to their taste: nemo dat qui non habet (no 
38 Kupiszewski (n 4) at 227 n 118.
39 Amielańczyk (n 15) at 504-505.
40 Kupiszewski (n 4) at 225.
41 Amielańczyk (n 5) at 355.
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one can give who does not have).42 Naturally, this short maxim eventually developed 
into a rule of common law.43
In Rome, nemo plus iuris came to be used in two senses. One was the sense 
in which Ulpian used it, the other, the way that Justinian’s jurists understood it. It 
is clear that in both cases, although to a varying extent, the jurists were thinking of 
a law, a legal rule. At the beginning of the title containing various rules of ancient 
law, Justinian’s compilers recorded what they considered to be a rule. In the opening 
paragraph D 50 17 1, they cited Paul’s definition from Book 16 of his Commentary 
on Plautius:
Regula est, quae rem quae est breviter enarrat. Non ex regula ius sumatur, sed ex iure quod 
est regula fiat. Per regulam igitur brevis rerum narratio traditur, et, ut ait Sabinus, quasi 
causae coniectio est, quae simul cum in aliquo vitiata est, perdit officium suum. (A rule is 
something which briefly describes what a thing is. The law may not be derived from a rule, 
but a rule must arise from the law as it is. By means of a rule, therefore, a brief description of 
things is handed down and, as Sabinus says, is, as it were, the element of a case, which loses 
its force as soon as it becomes in any way defective.)
The passage has been analysed in depth more than once,44 but that is not our concern 
now; it is enough to note the two different ways of perceiving a rule: as a criterion 
and as a normative standard. The above text shows that our perception of it differs 
from that of jurists in ancient times, since we believe an exception proves the rule. 
In their view, an exception disproved the rule, because a rule was not a source of 
law, but only a summary and description of the applicable law. It was a definition, 
and Javolenus’ famous remark was simply a warning against the absolutisation of 
definitions;45 the oft quoted passage comes from Book 11 of his Letters – D 50 17 
202: Omnis definitio in iure civili periculosa est: parum est enim ut non subverti 
potest (every definition in civil law is dangerous; for it is seldom that one cannot 
be overturned). Justinian’s compilers selected that single sentence, and included it 
in the regulae of ancient law in D 50 17 as the tenth passage from the end of the 
Digest. In the light of the omnis definitio warning, even if the nemo plus iuris rule 
was not subject to restrictions under Roman law, its importance must at least not 
have been exaggerated. Moreover, apices iuris non sunt iura (extreme solutions are 
not laws);46 which also applies to the interpretation of the rule. Bearing in mind the 
42 Cf Schulz (n 31) at 351-352.
43 Cf, eg, s 21(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 c 54 which only refers to the existence of that 
maxim.
44 The text was analyzed in detail by Kupiszewski (n 4) at 189ff, but earlier also by P Stein ‘Regulae 
iuris.’  From Juristic Rules to Legal Maxims (Edinburgh, 1966) at 67ff; B Schmidlin Die römischen 
Rechtsregeln. Versuch einer Typologie (Cologne-Vienna, 1970) at 7ff.
45 Cf Kupiszewski (n 4) at 204.
46 Cf D 17 1 29 4 Ulpian Disputations Bk 7. The translation “legal tricks are not law” has been 
suggested by K Burczak, A Dębiński & M Jońca Łacińskie sentencje i powiedzenia prawnicze 
(Warsaw, 2007) at 13.
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above proviso, we may now summarise what was said above and state that both 
classical and Justinian law held firmly to nemo plus iuris as a rule. Thus we have 
been able to learn both the original meaning attributed to nemo plus iuris, and that in 
which the regula was popularised.
4 Do not let yourself be caught by surprise
In Roman law, the said rule was of considerable significance in yet another branch 
of law − the law of obligations. It appeared in deliberations concerning contracts of 
sale, and so we should consider a passage from Ulpian in Book 29 of his Commentary 
on Sabinus – D 41 1 20pr-1:
Traditio nihil amplius transferre debet vel potest ad eum qui accipit, quam est apud eum qui 
tradit. Si igitur quis dominium in fundo habuit, id tradendo transfert, si non habuit, ad eum 
qui accipit nihil transfert. Quotiens autem dominium transfertur, ad eum qui accipit tale 
transfertur, quale fuit apud eum qui tradit. (Delivery should not and cannot transfer to the 
transferee any greater title than resides in the transferor. Hence, if someone conveys land of 
which he is owner, he transfers his title; if he does not have ownership, he conveys nothing to 
the recipient. Now whenever ownership is transferred, it passes to the transferee to the same 
extent as it was held by the transferor.)
In the first of the sentences quoted above, the jurist gave a slightly different wording 
to the nemo plus iuris rule. The palingenetic context of the above excerpt clearly 
indicates that Book 29 was concerned with emptio venditio.47 Incidentally, it is worth 
noting that the entire fragment confirms that the preposition ad was more appropriate 
than in when referring to the transfer of property rights – at least in Ulpian.48 The 
text talks of performance in terms of a contract of sale by traditio, delivery, but it is 
clear that originally the third-century jurist was referring to mancipatio. In classical 
law, land could not be alienated through traditio.49 That typical interpolation was 
made by Justinian’s compilers. In addition, one of the passages referring to nemo 
plus iuris, D 50 17 177pr, which they included in the rules of ancient law in the last 
title of their Digest, stems from discussions on contracts of sale. The entire quotation 
in D 50 17 177 was taken from Book 14 of Paul’s Commentary on Plautius: Qui in 
ius dominiumve alterius succedit, iure eius uti debet. Nemo videtur dolo exsequi, qui 
ignorat causam, cur non debeat petere (Whoever succeeds to the legal position or 
right of property of another must accept his rights. No one is regarded as something 
by fraud if he is ignorant of the reason why he may not claim). According to Otto 
Lenel, the first sentence in that passage, designated as “pr”, referred to exceptio rei 
47 Lenel (n 24) vol 2 col 1122 Ulpianus 2721.
48 Cf ad eg in Ulpianus On Sabinus Bk 29 – D 41 1 20 1; but in in the same jurist, eg in On the Edict 
Bk 9 – D 3 3 17pr. and D 3 3 27 1; and rem suam in alium transferre in Gaius Diurnal Matters Bk 
2 – D 41 1 9 3.
49 Lenel (n 24) vol 2 col 1122 nn 5-9.
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venditae ac traditae.50 The defendant used this exceptio because the thing sought had 
been delivered by the plaintiff in terms of a contract of sale. The beginning of Book 
14 relates to matters concerning exceptiones, namely pleas.
In terms of the emptio venditio contract, the seller was bound to deliver only 
vacua possessio − free and unimpeded possession, into which the purchaser could 
enter without interference from either the vendor or, more importantly, a third party. 
The buyer had to continue undisturbed, so that uti frui habere possidere licere – he 
could freely use, derive profits, retain and possess. Thus, what the purchaser owed 
was not dare, that is transfer of ownership, but facere, that is making or causing 
undisturbed possession.51 Naturally, if goods were transferred to the buyer by way 
of a formal act of disposal, mancipatio or in iure cessio, then ownership passed to 
the buyer. This also usually happened by means of traditio – the simple delivery of 
ordinary things that did not belong to the special category res mancipi. Failure to 
transfer ownership did not give rise to actio empti – an action on purchase – on the 
part of the buyer. It was a different matter if someone effectively vindicated the thing 
purchased from the buyer by the act of evictio. As long as the emptor 
retained his habere licere, the law did not give him any protection. For a modern lawyer 
this must sound both surprising and inequitable ... Was the Roman law ‘stiff and primitive’ 
in this regard? First of all, we have to remember ... [that in its structure] the contract of sale 
contained everything that was necessary to transfer ownership except [the act of delivery by] 
traditio (or mancipatio). Once the object was handed over (or mancipated), and provided the 
vendor himself had been owner, ownership passed.52 
Ulpian attested to this in Book 32 of his Commentary on the Edict – D 19 1 11 2: Et 
in primis ipsam rem praestare venditorem oportet, id est tradere: quae res, si quidem 
dominus fuit venditor, facit et emptorem dominum … (Firstly, the seller must provide 
the object itself, that is, deliver it. If the seller was its owner, his act [of delivery] 
also makes the buyer the owner ...). The structure of the emptio venditio contract 
lacked nothing. “Nothing else was necessary. But if that was so, there was neither 
room nor necessity for postulating a special duty to make the purchaser owner. That 
would be the automatic consequence of traditio (or mancipatio), which, in turn, the 
vendor was bound to perform.”53 Granted, the buyer made the seller the owner of 
the money he paid, but money was a thing that was publicly available. He was not, 
after all, bound to deliver specific coins, but expected to pay the price with coins of 
which the seller then became the owner. Having said that, Reinhard Zimmermann 
even noted that in Roman law the sale of generic goods was unknown: every sale 
was a sale of specific goods because of the obligation to deliver them; and such 
50 Lenel (n 24) vol 1 col 1167 Paulus 1196 n 8.
51 R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations. Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Oxford, 
1996) at 278.
52 Ibid.
53 Idem at 279.
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goods could be the property of a third party.54 It is indeed hard to imagine how much 
economic development would be hindered if one could only sell what one owned. 
The author only slightly adapted the division of generic and specific things to suit 
his argument; he wanted to emphasise that the purchaser expected the seller to make 
every effort to transfer ownership. Indeed, the seller could not be forced to do the 
impossible, especially since impossibilium nulla obligatio est (there is no obligation 
to do anything which is impossible).55 Providing all was in order, the seller made the 
purchaser the owner; at worst, the buyer became the owner after some time by means 
of usucapio, namely usucaption. As a rule, nemo plus iuris thwarted the expectation 
that the seller would transfer ownership whether or not he was the owner of the 
thing. In particular, it protected ownership of res furtivae − stolen things. We learn 
from the jurist Paul that when both parties knew the thing had been stolen, or when 
it was known only to the buyer, the obligation did not arise at all. The situation 
was different when the seller knew that the object of an emptio venditio was stolen, 
but the buyer was unaware of this.56 In the latter case, the nemo plus iuris rule did 
not prevent the obligation from arising. “Genetically, [the rule] is related solely to 
dispositive, factual acts. Its operation is as simple as its wording.”57 A question that 
proved more important concerned the content of the obligation, since the rational 
condition for its validity was the ability to perform it. The performance of a contract 
was possible precisely because the seller was not bound to transfer ownership, but 
only to ensure unimpeded possession. The only snag was that the buyer could not 
acquire a res furtiva by usucaption,58 even if he purchased it in good faith. The buyer 
could bring an actio empti against a seller who knew he was selling stolen things, not 
because ownership of the thing had not passed (to the buyer), but on account of bad 
faith. However, the real problem, to which there was no simple solution, arose when 
neither the buyer nor the seller knew the thing had been stolen. Both parties were 
being honest, and someone had to suffer the consequences, because they were still 
bound by a contractual tie. If the buyer received the object of the sale, which a third 
party then took from him using eviction, it would be unreasonable to involve the 
seller too. Periculum est emptoris – the risk was borne by the buyer, which became 
an established principle of Roman law.59 In English law, a buyer who had not become 
the owner could resort to the warranty of title, but such a remedy was unknown in 
Roman law.60 If the seller was not the owner, the nemo plus iuris rule prevented him 
54 Ibid.
55 D 50 17 185 Celsus in his Digest Bk 8.
56 D 18 1 34 3 Paul On the Edict Bk 34. 
57 Amielańczyk (n 5) at 359.
58 A Kacprzak Sprzedaż rzeczy kradzionej, (2002) 2(1) Zeszyty Prawnicze UKSW 93-104 at 94-95, 
102.
59 Dajczak, Giaro & Longchamps de Bérier (n 28) at 506-507.
60 R Powell “Eviction in Roman and English law” in D Daube (ed) Studies in the Roman Law of Sale 
Dedicated to the Memory of Francis de Zulueta (Oxford, 1959) 78-90 at 87-90.
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from transferring ownership. Although the contract was valid, transfer of ownership 
was objectively impossible. Roman law only knew an implied warranty of peaceable 
possession.61 The thing was transferred to the buyer, and he could enjoy it as long as 
the owner of the thing sold did not resort to eviction and take it away from the buyer. 
To summarise the foregoing, we should observe that the Roman-law doctrine was 
adopted by the ius commune: the seller was bound to ensure vacua possessio, but 
was not obliged to make the buyer the owner of the thing sold.62
5 Make sure the maxim is established in the law
In the last title of the Digest De diversis regulis iuris antiqui, Justinian’s compilers 
included as many as six passages confirming that it was impossible for anyone to 
transfer more rights to another person than he had himself. These are − in the sequence 
in which they were referred to above − texts from D 50 17: D 50 17 54; D 50 17 160 
2; D 50 17 120; D 50 17 175 1; D 50 17 11; and D 50 17 177pr. The number of 
rules of ancient law to which the compilers referred shows they believed nemo plus 
iuris was a well-established principle of the overall legal order. And because it was 
a regula (a rule), in accordance with the definition provided in D 50 17 1, there were 
no exceptions to it. Thus Roman law fully respected the nemo plus iuris rule.63
Exceptions to that rule with regard to derivative acquisition of ownership were 
only apparent. The academic discussion in Gaius’ Institutes, G 2 62-64, cannot be 
taken seriously. The jurist compared the example of an owner who did not have 
the authority to alienate his property with that of a non-owner who could dispose 
of another person’s property. A husband who owned land that was part of the 
dowry was prohibited from transferring it in terms of the special lex Iulia de fundo 
dotali. The statutory limitation of an owner’s rights does not require any comment. 
However, if a non-owner was an agnate who, under the Law of the Twelve Tables, 
had guardianship over a furiosus, he could alienate the latter’s property; and so could 
a procurator of his estate. The correlation between agnatio and ownership in ancient 
law seems to preclude the existence of a real anomaly here. In addition, a pledge 
creditor could dispose of the pledged thing although he was not even the possessor 
of the thing, only a detentor, namely a holder. His right to alienate resulted from 
the pactum de vendendo – an informal agreement concerning the case in which a 
debt secured by a pledge is not repaid. And one can only agree that it is a paradox 
that uti frui ius sibi esse solus potest intendere, qui habet usum fructum, dominus 
61 Zimmermann (n 51) at 293-294.
62 Idem at 303.
63 Unlike Kupiszewski (n 4) at 225, who wrote: “On close examination it soon turns out that today 
and in classical or Justinian Roman law it never had an absolute value. For it is neither always 
true that a right cannot be transferred by a non-owner, nor that it can be transferred by the person 
who is.” Legal intuition correctly takes into account the need for compromise. The examples he 
provided referring to Roman law in his substantiation are those we consider apparent exceptions.
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autem fundi non potest (the only person who can claim by law that he has the right 
to use and enjoy property is the man who has the usufruct of it). The rule was stated 
by Ulpian in Book 17 of his Commentary on the Edict – D 7 6 5, and followed 
by the explanation: quia qui habet proprietatem, utendi fruendi ius separatum non 
habet: nec enim potest ei suus fundus servire (the owner of the property cannot do 
so, because a man who has ownership does not have a separate right of use and 
enjoyment; the fact is that a man’s estate cannot be subject to a servitude in his own 
favour). In Book 65, the jurist referred to a similarly academic way of reasoning – 
D 41 1 46: non est novum, ut qui dominium non habeat, alii dominium praebeat: 
nam et creditor pignus vendendo causam dominii praestat, quam ipse non habuit (it 
is no novelty that one who does not have ownership may still confer ownership upon 
another; a creditor, for instance, in selling a pledge, gives title to ownership that he 
does not have himself). We should also add that Paul, in his characteristically concise 
manner, wrote in a single book On Exceptional Law – D 7 1 63: quod nostrum non 
est, transferemus ad alios: veluti is qui fundum habet, quamquam usum fructum 
non habeat, tamen usum fructum cedere potest (we can transfer to others what we 
do not ourselves have; for example, if a man has an estate, then even although he 
does not hold the usufruct, he can still grant usufruct to another). The nemo plus 
iuris rule reverberates in this quotation in the phrase quod nostrum non est and the 
verb transferemus. Ususfructus is not ownership, and an owner does not actually 
have usufruct – in the sense that we cannot say he only has a limited right, since 
the owner’s right to the thing is much broader than the right to usufruct. Therefore, 
formally, the owner establishes something that did not exist before – he isolates 
from his property the right of ususfructus, but does not transfer to another person a 
right to which he himself would not be entitled. The content of the right of usufruct 
is contained within the right of ownership. Therefore the conclusion that we can 
transfer to another what is not our own is a play on words and constructions, an 
uncomplicated brainteaser and without any substantive value. Legal issues can be 
constructed or stated in a way that suggest we are dealing with exceptions while in 
reality there is no exception here at all.
6 Do not neglect related and supporting maxims
The protection of ownership in Roman law went even further than set out above, 
finding its place in the broader context of securing control over a thing. Hence the 
counterpart to nemo plus iuris in respect of actual control − in the form of nemo sibi 
ipsum. Paul stated in Book 54 of his Commentary on the Edict – D 41 2 3 19: illud 
quoque a veteribus praeceptum est neminem sibi ipsum causam possessionis mutare 
posse (the earliest jurists further laid down that no one can change for himself the 
title by which he possesses something). When stating the rule, the jurist also invoked 
the earliest jurists so that we would know how long it had formed part of the law. 
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The question of its relevance or validity is another matter. We can say a rule is true 
if it only describes the law of a particular time and its role is then largely one of 
interpretation. If compliance with a rule is sought, the basis of its current validity 
should be specified. Legal bases may change, but even when replaced by new ones, 
they may express an unchanging rule. Thus Roman law, especially by blocking 
access to usucapio pro herede, prevented detentores from arbitrarily and covertly 
becoming rightful possessors. Nemo sibi ipsum as the counterpart to nemo plus 
iuris in the protection of possession represented a “systemic block” to changes in 
control. It protected the possessor and the owner, because strengthening possessory 
protection helped strengthen ownership.
The rule of nemo sibi ipsum was well established and documented in classical 
Roman law.64 It was adopted unreservedly by codes of natural law (Arts 2231 and 
2240 CC, § 319 ABGB), and the Italian civil code of 1942 (Art 1141 CCI), but 
rejected by the German and Swiss codes. Polish law, unfortunately, followed their 
example65 and adopted a purely factual concept of possession. The Supreme Court of 
Poland confirmed the rejection of nemo sibi ipsum when it allowed, expressis verbis, 
a change in the title of possession by the possessor himself.66 This, of course, does 
not apply to the rule that “no one can transfer greater rights to another person than 
he himself possesses”.
7 Take the local context into account
Polish law respects nemo plus iuris as a rule in the sense that it perceives it as the Latin 
wording of the requirement that the seller be the owner or person entitled to dispose 
of the thing. According to Andrzej Stelmachowski, the rule has not been embodied in 
any Polish statute because it is obvious. The right of the owner arises from his right 
to dispose of the thing he owns, and specific legal relationships provide the basis 
for disposing of the right to ownership of another person. Moreover, the provisions 
of family law allow spouses to dispose of their joint marital property.67 From the 
perspective of Roman law, it is pleasing to note that “in Polish law, the presence of 
that rule is most conspicuous in the law of succession”.68 It is usually perceived as the 
foundation of legal transactions in the derivative transfer of ownership.69 Laws have 
64 D 41 3 33 1 and D 41 5 2 1 Julian The Digest Bk 44; D 41 2 191 Marcellus The Digest Bk 17; D 41 
2 3 19-20 Paul On the Edict Bk 54.
65 F Zoll & A Szpunar Prawo cywilne w zarysie vol 2 (Krakow, 1947) at 306; Stelmachowski (n 
12) at 384; J Gołaczyński “Posiadanie” in E Gniewek (ed) System Prawa Prywatnego. Prawo 
rzeczowe vol 4 (Warsaw, 2005) 1-66 at 14-15.
66 I CR 167/59 (12.05.1959, Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego 1961, item 8); SN of 12.3.1971, III 
CRN 516/70 (12.03.1971, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich i Komisji Arbitrażowych 1971, 11).
67 Stelmachowski (n 12) at 315.
68 Amielańczyk (n 15) at 512.
69 Stelmachowski (n 12) at 336.
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created exceptions to this rule, allowing the acquisition of ownership of movable 
property and even real property from an unauthorised person. These laws were 
introduced because of the need to compromise in the interests of the reliability of 
business transactions and respect for good faith. However, a legislative compromise 
between nemo plus iuris and the rival principle of protecting the interests of persons 
acting in good faith “affects the acquisition of the ownership of real property to a 
much lesser extent than the acquisition of ownership of movable things”.70 In the 
former case, nemo plus iuris has been waived in order to reinforce confidence in the 
entry in a land and mortgage register, as the basis of the purchaser’s good faith.71 
Usucaption in bad faith is possible in Polish law only in respect of real property, 
and only after the elapse of thirty years of possession (Art 172 § 2 of the Polish 
Civil Code). On the other hand, the purchaser of a movable thing who acquires it 
from a non-entitled person becomes its owner upon taking hold of it, unless he was 
acting in bad faith (Art 169 § 1 of the Polish Civil Code). When a thing has been 
mislaid, stolen, or otherwise lost by the owner, a purchaser in good faith may acquire 
ownership after the elapse of thirty years from the time it was mislaid, stolen, or lost 
(§ 2). The rule of nemo plus iuris is therefore honoured in Polish law; and so the 
reliability of business transactions and the interests of the purchaser who acquires a 
thing in good faith from a person who is not the owner counterbalance the protection 
of ownership.72 The Polish legal system is based on the protection of ownership as 
the basis of private law, but the example of nemo plus iuris clearly shows that the 
law should be viewed from the perspective of the values and principles reflected in 
particular regulations.73 The rules of construction or interpretation result from legal 
policy and depend on the objectives, which here are the implemented values.
It is not only in Roman law that the protection of ownership was a general 
principle, fully applicable to derivative acquisition. Nemo plus iuris prevented 
acquisition from a non-owner: the vendor was either the owner – D 50 17 11, or 
an authorised person or the owner’s representative – G 2 62-64. In such a case, 
ownership passed to the purchaser immediately and not by usucaption. Because 
the law had to protect ownership, formal acts were required for the transfer of the 
most valuable things, namely res mancipi. The formal, abstract acts of mancipatio 
and in iure cessio caused the owner to consider the transaction carefully. The same 
applies to the requirement of iusta causa traditionis, if a person wanted to transfer 
70 Idem at 337.
71 Idem at 339; Amielańczyk (n 15) at 516.
72 Cf W Kowalski “Nabycie własności rzeczy ruchomej ‘a non domino’ w prawie rzymskim i 
współczesne zmagania z problemem” in F Longchamps de Bérier, R Sarkowicz & M Szpunar (eds) 
‘Consul est iuris et patriae defensor.’  Księga pamiątkowa dedykowana doktorowi Andrzejowi 
Kremerowi (Warsaw, 2012) 77-103 at 85, 93.
73 Cf M Kordela “Stanowienie zasad prawa” in A Dębiński, P Sitarz, T Barankiewicz, J Potrzeszcz, 
W Staszewski, A Szarek-Zwijacz & M Wójcik (eds) ‘Abiit, non obiit.’  Księga poświęcona pamięci 
ks. prof. Antoniego Kościa SVD (Lublin, 2013) 191-199 at 198.
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ownership by simple delivery. Further protection was provided by limiting usucapio, 
thus making it rather difficult in practice to acquire ownership of real property 
through long-term possession. Similarly, if a thing was abandoned, loss of ownership 
of it was not at all obvious, and certainly far from automatic. It all depended on the 
owner’s will and the claims he made regarding the thing, even a long time after it 
had been abandoned. This systemic protection of the owner included the nemo plus 
iuris rule, which was at least one legal expression of such protection. In Roman law, 
ownership was clearly related to and correlated with social perceptions of it. Here 
we are touching upon the foundations of law. Roman-law regulation of ownership 
was not as stringent as many people in the nineteenth century claimed.74 Ownership 
was nevertheless much more heavily protected than it is today, when the law places 
equal emphasis on protecting the certainty of business transactions and ownership.
8 Conclusion
Let us now summarise what has been established thus far. A legal dictum formulated 
in Latin is referred to as a rule, maxim, definition, precept, or principle. It is 
impossible to differentiate these terms clearly, although this has been done, for 
instance, in the terminology used in contracts in continental private law. Henryk 
Kupiszewski75 attempted to identify a fundamental difference between a maxim and 
a rule in Roman law − but without any success. We can certainly use equivalent 
terms: sentence, statement, phrase, as well as dictum. In the above discussion, the 
word “rule” has been used with reference to nemo plus iuris, because to Justinian’s 
compilers, nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest, quam ipse haberet was a regula, 
as it was in the title of D 50 17. Furthermore, some writers have concluded that in 
certain legal contexts nemo plus iuris was and still is perceived as a rule. We should 
therefore decide and clearly state, on a case-by-case basis, what we understand by 
the terms maxim, rule, or precept at a particular time and in a particular context. For 
jurists, such Latin phrases and statements refer to rules that are an important tool 
in interpreting and applying the law. Given the role of Roman private law in the 
historical formation of the European legal tradition and its contemporary influence 
and development, its main importance lies in its fundamental rules of private law. 
Therefore, when considering which dicta to use in argument, we should not make do 
with free association, or uncritically trust our intuition. We should acquaint ourselves 
with the full phrase as well as the context in which it is known and how it has been 
used up until now. Only then can we be creative, find other ways of applying it and 
construct new meanings for it. It is usually pointless to ask what the author meant 
by it; what he had in mind may be entirely beyond our reach. Once a maxim is 
formulated, it takes on a life of its own, whether we like it or not. Audiences and 
74 Longchamps de Bérier (n 22) at 181-185.
75 Kupiszewski (n 4) at 155-240.
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readers of various epochs or even cultures understand it subjectively. They are free 
to use ancient and contemporary dicta as useful tools in interpreting and applying 
the law. To be effective, however, they need to make an effort and be prepared and 
competent not only in dogmatic, but in historical terms as well.
Abstract
Lawyers use words with great care and, particularly in public discourse, often 
like to use Latin dicta. They do so not only to make their arguments sound more 
sophisticated, but also to support their theses not merely with elegantly worded, 
classical maxims, but also with well tested, established concepts based on the 
experience of people who lived in ancient Rome, a consummately practical society, 
very well versed in the practice of law.
A legal dictum formulated in Latin is referred to as a rule, maxim, definition, 
precept, or principle. It is impossible to differentiate these terms clearly, although 
this has been done for instance in the terminology used in contracts in continental 
private law.
How can contemporary lawyers best use Latin maxims and sentences? This is 
explored by using the example of nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest, quam 
ipse haberet. The six steps are as follows: use maxims competently; be aware of 
the context of your quotation; do not allow yourself to be taken by surprise; make 
sure the maxim is well established in the law; do not neglect related and supporting 
maxims; and take the local context into account. 
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BEMERKUNGEN zUR BEWEISFÜHRUNG 
IN CICEROS CLUENTIANA
Tamás Nótári*
Die längste uns überlieferte und tatsächlich gehaltene oratio Ciceros ist die im Jahre 
66, dh im Jahre seiner Prätur für Aulus Cluentius Habitus gehaltene Rede. Aus 
gewisser Hinsicht ist sie einer der Edelsteine der ciceronianischen Redekunst: Ihre 
Narrative ist lebhaft und spannend, wie die eines Kriminalromans, die Ereignisse, 
die Tatorte und die Zeitebenen wechseln sich in ihr gewagt und manchmal scheinbar 
unlogisch, ergeben aber zum Schluss eine präzis abgerundete, geschlossene, dem 
Ziel des Redners dienende Einheit. Gegen Cluentius, der dem Ritterstand (ordo 
equester) angehörte, wurde einerseits mit jener Begründung Anklage erhoben, dass 
er seinen Stiefvater, Statius Albius Oppianicus vergiftet haben soll. Andererseits 
wurde gegen ihn im Prozess auch vorgebracht, dass er vor acht Jahren in einem 
Prozess, den er gegen Oppianicus deswegen angestrengt hatte, weil dieser angeblich 
versucht hatte ihn zu ermorden, die Richter bestochen haben soll, was zur Folge 
hatte, dass Oppianicus den letzten Teil seines Lebens im Exil zu verbringen hatte. 
Den gesetzlichen Hintergrund der Anklage wegen Giftmordes bildete die lex 
Cornelia de sicariis et veneficiis aus dem Jahre 81, in der allerdings nur für jene 
Art der Richterbestechung eine Sanktion festgesetzt war, die von Mitgliedern des 
Senatorenstandes begangen wurde.
Zuerst sollte der historische Hintergrund der Rede und der gesetzliche Tatbestand, 
dh die Anwendbarkeit der lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficiis untersucht werden. 
* Wissenschaftlicher Hauptmitarbeiter, Rechtswissenschaftliches Institut des Gesellschaftswissen-
schaftlichen Zentrums der Ungarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften; Universitätsdozent, Károli 
Gáspár Universität Budapest.
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Abschliessend sollen die von Cicero in der Cluentiana angewandten rhetorischen 
Mittel unter die Lupe genommen und aus jener Hinsicht behandelt werden, wie 
Cicero die Chronologie der Anklagepunkte in seiner auch juristisch brillanten 
Argumentation behandelt, verändert bzw entstellt hat. 
1 Die Rede für Aulus Cluentius Habitus aus dem Jahre 66 wurde von 
Cicero in seinem zwanzig Jahre später geschriebenen Orator als Beispiel für die 
Verwendung der drei Stilarten in derselben Gerichtsrede erwähnt,1 und er zitiert 
daraus2 diesbezüglich eine äusserst gelungene Formulierung.3 Als Quintilian 
über das Urteilsvermögen des Redners schreibt, beruft er sich auf die Cluentiana 
als Musterbeispiel der gut angelegten forensischen Strategie,4 anderswo stellt er 
wiederum fest, dass in der Cluentiana Cicero den Geschworenen Sand in die Augen 
gestreut hat.5 Die Rede für Cluentius wird von Gellius zitiert,6 Plinius der Jüngere 
hält sie für die hervorragendste rednerische Leistung Ciceros,7 von den Juristen beruft 
sich Claudius Tryphoninus auf sie.8 Theodor Mommsen würdigt die Cluentiana 
folgendermassen: „Die Criminalstatistik aller Zeiten und Länder wird schwerlich ein 
Seitenstück bieten zu einem Schaudergemälde so mannichfaltiger, so entsetzlicher 
und so widernatürlicher Verbrechen, wie es der Prozess des Aulus Cluentius in 
einem Schoss einer der angesehensten Familien einer italischen Ackerstadt vor uns 
aufgerollt.“9
Der Angeklagte des Prozesses, A Cluentius Habitus ist im nördlichen Apulien, 
in dem von den miteinander mehrfach verschwägerten Aurii, Albii, Cluentii und 
Magii dominierten Larinum geboren,10 das ein Spiegelbild der in Rom wuchernden 
Lastern zeigte11 – und es kann nicht einmal behauptet werden, dass der Grösse der 
Landstadt entsprechend.12 Seinen Vater, Cluentius den Älteren, verlor er im Jahre 88, 
als er fünfzehn Jahre alt war,13 seine Mutter, Sassia heiratete zwei Jahre später ihren 
1 Cicero Orator 103.
2 Cicero Pro Cluentio 199.
3 Cicero Orator 108.
4 Quintilianus Institutio oratoria 6 5.
5 Quintilianus Institutio oratoria 2 17 21: gloriatus est offudisse tenebras iudicibus Cluentianis.
6 Gellius Noctes Atticae 16 7 10.
7 Plinius Epistulae 1 20 4.
8 Tryphoninus D 48 18 39.
9 Th Mommsen Römische Geschichte (Berlin, 1875) Bd 3 528.
10 Zum Hintergrund der Vorgeschichte des Verfahrens siehe GS Hoenigswald „The murder charges 
in Cicero’s Pro Cluentio” (1962) 93 Transactions of the American Philological Association 
S 109-123.
11 Vö Sallustius De coniuratione Catilinae 11, 4.
12 W Kroll „Ciceros Rede für Cluentius“ (1924) 53 Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum 
S 174-184, 176.
13 Cicero Pro Cluentio 11.
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Schwiegersohn A Aurius Melinus, den geschiedenen Gatten ihrer Tochter Cluentia.14 
Cicero datiert von hier an das schlechte Verhältnis zwischen dem Angeklagten und 
seiner Mutter und behauptet, dass ihn Sassias Verhalten dermassen empört hatte, dass 
er beschloss, mit seiner Mutter keinerlei Kontakt pflegen zu wollen.15 Aurius fiel – 
angeblich in Folge der Machenschaften des St Abbius Oppianicus – den sullanischen 
Proskriptionen zum Opfer.16 Sassia heiratete Oppianicus, der sich schon von zwei 
Ehefrauen, von Papia (der Witwe des Magius) und Novia getrennt hatte bzw zwei 
Gattinnen, Cluentia die Ältere und Magia verloren hatte.17
Es ist erwähnenswert, dass Cicero, als er vom Hass zwischen Oppianicus 
dem Älteren und Cluentius spricht, von jenem Element Gebrauch macht, das er 
als psychologische Motivation des von Oppianicus auf seinen Stiefsohn verübten 
Giftmordversuches hätte verwenden können, nämlich dass Cluentius auf die Heirat 
zwischen Sassia und Oppianicus mit Antipathie und Groll reagiert hat.18 Oppianicus 
der Jüngere, der im Jahre 66 gegen Cluentius als Ankläger auftrat, stammte von 
Magia, einer früheren Gattin des Oppianicus des Älteren. Oppianicus der Ältere 
wollte angeblich seinen Stiefsohn Cluentius vergiften lassen: Zur Ausführung 
seines Plans nahm er die Hilfe des C Fabricius in Anspruch, der zusammen mit 
dem Freigelassenen Scamander, den Sklaven des Cluentius behandelnden Arztes, 
für sein Vorhaben gewinnen wollte.19 In wie fern der Mordversuch als bewiesen 
gelten kann, mag dahingestellt bleiben, Tatsache ist, dass Cluentius zuerst gegen 
Scamander und Fabricius bzw abschliessend gegen seinen Stiefvater, Oppianicus 
den Älteren Anklage erhob. Oppianicus wurde vom Gericht mit einer ganz knappen 
Stimmenmehrheit für schuldig befunden und verurteilt.20 Den Prozess umgaben 
mehrere verdächtige Umstände, so zB wurden die Richter nicht vorschriftsgemäss 
ausgelost21 und der Bestechungsverdacht22 betraf mehrere Senatoren, unter anderen 
C Fidiculanius Falcula,23 M Atilius Bulbus und Staienus.24
Aufgrund all dessen schlug der Verdacht Wurzel, dass das Urteil im Prozess 
gegen Oppianicus den Älteren von bestochenen Richtern gefällt wurde. Cicero 
versucht – trotz der Verurteilung des Oppianicus – die Lage so darzustellen, dass 
die Bestechung von Oppianicus selber vorgenommen wurde, und er nur diesem 
zu verdanken hatte, dass beinahe die Hälfte der Richter für seinen Freispruch 
14 Idem 12f.
15 Idem 16. Vgl Hoenigswald (Fn 10) S 115.
16 Idem 25.
17 Idem 27f.
18 Hoenigswald (Fn 10) S 116.
19 Cicero Pro Cluentio 47ff.
20 Vgl Cicero Pro Caecina 29.
21 Cicero In Verrem 2 1 157.
22 Idem 1 29.
23 Cicero Divinatio in Caecilium 28f.
24 Cicero In Verrem 2 2 79.
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stimmten, im Gegensatz zur einstimmigen Verurteilung des Scamander und des 
Fabricius. L Quinctius, der Verteidiger des Oppianicus verdächtigte Cluentius der 
Richterbestechung, da seiner Anklage im Endeffekt Erfolg beschieden war, und 
gebrauchte als Volkstribun gerade diesen Fall als Beispiel vor der Volksversammlung, 
um gegen die senatorischen Gerichtshöfe zu agieren.25 Der Prozess schlug politische 
Wellen und mehrere Senatoren, die am Verfahren als Richter beteiligt waren, wurden 
wegen Korruption verurteilt.26 Cicero, der im Verfahren im Jahre 74 als Verteidiger 
Scamanders auftrat, erwähnte den Prozess gegen Oppianicus gerade wegen der 
Verurteilung des Angeklagten mit einer knappen Stimmenmehrheit, woraus er 
Beweise, oder zumindest Indizien auf die Bestechung der Richter durch Oppianicus, 
als Paradebeispiel der Korruptheit des Gerichtswesens bringen wollte.27
Zwei Jahre nach seiner Verurteilung, dh im Jahre 72, starb Oppianicus der 
Ältere in der Nähe von Rom;28 der Ankläger behauptete, dass ihn Cluentius vergiften 
liess,29 aber von den Umständen seines Todes ist uns nichts Genaueres bekannt. 
Seine Witwe, Sassia, verdächtigte ihren Sohn (dh den Stiefsohn des Oppianicus) 
damit, dass er Oppianicus vergiftet haben soll, und versuchte ihren Verdacht durch 
Beweise, in erster Linie durch Geständnisse ihrer Sklaven, die sie einer Tortur 
unterziehen liess, zu untermauern – allerdings mit wenig Erfolg.30 Nachdem 
Cluentius in mehrere Todesfälle, die sich in der Zwischenzeit ereignet haben, 
verwickelt worden war, erhob im Jahre 66 aufgrund der lex Cornelia de sicariis et 
veneficiis der junge – zum Zeitpunkt des Prozesses ungefähr einundzwanzigjährige31 
– Abbius Oppianicus gegen Cluentius Anklage. Das Mordgesetz Sullas umfasste 
mehrere Tatbestände: Todschlag, unerlaubtes Tragen von Waffen, Herstellung und 
Verkauf bzw Verabreichung von Gift in Tötungsabsicht, Brandstiftung und einige 
Straftaten im Zusammenhang mit dem Kriminalverfahren, so zB die Bestechung 
von Richtern, um mit deren Beihilfe Unschuldige verurteilen zu lassen – das letztere 
Tatbestandselement bezog sich allerdings nur auf Magistrate und Senatoren.32 
25 Cicero Pro Cluentio 74ff.
26 CJ Classen Recht, Rhetorik und Politik, Untersuchungen zu Ciceros rhetorischer Strategie 
(Darmstadt, 1985) S 21.
27 Cicero In Verrem 1 38-40.
28 Kroll (Fn 12) S 174.
29 Vö Cicero Pro Cluentio 161ff.
30 Hoenigswald (Fn 10) S 111; Kroll (Fn 12) S 175.
31 W Stroh Taxis und Taktik, Die advokatische Dispositionskunst in Ciceros Gerichtsreden (Stuttgart, 
1975) S 195.
32 Vgl Th Mommsen Römisches Strafrecht (Leipzig, 1899) S 628; W Kunkel Untersuchungen zur 
Entwicklung des römischen Kriminalverfahrens in vorsullanischer Zeit (München, 1962) S 64-
70; JD Cloud „The primary purpose of the lex Cornelia de sicariis“ (1969) 86 Zeitschrift der 
Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung S 258-268; CJ Classen „Cicero, 
Pro Cluentio 1-11 im Licht der rhetorischen Theorie und Praxis“ (1965) 108 Rheinisches Museum 
S 104-142, 140; J Humbert „Comment Cicéron mystifia les juges de Cluentius“ (1938) 16 
Latomus, Revue des Etudes Latines S 275-296, 276.
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Cluentius gehörte – wie gesagt – dem Ritterstand an, und hatte kein Amt innegehabt, 
so hätte er nach dem Wortlaut des Gesetzes keine Bestechung ausüben können, die 
unter das besagte Gesetz fiel.33 Das Amt des iudex quaestionis versah Q Voconius 
Naso,34 als Nebenankläger trat neben Oppianicus Titus Attius, ein junger Ritter 
aus Pisaurum auf.35 Die Verteidigung des – in jenen Anklagepunkten, die gegen 
ihn vorgebracht wurden, mit grösster Wahrscheinlichkeit schuldigen – Cluentius 
übernahm der im Jahre des Prozesses als Prätor fungierende Cicero, der mit seiner 
rednerischen Brillanz den Freispruch seines Klienten erwirken konnte.36 Den 
Gerichtshof bildeten zweiunddreissig Richter, die nach der im Jahre 70 erbrachten lex 
Aurelia iudiciaria zu je einem Drittel aus dem Senatorenstand, aus dem Ritterstand 
und dem Stand der Ärartribunen hervorgingen.37
Die ciceronianische Verteidigung läuft auf zwei Linien, der Redner wendet 
sich nicht sofort der Hauptanklage zu, sondern verweilt länger bei der Frage der 
Richterbestechung. Um seine eigene Theorie von der Richterbestechung zu belegen, 
behandelt er das Thema der Bestechung wahrscheinlich viel ausführlicher, als der 
Ankläger darauf eingegangen ist: Er schildert detailliert das üble Vorleben des 
Oppianicus und widmet jenen zwei Prozessen, die mit dem versuchten Attentat 
gegen Cluentius in Verbindung stehen, grosse Aufmerksamkeit. In seiner Einleitung 
kündet Cicero an, dass er der von dem Ankläger angelegten Thematik folgen will, 
bzw er gibt darüber Rechenschaft, warum er sich viel ausführlicher mit dem ersten, 
als mit dem zweiten Anklagepunkt auseinander zu setzen beabsichtigt. Hiernach 
sollte der Anklagepunkt des Giftmordes vollkommen unbegründet sein und könnte 
mit wenigen Worten abgetan werden, jener der Richterbestechung hätte sich aber 
in den letzten acht Jahren dermassen im Bewusstsein aller festgesetzt, dass es der 
einträchtigen Anstrengung der Richter und des Verteidigers bedurfte, diese Nachrede 
aus der öffentlichen Meinung auszumerzen. Der erste Teil der Rede besteht aus drei 
grösseren Kapiteln, die sich mit dem Vorleben des Oppianicus des Älteren, mit dem 
Giftmordprozess aus 74 und mit dem Tatbestand der Richterbestechung befassen. Im 
zweiten Teil der Cluentiana, der nun von dem eigentlichen Anklagepunkt, dh von 
der Ermordung des Oppianicus durch Cluentius handelt, werden die dunklen Kapitel 
des Vorlebens des Cluentius und auch die Ermordung des Oppianicus von Cicero in 
lapidarer Kürze und mit verdächtiger Leichtigkeit abgetan: Eine verhältnismässig 
längere Ausführung erfährt nur das vom Ankläger als Beweis vorgebrachte 
Geständnis, das den Sklaven durch Folter entnommen wurde.
33 Stroh (Fn 31) S 196.
34 Cicero Pro Cluentio 147f.
35 Idem 65 84 156; Brutus 271.
36 Kroll (Fn 12) S 174.
37 Stroh (Fn 31) S 202.
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2 Gleich im prooemium trennt Cicero die Anklage wegen Giftmordes von 
jener, die von dem Nebenankläger Attius vorgebracht wurde und sich auf die 
angebliche Bestechung jenes Gerichtshofes bezog, die vor acht Jahren Oppianicus 
verurteilt hatte.38 Die genaue Bestimmung der Anklagepunkte, die dem Prozess 
gegen Cluentius zugrunde gelegen haben müssen, scheint keines Wegs einfach zu 
sein: Die Anklage hätte sich erstens auf Meuchelmord und Giftmischerei, zweitens 
auf Giftmordversuch und Bestechung des Gerichts, drittens auf Mordversuch 
richten können.39 Die Rekonstruktion der Fakten wird auch noch dadurch 
erschwert, dass Cicero einerseits manche Umstände, die schlechtes Licht auf seinen 
Klienten werfen könnten wissentlich verschweigt, und andererseits einige, für den 
Zeitgenossen selbstverständliche, für den heutigen Leser aber nicht hinreichend 
bekannte Elemente übergeht. Ciceros Aufgabe war es, da er die Verteidigung des 
Cluentius übernahm, den Richtern überzeugend darzulegen, dass sein Klient jene 
Straftat(en), deren er angeklagt worden war, nicht begangen haben kann, dh er hatte 
gemäss der rhetorischen Theorie nach der zu dem status coniecturalis passenden 
Argumentationsweise vorzugehen.
Aus rechtshistorischer Hinsicht ist eine der interessantesten Fragen, die 
sich in Verbindung mit der Cluentiana ergeben, ob sich jene Anklage, die vom 
jüngeren Oppianicus gegen Cluentius aufgrund der lex Cornelia de sicariis et 
veneficiis erhoben wurde, nur auf den Giftmord oder aber auch auf die Bestechung 
der Richter bezog, die Cluentius vor acht Jahren im Prozess gegen Oppianicus 
den Älteren begangen haben soll. Bei der Klärung dieses Problems stellt sich 
natürlich die Frage nach der Zuverlässigkeit der Quellenbasis: Die ciceronianische 
Darstellungsweise und seine Verweise auf den Gesetzestext sind mit grosser 
Wahrscheinlichkeit tendenziös – selbst wenn er bei der Zitierung des Gesetzes 
keine wesentlichen Änderungen hat vornehmen können –, und die uns überlieferte 
Form der sullanischen Gesetze entstammt einer späteren Epoche,40 was wiederum 
vermuten lässt, dass der zum Zeitpunkt des Prozesses geltende Gesetzestext mit dem 
uns bekannten nicht unbedingt als identisch gelten dürfte.41 Die spätere Fassung 
der lex Cornelia de falsis sanktioniert zwar die aktive Form der Bestechung des 
Gerichts, es erscheint allerdings als unwahrscheinlich, dass die ursprüngliche lex 
Cornelia testamentaria ebenfalls eine solche Bestimmung enthalten hätte. Beim 
38 Cicero Pro Cluentio 1-2 11 119. Vgl Humbert (Fn 32) S 287; CJ Classen „Cicero, the Laws, and 
the Law-Courts“ (1978) 37 Latomus, Revue des Etudes Latines S 597-619, 604ff.
39 CJ Classen „Die Anklage gegen A. Cluentius Habitus (66 v. Chr. Geb.)“ (1972) 89 Zeitschrift 
der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung S 1-17; Ch Köhler Die 
Proömientechnik in Ciceros Reden: Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von rhetorischer Theorie und 
rednerischer Praxis bei Cicero. Dissertation (Jena, 1968) S 100-109; G Pugliese „Aspetti giuridici 
della Pro Cluentio di Cicerone“ (1970) 21 Iura S 155-181.
40 Paulus Sententiae 5 23; Collatio legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum 1 2 3; D 48 8. Vgl Mommsen 
(Fn 32) S 628ff; Cloud (Fn 32) S 258ff.
41 Classen (Fn 39) S 2.
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Bestimmungsversuch der Anklagepunkte darf auch nicht ausser Acht gelassen 
werden, dass im Quästionsprozess der Ankläger den Richtern alles vortragen durfte, 
was er gegen den Angeklagten vorbringen konnte, da sein Ziel nur ein allgemeiner 
Schuldspruch, und nicht die Feststellung der Schuld in den einzelnen Punkten war 
bzw die Festlegung der Strafe nicht dem Ermessen des Gerichtshofes oblag.42 Es ist 
nicht mit Sicherheit zu bestimmen, ob bei der delatio nominis neben dem Gesetz, 
das der Anklage zugrunde gelegt werden sollte, auch die genauen Passagen und die 
anderen, im Kreise der Anklage vorzubringen gedachten Punkte genannt werden 
sollten bzw ob diese im weiteren Laufe des Prozesses von zwingender Kraft waren.43
Es ist mit gutem Grund anzunehmen, dass bei der Einleitung des Prozesses die 
Anklage schriftlich fixiert werden musste, was auch in Bezug auf die vorsullanische 
Periode von Cicero in seinem Werk De inventione festgehalten wird.44 Es lohnt sich, 
etwas genauer unter die Lupe zu nehmen, in welchem Mass Cicero in seinen Reden 
die gesetzliche Grundlage des Verfahrens präzisiert bzw auf die Prozesseinleitung 
(postulatio, delatio nominis, receptio nominis) reflektiert. In seinen Gerichtsreden 
lassen sich direkte Hinweise auf den Tatbestand des crimen repetundarum,45 des 
crimen maiestatis,46 des ambitus,47 des peculatus,48 des crimen inter sicarios und 
des crimen veneficii,49 der iniuria,50 des furtum,51 der vis,52 der alea53 und des crimen 
parricidii54 finden.55 In zahlreichen Fällen beruft er sich auf ein konkretes Gesetz, so 
zB auf die lex Plautia de vi,56 die lex Iulia de pecuniis repetundis,57 die lex Papia,58 
die lex Acilia59 und die lex Scantinia.60 In einigen seiner Reden verweist er direkt 
auf die gesetzliche Grundlage der Anklagepunkte, so unter anderen in der Rede für 
42 Idem S 3.
43 Mommsen (Fn 32) S 3854. 
44 Cicero De inventione 2 58.
45 Cicero Divinatio in Caecilium 76; In Verrem 2 2 142; ad Quintum fratrem 3 1 15; ad familiares 8 
8 2 3.
46 Cicero ad Quintum fratrem 3 1 15; De inventione 2 72; ad familiares 3 2 3; Philippicae 1 23.
47 Cicero Pro Caelio 16 76; De oratore 2 274 280; ad Quintum fratrem 1 2 15; 2 3 5; 3 2 3; Pro 
Cluentio 114.
48 Auctor ad Herennium 1 22.
49 Cicero De inventione 2 58; Pro Roscio Amerino 90; Pro Cluentio 21; Auctor ad Herennium 4, 23.
50 Cicero De domo sua 13; De inventione 2, 59.
51 Cicero Pro Cluentio 163; ad familiares 7, 22; Pro Flacco 43.
52 Cicero post reditum in senatu 19; ad Quintum fratrem 2, 3, 5; Pro Sestio 90 95.
53 Cicero Philippicae 2, 56.
54 Cicero Pro Roscio Amerino 28 64.
55 Classen (Fn 39) S 5.
56 Cicero ad familiares 8 8 1.
57 Cicero Pro Rabirio Postumo 12.
58 Cicero Pro Balbo 52.
59 Cicero In Verrem 2 1 26.
60 Cicero ad familiares 8 12 3; 8 14 4.
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Sextus Roscius aus Ameria,61 in der gegen Verres,62 in der für Scaurus,63 in der für 
Rabirius Postumus64 und in der für Ligarius.65
In der Cluentiana bedient sich Cicero einer janusartigen Darstellungsweise. 
Einerseits erweckt er den Eindruck, als ob das Gerichtshof ausschliesslich für den 
Giftmord zuständig sei,66 da jene Passage der lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficiis, 
die sich mit der Bestechung des Gerichtes durch die Mitglieder des Ritterstandes 
auseinandersetzt, sich auf Cluentius, der zum ordo equester gehört, nicht bezieht;67 
andererseits bringt er den Anklagepunkt der Bestechung immer wieder zur Sprache. 
Die unter dem Vorsitz des Q Voconius Naso tagende quaestio war zweifelsohne in 
erster Linie für die Giftmorde zuständig – was natürlich nicht ausschloss, dass andere 
Anklagepunkte nicht hätten vorgebracht werden können –, aber ihre Zuständigkeit 
konnte auch auf die erwähnten Bestechungsdelikte ausgedehnt werden.68 Es lohnt 
sich allerdings, etwas länger bei den von Joachim Classen erwähnten Anklagepunkten 
zu verweilen, um den in der Anklage erfassten Tatbestand genauer definieren zu 
können. Trotz der lückenhaften Quellenbasis kann festgestellt werden, dass in 
anderen Fällen aufgrund der lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficiis keine Anklagen 
wegen Richterbestechung erhoben wurden, da sich auch andere Möglichkeiten zur 
Verfolgung dieser Straftat boten. Es ist ausserdem höchst unwahrscheinlich, dass der 
iudex quaestionis eine Anklage angenommen hätte, die dem Wortlaut des Gesetzes 
zuwiderläuft, oder – mit anderen Worten – zugelassen hätte, dass der Ankläger 
den Tatbestand des sullanischen Gesetzes mit einer interpretatio extensiva auch 
auf den Ritterstand ausdehnt. Nach Cicero soll sich Attius mehrere Male auf die 
aequitas berufen und für die extensive Interpretation des Gesetzes plädiert haben. 
Im Gegensatz zu ihm behandelte Cicero – obwohl er bestrebt war Cluentius von den 
Folgen des Verdachtes der Richterbestechung zu verschonen – die vor acht Jahren 
angeblich vorgefallene Bestechung des Gerichtshofes an keinem Punkt als ein 
wirkliches crimen, bzw. er zitierte keine einzige Zeugenaussage, die dies widerlegen 
sollte, sondern tat dieses Element als ein vom Ankläger vorgebrachtes Gerücht ab,69 
das die Gefahr in sich barg, bei den Richtern Antipathie und Voreingenommenheit 
gegen Cluentius zu generieren.70
61 Cicero Pro Roscio Amerino 28 61 64 76.
62 Cicero In Verrem 2 2 141.
63 Cicero Pro Scauro 1.
64 Cicero Pro Rabirio Postumo 8 9 37.
65 Cicero Pro Ligario 1 4 5 9 11.
66 Cicero Pro Cluentio 1 2 148 164.
67 Idem 144ff.
68 Classen (Fn 39) S 10f.
69 Vgl Cicero Pro Cluentio 142.
70 Classen (Fn 39) S 14f.
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3 Die Behandlung der crimina veneficii, dh der tatsächlichen, juristisch 
relevanten Anklagepunkte an erster Stelle konnte in den Richtern jenen Eindruck 
erwecken, als ob Cicero versuchte, das iudicium Iunianum, den juristisch eher 
irrelevanten, jedoch höchst effektvollen Teil der Anklage zu umgehen und sich – 
allerdings nur scheinbar, da er nur später auf den Oppianicusprozess zu sprechen 
kommt71 – dem von Attius erstellten System zu fügen. Wegen der Zwangswahl 
zwischen dem status collectionis und dem status coniecturalis entschloss sich 
Cicero zu einem halsbrecherischen, jedoch bereits in der Rosciana mit Erfolg 
angewandten72 Versuch: Er trennte seine eigenen Interessen bzw Forderungen von 
denen seines Klienten, indem er behauptete, dass er sich als Verteidiger nur auf den 
Wortlaut des Gesetzes hätte berufen müssen,73 sich aber dennoch – um den Wunsch 
des Cluentius, der nicht nur seinen Freispruch erreichen, sondern auch seinen guten 
Ruf wiederherstellen lassen wollte, nachzukommen74 – für den schwierigeren Weg 
entschieden hatte, der darin bestand, die Unschuld des Angeklagten nicht nur formell, 
sondern auch materiell zu beweisen.75 Hiermit gelang es ihm, den Eindruck zu 
erwecken, als ob jeder einzelne der beiden status an und für sich genügend Gewicht 
besessen hätte, den Sieg im Prozess zu sichern.76
Die von Cicero angewandte, auf zwei Spuren laufende Argumentation war 
auch den Erwartungen der Geschworenen angepasst. Einerseits verteidigte er mit 
der Anwendung des status collectionis die Interessen des Ritterstandes, indem er 
sich an den Wortlaut des Gesetzes hielt, der für sie die Straffreiheit vorsah,77 und 
erweckte in ihnen zugleich jene Angst, dass im Falle einer extensiven Interpretation 
in der Zukunft auch gegen Ritter Anklage wegen Richterbestechung erhoben werden 
könnte.78 Andererseits brauchte sich Cicero nicht davor zu fürchten, sich den Zorn 
der Richter aus dem Senatorenstand zuzuziehen, da er sich mit der Anwendung des 
status coniecturalis ihre Sympathie gesichert hatte, indem er beweisen konnte, dass 
sich im iudicium Iunianum Oppianicus, und nicht Cluentius der Richterbestechung 
schuldig gemacht hatte bzw. dass nur einige Richter bestochen worden waren und 
Staienus als einziger Geld erhalten hatte,79 wodurch es ihm gelang, die durch die 
Ereignisse des Jahres 74 angeschlagene Ehre des Richterstandes wiederherzustellen.80 
Die Disposition der Cluentiana lässt sich – wie Stroh zutreffend festgestellt hat81 
71 Cicero Pro Cluentio 59ff.
72 Cicero Pro Roscio Amerino 128ff.
73 Cicero Pro Cluentio 145.
74 Idem 144.
75 Stroh (Fn 31) S 200.
76 Quintilianus Institutio oratoria 6 5 9.
77 Cicero Pro Cluentio 150-155.
78 Idem 152 157. Zur Gerichtsbestechungs Mommsen (Fn 32) S 634f.
79 Kroll (Fn 12) S 178.
80 Stroh (Fn 31) S 203.
81 Idem S 204.
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– folgendermassen aufteilen: In der Erörterung des iudicium Iunianum82 werden 
durch den status coniecturalis (dh mit jener Behauptung, dass Cluentius den 
Giftmord nicht verübt hatte) die Senatoren,83 durch den status collectionis (dh mit 
jener Argumentation, dass aufgrund des sechsten Paragraphen der lex Cornelia de 
sicariis et veneficiis Cluentius nicht strafbar sei) die Ritter angesprochen,84 worauf 
die Behandlung der crimina veneficii folgt.85
Um der dem jüngeren Oppianicus zuströmenden Sympathie jegliche Bedeutung 
zu nehmen, greift Cicero zu einem meisterhaften Mittel: Er lässt die Mutter des 
Cluentius (dh die Witwe des Oppianicus des Älteren bzw die Stiefmutter des 
Oppianicus des Jüngeren), die gegenüber ihrem eigenen Sohn von hostile odium und 
crudelitas erfüllte Sassia, ins Bild treten, in deren Hand – da angeblich sie diejenige 
sein sollte, die die Fäden der Anklage zog – selbst der von pietas geleitete jüngere 
Oppianicus zum Rachewerkzeug wird.86 Es lohnt sich, genauer zu untersuchen, an 
welchen Punkten und in welchem Kontext Sassia von Cicero erwähnt wird.87
Unmittelbar nach dem Exordium nennt er Sassia, die von Grausamkeit und 
Hass geleitete Mutter, als Quelle der Anklage.88 Jene Frage, ob Sassia (wie Classen 
behauptet) bei der Verhandlung anwesend war,89 oder (wie Stroh und Humbert 
vermuten) nicht,90 ist – da sie weder von Cicero angesprochen wird, noch wir davon 
unterrichtet sind, dass sie in den Zeugenstand getreten wäre – nicht zu entscheiden 
und vielleicht auch nicht von ausschlaggebender Relevanz. Schon hier betont er 
mit Nachdruck, dass Sassia eine überaus bedeutende Rolle im Prozess spielt91 und 
dass er sie – im Interesse des Cluentius – nicht schonen kann,92 aber worin all dies 
genau besteht, erfahren wir erst später, nämlich bei der Behandlung der crimina 
veneficii.93 Das Protokoll vom Sklavenverhör liess Attius vor Gericht vorlesen,94 es 
ist jedoch fraglich, ob der Name der Sassia darin vorkam.95 Diese – mit grosser 
Wahrscheinlichkeit höchst subjektive und an rhetorischen Übertreibungen reiche – 
Darstellung der Ereignisse, die wohl kaum als Rekonstruktion genannt werden kann, 
bot Cicero eine willkommene Gelegenheit, eine effektvolle Invektive gegen Sassia 
82 Cicero Pro Cluentio 9-160.
83 Idem 9-142.
84 Idem 143-160.
85 Idem 161-187.
86 Idem 12ff. Vgl Quintilianus Institutio oratoria 6 5 9; 11 1 62.
87 Stroh (Fn 31) S 205ff.
88 Cicero Pro Cluentio 12ff.
89 Classen (Fn 26) S 36.
90 Stroh (Fn 31) S 206; J Humbert Les plaidoyers écrits et les plaidoiries réelles de Cicéron (Paris, 
1925) S 115ff.
91 Cicero Pro Cluentio 17.
92 Idem 18.
93 Idem 176ff.
94 Idem 184.
95 Stroh (Fn 31) S 206.
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zu beginnen.96 Jenes frühere Versprechen von einer detaillierten Ausführung97 löst 
der Redner nur nach dieser Invektive ein und führt den vom Verhältnis zwischen dem 
Angeklagten und dessen Mutter vor der Verhandlung mit grosser Wahrscheinlichkeit 
nichts ahnenden Richtern das Bild der zum Monster stilisierten unmütterlichen Mutter 
vor Augen. Nach dieser Darstellung war sie schon von Anfang an am Mordversuch 
gegen Cluentius beteiligt,98 er machte ihren Stiefsohn zu ihrem Schwiegersohn, 
um in seiner Person einen geeigneten Ankläger gegen ihren leiblichen Sohn stellen 
zu können.99 Nach der kurzen Zusammenfassung des Sklavenverhörs100 schafft 
der Redner das Bild der Zeugen manipulierenden, das Verderben ihres Sohnes 
herbeiführenden, nach Rom geeilten, die Fäden der Anklage in ihrer Hand haltenden 
und sich vor der Öffentlichkeit im Verborgenen haltenden Sassia.101
Da die Ankläger Sassia wahrscheinlich unerwähnt liessen und den Gegensatz 
vom pius Oppianicus und vom impius Cluentius den Richtern einzuprägen 
versuchten, liess Cicero – indem er das Mittel der retorsio criminis in Anspruch 
nahm – mit gutem Gefühl die von den Anklägern erstellte Charakterisierung auf sie 
zurückfallen: Den jüngeren Oppianicus, der wegen seines jugendlichen Alters bei 
den Richtern einen guten Eindruck hinterliess, konnte Cicero nicht angreifen, anstatt 
seiner wählte er Sassia zu seiner Zielscheibe, die zu diesem Zweck umso geeigneter 
zu sein schien, weil ihre um 86 mit ihrem Schwiegersohn eingegangene Ehe102 in 
den Richtern den Topos eines die Gesetze der Natur missachtenden und auch vor 
Verbrechen nicht zurückschreckenden Weibes bestärkte.103 Sein Ziel erreicht Cicero 
mit der genialen Umstrukturierung der Ereignisse, denn ihm wird von dem ordo 
artificiosus ermöglicht, die zweigeteilte narratio in die argumentatio einzubauen und 
von hieraus auf geradem Wege zur peroratio, die zugleich die Rolle einer Invektive 
gegen Sassia einnimmt, zu gelangen. Hiernach soll sich die Aufmerksamkeit und das 
Bestreben der Richter nicht mehr darauf richten, den Fall des für die Verurteilung und 
den Tod seines Stiefvaters auf Rache sinnenden jüngeren Oppianicus zu erwägen, 
sondern darauf, Cluentius von der Rache seiner Mutter zu retten, die alle Gesetze des 
menschlichen Zusammenlebens mit Füssen tritt, und um ihr Ziel zu erreichen, die 
Justiz hierzu als missbrauchen will.104
In dem Teil der Rede, in dem er das iudicium Iunianum behandelt,105 vermischt 
Cicero die traditionell gut trennbaren Mittel der narratio und der argumentatio 
96 Cicero Pro Cluentio 176-187.
97 Idem 17.
98 Idem 189.
99 Idem 190. Vgl Kroll (Fn 12) S 175; Hoenigswald (Fn 10) S 111.
100 Cicero Pro Cluentio 191.
101 Idem 192ff.
102 Idem 12.
103 Hoenigswald (Fn 10) S 113.
104 Stroh (Fn 31) S 210.
105 Cicero Pro Cluentio 9-142.
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mit grossem Geschick. Nach der propositio106 und der dazwischen geflochtenen 
Erzählung über Sassia107 beginnt er eine in der confirmatio gipfelnden108 narratio, aber 
deren gewisse Teile,109 so zB die Greueltaten des Oppianicus110 und die praeiudicia 
erzählenden Paragraphen111 erfüllen den Zweck des probabile e causa,112 da sie 
jene Behauptung zu unterstreichen berufen waren, dass es nicht Cluentius, sondern 
Oppianicus im Interesse gestanden hat, das Gericht zu bestechen.113 Genauso geht 
die Argumentation über das Bestechungsgeld als probabile e facto dem narrativen 
Teil einerseits voraus,114 andererseits folgt sie ihm,115 dh sie umschliesst die hiervon 
handelnde narratio.116 Jene Argumentation also, in der sich die ungefähre Chronologie 
der Ereignisse abzeichnet, trägt einen narrativen Charakter.117
Dieses komplizierte Vorgehen ist unerlässlich, damit Cicero den Richtern jenen 
(ziemlich unwahrscheinlichen) Gedankengang akzeptabel machen kann, dass im 
Prozess des Jahres 74 nicht der obsiegende Cluentius, sondern der für schuldig 
erklärte Oppianicus den Gerichtshof bestochen hat, und zwar auf jene Weise, dass 
der von ihm gedungene Mittelsmann, Staienus, den Richtern das Bestechungsgeld 
zwar versprochen, später aber behauptet hatte, dass der Angeklagte nicht bereit sei, 
zu zahlen, um die Richter gegen ihn aufzuwiegeln und sichern zu können, dass 
Oppianicus verurteilt werde und er die ganze Summe behalten könnte. Cicero konnte 
aber seinen Hörern diese Erzählung nicht ohne Vorbereitung auftischen, so war er 
gezwungen, die rekonstruktive narratio mit der vorausgehenden argumentatio zu 
untermauern und wahrscheinlich zu machen, dass Oppianicus – in Anbetracht seiner 
zahlreichen Untaten und jener praeiudicia, die seinen Fall negativ beeinflussten 
– gewichtige Gründe gehabt haben muss, das Gericht zu bestechen.118 Cicero 
gerät hier in Widerspruch mit jenem Versprechen, dass er in seiner Rede die vom 
Gegner aufgestellte Gliederung befolgen will,119 obwohl er sein Versprechen in der 
eigentlichen narratio mehr oder minder einlöst, trotz jenes Umstandes, dass er zuvor 
auf mehrere, vom Ankläger nicht berührte Punkte zu sprechen kommt. In der langen 
Einleitung versichert Cicero die Richter dessen, dass er sich nunmehr kurz fassen 
106 Idem 9-11.
107 Idem 11-18.
108 Idem 81.
109 Idem 21-61.
110 Idem 21ff.
111 Idem 49ff.
112 Stroh (Fn 31) S 211.
113 Cicero Pro Cluentio 62 64 81.
114 Idem 64f.
115 Idem 82.
116 Idem 66-81.
117 Stroh (Fn 31) S 211.
118 Idem S 312.
119 Cicero Pro Cluentio 1.
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will,120 und kündigt gleich am Anfang der Rede an, dass er vom Tatbestand nichts 
zu verheimlichen und auf jeden, vom Attius erwähnten Umstand zu reflektieren 
vorhat.121
Das Durchbrechen der Chronologie zeigt sich bei der Behandlung der gegen 
den Fall des Cluentius sprechenden praeiudicia und des Verbrechenskatalogs des 
Oppianicus am deutlichsten. Der Vorsitzende (iudex quaestionis) des Gerichtshofes 
im Oppianicusprozess, C Iunius wurde im Jahre 74 verurteilt und der Senat erliess 
noch im selben Jahr einen Beschluss, der es ermöglichte, dass die am iudicium 
Iunianum beteiligten Richter zur Verantwortung gezogen wurden.122 Im Jahre 
73 wurde C Fidiculanius Falcula in zwei Prozessen freigesprochen,123 72 wurde 
P Septimius Scaevola wegen crimen repetundarum und zwischen 73 und 70 
M Atilius Bulbus wegen crimen maiestatis verurteilt, im Jahre 70 erteilten die Zensoren 
M Aquilius, Ti Gutta, P Popilius und Cluentius eine Rüge, 69 wurden Popilius und 
Gutta wegen ambitus und Staienus wegen anderer Verbrechen verurteilt.124 Der 
Ankläger versuchte all diese Urteile von der Art der jeweiligen Anklage unabhängig 
als Konsequenz des iudicium Iunianum darzustellen.125 Cicero erstellt hiergegen 
eine künstliche, den Interessen der Verteidigung entsprechende Chronologie, die 
einerseits die Urteile als Folge der vom Volkstribun Quinctius geschürften invidia 
erscheinen lässt126 und andererseits mit eine Antiklimax die Aufmerksamkeit von 
den gewichtigeren Fällen127 (dh der litis aestimatio des Septimius Severus,128 den 
als unwichtig abgestempelten zensorischen Rügen,129 dem Testament des Egnatius130 
und den Senatsbeschlüssen)131 auf seine eigene in den Verrinen formulierte Meinung 
lenkt.132 Hiermit erweckt er in seinen Hörern den Eindruck einer sich legenden 
invidia.133
Genauso deutlich wird die von Cicero der forensischen Taktik entsprechend 
erstellte Chronologie im Hinblick auf die von Oppianicus dem Älteren begangenen und 
ihm zugeschriebenen Morde und Untaten.134 Der erste Mord: Oppianicus ermordete 
120 Idem 19 20 30 36 41.
121 Idem 1.
122 Idem 136.
123 Idem 114.
124 Stroh (Fn 31) S 215f.
125 Cicero Pro Cluentio 115.
126 Hoenigswald (Fn 10) S 111; Kroll (Fn 12) S 174ff.
127 Cicero Pro Cluentio 89-114.
128 Idem 115-116.
129 Idem 117-134.
130 Idem 135.
131 Idem 136-138.
132 Idem 138-142.
133 Stroh (Fn 31) S 217.
134 Cicero Pro Cluentio 20-41.
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seine Ehefrau Cluentia, die Tante des Cluentius.135 Der zweite und dritte Mord: 
Oppianicus vergiftete die schwangere Ehefrau seines Bruders, des C Oppianicus 
und den eigenen Bruder, um an dessen Erbschaft zu kommen.136 Nach dem Tode 
seines Schwagers, des Cn Magius, der den jüngeren Oppianicus als Erben eingesetzt 
hatte, überredete Oppianicus der Ältere die schwangere Witwe zur Abtreibung und 
heiratete sie.137 Der vierte Mord und die Testamentsfälschung: Mit der Hilfe eines 
reisenden Giftmischers ermordete Oppianicus seine ehemalige Schwiegermutter 
Dianea, die ihn als Erben eingesetzt hatte, und liess das Testament, als er die Legate 
schon früher hatte tilgen lassen, neu schreiben und mit einem falschen Siegel 
versehen.138 Der fünfte Mord: Oppianicus liess M Aurius, den Sohn der Dianea, dem 
seine Mutter vierhunderttausend Sesterzen vermacht hatte, ermorden, von dem er 
erfuhr, dass er in Kriegsgefangenschaft geraten war und als Sklave in Gallien lebte.139 
Der sechste, siebte und achte Mord: Oppianicus liess A Aurius, der ihm wegen der 
Ermordung des M Aurius mit einer Anklage gedroht hatte – und drei weitere Bürger 
aus Larinum – unter dem Vorwand der Proskriptionen töten.140 Der zehnte und elfte 
Mord: Oppianicus wollte Sassia, die Witwe des A Aurius heiraten, die aber nicht die 
Stiefmutter von dessen drei Söhnen werden wollte, und Oppianicus tötete deswegen 
zwei von seinen drei Söhnen und liess nur den jüngeren Oppianicus am Leben.141 
Die Testamentsfälschung und der zwölfte Mord: Oppianicus liess, um sich als Erben 
einsetzen zu lassen, das Testament des Asuvius, eines Bürgers aus Larinum, fälschen 
und Asuvius ermorden; hiernach bestach er den triumvir capitalis Q Manlius, der 
eine Untersuchung wegen des Falles in die Wege leiten wollte.142
Cicero ändert diese Chronologie und gibt von den Verbrechen des Oppianicus 
in folgender Reihenfolge Rechnung: die Ermordung des M Aurius,143 des 
A Aurius und der drei Bürger aus Larinum,144 der zwei Söhne,145 der Cluentia,146 der 
Schwägerin und des C Oppianicus, des Bruders,147 die Anstiftung zur Abtreibung,148 
die Testamentsfälschung und die Ermordung des Asuvius,149 die Ermordung der 
135 Idem 30.
136 Idem 30-32.
137 Idem 33-35.
138 Idem 40-41.
139 Idem 21-23.
140 Idem 23-25.
141 Idem 26-28.
142 Idem 36-39.
143 Idem 21-23.
144 Idem 23-25.
145 Idem 26-28.
146 Idem 30.
147 Idem 30-32.
148 Idem 33-35. 
149 Idem 36-39.
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Dinaea und die Fälschung ihres Testaments.150 Es stellt sich die Frage, warum Cicero 
diesen Weg einzuschlagen „gezwungen“ ist.151 Da die narratio in keiner direkten 
Verbindung mit dem Fall des Cluentius steht, kann der Redner auf die einzelnen 
Fälle nicht so eingehen, dass er diese mit Urkunden oder Zeugenaussagen zu 
beweisen versuchen könnte, sondern muss sich damit begnügen, den Anschein einer 
eingehenden Beweisführung zu erwecken.152 Eine eventuelle Beweisführung wäre 
durch die Unwahrscheinlichkeit des von Cicero vorgetragenen Kriminalromans 
zweifelsohne erschwert worden: Warum sollte der Serienmörder Oppianicus, dem 
seine eigenen Familienmitglieder zum Opfer fielen, der sich am Vermögen seiner 
Opfer bereicherte, der die Gattin seines Opfers heiratete, erst fünfzehn Jahre nach 
seinem ersten Mord zur Verantwortung gezogen worden sein; warum sollte er von 
mehreren als Erbe eingesetzt worden sein, obwohl es den Testierenden klar gewesen 
sein muss, dass sie damit ihren baldigen Tod herbeiriefen; warum sollte C Oppianicus 
den Mörder seiner Gattin zu seinem Erben gemacht haben; warum sollte Oppianicus 
nur zwei von seinen Söhnen ermordet und den dritten am Leben gelassen haben; 
warum sollte Oppianicus Aurius ermordet haben, obwohl er dessen Legat schon 
früher, als er das Testament der Dianea gefälscht hatte, aus dem Testament tilgte?153
Der Redner versucht die hier angeführten Gegenargumente erst gar nicht zu 
widerlegen, sondern er ist vielmehr bemüht, dass diese seiner Hörerschaft gar 
nicht in den Sinn kommen, dh er arbeitet anstatt mit offensichtlichen Lügen, mit 
subtilen Verschleierungen und raffiniertem Verschweigen bzw mit der willkürlichen 
Anordnung der Dramaturgie der Ereignisse. Dass sein Bestreben von Erfolg gekrönt 
wurde, wird auch dadurch bewiesen, dass auch die späteren Kommentatoren keinen 
Verdacht geschöpft haben und erst Winfried Stroh versucht hat, den tatsächlichen 
Hergang der Ereignisse zu rekonstruieren.
Dass Cicero die Ermordung des M Aurius an erster Stelle behandelt hatte, 
erwies sich als meisterhafter Kunstgriff, da er als „Beweis” für die um den Fall 
entstandenen Gerüchte und die von A Aurius ausgesprochenen Drohungen154 bzw 
für das Ausbleiben des Prozesses den Missbrauch der sullanischen Proskriptionen, 
dh die Ermordung des A Aurius mit Hilfe politischer Machenschaften vorbrachte.155 
Mit dem politischen Einfluss des Oppianicus konnte der Redner zugleich erklären, 
warum der Serienmörder Oppianicus erst fünfzehn Jahre nach seinem ersten Mord 
zur Verantwortung gezogen worden ist.156 Die Fragen, die in Verbindung mit dem 
Tod der Dianea und ihrem Testament gestellt werden könnten, umgeht Cicero mit 
150 Idem 40f.
151 Stroh (Fn 31) S 220.
152 A Michel Rhétorique et philosophie chez Cicéron. Essai sur les fondaments philosophiques de l’ 
art de persuader (Paris, 1960) S 257ff.
153 Stroh (Fn 31) S 221.
154 Cicero Pro Cluentio 23.
155 Kroll (Fn 12) S 176.
156 Stroh (Fn 31) S 222.
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genauso grosser Genialität. Als er Dianea zum ersten Mal erwähnt, spricht er bloss 
von ihrer Krankheit und ihrem Tod bzw über die Existenz ihres Testaments, übergeht 
aber die Testamentsfälschung,157 und bringt erst später – nach einer kataraktartigen 
Aufzählung der Verbrechen des Oppianicus, was den neuen Mord gleichsam logisch 
macht – die Ermordung der Dianea und die Tatsache der Testamentsfälschung zur 
Sprache.158 Dass Oppianicus bereit war, seine eigenen Söhne zu ermorden, erklärt 
Cicero nicht aus dem Charakter des Oppianicus, sondern aus dem der Sassia, die 
zur Eheschliessung nur unter dieser Voraussetzung ihr Einverständnis gab – das 
von der den Mörder ihres Gatten heiratenden Sassia gezeichnete düstere Portrait159 
schliesst den Mord nicht aus, sondern macht ihn gerade wahrscheinlich.160 Der 
Mangel an Beweisen hält Cicero davon nicht ab, aus der Not eine Tugend zu machen 
und die Richter daran zu erinnern, dass ihre Empörung im Vergleich zur Empörung 
jener Richter, die vor acht Jahren den Fall des Oppianicus untersucht und die 
Zeugenaussagen angehört hatten, als gering erscheinen wird.161
Die Ermordung der Cluentia (der ersten Gattin des Cluentius), der Schwägerin 
und des C Oppianicus (des Bruders) tut Cicero – angeblich um seine Rede nicht in 
die Länge zu ziehen – in aller Kürze ab. Allerdings veranlasst die Erwähnung der 
Cluentia nach Sassia – von der Cicero nicht behauptet, dass sie bis zu dessen Tod 
die Gattin des Oppianicus geblieben ist – die Hörerschaft mit gutem Grund zu jener 
Vermutung, dass Cluentia erst später, nach Sassia zur Gattin des Oppianicus wurde, 
und es kommt in ihnen der Verdacht nicht hoch, dass der Redner von Ereignissen 
vor dem Jahre 82 spricht. Es steht ausser Zweifel: Ciceros Ziel muss es gewesen 
sein, die Chronologie und damit auch die Hörerschaft gänzlich zu verwirren, da er 
die hier aufgezählten Morde nicht beweisen, höchstens beklagen konnte.162 Jene 
Geschenke, die Oppianicus Magia, der Witwe seines Schwagers, gegeben hat, 
lassen zwar nur auf Heiratsabsichten schliessen, aber Cicero stellt sie als merces 
abortionis dar, indem er sie mit der auf Anstiftung des Oppianicus vorgenommene 
Abtreibung von Magia in Verbindung bringt.163 Um die Ermordung der Dianea und 
die Fälschung ihres Testaments glaubhaft erscheinen zu lassen,164 fügt hier Cicero 
die Ermordung des Asuvius ein – in dessen Testament Oppianicus als Haupterbe 
eingesetzt worden ist –, was durch die Aussage des Avillius, eines Komplizen des 
Oppianicus unterstützt wird. Hierdurch wird das Beerben seiner Opfer zu einem der 
Hauptmotive der Untaten des Oppianicus,165 was die Ermordung der Dianea und die 
157 Cicero Pro Cluentio 21f.
158 Idem 40f.
159 Idem 12-16.
160 Stroh (Fn 31) S 222.
161 Cicero Pro Cluentio 29.
162 Stroh (Fn 31) S 223.
163 Cicero Pro Cluentio 34.
164 Idem 40f.
165 Idem 36-39.
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Fälschung ihres Testaments nur zu einer Steigerung der Motive des Asuvius-Falles 
macht.166
Die narratio der Cluentiana ist ein Paradebeispiel für den ordo artificialis – bzw 
für den mos Homericus167 –, in der die von der utilitas causae bedingte Strategie 
die Stelle der als Tugend angerechneten perspicuitas übernimmt. Aufgrund dieser 
Strategie werden einerseits bei der Kette, andererseits bei der Darstellung der inneren 
Struktur der Ereignisse die glaubhafteren und besser belegbaren Elemente vor die 
schwer beweisbaren – oder gar unbeweisbaren – gestellt, damit gleichsam der Kredit 
und der Grund für die letzteren geschaffen werden.168
4 Um die Bravouren der Cluentiana technisch zusammenzufassen: Mit 
der getrennten Behandlung der Anklagepunkte wegen Bestechung und Giftmord 
verdoppelt Cicero sowohl die narratio, als auch die argumentatio; er fügt die 
normalerweise der narratio folgende propositio unmittelbar nach dem prooemium 
ein; bei der Behandlung sowohl des ersten, als auch des zweiten Anklagepunktes 
verschmelzen die argumentatio und die narratio ineinander; die als Abschluss 
eingefügte peroratio fliesst direkt aus der narratio; die extra causam eingefügten 
Erzählungen, die freie Behandlung der Chronologie bzw die gleichzeitige 
Verwendung des status collectionis und des status coniecturalis verstärken 
zusammen die Positionen des Verteidigers. Diese forensische Taktik versetzt den 
Leser bzw den Hörer gerade deswegen in Erstaunen, weil er kein einziges Mal das 
Gefühl bekommt, als wäre er das Opfer einer vorsätzlichen Irreführung seitens von 
Cicero, und was mehr ist: Die Teile der Erzählung reihen sich in einer scheinbar 
logischen Kette so aneinander, dass ausser Stroh fast alle Kommentatoren der Rede 
von der von Cicero aufgestellten Ordnung der Ereignisse ausgingen und versuchten, 
den historischen Tatbestand zu rekonstruieren.169
Cicero selbst beruft sich als beispielhaftes Exempel der Mischung der drei Stilarten 
auf seine Cluentiana,170 in der das in die Länge gezogene Exordium, die nüchtern 
kurzen Beschreibungen, die präzise Argumentation, die farbigen Erzählungen, die 
emotionalen Begründungen, der Pathos und die Ironie, der sprachliche Humor und 
die mit Leidenschaft eingeprägten Stichwörter, die zutreffenden Charakterisierungen, 
die auch Übertreibungen nicht entbehrenden Verallgemeinerungen, die mit Wucht 
gestellten Fragen und die invektivenartigen Exkurse in einer sonst nirgends 
gesehenen Harmonie verflochten werden.171 Cluentius wurde – dank Cicero – 
freigesprochen, aber, wie wir es von Quintilian erfahren können, gestand der Redner 
166 Stroh (Fn 31) S 224.
167 Quintilianus Institutio oratoria 7, 10, 11.
168 Stroh (Fn 31) S 224f.
169 Idem S 226f.
170 Cicero Orator 103. Vgl Humbert (Fn 32) S 280.
171 Classen (Fn 26) S 105.
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auch zu, dass dies nur mit der geschickten Manipulation der Richter erreicht werden 
konnte.172 Vielleicht auch deswegen betrachtete Cicero seine Rede für Cluentius 
als eine der Höchstleistungen seiner rednerischen Laufbahn,173 wo ihm sowohl 
Quintilian,174 als auch Plinius der Jüngere, der diese oratio als die hervorragendste 
Gerichtsrede Ciceros lobpreiste, beipflichteten.175 Die Rede ist wahrlich beispielhaft 
gestaltet: Der Redner wechselt meisterhaft die Stilarten, bringt Pathos, einfache 
Beschreibungen und Humor miteinander in Einklang, stellt mit grosser Präzision 
abenteuerliche Ereignisse und dramatische Persönlichkeiten dar und verbindet die 
Zeitebenen und Argumente plastisch miteinander, ohne – ausser es steht in seinem 
Interesse – den Tatbestand noch rätselhafter zu machen. Er fesselte bis zum Schluss 
die Aufmerksamkeit seiner Hörerschaft und lenkte die Entscheidung der Richter in 
die von ihm gewünschte Richtung, da es ihm gelang – wie er es später selber gestand 
– ihnen Sand in die Augen zu streuen.176
Abstract
The speech for the defence in the criminal action (causa publica) of Aulus Cluentius 
Habitus, Cicero’s longest surviving speech, dates back to the year 66 when Cicero 
was praetor. In certain respects, it is the jewel in Cicero’s ars oratoria, since its 
narrative is vivid and full of twists and turns like a crime story. Events, scenes and 
time sequences follow one another in a dramatic, sometimes seemingly illogical 
fashion, but in view of the effect the orator seeks to attain, in an exactly premeditated 
sequence. One charge against Cluentius was that he had poisoned his stepfather, 
Statius Albius Oppianicus. Another charge was based on the criminal proceedings that 
had been instituted eight years previously, when Cluentius had charged Oppianicus 
with attempting to poison him, which resulted in Oppianicus being forced into exile. 
In the current lawsuit, however, the prosecution alleged that the court in the previous 
case had declared Oppianicus guilty purely because Cluentius had bribed the judges. 
The lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficiis of 81 was applicable with regard to charges 
of poisoning. However, that law prohibited bribing only those judges who belonged 
to the order of senators, and Cluentius belonged to the order of knights. First, I 
outline the historical background of the oration, that is to say, the facts of the case; 
then, I turn my attention to the possibility of applying the lex Cornelia de sicariis et 
veneficiis to the case. Finally, I examine Cicero’s oratorical strategy of addressing, 
modifying or distorting the charges and their chronology in order to back up his 
argument, which lawyers, too, will regard as brilliant. 
172 Quintilianus Institutio oratoria 2 17 21.
173 Cicero Orator 107f.
174 Quintilianus Institutio oratoria 4 1 35; 6 5 9.
175 Plinius epistulae 1 20 4.
176 Quintilianus Institutio oratoria 2 17 21.
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1 Introduction
Almost two decades after the end of apartheid, chronic overcrowding remains one 
of the most serious problems facing the South African penal system. For example, 
the most recent annual report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services 
in South Africa states as follows: 
The inmate population in South Africa has been characteristically one of the highest per 
capita in the world as has been written about in numerous publications including in the 
Inspectorate’s Annual Reports. It is accepted that the over-population of inmates per 
available infrastructure is a problem in certain centres and then, within such centres, largely 
in the communal cells and, in some instances, single cells where inmates are “doubled-up” 
or even “tripled-up”. These conditions are unacceptable and have been found to be so during 
our inspections around the country.1
1 Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services for the period 1 Apr 2013 
to 31 Mar 2014 at 37. (See website http://judicialinsp.dcs.gov.za/Annualreports/Annual%20
Report%202013%20-%202014%20(2).pdf (accessed 22 Jan 2015).) Figures setting out the precise 
* Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, Howard College Campus, University of KwaZulu-
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Overcrowding is, quite simply, a scourge which bedevils efforts to ensure that 
imprisonment in South Africa is, at the very least, a humane form of punishment. 
At various times during the post-apartheid period the extent of overcrowding 
in South African prisons has been sufficiently serious so as to raise doubts as to 
the constitutionality of this form of punishment. In 2004, for example, Jonny 
Steinberg conducted research on behalf of the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation into prison overcrowding and the constitutional right to adequate 
accommodation in South Africa. At the outset of his paper detailing the results of his 
research he gave the following sobering assessment: 
At risk of second-guessing a jurisprudence which is yet to emerge, it seems clear that the 
extent of overcrowding in South Africa’s prisons places the incarceration of the vast majority 
of this country’s inmates in violation of constitutional standards, no matter how low these 
standards are set.2 
extent of overcrowding are not provided in the 2013/2014 report. An examination of the 2012/2013 
report, however, reveals that during that particular year, the total South African prison population 
amounted to 153,049 prisoners, whereas the system as a whole was designed to accommodate 
just 119,890 persons (see the Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services 
for the period 1 Apr 2012 to 31 Mar 2013 at 40. See website http://judicialinsp.dcs.gov.za/
Annualreports/ANNUAL%20REPORT%202012%20-%202013.pdf (accessed 4 Feb 2015).) This 
means that South African prisons were approximately 128% overcrowded during the 2012/2013 
year. It is interesting to note that the total prison population in South Africa as at 31 Mar 2014 
amounted to 154 648 prisoners (Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional 
Services for the period 1 Apr 2013 to 31 Mar 2014 at 38. See website http://judicialinsp.dcs.
gov.za/Annualreports/Annual%20Report%202013%20-%202014%20(2).pdf (accessed 22 Jan 
2015).) It is further interesting to note certain comments made on 11 Feb 2013 by the Minister 
of Correctional Services, Sibusiso Ndebele. He was reported as stating that South Africa had the 
highest prison population in Africa and that the country was “currently ranked ninth in the world in 
terms of prison population, with approximately 160 000 inmates”. (See Mail & Guardian Online 
available at http://mg.co.za/article/2013-02-11-south-africa-has-highest-prison-population-in-
africa-says-ndebele (accessed 12 Feb 2013).) 
2 J Steinberg Prison Overcrowding and the Constitutional Right to Adequate Accommodation in 
South Africa (Paper commissioned by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation) 
Jan 2005 at 1. Steinberg went on to examine the space available in South African prisons as at 
31 Jul 2004, and pointed out that just under 2,1 square metres of floor space was available to 
each prisoner confined in an average communal cell. He went on to point out that, in Europe, the 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CPT), the body charged with monitoring compliance to the European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, had set four square 
metres per prisoner in a communal cell as a bare minimum standard. This meant that, at the time 
in question, “the average South African prisoner in a communal cell thus occupies just over half 
the floor space considered a bare minimum in the CPTs jurisdiction” (at 2). Steinberg pointed out 
that, although the constitutionality of prison accommodation could not be judged simply on the 
basis of available floor space, “when floor space per prisoner diminishes to the extent that it has 
in South Africa, even the most reticent and cautious courts have ruled, on an adjudication of floor 
space alone, that prison conditions are degrading or cruel” (ibid).
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Clearly, Steinberg’s research was conducted at a time of particular crisis in relation 
to overcrowding within South Africa’s penal system. Despite the fact that the gravity 
of the problem has fluctuated over time, it has remained of serious concern to both 
the prison authorities and South Africa’s leading penologists throughout the post-
apartheid period. The dogged persistence of this problem during the post-apartheid 
period is well illustrated in the following extract from a 2006 research report by 
Chris Giffard and Lukas Muntingh, in which they summarise trends in overcrowding 
within South Africa’s prisons during the country’s first decade of freedom:
The total number and proportion of prisoners living in prisons that are overcrowded have 
increased substantially since 1995. It is only the special remissions of 2005 that have 
brought some respite ... [E]ven though the proportion of prisoners living in conditions of 
between 100% and 200% occupancy slowly decreased from 1996 to 2004 (a trend ended by 
the remission), this decrease has been at the expense of the proportion of prisoners living 
in conditions of occupancy rates more than 200%: those detained in prisons which have 
more than twice as many prisoners than they were intended for increased from just 1% in 
1995 to 36% in 2004 ... Of equally great concern is the proportion of prisoners detained in 
institutions in which there are three times as many prisoners than capacity allows. There 
were no prisoners in this category until 1997, but by 2004 as many as 5% of all prisoners 
(a total of over 9000) were held such facilities. The special remissions reduced this number 
only slightly, to just less than 8 500.3 
Prison overcrowding is not, however, solely a feature of the post-apartheid period. 
During the apartheid period, the problem plagued the National Party government 
and its prison authorities, providing those opposed to the apartheid system with the 
3 See C Giffard & L Muntingh The Effect of Sentencing on the Size of the South African Prison 
Population (Report commissioned by the Open Society Foundation for South Africa) 2006 at 
64-65. See, also, in general, J Steinberg (n 2); J Redpath “Unsustainable and unjust − criminal 
justice policy and remand detention since 1994” (2014) 48 (June) SA Crime Quarterly at 25-37; 
C Ballard Research Report on Remand Detention in South Africa: An Overview of the Current 
Law and Proposals for Reform (Community Law Centre: University of the Western Cape, 2011); 
S Johnstone-Robertson, SD Lawn, A Welte, L-G Bekker & R Wood “Tuberculosis in a South 
African prison: A transmission modelling analysis” (2011) 101(11) South African Medical 
J at 809-813; D van Zyl Smit “Swimming against the tide: Controlling the size of the prison 
population in the new South Africa” in B Dixon & E van der Spuy (eds) Justice Gained? Crime 
and Crime Control in South Africa’s Transition (Cape Town, 2004) at 227-258; D van Zyl Smit 
“National report − South Africa” in D van Zyl Smit & F Dünkel (eds) Imprisonment Today and 
Tomorrow − International Perspectives on Prisoners’ Rights and Prison Conditions − Second 
Edition (Kluwer Law International, 2001) at 589-608; S Peté “The politics of imprisonment in the 
aftermath of South Africa’s first democratic election” (1998) 1 South African J of Criminal Justice 
51-83 (hereafter Peté “Politics”); S Peté “The good the bad and the warehoused − The politics of 
imprisonment during the run-up to South Africa’s second democratic election” (2000) 13(1) South 
African J of Criminal Justice 1-56 (hereafter Peté “The good”); S Peté “Between the devil and 
the deep blue sea – The spectre of crime and prison overcrowding in post-apartheid South Africa” 
(2006) 27(3) Obiter 429-453 (hereafter Peté “Devil”).
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means to launch a series of ideological attacks on the apartheid regime.4 Aspects 
of the apartheid system clearly contributed to the problem of prison overcrowding 
during this period − for example the thousands of people imprisoned under the 
infamous pass laws.5 But the problem of prison overcrowding in South Africa did 
not start with the rise of apartheid. It can be traced back much earlier than this, to 
the very introduction of this form of punishment into South Africa by the colonial 
authorities. It is the aim of this article to examine just one of the four British colonies 
which were joined together to form the Union of South Africa in 1910, in order to 
illustrate the manner in which chronically overcrowded prisons, as well as countless 
debates on the problem, remained a feature of colonial life throughout the period 
during which the colony was in existence. The colony in question is the Colony 
of Natal and the period under examination is from the time of the introduction of 
British administration in 1845, following the annexation by the British Empire three 
years earlier in 1842, until the Union of South Africa came into existence in 1910. 
By shedding light on this one small part of South Africa’s penal history, it is hoped 
that this article will contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the problem of 
chronic overcrowding in South African prisons.6 Part 1 of the article will cover the 
period 1845 to 1875, while Part 2 will cover the period 1875 to 1910.
4 See, in general, S Peté “Holding up a mirror to apartheid South Africa – Public discourse on the 
issue of overcrowding in South African prisons 1980 to 1984 – Part One” (2014) 35(3) Obiter 
485-505. See also Part Two of this article, which is due to be published in (2015) 36(1) Obiter. A 
clear indication of the continued severity of prison overcrowding in South Africa throughout both 
the apartheid and post-apartheid periods, is the fact that both periods are marked by a succession 
of “special amnesties” – colloquially known as “bursting” – designed to relieve pressure on an 
overstretched penal system. Giffard & Muntingh (n 3) at 56-57 summarise the use of special 
amnesties to reduce severe overcrowding in South Africa from the early 1970s as follows: “In 
conditions of severe overcrowding (180%) in 1971, about 13 000 sentenced prisoners were given 
between three and six months amnesty. A further 28 000 sentenced prisoners were released in 
1981, and in total, nearly 88 000 more between then and the first democratic elections in 1994. 
Between 1994 and the end of 2000, a further estimated 49 000 prisoners were released, including 
8 000 unsentenced prisoners who had been granted bail of less than R1000, and there were 
also amnesties for certain politically motivated violent offences. In 2005, a special remission 
of sentence was granted to prisoners who were serving sentences for non-violent offences. 
This eventuated in the release of nearly 32 000 sentenced offenders, reducing the total prisoner 
population from an all-time high of 187 000 to a more manageable 155 000.”
5 See, in general, S Peté (n 4). Many must have hoped that the end of apartheid would bring an end 
to chronic overcrowding in the prisons, but as is indicated by the following comment in Feb 2013 
by the Minister of Correctional Services, Sbu Ndebele, this was not to be: “That our offender 
population has remained constant, whether you remove pass laws, group areas, or apartheid laws, 
should make us search more urgently for answers to the high prison population in South Africa”: 
see Mail & Guardian Online available at http://mg.co.za/article/2013-02-11-south-africa-has-
highest-prison-population-in-africa-says-ndebele (accessed 12 Feb 2013).
6 For an analysis of prison overcrowding in the context of the African continent as a whole, including 
a very brief summary of overcrowding in the prisons of colonial Natal, see S Peté “A brief history 
of human rights in the prisons of Africa” in J Sarkin (ed) Human Rights in African Prisons (Cape 
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2 Background and Early Years 1845-1860
Any discussion of penal policy requires some understanding of the social, political 
and economic context within which that penal policy is shaped and implemented. 
The first point to be noted in relation to the penal policy of colonial Natal is that the 
annexation of Natal by the British in 1842 was carried out, primarily, to thwart the 
ambitions of Afrikaner Voortrekkers who were intent on establishing control over 
the area. It was with some reluctance that the Colony of Natal was added to the 
British Empire, since the British colonial authorities did not believe that the new 
colony held out much prospect of financial gain for the mother country. Because of 
this, the administration of the colony was conducted, by and large, “on the cheap”, 
with the Imperial Government determined to keep costs to a minimum.7 As will be 
seen in the sections which follow, colonial officials stationed in Natal were forced, 
time and again, to plead with the Imperial Government in London for the necessary 
funds to build additional prison accommodation. These pleas were often either 
rebuffed by the Imperial authorities or else acceded to only in part, in a half-hearted 
and begrudging manner. The fact that the colonial state was permanently weak due 
to lack of sufficient finances was a major factor which shaped penal policy in the 
Colony of Natal and affected the degree of overcrowding in the gaols.
Another major factor which affected penal policy in colonial Natal was the 
relationship which existed between various political and economic interest groups in 
the colony. The most important of these interest groups was a large class of African 
subsistence farmers, who were essentially peasant producers engaged in the homestead 
system of production.8 The efficiency of this mode of production meant that peasant 
producers were well able to produce sufficient surplus to maintain their economic 
independence. To the British government, it made sound financial sense to retain the 
system of peasant production, since revenue obtained from these producers could 
offset expenditure in the new colony. The British government decided, therefore, to 
adopt a system of “indirect rule”, as advocated by Theophilus Shepstone, who later 
became the Secretary for Native Affairs in the Colony. This allowed the consolidation 
of Zulu social structures within the colonial system and the continued existence of 
a strong class of peasant producers.9 Certain powerful economic interests within the 
Town, 2008) 40-66 at 46-48 and 53-55. Further, for an analysis of prison overcrowding during 
the apartheid period, see, in general, S Peté (n 4). Finally, for an analysis of prison overcrowding 
during the post-apartheid period, see Peté “Devil” (n 3) at 429-453 passim.
7 See EH Brookes & C De B Webb A History of Natal (Pietermaritzburg, 1965) at 29-41; D Welsh 
The Roots of Segregation – Native Policy in Colonial Natal 1845 to 1910 (Cape Town, 1971) at 
7-9.
8 See J Guy “The destruction and reconstruction of Zulu society” in S Marks & R Rathbone (eds) 
Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa: African Class Formation, Culture and 
Consciousness 1870-1930 (New York, 1982) at 168-169; S Marks & A Atmore Economy and 
Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa (London, 1980) at 113-114.
9 See Welsh (n 7) at 7-30.
FUNDAMINA_21_1_15.indb   106 2015/06/10   13:26:06
107
white ruling class were also in favour of the continued existence of the Zulu peasant 
producers. Among these were absentee speculators who owned large sections of land 
in the colony, and who found that the easiest way to make a profit was to allow the 
Zulu subsistence farmers to continue utilising the land in return for rent.10 Due to a 
desire to maintain trade, merchants in the colony were also inclined to support the 
continued existence of the Zulu subsistence farmers. With the Imperial government 
and several powerful economic interest groups on their side, the Zulu subsistence 
farmers in Natal were able to avoid becoming involved in wage labour for the white 
colonists for much of the nineteenth century. 
The independence of the Zulu subsistence farmers was bitterly resented by the 
white farmers of the colony, since they were deprived of all the advantages which 
would be offered by cheap black labour. Over the years these white farmers and their 
allies waged a bitter struggle to narrow the options available to the black peasant 
producers, and so force them into the service on their farms.11 The white stock farmers 
of the interior were more strident in their views than the coastal sugar farmers, since 
the latter were somewhat pacified by the importation of Indian indentured labour, 
from 1860 onwards, to work on the sugar cane fields. According to Shula Marks, the 
stock farmers were inclined “to be far more radical in their views than the officials, 
planters, or townsmen” and they “regarded the failure of Africans to work for them 
virtually as a criminal offence”.12 The white farmers desired a coercive labour 
system based on racial lines and sought every opportunity to secure a reliable supply 
of cheap black labour. In general, the social relations between the white colonists 
and the indigenous population of the colony were deeply coloured by the coercive 
nature of the economic relationships which the colonists wished to enforce over the 
reluctant black populace. Generally speaking, the ideology of the white colonists 
was dominated, on the one hand, by a deeply ingrained fear of the massive Zulu 
nation on their doorstep and, on the other hand, by racist paternalism towards the 
childlike black “savages” who needed to be “civilized” by the superior white race.13 
The powerful mix of fear, racist paternalism, and extreme frustration at the 
reluctance of the indigenous inhabitants of Natal to become docile and obedient 
workers, was bound to influence ideologies of punishment within the colony. 
Whereas penal theory in Britain may have been based on the idea that offenders 
were to be rehabilitated by means of imprisonment within the so-called “separate 
system” − discussed further below − the social system of colonial Natal was based 
10 See Brookes & Webb (n 7) at 50-57. This practice was known by the racist term “Kafir Farming”. 
See Marks & Atmore (n 8) at 162-163.
11 See Marks & Atmore (n 8) at 158-160.
12 See S Marks Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-1908 Disturbances in Natal (Oxford, 1970) at 15, 17.
13 See S Peté & A Devenish “Flogging, fear and food: Punishment and race in colonial Natal” (2005) 
31(1) J of Southern African Studies 3-21; S Peté “Punishment and race: The emergence of racially 
defined punishment in colonial Natal” (1986) 1(2) Natal University Law and Society Review 99-
114. See, also, Marks (n 12) at 3-26. 
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upon white domination, meaning that colonial penal theory sought to emphasise 
white sovereignty through the firm punishment of black offenders. In general, white 
colonial opinion favoured harsh corporal punishment and forced labour as forms of 
punishment suitable for black offenders, rather than imprisonment. The latter form 
of punishment was seen as a “humane” European-style of correction, which did not 
quite fit the realities of colonial society. Throughout the colonial period there was a 
conflict between the Imperial authorities on the one hand, constantly urging penal 
reform in order to bring the colony into line with “accepted penal practice”, namely 
the best practice in England at the time, and the white colonists on the other, who 
complained bitterly and in racist terms that imprisonment had no effect on the idle 
and ignorant indigenes. To the white colonists in Natal, the officials in England 
who prescribed the “proper” forms of punishment for black offenders were guilty 
of a deeply misguided sentimentalism. The colonial state stood in the middle of 
these two ideological forces − on the one hand having to implement the instructions 
handed down by the Imperial authorities, and on the other hand having to resist 
political pressure brought to bear by the white colonists. Before Natal was granted 
responsible government status in 1894, the balance of power in this ideological 
conflict rested with the Imperial authorities, but thereafter it shifted in favour of the 
white colonists.     
An important reason for overcrowding in the prisons of colonial Natal was an 
explosive growth of the prison population over the years of the colony’s existence. One 
of the main reasons why Natal’s prison population grew so rapidly, was the coercive 
nature of social relations − as sketched above − between the indigenous inhabitants 
of the region and the white colonists. Resistance on the part of the indigenous 
inhabitants led to the imprisonment of large numbers of Africans for petty offences. 
A significant reason for this was that, throughout the colonial period, prisons were 
used as a means of exercising social control over the indigenous population of the 
colony.14 In other words, Natal’s gaols were, in general, overcrowded with offenders 
against social control legislation − such as the Masters and Servants Ordinance; 
the Pass Laws; and the Borough Bye Laws rather than with “criminals” in the true 
sense of the word.15 As was to happen a century later during the apartheid period, 
14 This was to become a recurring theme in the penal history of South Africa as a whole. See, eg, in 
general, Peté (n 4).
15 See, in general, J Riekert The Natal Master and Servant Laws (unpublished LLM thesis, University 
of Natal: Pietermaritzburg, 1983). Similar processes were at work in other parts of the country. C 
van Onselen makes the following perceptive comment about the close inter-relationship between 
the mechanisms of economic coercion – in his example the mine compounds of the Witwatersrand 
– and the mechanisms of social coercion – namely the prisons: “[Economic forces] prised black 
South Africans off their land, separated them from their families, reduced them to the status of 
workers, and then ruthlessly reallocated them to the towns. There, on the bureaucratic leash of 
the pass laws, they were soon exposed to two sociologically similar institutions which served the 
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countless numbers of ordinary black residents in the Colony became victims of the 
petty rules and regulations designed by the white colonists to keep control over the 
black population. Persons swept up in this dragnet of petty rules and regulations were 
often unable to pay the stipulated fines, and so ended up in the colony’s overcrowded 
gaols. Many prisoners were not criminals but victims of economic forces beyond 
their control, forced to seek wage labour in towns or on farms controlled by the white 
colonists, before falling foul of the restrictive legislation designed to keep a tight 
rein on the black labour force, or some other petty measure aimed at the “protection” 
of white society. Sometimes low-level strife erupted into all-out war or rebellion 
− for example, the Langalibalele Rebellion of 1873; the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879; 
the Anglo-Boer War of 1899; and the Bambata Rebellion of 1906. Each of these 
events delivered a shock to the penal system of colonial Natal, and led to an influx of 
prisoners into already overcrowded prisons.
With the above as general background, we turn now to a few brief remarks on 
prison overcrowding in the first fifteen to twenty years of the colony’s existence. 
Details of the birth of the prison in colonial Natal have been set out elsewhere 
and need not detain us here, apart from highlighting certain points relating to 
overcrowding.16 The first “prisons” in the colony − perhaps better described as 
lock-up houses − consisted of a few wattle-and-daub cottages, at least one purpose 
built by the Voortrekkers before the arrival of the British, but others simply rented 
from local residents.17 Initially, the number of offenders who had the misfortune 
to end up in one of these “gaols” was very low. For example, there were only five 
rapidly industrialising economic system particularly well – the prisons and the mine compounds”: 
see C van Onselen Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand 1886 to 1914 
(Johannesburg, 1982) at 171. 
16 For more details on the birth of the prison in colonial Natal, see S Peté “Falling on stony ground: 
Importing the penal practices of Europe into the prisons of colonial Natal (Part 1)” (2006) 12(2) 
Fundamina 100-112 at 101-106.
17 The “Tronk” in Pietermaritzburg was described by AF Hattersley as “a wattle-and-daub structure, 
flanked with sod walls and surrounded by a pleasant garden, – not in the least suggestive of 
the rigours of prison life”: see Portrait of a City (Pietermaritzburg, 1951) at 9-10. The Gaol in 
Durban, a wattle-and-daub building rented from a certain Mr Dand in 1849 (the previous lock-
up having been rented from a Mr Benningfield in 1847), was described by the Natal Witness 
as “a low cottage, overgrown with creepers, fronted by a thick, verdant and lofty hedge”. See 
18 Apr 1851 Natal Witness. Despite these idyllic descriptions, life for inmates could clearly be 
unpleasant. One of the earliest complaints about prison conditions in Natal came from a group of 
ten traders who were locked up in the Pietermaritzburg “Tronk” in 1842 when the Boers were still 
in charge of the town. They complained to the Boer Commandant-General inter alia as follows: 
“We humbly submit to you and hope you will take into consideration and kindly ease us of being 
chained during the day and of the intolerable stench caused by our being obliged to ease ourselves 
inside the Tronk, this with being confined with closed windows which may soon cause a disease 
fatal to us and perhaps spread through the whole town.” See E Goetzche The Father of a City: The 
Life and Times of George Cato, First Mayor of Durban (Durban, 1967) at 47-48.
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prisoners in the Pietermaritzburg Gaol in February 1846.18 As the years went by, 
however, the number of prisoners began to rise and the accommodation provided by 
the rustic cottages became increasingly inadequate. For example, in February 1859, 
Lieutenant-Governor Scott described the Pietermaritzburg Gaol as “in every respect 
unsuited for the present wants of the Colony” and informed the Imperial authorities 
in London that “there is now a pressing need for better provision being made for 
prisoners, not only in Pietermaritzburg, but also in Durban and elsewhere”.19 On 
3 June 1861, in his opening address to the Legislative Council, the Lieutenant-
Governor alluded to the fact that growth in the Colony had resulted in “our great 
deficiency in prison accommodation”, which he described as “more and more 
conspicuous amongst the pressing requirements”.20 Although the construction of 
purpose built prisons to replace the wattle-and-daub structures of earlier times began 
in the first half of the 1860s, certain gaols remained dilapidated and overcrowded 
well into this period.21 As late as February 1864, for example, the Durban gaoler 
reported that thirty-six prisoners were forced to occupy the seven rooms which were 
available in the antiquated gaol. Racial segregation was firmly in place within the 
Durban Gaol at this time, with white prisoners being kept apart from black prisoners. 
As was to be expected in a colony dominated by racist ideology, white prisoners 
were shielded from the very worst effects of the overcrowding. According to the 
Durban Gaoler, whilst a particular room in the gaol might accommodate as many as 
nine black prisoners, “there would not be more than six white men in such a room”.22 
It is clear, therefore, that the general suffering inflicted on prisoners due to severely 
overcrowded conditions, was much harsher in the case of black prisoners than their 
white counterparts.  
3 Chronic Overcrowding and the Failure to Introduce the 
‟Separate System” into the Penal System of Colonial 
Natal in the 1860s and early 1870s
An enduring theme within the discourse surrounding imprisonment in colonial Natal 
during the 1860s and early 1870s was a series of calls by the Imperial authorities in 
England, directed at the Government of Natal, to introduce the so-called “separate 
18 Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers – Colonies Africa (Shannon, 1971) 
vol 28 Natal at 65: West to Maitland, 24 Feb 1846. Martin West had taken up his duties as the first 
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal in Dec 1845.
19 NAB (KwaZulu-Natal Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository) Colonial Office (London) 179/51: 
Scott to Lytton, 4 Feb 1859.
20 7 Jun 1861 Natal Witness.
21 Construction of a new Central Gaol in Pietermaritzburg was begun in Jan 1861, while construction 
of a new gaol in Durban only started in Nov 1864. See 22 Nov 1864 Natal Witness.  
22 NAB CSO (Colonial Secretary’s Office, Natal) 196/327: Report of Durban Gaoler, 12 Feb 1864. 
FUNDAMINA_21_1_15.indb   110 2015/06/10   13:26:07
111
system” into the gaols of the colony.23 These calls were, however, doomed to failure 
as a result of the ever increasing prison population, as well as scepticism on the 
part of the white colonists in general. For the latter, although the “separate system” 
might be necessary in the punishment of “European” offenders, who needed to be 
rehabilitated before they could be re-accepted into the fold of white colonial society, 
in the case of “non-European” offenders the lessons needed could be taught most 
effectively by the cat-ò-nine-tails, as well as by forced productive labour for the 
colonial state and/or for white colonial society in general. In the eyes of the white 
colonists, who lived in a society stratified along strict racial lines and dominated 
by racist ideology, “rehabilitation” for the latter category of prisoners consisted in 
knowing who was the “master” and who the “servant”, as well as in understanding 
that the economic future of “non-Europeans” lay in wage labour for the white man.  
The insistence of the Imperial authorities that the “separate system” be introduced 
into the gaols of colonial Natal was based upon what was at the time believed to be 
“best practice” in the treatment and rehabilitation of offenders in England. During 
the 1860s an extensive and widespread investigation was conducted by the Imperial 
authorities in order to determine whether or not the various penal practices of the 
many British colonies conformed to the model provided by the penal practices of 
the mother country. In 1863, two reports were sent to the colonies describing what 
was believed to be the “state of the art” in relation to methods of punishment.24 The 
purpose of sending these reports to the colonies was clearly to enable the colonies to 
copy these state of the art methods.
In 1865, questionnaires were sent to all British colonies in order to gather 
information on the different penal practices which were in operation across the 
Empire. The information received was used to compile what came to be known as 
the “Digest and Summary of Information respecting Colonial Prisons” (hereafter 
referred to as the Digest).25 Two principles which were particularly stressed in the 
Digest were the principle of “strictly penal labour” − for example, non-productive 
labour on a “treadwheel” or “crank” or at “shot drill” − and the principle of strict 
separation of prisoners, one from another − the “separate system” − which was 
regarded as fundamental to prison discipline.26 The inescapable implication of the 
23 For a more general discussion of the penal reforms proposed by the Imperial authorities during the 
period 1865 to 1867, including in particular the issue of penal labour, see Peté (n 16) at 107-111. 
24 These reports were the “Report of the Committee of the House of Lords on the State of Discipline 
in Gaols” and the “Report of the Royal Commission on Penal Servitude”. See NAB Government 
House, Natal 359/2: Circular Despatch Newcastle to Scott, 19 Oct 1863; and NAB Government 
House, Natal 358/162: Circular Despatch Newcastle to Scott, 19 Aug 1863.
25 See NAB Imperial Blue Book – Digest and Summary of Information Respecting Colonial Prisons 
(drawn up and presented to the British Parliament by Command of Queen Victoria in 1867, C3961 
of 1867) at 4: Circular Despatch Cordwell to Maclean, 16 Jan 1865.
26 For details on the introduction of strictly penal labour into the prisons of colonial Natal, see Peté 
(n 16) at 100-112; S Peté “Falling on stony ground: Importing the penal practices of Europe into 
the prisons of Colonial Natal – Part Two” (2007) 13(2) Fundamina 111-125. 
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latter principle for prison accommodation was that a sufficient number of cells had 
to be built so as to allow each prisoner be confined in a separate cell.27 Clearly, 
in a financially strapped colony such as Natal where the prisons were already 
overcrowded, this was always going to be a tall order. What made it even more 
difficult was the fact that the white colonists saw no good reason to treat African 
prisoners in the same manner that “European” prisoners were treated in England. 
For their part, the Imperial authorities remained resolutely wedded to the principle 
of separation.28 
The response of the authorities in Natal to the insistence of the Imperial authorities 
in London that the principle of separation as set out in the Digest be implemented 
in the colony, was very negative.29 There were not nearly enough cells in the penal 
system to allow prisoners to be kept apart at night, and during the day most prisoners 
worked together in gangs on public works. In any event, most colonists believed 
that the “separate system” would be wasted on “non-European” prisoners, who were 
not so much in need of being rehabilitated into society, as in need of a swift harsh 
lesson as to who was in charge of the colony – namely the white colonists − and 
what the role of “non-Europeans” in the colony actually was − namely to provide a 
source of cheap labour for the white colonists.30 To the colonial mind, the “separate 
system” only made sense if it meant reserving separate cells for white prisoners. In 
other words, in the overcrowded conditions of a colonial prison, a single cell was 
something of a “luxury” for selected (white) prisoners, rather than a necessity for all 
prisoners. 
On 19 November 1868 a Commission of Enquiry was appointed to investigate 
the reform of Natal’s penal system. The Commission confirmed that it was impossible 
to carry out the separate system in either the Durban or the Pietermaritzburg Gaol, 
27 M Ignatieff Just Measure of Pain (New York, 1978) at 102 describes the attraction of the “separate 
system” to prison authorities in England as follows: “Solitary confinement was designed to wrest 
the governance of prisons out of the hands of the inmate subculture. It restored the state’s control 
over the criminal’s conscience. It divided convicts so that they would lose the capacity to resist 
both in thought and action.”
28 They clearly believed the following principal stated in the Digest: “It has been recognised too long 
and too widely to be now disputed that good discipline is impracticable and corruption certain 
where prisoners are in communication with each other, and that separation is the only basis for 
a sound penal system.” See NAB Imperial Blue Book – Digest and Summary of Information 
Respecting Colonial Prisons (drawn up and presented to the British Parliament by Command of 
Queen Victoria in 1867, C3961 of 1867) (n 25) at 65 IV.
29 See, eg, NAB Colonial Office, London 179/89: Keate to Buckingham, 6 May 1868: Enclosure – 
Report of Colonial Engineer, 26 Dec 1867.
30 A good example of the general rejection of the “separate system” by the colonial authorities is the 
following opinion of the Colonial Engineer that the separate system would not be “particularly 
advantageous in the case of Kafirs and Coolies who form the great majority of prisoners in Natal. 
Provision for enforcing this system, however, in particular cases and especially amongst persons 
of European blood is very desirable ...”: see NAB Colonial Office, London 179/89: Keate to 
Buckingham, 6 May 1868: Enclosure – Report of Colonial Engineer, 26 Dec 1867.
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because of lack of accommodation. In the Pietermaritzburg Gaol at this time, seven 
cells were occupied by twenty-two white prisoners, whereas forty black prisoners 
were forced to live in only ten cells.31 Furthermore, due to financial constraints, there 
was not much hope of more prison accommodation being built. The Commission 
pointed out that “in the present financial state of the Colony there is no probability 
that new gaols would be constructed”.32 
The situation did not improve over the years which followed. In 1872 the 
Durban Gaol was overcrowded to such an extent that only 176 cubic feet of space 
was available for each prisoner. The Digest laid down that 900 cubic feet of space per 
prisoner was suitable for prisoners in England, while even more space was necessary 
in tropical climates.33 This was the lowest figure of all the Natal gaols and compared 
very unfavourably with the figure for the Pietermaritzburg Gaol, namely 696 cubic 
feet per prisoner.34 Overcrowding had many adverse effects; for example, since there 
was no infirmary at the Durban Gaol, the general overcrowding resulted in the cells 
which were allocated to sick prisoners also being overcrowded. On 5 November 
1872, in a chilling comment, the Durban Gaol Board stated that “in some cases it 
is to be feared that life has been sacrificed for want of proper accommodation for 
the sick”.35 Of course, with the overcrowding in Natal’s gaols, it was impossible 
to introduce the separate system, although the Imperial authorities continued to 
urge that this problem be rectified.36 On 30 July 1873 the Secretary of State, Lord 
Carnarvon, expressed his concern at the lack of prison accommodation in Natal and 
recommended that the Lieutenant-Governor give the matter his “early and serious 
consideration”.37 Within a few months of this despatch being sent, the problem of 
chronic overcrowding in the two central gaols of the colony was to become worse 
than ever, as these gaols were flooded with “rebel” prisoners who were captured and 
incarcerated following the “Langalibalele Rebellion” of 1873.   
31 NAB CSO 324/304: Evidence of Superintendent Pietermaritzburg Gaol to Commission of 
Enquiry appointed on 19 Nov 1868.
32 Idem at 3.
33 NAB Imperial Blue Book – Digest and Summary of Information Respecting Colonial Prisons 
(drawn up and presented to the British Parliament by Command of Queen Victoria in 1867, C3961 
of 1867) (n 25) at 84 XVI.
34 NAB Natal Blue Book, 1872: AA8 point IV.
35 NAB CSO 424/2228: Meeting of Durban Gaol Board, 5 Nov 1872.
36 The Natal Blue Book for 1872 stated as follows: “None of the prisons are on the separate system. 
The separation enforced, where the gaol accommodation admits of it, is that of sexes and races. 
Prisoners on remand are also, where practicable, kept apart from convicted prisoners. All male 
prisoners sentenced to hard labour are worked in association.” See NAB Natal Blue Book, 1872: 
AA8 point I.
37 Government House Natal 58/Despatch 350 KwaZulu-Natal Archives Pietermaritzburg Archives 
Repository: Kimberley to Pine 30 Jul 1873.
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4 The Langalibalele Rebellion of 1873 and its Effect on 
Prison Overcrowding 
An infrequent yet important factor contributing over the decades to chronic 
overcrowding in the prisons of colonial Natal was the outbreak, from time to time, 
of war or serious rebellion within the colony. An important example of one such 
“rebellion” was the so-called “Langalibalele Rebellion” of 1873 which led to the 
imprisonment of a large number of African “rebels” in prisons of the colony. Clearly, 
the “rebels” were not “criminals” in the strict sense of the word. This being the case, it 
was inappropriate for them to be confined in gaols of the colony, which were already 
bursting at the seams with conventional “criminals”. After both the Langalibalele 
Rebellion and the Bambata Rebellion, the Natal governmental authorities took steps 
to keep the “rebels” out of the penal system. Each rebellion will be examined in turn.
The events which came to be known as the “Langalibalele Rebellion” took 
place towards the end of 1873. Langalibalele was the chief of the Hlubi tribe which 
occupied land in the foothills of the Drakensberg mountains near Champagne Castle 
and Cathkin Peak. Following a dispute with the local magistrate over unregistered 
guns in the possession of his tribesmen, Langalibalele ignored an order to report 
in person to the authorities in Pietermaritzburg. In the eyes of the authorities this 
amounted to open rebellion. A force consisting of 200 British troops, 300 colonial 
volunteers, and 6 000 African tribesmen was sent to quell the “insurrection”. During 
the ensuing battle, between 150 and 200 of the Hlubi were killed. Langalibalele 
and one of his sons were banished to Robben Island and 200 Hlubi tribesmen were 
imprisoned.38 
The increase in the prison population due to the sudden influx of “rebel” 
prisoners placed great strain on Natal’s already overcrowded gaols. On 30 December 
1873, the Pietermaritzburg Gaoler reported that he had been forced to confine the 
“rebel” prisoners as follows:
… 24 in the carpenter’s shop, 12 in a tent and 9 in a small shed, making in all 45 in the Gaol 
yard.39
He pointed out that “the rebel chief may be expected soon, and the confinement of 
prisoners in the Gaol yard is to say the least dangerous ...”.40 Forty-eight prisoners 
were transferred to Durban to make room for the “rebel” prisoners, and five additional 
staff members were appointed at the Durban Gaol to cater for the increase in the 
prison population.41 Langalibalele was subsequently confined in the Pietermaritzburg 
Gaol for a time, amid intense speculation on the part of the local African population 
38 Brookes & Webb (n 7) at 113-123.
39 NAB CSO, 459/3127: Superintendent Pietermaritzburg Gaol to Colonial Secretary, 30 Dec 1873.
40 Ibid.
41 NAB CSO 460/97: Superintendent Durban Gaol, 8 Jan 1874.
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that he would escape somehow. This speculation was caused by two unusual natural 
phenomena which happened to occur at this time, namely an eclipse of the sun, 
followed by a fierce hailstorm. According to the Natal Witness the local African 
population believed both these phenomena to be the work of Langalibalele.42 The 
eclipse was seen as an attempt by Langalibalele to bring total darkness to the earth, 
under cover of which he might be rescued by his followers. He was believed to have 
caused the hailstorm in an attempt to break open the roof of the gaol in which he was 
imprisoned. Needless to say, neither Langalibalele nor any of the imprisoned Hlubi 
tribesmen were able to escape. The overcrowded conditions in the prisons remained 
of major concern to the authorities at the time. 
One of the consequences of the Langalibalele Rebellion was the passing of Law 
18 of 1874, with the following self-explanatory title: “To make Special Provision 
with regard to the Employment of Convicts”.43 Under this law the Lieutenant 
Governor was authorised to assign any convict who had been sentenced to hard 
labour, as a servant to any private individual or to the Colonial Engineer, for the term 
of his sentence.44 The Lieutenant Governor in Executive Council was empowered 
to frame rules and regulations for carrying out the new Law, and on 10 April 1874 
a set of such rules and regulations was promulgated in the Government Gazette.45 
The rules and regulations laid down not only the rights and duties of the “European 
employer” and the “native convict” who had been assigned to him, but also made 
provision for the convict’s family.46 Family members were permitted to reside with 
the convict on the land of his employer.47 The employer was required to provide both 
the convict and his family with food and lodging.48 In return, the employer could 
demand the services of any unmarried female who was over ten years of age and any 
male who was over twelve years of age, who belonged to the convict’s family and 
42 1 May 1874 The Natal Witness.
43 Law 18 of 1874 (Natal) “To make Special Provision with regard to the Employment of Convicts”.
44 It is interesting to note that there had been a failed attempt to pass similar legislation just over 
a decade earlier in 1863. In that year a Bill was proposed which sought to give the Lieutenant 
Governor the power to “permit any person undergoing any sentence of imprisonment to become 
the servant or apprentice of any house-holder applying for the same ...”. (See GN 56 Government 
Gazette, Natal of 21 Apr 1863: Bill “For the Employment of Prisoners on Public Works” at 
s 10.) Prisoners so assigned were to be subjected to the provisions of the Masters and Servants 
Ordinance Number 2 of 1850 (idem at s 11). However, the punishment for desertion was to be 
more severe for prisoners assigned as servants, than the punishment for desertion by “normal” 
servants under the Masters and Servants Ordinance. Prisoners who deserted their masters were 
to be punished by up to two years’ additional punishment plus, at the discretion of the resident 
magistrate, up to fifty lashes (idem at s 7). The Bill was rejected by the Legislative Council and 
never became law. (See 17 Jul 1863 The Natal Witness “Legislative Council 8 July 1863”.)
45 NAB Executive Council Vol 9 at 258; and NAB Colonial Office, London 179/117: Pine to 
Carnarvon, 22 Feb 1875 – Enclosure 1: Government Notice 117 of 1874.
46 Ibid.
47 Idem: Regulation 1.
48 Idem: Regulation 2.
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were residing with the convict on the employer’s land. Males over eighteen years of 
age who belonged to the convict’s family and were residing with the convict on the 
employer’s land, were not free to work elsewhere until such time as the convict’s 
period of assignment had expired.49 This did not apply, however, if the employer 
was unwilling to employ such males and pay them wages equivalent to the going 
rate at the time. In terms of the regulations, family members were to be remunerated 
“at such rate of wages as shall in each case be fixed by the magistrate, taking into 
account the obligations of the employer”.50 
With regard to the convict, the employer was to be entitled to his services “at all 
reasonable times” and his wages were to be fixed by the magistrate.51 These wages 
were not to be paid directly to the convict, except by direction of the Lieutenant 
Governor.52 In the normal course of events all such wages were to be paid into 
an account entitled “The Convict Relief Fund”.53 The Lieutenant Governor was 
authorised to
draw upon such fund for the purpose of relieving from want or rewarding for good conduct, 
or for the purpose of enabling any native convict on expiration of the period of imprisonment 
to acquire the means of re-establishing himself in the Colony: Provided that in no case shall 
the amount so granted for relief, reward, or otherwise, exceed the aggregate amount of wages 
earned by the said convict during his imprisonment.54       
Law 18 of 1874 was aimed at black political offenders, namely “rebels”, who had 
resisted white domination rather than at “criminals” in the true sense of the word. 
This is apparent from the circumstances under which the Law was framed and the 
contents of the Law itself. 
Following the Langalibalele Rebellion, 200 tribesmen were imprisoned. Clearly 
these men were not criminals from whom society would have to be protected, and 
who would have to be rehabilitated before they could take up their place in society. 
They were “rebels”, political offenders, and once the rebellion had been broken, a 
punishment was needed which would be sufficiently severe yet would not involve 
imprisonment, since the prisons were already overcrowded with “real” criminals. 
In other words, the law had been used as an instrument of political oppression. The 
penal system was not suitable for dealing with political offenders. In the eyes of the 
white colonists, Law 18 of 1874 clearly provided the ideal punishment for “rebels”, 
namely compulsory labour for the benefit of the white man. As pointed out earlier in 
this article, a major theme of the political economy of Natal throughout the colonial 
period was the constant struggle by the white colonists to force the African tribesmen 
49 Idem: Regulation 5.
50 Idem: Regulation 3.
51 Ibid.
52 Idem: Regulation 9.
53 Idem: Regulation 12.
54 Idem: Regulation 13.
FUNDAMINA_21_1_15.indb   116 2015/06/10   13:26:07
117
into wage labour on white farms. Indeed, certain white farmers viewed the failure 
of the African tribesmen to work on their farms as tantamount to a criminal offence. 
To these white colonial farmers, forcing “rebels” into wage labour on white farms 
was a fitting punishment for those who had dared to challenge white sovereignty. Of 
course, such punishment would not have been suitable for “criminals” in the strict 
sense of the word, such as murderers, rapists, thieves and so on. On 21 April 1874, 
The Natal Witness, commenting on the rules and regulations promulgated under Law 
18 of 1874, stated that since strong opposition was to be expected from “English 
negropholists”, perhaps it would be better to treat offenders such as Langalibalele’s 
200 “rebels” as ordinary criminals.55 As hard labour prisoners they could be employed 
in the construction of much needed public works. The Natal Witness found it difficult 
to understand why the “Exeter Hall mind ... would rather the Kafirs endured penal 
servitude, than that they should be restored to their families and be required to work 
for white employers at fair wages”.56
Clearly the reason was that the authorities in England feared that, since Law 18 
of 1874 was designed to deal with political offenders, it would be used as a means 
of political oppression. As an official in the Colonial Office in London remarked:
If the law is intended to apply really to convicts condemned to hard labour, fancy assigning 
20 criminals to a farmer without any provision either for his protection or their discipline, 
while if it is intended to be applied as it really is to political offenders it must inevitably be 
used as an instrument of oppression.57
In his Despatch of 29 April 1875, the Secretary of State, Lord Carnarvon, informed 
the Lieutenant Governor that Law 18 of 1874 had been disallowed. The following 
reasons were given for the step that had been taken:
On a sudden emergency, such as lately arose, where it was imperatively necessary to 
make instant provision for feeding a large number of prisoners, and the resources of the 
Government were inadequate for the purpose of lodging and keeping them, such a course as 
assigning natives for a short period to those who would provide properly for them, might be 
defensible as a temporary measure resorted to under pressure; but to take a general power of 
assigning convicts as private servants, would open a door to many objectionable practices, 
owing, among many other causes, to the impossibility of properly supervising either the 
employers or the employed.58
55 21 Apr 1874 The Natal Witness.
56 Ibid.
57 NAB Colonial Office, London 179/117: Pine to Carnarvon, 22 Feb 1875: Minute by Colonial 
Office official, 7 Apr 1875.
58 NAB Government House, Natal 64/Despatch 57: Carnarvon to Wolseley, 29 Apr 1875 at par 3.
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5 Conclusion
Throughout the period dealt with in part one of this article, chronic overcrowding 
remained a pressing problem in the gaols of colonial Natal. Starved of adequate 
financial resources, the colonial state was unable to provide sufficient prison 
accommodation to cater for the number of inmates confined within the system. The 
problem was aggravated by the fact that the prisons were used as a method of social 
control over the indigenous population of the Colony. Furthermore, as illustrated 
by the Langalibalele Rebellion, the penal system was vulnerable to external shocks 
caused by war and civil strife, which greatly increased the number of prisoners 
requiring accommodation. Finally, the problem of overcrowding in the prisons of 
colonial Natal came with a nasty racial twist. Due to socio-economic circumstances 
prevailing in the Colony and the peculiar nature of the racist ideology which 
dominated white colonial society, most white colonists did not regard imprisonment 
as a particularly suitable form of punishment for black offenders, preferring harsh 
corporal punishment combined with forced labour in service of the colonial state and/
or white society in general. The result was that conditions were always considerably 
more overcrowded for “non-European” prisoners than for “European” prisoners in 
the gaols of colonial Natal. These themes will be further explored in part two of this 
article, which will examine the period from 1875 until the end of the colonial period 
in 1910.     
ABSTRACT
During recent decades, like the proverbial bad penny, the problem of chronic 
overcrowding has turned up over and over again to haunt South African prison 
administrators. As this article indicates, however, overcrowding in South African 
prisons is not only a recent phenomenon. Overcrowding has been a significant 
feature of imprisonment in South Africa from the very introduction of this form of 
punishment into the country. This article examines overcrowding in the prisons of 
colonial Natal from 1845 until 1910. Through an analysis of the official discourse 
surrounding this difficult problem throughout the colonial period, this article 
shows that imprisonment as a form of punishment in South Africa has always been 
inextricably bound up with the problem of overcrowding. By illustrating the deeply 
entrenched nature of the problem from a historical perspective, this article hopes to 
provide present-day prison administrators with useful insights into the nature of their 
struggle to overcome the problem. The article is in two parts. Part 1 of the article 
covers the period 1845 to 1875, while Part 2 covers the period 1875 to 1910.
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PROTECTION AGAINST FORCED SALE 
OF A DEBTOR’S HOME IN THE ROMAN 
CONTEXT
Lienne Steyn* **
Therefore am I called Janus; … 
… for my shape … you know 
That every door must have a double face; 
One views the Lares, one the Populace; 
And as your mortal Janitor, who sees  
From threshold floor, exits and entrances, 
So I, the Janitor celestial, view 
Eoan and Hesperian regions too. 
Hecat’ you know is furnished with fronts three 
That she may watch and ward her Trivise, 
And I have twain, that, without movement, I 
May view alike past and futurity. 
Translated extract from Ovid Fasti Book 1***
1 Introduction
The home of a debtor has never enjoyed specific statutory protection in the form 
of exemption from forced sale in the individual debt enforcement and insolvency 
* Associate Professor, School of Law (Howard College Campus), University of KwaZulu-Natal.
** This article is based on sections of the author’s unpublished LLD thesis entitled Statutory 
Regulation of Forced Sale of the Home in South Africa (University of Pretoria, 2012).
*** JB Rose The Fasti of Ovid (London, 1866) at 5.
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procedures in South Africa.1 Only in the last decade has recognition by the courts of 
the impact of one of the socio-economic rights included in the Bill of Rights,2  the right 
to have access to adequate housing, provided for in section 26 of the Constitution, 
profoundly affected developments in relation to execution against a debtor’s home in 
the individual debt enforcement process.3 The combined effect of the Constitutional 
Court’s decisions in Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz4 and Gundwana v Steko 
Development CC,5 is that it is acknowledged that execution against a debtor’s home 
may constitute an unjustifiable infringement of the right to have access to adequate 
housing. Further, this may occur even where the home has been mortgaged in favour 
of the creditor. Therefore, in every case in which execution is sought against a 
person’s home, judicial oversight is required to determine, after considering “all the 
relevant circumstances”, whether execution is justifiable in terms of section 36 of 
the Constitution. 
Given that before the decision in Jaftha v Schoeman, the right of a creditor, 
especially a mortgagee, to execution against the debtor’s property had been 
largely regarded as unassailable, these were ground-breaking changes effected by 
the Constitutional Court in the course of carrying out constitutional imperatives. 
However, it should be borne in mind that the fact that judicial oversight is required 
will not necessarily have the outcome that a court will refuse to grant an order 
declaring a debtor’s home specially executable. It will depend on the degree to which 
any specific circumstances are exceptional as well as whether judicial officers adopt 
a more debtor-friendly, as opposed to a creditor-friendly, approach in such matters.6 
1 Although various statutory provisions regulating the individual debt enforcement and insolvency 
procedures (such as, eg, s 67 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944, s 39 of the Supreme Court 
Act 59 of 1959, s 23 and s 82(6) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936), and other statutes (such as the 
Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956, the General Pensions Act 29 of 1979, the Long-Term Insurance 
Act 52 of 1998 and the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996) place certain assets beyond 
the reach of creditors, these do not include the debtor’s home.
2 Contained in Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter 
referred to as the Constitution), which came into operation on 4 Feb 1997.
3 See, generally, Steyn (n**) supra, and authorities cited there. 
4 Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) (hereafter referred to as Jaftha v 
Schoeman).
5 Gundwana v Steko Development CC 2011 (3) SA 608 (CC) (hereafter referred to as Gundwana v 
Steko).
6 Jaftha v Schoeman concerned unique circumstances in that the debtors were severely impoverished; 
suffered from poor health; had received minimal primary-level education; and had suffered their 
government-subsidised homes being sold in execution for non-payment of unsecured debts of 
minimal amounts of R250 and R190, respectively. Thereafter, cases in which the court refused 
orders declaring the debtor’s home specially executable included ABSA Bank Ltd v Ntsane 2007 
(3) SA 554 (T), where execution against the home was sought in respect of an arrears mortgage 
debt of R18.46, and FirstRand Bank Ltd v Maleke and Three Similar Cases 2010 (1) SA 143 
(GSJ), which was decided at a time when there was a lack of clarity in relation to the application 
of the newly enacted National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (NCA), and in which the presiding judge 
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Further, thus far, there has been no equivalent development where the debtor’s estate 
has been sequestrated in terms of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.7 The position is that 
all of the insolvent debtor’s property, including immovable property that constitutes 
his or her home, vests in the trustee whose duty it is to liquidate the property of 
the insolvent estate for distribution of the proceeds amongst creditors.8 Therefore, 
although specific judicial evaluation of the circumstances is now required in the 
individual debt enforcement process, this does not necessarily result in prohibition 
or prevention of, or specific protection for the debtor and his or her family against, 
forced sale of the home.       
Against the South African contextual background set out above, and keeping 
in mind recent developments in the European Union since the global economic 
recessions and mortgage crises towards forced sale of the home being permitted only 
as a last resort,9 this article explores the ways in which a debtor’s home was likely 
to have been treated according to Roman law, a common source of contemporary 
legal systems. Initially, substantive and procedural rules relating to debt enforcement 
permitted execution only against a debtor’s person. Thereafter, the law developed to 
provide for execution against a debtor’s property. Rules and procedures regarding 
collective debt enforcement (or insolvency) evolved as did principles pertaining to 
mortgage and a creditor’s real security rights. Certain types of assets came to be 
regarded as exempt from execution in the individual and collective debt enforcement 
processes but there was no formal exemption of the home of a debtor. However, 
scrutiny of the relevant legal principles and procedures, as applied in their historical 
and socio-economic context, reveals, it is submitted, the effect, albeit indirect and 
distinguished the case from others in which execution had been permitted. FirstRand Bank Ltd 
v Seyffert and Three Similar Cases 2010 (6) SA 429 (GSJ) was also decided in the context of 
uncertainty relating to the application of the NCA; see pars 18-20 of the judgment. Cf Standard 
Bank v Hales 2009 (3) SA 315 (D); FirstRand Bank Ltd v Meyer ECPE Case No 3483/10 [2011] 
(17 Mar 2011); and, post-Gundwana v Steko, Nedbank Ltd v Fraser and Four Similar Cases 
2011 (4) SA 363 (GSJ); FirstRand Bank Ltd v Folscher and Similar Matters 2011 (4) SA 314 
(GNP); Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Bekker and Four Similar Cases 2011 (6) SA 111 
(WCC); Mkhize v Umvoti Municipality 2010 (4) SA 509 (KZP) and, on appeal, 2012 (1) SA 1 
(SCA); ABSA Bank Ltd v Petersen 2013 (1) SA 481 (WCC). For a more detailed discussion of the 
position, see Steyn (n **), supra, ch 15.         
7 The only reported judgment involving the sale, at the instance of the trustee of the insolvent 
estate, of the home of insolvent spouses, is ABSA Bank Ltd v Murray 2004 (2) SA 15 (C), which 
dealt with their eviction from it and the application of the provisions of the Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction From and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. 
8 See, inter alia, ss 20, 69 and 82 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936; RD Sharrock et al Hockly’s 
Insolvency Law 9 ed (Cape Town, 2012) ch15.  
9 See Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 
on Credit Agreements for Consumers Relating to Residential Immovable Property ch 10, Art 28, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014L0017 (accessed 
23 Apr 2014). In respect of requirements in England and Wales, Scotland and Ireland with which 
a mortgagee must comply in cases where it seeks to execute against a debtor’s home, see Steyn 
(n **) ch 7.   
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subtle, of providing protection for an impecunious debtor against the loss of his 
home at the instance of a creditor.
2 Individual debt enforcement in Roman law
Debt enforcement in Rome initially occurred in the form of “self-help” against the 
person of the debtor.10 Written laws, the earliest of which were contained in Table 
3 of the Twelve Tables,11 as well as legal structures and procedural mechanisms 
came to regulate this.12 Examples of procedural mechanisms are found in the three 
successive kinds, or stages in the development, of legal redress – legis actiones, the 
formulary procedure and the cognitio procedure – which coincided roughly with the 
main recognised historical periods of the Monarchy (753 to 510 BC), the Republican 
period (510 to 27 BC) and the Empire (from 27 BC onwards).13 Most significant for 
Roman law were the years from 367 BC onwards, with praetorian influences in the 
application and supplementation of the civil law,14 and the period when Justinian, 
as the Emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire from AD 527 to 565, carried out a 
comprehensive compilation of the laws and brought about a number of important 
reforms.
In the legis actio procedure, if a judgment debt had not been paid within thirty 
days, the creditor could arrest and bring the debtor before the praetor.15 If the debt 
remained unpaid,16 the praetor “addicted” the debtor to the creditor who could hold 
him in chains in a private prison17 for sixty days during which time they might reach 
10 P van Warmelo An Introduction to the Principles of Roman Civil Law (Cape Town, 1976) at 271.
11 Promulgated c 450 BC; Table 3 dealt with execution of judgments.
12 M Kaser (tr by R Dannenbring) Roman Private Law 2 ed (Durban, 1968) at 330 refers to the 
written laws as “state-restricted and supervised self-redress”.
13 See WA Hunter A Systematic and Historical Exposition of Roman Law: In the Order of a Code 4 
ed (London, 1903) at 122-142; 967ff; see, also, R van den Bergh “The patronus as representative 
in civil proceedings and his contribution towards the attainment of justice in Rome” (2009) 15 (2)
Fundamina 159-173 at 160.
14 See J Thomas Textbook of Roman Law (Amsterdam, 1976) at 15.
15 This was called manus iniectio, the laying of hands on a person; see Hunter (n 13) at 1030-1031. 
See, also, AL Stander “Geskiedenis van die insolvensiereg” 1996 (21) TSAR 371-377 at 371; J 
Calitz “Historical overview of state regulation of South African insolvency law” (2010) 16 (2) 
Fundamina 1-27 at 5ff.  
16 A debtor could arrange for a substitute, called a vindex, to answer for the debt. However, if the 
vindex lost the case, he was liable for double damages. See XII Tab 3 3; R Sohm The Institutes: 
A Textbook of the System of Roman Private Law (Oxford, 1907) at 235; WW Buckland & P Stein 
Buckland’s Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (Cambridge, 1963) at 619 n 7; 
Thomas (n 14) at 79; R Lee The Elements of Roman Law 4 ed (London, 1956) at 427. JA Crook 
Law and Life of Rome (London, 1967) at 92 states that this legal procedure “weighted the scales 
of litigation heavily in favour of the rich against the poor”. As to who might opt to come to the 
debtor’s rescue by paying the debt on his behalf or by acting as vindex, see par 6, infra.
17 XII Tab 3 3-4; Aulus Gellius Noctes Atticae (tr by JC Rolfe) (Oxford, 1968) at 20 1 46; Lee (n 16) 
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a compromise.18 At this stage the debtor was still free, as opposed to being a slave; 
he was still the owner of his property and capable of contracting.19 On the last three 
market days of these sixty days, the creditor was obliged to again bring the debtor 
before the praetor into the “meeting place” and the amount for which he had been 
judged liable was declared publicly. This was done in the hope that someone might 
come forward to pay the debt and release the debtor.20
If the debt remained unpaid, the creditor was entitled to sell the judgment debtor 
as a foreign slave.21 It is uncertain whether, at this stage, the debtor’s property “went 
with his person to the creditor”22 although, according to Sohm23
[w]hen the person of the debtor (whom execution placed in the position of a slave in regard 
to his creditor) passed into the power of the creditor, the same fate befell his whole estate 
and probably also his whole family, i.e., the aggregate of those who were subject to his 
potestas [sic]. Thus every personal execution involved necessarily – though only indirectly – 
an execution against the debtor’s property, because it went, in all cases, against the debtor’s 
entire person and estate, quite regardless of the actual amount due.
Where there was more than one creditor, they were entitled to “cut shares”.24 Some 
commentators regard this as meaning cutting the debtor’s body into pieces25 while 
others believe it meant that creditors shared the proceeds of the debtor’s sale into 
foreign slavery.26 The primary purpose of this harsh procedure was to bring pressure 
at 427-428; Kaser (n 12) at 338. Cf G Mousourakis Historical and Institutional Context of Roman 
Law (Farnham, 2003) at 137-138; H Jolowicz & B Nicholas Historical Introduction to the Study 
of Roman Law (Cambridge, 1972) at 188. 
18 XII Tab 3 5; W Burdick The Principles of Roman Law and their Relation to Modern Law (Holmes 
Beach Fla, 1993) at 633, 671; Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 619.
19 See Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 619; Jolowicz & Nicholas (n 17) at 188, 190. Cf L Wenger 
Institutes of the Roman Law of Civil Procedure (New York, 1955) at 227; Kaser (n 12) at 338; 
Sohm (n 16) at 235. The latter sources refer to such a debtor as being a “debt-slave” or “ipso iure 
in the position of a slave”.
20 XII Tab 3 5. See Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 619; Thomas (n 14) at 79. Cf Gellius Noctes Atticae 
20 1 48.
21 XII Tab 3 5; see Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 620; Wenger (n 19) at 225.
22 Jolowicz & Nicholas (n 17) at 190.
23 Sohm (n 16) at 287.
24 XII Tab 3 6. 
25 Thomas (n 14) at 79. Cf A Borkowski Textbook on Roman Law (London, 1994) at 65; Kaser (n 12) 
at 338.
26 Gellius Noctes Atticae 20 1 47 and 20 1 48; Wenger (n 19) at 224-225; Buckland & Stein (n 16) 
at 620; Burdick (n 18) at 633-634, 671; D Johnston Roman Law in Context (Cambridge, 1999) 
at 108-109; Thomas (n 14) at 79; JW Wessels History of the Roman-Dutch Law (Grahamstown, 
1908) at 661. WW Buckland The Roman Law of Slavery (Cambridge, 1908) at 402 states, with 
reference to Gellius Noctes Atticae 20 1 47, that, while a judgment debtor might ultimately be sold 
into slavery, his position in early law is to some extent obscure and the provisions were, very early 
on, obsolete.
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to bear on the debtor to pay.27 A debtor who had no assets, who was without access 
to credit and who did not have anyone to pay the debt on his behalf, would, in most 
cases, save his “life and freedom” by entering into a transaction of nexum in terms of 
which he would submit to working off his obligation to the creditor.28
In the formulary process, if a judgment debt was not paid within thirty days, the 
creditor could take the debtor before the praetor again and, if the debtor challenged 
the claim but lost, he would be liable for double the original amount of the debt.29 
The lex Poetelia,30 introduced to improve the judgment debtor’s position, prohibited 
his sale into slavery and his being put to death.31 However, the creditor could still, 
with the praetor’s permission, take the debtor into confinement32 to work off the 
debt33 in which case the debtor retained rights of property and disposition, as would 
27 Van Warmelo (n 10) at 274; Wenger (n 19) at 230. Cf Wessels (n 26) at 661 who states that there is 
“[s]ome doubt whether the debtor was sold as a slave ... [and h]e may have been held as a pledge 
compellable to redeem the debt by the services of himself and his family”.
28 Wenger (n 19) at 222, 226 n 12; Kaser (n 12) at 338; Jolowicz & Nicholas (n 17) at 164-166, 
189-190. Although reference is often made to a debtor who surrendered himself to his creditor in 
nexum as a “debt-slave”, he did not lose his status as a free person: see Thomas (n 14) at 217. In 
relation to nexum, see Calitz (n 15) at 5; JH Dalhuisen Dalhuisen on International Insolvency and 
Bankruptcy (Deventer, 1986) vol 1 par 1 02[1] 1-4-1-5. Also, on slavery and debt servitude, see 
H Rajak “The culture of bankruptcy” in P Omar (ed) International Insolvency Law: Reforms and 
Challenges (Farnham, 2008) ch 1 8-11. 
29 G 4 9. See Hunter (n 13) at 1031ff; Thomas (n 14) at 109; Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 642; Burdick 
(n 18) at 671; P Garnsey Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire (Oxford, 1970) 
at 204 n 1. Garnsey at 138 points out how it was the poorer section of the population who suffered 
considerable hardship, being “forced through debt to sell their meagre possessions, take out credit 
at unfavourable rates, and ultimately fall victim to the savage debt laws and forfeit their freedom”.
30 Also referred to as the lex Poetilia. It was promulgated in 325 or 326 BC or, according to Sohm 
(n 16) at 287, in 313 BC.
31 Controversy surrounds its exact provisions. See Hunter (n 13) at 1035; Burdick (n 18) at 634; 
Jolowicz & Nicholas (n 17) at 164, 190; Sohm (n 16) at 287; Wenger (n 19) at 225, 230-231; 
Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 620; Van Warmelo (n 10) at 274; Thomas (n 14) at 79. Mars The Law 
of Insolvency in South Africa 9 ed by E Bertelsmann et al) (Cape Town, 2008) at 6 refer to W 
Kunkel An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History 2 ed (tr by J Kelly) (Oxford, 
1973) at 31 and the contrary view expressed in M Kaser Das römische Privatrecht (München, 
1971) vol 1 at 154 n 36.
32 During the later Republic, slavery had been replaced by imprisonment in a public prison for 
debtors who were unable to pay their debts: see C 7 71 1 and D 42 1 34; Hunter (n 13) at 1035-
1036; Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 622.
33 Thomas (n 14) at 109; Lee (n 16) at 454; Wenger (n 19) at 230-231. Buckland & Stein (n 16) 
at 643 states that “[t]he confinement put pressure on the debtor: perhaps it was used mainly for 
solvent debtors”. Kaser (n 12) at 338 submits that the lex Poetelia “regulated in detail rather than 
introduced” the debtor being able to work off his debt as a debt-slave of the pursuer. See also 
Johnston (n 26) at 109; Crook (n 16) at 173; AA Schiller Roman Law Mechanisms of Development 
(New York, 1978) at 209.
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a person who had pledged himself in a transaction of nexum.34 Wenger explains the 
position as follows:35
Then it would be comprehensible, if a person, in order to save his little home for himself 
and his family, incurred a manus iniectio in order to wipe out the debt with the work of his 
hands ... Indeed this manus iniectio now meant temporary quasi-slavery … and in truth 
even beyond the sixty days, especially when the danger of death no longer threatened. Since 
personal execution also … befell just the poor man who had no property, we understand its 
continued existence until far beyond the formulary procedure.
In AD 320, Constantine abolished imprisonment for debt unless the debtor 
“contumaciously refused to pay”.36 Nevertheless, persons often sold themselves 
into, or stayed in, slavery as an easier alternative.37 Others hired out themselves 
or their children as a way of working off a debt, often in transactions which were 
apparently service contracts in terms of which the servant was bound for life or for 
a number of years.38 In Justinian’s time, a defaulting debtor could be put to work for 
four months.39
Execution against a debtor’s property was a praetorian innovation in the 
formulary process.40 The praetor could grant to a creditor missio in bona which was 
an order giving a claimant possession of the entire property of a debtor who was 
in hiding or who had left the country to evade arrest, imprisonment or slavery.41 
Thereafter, the creditor could sell the debtor’s property and apply the proceeds to 
satisfy his claims.42
In terms of the cognitio procedure execution could occur against the person43 or 
the property of the debtor, the latter being the norm.44 A later development allowed 
a court officer to proceed with the execution where judgment was for payment of 
a sum of money, by seizing part of the judgment debtor’s property to be kept as a 
34 Wenger (n 19) at 230.
35 Ibid. See, also, Jolowicz & Nicholas (n 17) at 190.
36 C 10 19 2; Mars (n 31) at 6; Hunter (n 13). Cf C Th 9 11 1 and C 9 5 2 (Justinian) with reference to 
which Mousourakis (n 17) at 373 states that in practice powerful landowners continued to confine 
their debtors in private prisons.
37 Crook (n 16) at 59.
38 JE Grubbs Law and Family in Late Antiquity: The Emperor Constantine’s Marriage Legislation 
(New York, 1995) at 270; Crook (n 16) at 61.
39 Kaser (n 12) at 366.
40 Wenger (n 19) at 233; Kaser (n 12) at 339, 342.
41 Mousourakis (n 17) at 219; Garnsey (n 29) at 193; Hunter (n 13) at 1037; Buckland & Stein (n 
16) at 631, 644; Thomas (n 14) at 110.
42 Kaser (n 12) at 355; Crook (n 16) at 172.
43 As in the formulary process it was initiated by the actio iudicati. Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 672 
and Thomas (n 14) 122 state that a judgment debtor could be confined in a public prison. Lee (n 
16) at 458 states that private imprisonment continued in spite of attempts to suppress it. 
44 RG Evans A Critical Analysis of Problem Areas in Respect of Assets of Insolvent Estates of 
Individuals (LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, 2008) at 30.
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pledge.45 If the debtor did not pay within two months after judgment, the property 
could be sold by auction.46 If the sale yielded insufficient proceeds to satisfy the claim 
more property could be seized for the same purpose.47 Slaves, oxen and agricultural 
implements were exempt from seizure and sale48 and movable property was to be 
exhausted before land could be seized.49 This became the norm, during the later 
Empire, where the debtor was not suspected of being insolvent. This state of affairs 
has been regarded as an indication of the balancing of the interests of the creditor 
and the judgment debtor.50
3 Collective debt enforcement in Roman law
As mentioned above, where there was more than one creditor, they could “cut 
shares” or at least share in the proceeds of the debtor’s sale into foreign slavery.51 
A praetorian innovation, in the late second century BC,52 permitted creditors, 
alternatively or in addition to personal execution, to levy execution directly against 
a debtor’s property.53 Through this process, the debtor was rendered infamis and 
45 The pignus ex judicati causa captum. See B Nicholas An Introduction to Roman Law (Oxford, 
1962) at xiv; Lee (n 16) at 458; Wenger (n 19) at 313-314; Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 672; 
Mousourakis (n 17) at 373.
46 D 42 1 31. In Justinian’s time, this had been extended to four months: see C 7 54 2. See, also, 
Thomas (n 14) at 121; Borkowski (n 25) at 74-75.
47 Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 672; Thomas (n 14) at 122.
48 C 8 17 7. See Hunter (n 13) at 1043; Burdick (n 18) at 672. 
49 D 42 1 15 8. See Wenger (n 19) at 314; Hunter (n 13) at 1043; Burdick (n 18) at 672; Mousourakis 
(n 17) at 373.
50 D 42 1 31; D 46 1 6 2. See Burdick (n 18) at 672; Hunter (n 13) at 1043; Buckland & Stein (n 16) 
at 608; Thomas (n 14) at 122; Sohm (n 16) at 289. Wenger (n 19) at 239-240 and at 314 where he 
states that it “threaten[ed] … the existence of the debtor no more than … [was] necessary in the 
interest of the creditor”. Crook (n 16) at 178 refers to it as “the intelligent solution”.
51 See the text to footnotes 24 and 25 supra.
52 The actio Rutiliana. See Mars (n 31) at 6; M Roestoff “’n Kritiese Evaluasie van 
Skuldverligtingsmaatreëls vir Individue in die Suid-Afrikaanse Insolvensiereg” (hereafter 
“’n Kritiese Evaluasie” (LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, 2002) at 16ff; M Roestoff 
“Skuldverligtingsmaatreëls vir individue in die Suid Afrikaanse insolvensiereg: ‘n Historiese 
ondersoek” (hereafter “‘n Historiese ondersoek” (Deel 1) (2004) 10 Fundamina 113-136 at 118ff; 
Calitz (n 15) at 7-8.
53 This entailed the issue of three decrees, namely the missio in possessionem; proscriptio bonorum; 
and venditio bonorum (also referred to as emptio bonorum; see G 3 78-79). See, also, G 4 35, 
specifically referred to by Thomas (n 14) at 109; Hunter (n 13) at 1037; Buckland & Stein (n 
16) at 643ff; Kaser (n 12) at 356-357; and Sohm (n 16) at 287ff. A missio in possessionem was 
an authorisation by the praetor to take possession either of a particular thing or the whole of a 
person’s property: see Jolowicz & Nicholas (n 17) at 228. Wenger (n 19) at 236 refers to this 
as missio in bona which was an order giving a claimant possession of the whole of a person’s 
property: see Mousourakis (n 17) at 219. Apparently, there was some overlap between these two 
concepts.
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was deemed bankrupt. His property was sold en masse to the highest bidder, that 
is, the person who offered the creditors the highest dividend on their claims.54 The 
purchaser succeeded to the entire estate and the proceeds were divided amongst 
creditors according to a fixed order of preference.55 This was in effect the Roman 
equivalent of bankruptcy proceedings.56
This process was rarely resorted to against members of the upper class with 
the result that it probably affected only debtors of lower social standing.57 Where 
the proceeds of the sale did not satisfy the creditors’ claims in full they could bring 
proceedings to execute against any assets which the debtor acquired subsequently.58 
However, this was subject to the beneficium competentiae which afforded the debtor 
a period of recovery of one year after the sale during which time he was rendered safe 
from execution against his person and “articles of necessity”, including necessary 
food, clothing, and movables necessary for agriculture and trade, were exempt from 
execution.59 This has been regarded as signifying a shift in policy, to some extent, 
towards a more humanitarian conception or recognition of a debtor’s rights.60
A senatusconsultum61 provided that where debtors were clarae personae, 
particularly those of senatorial rank, a curator62 could be appointed who, subject to 
the praetor’s sanction, sold the debtor’s assets, not en masse, but in lots. This was 
known as distractio bonorum.63 This process did not render the debtor infamis nor 
dispossess him of all of his assets. Only assets sufficient to satisfy the creditors’ 
claims were sold and the debtor retained the rest of his estate.64 With the passing of 
time, and certainly by the cognitio period, distractio bonorum became the general 
mode for realisation of a debtor’s assets.65
A significant development, presumably in the interests of severely over-
indebted nobles, was the introduction of cessio bonorum66 which allowed a debtor, 
54 Wenger (n 19) at 237; Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 644; Johnston (n 26) at 109.
55 CH Smith The Law of Insolvency (Durban, 1988) at 5; Mars (n 31) at 6-7.
56 Wenger (n 19) at 233; Sohm (n 16) at 288; Johnston (n 26) at 109.
57 Crook (n 16) at 174.
58 Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 403, 644; Wenger (n 19) at 237; Crook (n 16) at 174.
59 Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 693-694; Kaser (n 12) at 357.
60 See Wenger (n 19) at 238 n 39.
61 The date of which is unknown: see Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 645. Garnsey (n 29) at 186 states 
that this occurred during the early Empire.
62 Instead of a magister.
63 Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 645; Johnston (n 26) at 110; Kaser (n 12) at 355, 357; Wenger (n 19) 
at 238-239; Crook (n 16) at 177-178; Roestoff “’n Kritiese Evaluasie” (n 52) at 29; Calitz (n 15) 
at 9.
64 Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 645; Thomas (n 14) at 110; Wenger (n 19) at 239; Mars (n 31) at 7.
65 Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 672-673; Thomas (n 14) at 122; Mars (n 31) at 7.
66 With the passing of the lex Julia, possibly in 17 BC. See Hunter (n 13) at 1039; Burdick (n 18) at 
671; Sohm (n 16) at 288. See, also, Garnsey (n 29) at 186-187; MW Frederiksen “Caesar, Cicero 
and the problem of debt” 1966 (56) J of Roman Studies at 128-141.
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probably where insolvency was due to no fault of his own,67 voluntarily to surrender 
his property. Transfer of his property to his creditors would exempt a debtor from 
infamia68 and personal seizure for any debts which remained unpaid.69 After cessio 
bonorum, venditio bonorum took place and the debtor could rely on the beneficium 
competentiae for all time and not merely for a year.70
In the cognitio procedure execution against all of the property of the debtor 
occurred only where the debtor was insolvent.71 On application by the creditors, the 
judge appointed a curator bonorum to manage the bankrupt property.72 Creditors 
had to join the proceedings within two to four years.73 In all instances, distractio 
bonorum took place.74 The claim of a creditor who was a pledgee was first paid out 
of the proceeds of the thing pledged to him. Any surplus would then go to the other 
creditors, with certain claims receiving preference, after which other creditors would 
receive their respective percentages of the proceeds.75
By the time of Justinian, a majority vote by creditors could result in a moratorium 
being granted to the debtor.76 It was also possible for the debtor to approach the 
Emperor for a moratorium “in the face of an impending execution”.77
4 Debt relief measures available in Roman law
Apart from cessio bonorum, and the benefits which it offered, the Roman law of 
contract presented alternative options for a debtor unable to meet his obligations 
67 Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 645; Johnston (n 26) at 110; Crook (n 16) at 174; Kaser (n 12) at 357.
68 C 2 11 11. See Sohm (n 16) at 289.
69 Thus excluding the creditor’s choice between executing against the debtor’s person, at civil law, 
or against the debtor’s property under praetorian law. See Sohm (n 16) at 288; Wenger (n 19) at 
235; Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 645. 
70 There is some dispute about this. See Smith (n 55) at 5; Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 645, 693-694; 
Sohm (n 16) at 289; Thomas (n 14) at 110; Lee (n 16) at 455; Mars (n 31) at 7. Cf Wessels (n 26) 
at 663; Burdick (n 18) at 671-672; Wenger (n 19) at 235, 237-238, 316.
71 Wenger (n 19) at 314; Kaser (n 12) at 366.
72 Wenger (n 19) at 315.
73 Two years if they lived in the same province and four years if they lived in a different province; 
see Wenger (n 19) at 315. Otherwise, creditors could not share in the proceeds of the seized 
property and they would be left with only a claim against the debtor.
74 Wenger (n 19) at 315; Kaser (n 12) at 366. See Roestoff “’n Kritiese Evaluasie” (n 52) at 29, who 
agrees with the submission made by B Swart Die Rol van ‘n Concursus Creditorum in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Insolvensiereg (LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, 1990) 55 that distractio bonorum 
was the origin of the South African insolvency regime.
75 Wenger (n 19) at 315-316.
76 C 7 71 8; Wenger (n 19) at 316, n 23.
77 C 1 19 4. See Wessels (n 26) at 663. See also Wenger (n 19) at 316-317 n 23a who states, with 
reference to C 1 19 4, that the law at the time of Justinian was that this would only occur if 
sufficient security was furnished by the debtor. He also mentions that Egyptian provincial law 
likewise allowed a moratorium for a period of five years. See, further, Roestoff “’n Kritiese 
Evaluasie” (n 52) at 31.
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timeously. These included solutio per aes et libram and acceptilatio, by which a 
creditor formally released the debtor from liability; pactum de non petendo, an 
agreement not to sue or take action; and transactio, or compromise, which brought 
an obligation to an end. In Justinian’s time, datio in solutionem entitled a debtor, who 
could not meet his obligation to the creditor, and who owned immovable property 
for which he could not find a buyer, instead of payment to transfer the immovable 
property to the creditor, even without the latter’s consent.78 Parties could also resort 
to remissio,79 a partial release, and dilatio,80 by which a moratorium was created if 
the majority of the creditors were in favour of it.
5 Real security in Roman law 
5 1 Forms of real security
Roman law recognised three forms of real security:81 fiducia and, under praetorian 
law, pignus and hypotheca.82 
Fiducia entailed the transfer of ownership83 of the debtor’s property to the 
creditor who agreed to re-transfer the property to the debtor as soon as the debt was 
paid.84 Parties usually also agreed, in a pactum de vendendo, on the circumstances in 
which the creditor could sell the property.85 Where the seller sold the property either 
before the debt was due or contrary to their agreement, the sale was nevertheless 
valid and the purchaser received good title. This meant that the debtor could not 
78 Nov 4 3 and 120 6 2. See Roestoff “’n Kritiese Evaluasie” (n 52) at 35-37.
79 D 2 14 7 17; D 2 14 7 18; D 2 14 7 19; D 2 14 8; D 2 14 10; D 17 1 58 1 and D 42 9 23.
80 See Roestoff “’n Kritiese Evaluasie” (n 52) at 31.
81 Real security entails the giving of a real right to a creditor as security for the performance of a 
debt, the effect being that the creditor has, in addition to the right to claim satisfaction of the debt 
from the debtor personally, a right to obtain satisfaction of his claim by selling the thing given as 
security. See Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 473; Sohm (n 16) at 351-352.
82 Hunter (n 13) at 436ff refers to pignus as pledge and hypotheca as mortgage. Burdick (n 18) at 382 
explains that, in Roman law, both pignus and hypotheca were used for movables and immovables. 
These three forms co-existed until the time of Constantine. See, also, Buckland & Stein (n 16) 
at 478; Thomas (n 14) at 330-333; DH van Zyl History and Principles of Roman Private Law 
(Durban, 1983) at 197-198, particularly n 293.
83 Either by mancipatio or in iure cessio.
84 The agreement to re-transfer was known as pactum fiduciae. See Sohm (n 16) at 352; Thomas 
(n 14) at 329; Jolowicz & Nicholas (n 17) at 301ff; Kaser (n 12) at 127ff; Van Warmelo (n 10) at 
113-114.
85 This was required to release the creditor from his fiduciary obligation, arising from the pactum 
fiduciae, to re-transfer the property to the debtor, so that he could obtain satisfaction of his claim 
by selling the thing; see Sohm (n 16) at 352; Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 474.
PROTECTION AGAINST FORCED SALE ...
FUNDAMINA_21_1_15.indb   129 2015/06/10   13:26:08
130
LIENNE STEYN
recover the property from the purchaser although he had a claim against the creditor 
for breach of the fiduciary obligation.86
Pignus87 developed out of the praetorian protection of possession.88 The debtor 
retained ownership but gave possession of the thing to the creditor who had to restore 
it to the debtor once the debt was paid.89 The creditor did not have the right to dispose 
of the pledged property and, if he did sell it, the debtor as owner could recover it 
from anyone who had obtained possession of it. From the creditor’s perspective, this 
was unsatisfactory, especially where the debtor was in default, and so the parties 
usually agreed, in a pactum de vendendo, that the creditor could sell the property if 
the debt was not paid by a certain date.90
Hypotheca, also referred to as “mortgage”, occurred when the property remained 
with the debtor but, if the debtor failed to pay the debt, the creditor had a real right 
to obtain possession of the hypothecated property and, in terms of a pactum de 
vendendo, the right to sell the property in order to satisfy his claim. The debtor as 
owner could recover his property if a third party obtained possession of it. He could 
also enter into successive transactions of hypotheca with various creditors.91 Thus 
hypotheca catered for both the debtor’s and the creditor’s interests and was “more in 
keeping with the capitalistic character of the time”.92
5 2 The creditor’s rights
Essentially, the effect of the creation of real security was that the creditor acquired 
the right:
 ● to obtain (if not already in) possession of the pledged or hypothecated property;
86 Sohm (n 16) at 353; Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 474. In the case of land provided as security, the 
creditor often left it in the hands of the debtor as a precarium; see Thomas (n 14) at 143, 329.
87 Referred to as pledge; see Hunter (n 13) at 436.
88 A pignus praetorium granted a creditor “missio in possessionem” of the debtor’s property by 
which the creditor gained control of a thing as security for his claim. A pignus judiciale arose in 
the seizure of a debtor’s property in the course of a judicial execution; see Sohm (n 16) at 287, 
353-356. See, also, Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 475; Thomas (n 14) at 330; Jolowicz & Nicholas 
(n 17) at 302; Van Warmelo (n 10) at 115-116. In relation to the order in which developments 
occurred, cf Kaser (n 12) at 129.
89 Transfer of possession occurred by traditio. The debtor could not use the thing unless by specific 
agreement with the creditor, that is, by precario. See Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 476.
90 Sohm (n 16) at 353-354; Thomas (n 14) at 331; Hunter (n 13) at 437; Jolowicz & Nicholas (n 17) 
at 302.
91 Sohm (n 16) at 354, 356; Hunter (n 13) at 436ff; Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 475; Thomas (n 14) 
at 332-333; Van Zyl (n 82) at 198; Kaser (n 12) at 129; Jolowicz & Nicholas (n 17) at 303; Van 
Warmelo (n 10) at 116-119. 
92 Sohm (n 16) at 354-355.
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 ● to sell the property once the secured debt had become due and, in spite of notice 
or judgment against him, the debt had not been paid; and 
 ● of foreclosure, in which case the property was forfeited to the creditor.93
In later classical law, in the absence of a pactum de vendendo, the creditor’s right 
to sell the property when the debt became due was implied unless it was expressly 
excluded.94 In such a case, three successive notices to the debtor were required.95 If 
the proceeds of the sale exceeded the amount of the debt, the surplus had to be paid 
to the debtor.96 Although the creditor could not sell the property to himself,97 the 
debtor could sell it to him.98
Justinian modified the position so that, even where the agreement expressly 
provided that the creditor could not sell the property, he could do so as long as he 
gave three successive notices to the debtor.99 Another significant modification by 
Justinian was that, where parties agreed that the creditor could sell the property on 
the debtor’s failure to pay the debt by a certain date, no sale could take place until 
two years after formal notice of his intention to the debtor.100 If the creditor was not 
in possession of the property, he had first to obtain a judicial decree authorising it.101
Parties could also agree in a lex commissoria, or “forfeiture clause”, that if the 
debt was not paid by a certain date the creditor would become the owner of the 
property.102 This was known as foreclosure. However, this was disadvantageous to 
the debtor in circumstances where the value of the property exceeded the amount 
of the debt. In AD 230, a new kind of foreclosure, called impetratio dominii,103 was 
introduced whereby the creditor could apply to the court to have ownership granted 
93 Sohm (n 16) at 356; Hunter (n 13) at 436-437, where the author describes fiducia as “essentially 
a self-acting foreclosure”.
94 Hunter (n 13) at 437; Thomas (n 14) at 331; Kaser (n 12) at 132; Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 476-
477.
95 See Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 477 n 1 and Thomas (n 14) at 331. Cf G 2 64; PS 2 5 1; and C 8 
27 14. See, also, Kaser (n 12) at 132. Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 477 states that the creditor did 
not have to obtain possession before the sale.
96 Sohm (n 16) at 356; Hunter (n 13) at 439.
97 See, also, Kaser (n 12) at 132-133.
98 Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 477; Kaser (n 12) at 132-133; Hunter (n 13) at 438.
99 D 13 7 4. Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 477 state that it might have been some later authority who 
brought about this modification. 
100 If the creditor was in possession of the pledged property; see Hunter (n 13) at 437. See, also, 
Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas (tr P Gane The Selective Voet Being the Commentary on the 
Pandects vol 3, London,1955) 20 5 1.
101 C 8 14 10; C 8 28 5; C 8 34 3 1; Inst 4 7 1; D 13 7 4; D 13 7 5; D 47 2 73. See Buckland & Stein 
(n 16) at 477; Thomas (n 14) at 331; Hunter (n 13) at 437; Burdick (n 18) at 381-382.
102 Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 477; Sohm (n 16) at 353-354 n 2; Thomas (n 14) at 331; Hunter (n 13) 
at 438.
103 C 8 33 1. See Kaser (n 12) at 133; Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 477; Thomas (n 14) at 331; Van 
Warmelo (n 10) at 116; Hunter (n 13) at 438.
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to him. The property was valued and, upon notice to the debtor104 and after the lapse 
of one year, the creditor became bonitary owner105 of the pledged property. If the 
property was worth less than the amount of the debt, the debtor was discharged 
from liability but, if it was worth more, the creditor had to pay the difference to the 
debtor.106 However, the debtor could pay the debt and the interest due and “redeem 
the pledge”107 at any time before the creditor’s usucapio became complete,108 that is, 
within two years of uninterrupted possession, in respect of land and houses, and one 
year, in respect of movables.109 After Constantine abolished the lex commissoria, in 
AD 320,110 impetratio dominii became the only means of foreclosure available to the 
creditor.111
Justinian permitted foreclosure only where no purchaser, for an adequate price, 
could be found.112 If the debtor and creditor lived in the same province, the creditor 
was obliged to give formal notice to the debtor once two years had elapsed since 
the debt became due. If they lived in different provinces, the creditor had to apply 
to the provincial judge who would serve a notice on the debtor, setting a date for 
payment to occur.113 Once that date passed without the debt having been paid, 
the creditor could obtain ownership on petition to the Emperor.114 A debtor who, 
within a subsequent period of two years, paid in full, including interest and costs, 
could nevertheless redeem the property. Failing this, the ownership of the creditor 
became irrevocable.115 Further, if the property was sold the creditor had to transfer 
to the debtor any amount of the proceeds which exceeded that which the debtor had 
owed.116 If the proceeds were less than the amount due the creditor could still claim 
the balance from the debtor.117
104 Hunter (n 13) at 438 states that the public had to be notified of the hypotheca and there had to be 
a delay of a year.
105 Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 477 calls bonitary ownership “praetorian ownership”. In relation to 
bonitary ownership, see Sohm (n 16) at 81ff, 311; Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 191ff; Hunter (n 13) 
at 263ff.
106 Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 477; Sohm (n 16) at 356.
107 Thomas (n 14) at 331. Cf Borkowski (n 25) at 290 who does not mention the required initial lapse 
of a year before approaching the court.
108 In relation to usucapio, the acquisition of ownership by uninterrupted possession, see Sohm (n 16) 
at 318ff; Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 241ff.
109 Cf G 2 42. See Thomas (n 14) at 159; Hunter (n 13) at 265. 
110 C 8 34 1. See Hunter (n 13) at 438; Kaser (n 12) at 132-133; Sohm (n 16) at 356; Van Warmelo (n 
10) at 115.
111 Cf C 8 34 3. See Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 477; Thomas (n 14) at 331. See, further Sohm (n 16) 
at 356.
112 Hunter (n 13) at 438; Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 477; Sohm (n 16) at 356; Kaser (n 12) at 133.
113 Hunter (n 13) at 438. If the debtor could not be found, the court would order the debt to be paid 
by a certain date.
114 Cf C 8 34 1.
115 Cf C 8 34 3 3. See Buckland & Stein (n 16) at 477; Thomas (n 14) at 331-332. 
116 C 8 33 3.
117 Ibid.
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Thus significant measures were put in place which, through delaying foreclosure 
and requiring a judicial decree where the creditor was not in possession of the 
hypothecated property, effectively protected a defaulting debtor against loss of his 
immovable property and even enabled him to redeem it within a period of two years 
after foreclosure had occurred.  
6 Significance of the family home in the Roman social 
and historical context 
Understanding the significance of family and the family home in the Roman social and 
historical context, provides additional insights into the implications for homeowners 
of the debt enforcement laws. A familia, controlled by the paterfamilias,118 was at 
“the centre of the Roman community”.119 A number of familiae120 formed a gens.121 
The word “familia” initially meant “dwelling-place or house”; later it came to mean 
“the house-community” and, “in a legal sense, the house-property”.122 The family 
home held great religious significance: it housed the spirits of deceased family 
members and the obligatory hereditary altar and ancestral tomb.123 Dupont states that 
“family and house really were indissoluble” with the house consisting of a family 
and a single patriarchal head “joined together in veneration of the lar familiaris”.124 
Generally, during all periods and in every social class, members of the familia 
118 FM Heichelheim, CA Yeo & AM Ward A History of Roman People 2 ed (New Jersey, 1984) 
at 35. Familia included every member of the household who was subject to the power of the 
paterfamilias: The children who were subject to his potestas; the wife who was in the position of 
a child if she had been married in manus; adopted members; slaves over whom he had dominium 
and former slaves who had been freed. See, also, F Dupont Daily Life in Ancient Rome (London, 
1989) at 103.
119 Van Zyl (n 82) at 9; Thomas (n 14) at 410ff.
120 “ … with a common progenitor (even if he was a legendary figure)”, as stated by O Tellegen-
Couperus A Short History of Roman Law (London,1993) at 6.
121 A clan.
122 Heichelheim, Yeo & Ward (n 118) at 35.
123 Dupont (n 118) at 103.
124 Ibid. The household gods which played a fundamental role in the family’s religious life included 
the lares and the penates (spirits who inhabited the pantry), Janus (the “spirit of the door”, with 
whom family life began), and Vesta (the “spirit of the hearth” who was “the centre of family life 
and worship”). See Heichelheim, Yeo & Ward (n 118) at 42; C Scott Littleton Gods, Goddesses 
and Mythology (New York, 2005) at 1100-1101; and WM Short Sermo, Sanguis, Semem: An 
Anthropology of Language in Roman Culture (PhD thesis, University of California, 2007) ch 5, 
available at http://books.google.co.za/books?id=f2Jp5y4_TsMC&pg=PA120&dq=lares+penate
sque&hl=en&sa=X&ei=AqlYU9bZEqOQ7AbwjYHwAQ&ved=0CEAQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q
=lares%20penatesque&f=false (accessed 23 Nov 2013).
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all lived under the same roof125 until the death of the paterfamilias.126 All family 
property, movable and immovable, fell into the estate of the paterfamilias.127 Roman 
marriages128 were mostly strategically arranged in order to forge important ties and 
alliances between families. Slaves were important assets129 who, if they were freed, 
continued to constitute invaluable support for their former master in a patron-client 
relationship.130
“Patronage” (clientela)131 was an important institution for economic, political, 
and social reasons and was fortified by the religious significance of the concept of 
fides.132 In early Roman times, persons became clients133 of the gens, as a whole, in 
a symbiotic relationship: the gens granted them land, political and financial support, 
protection in the courts and permission to share in its religion; clients pledged, 
inter alia, loyalty, military service and field work. Later, as the gens became less 
important, clients submitted to the patronage, and became the dependants, of rich 
and influential families who also established amongst themselves alliances based 
largely on the concept of amicitia.134 Crook explains the position as follows:135
The wheels of Roman society were oiled – even driven, perhaps – by two notions: mutual 
services of status-equals (I help you in your affairs; I then have a moral claim on your help 
125 Although, sometimes, members of the younger generations might take up lodgings elsewhere 
or even build or purchase other houses in which to reside. See Dupont (n 118) at 103, 105; 
Heichelheim, Yeo & Ward (n 118) at 36; Thomas (n 14) at 414; RW Moore The Roman 
Commonwealth (London, 1942) at 93.
126 Upon this event, “the family would split into as many new families as there were men of the 
subsequent generation”, according to Dupont (n 118) at 103. 
127 Neither wives married in manus nor children could own property, subject to the legal principles 
regarding peculium: Thomas (n 14) at 416-417.
128 Including marriages without manus: Wives married without manus to the men in the family 
also lived in the house, but were regarded as merely “ʻpassing through’ in order to provide their 
husband with children” and remained subject to the power of their oldest agnatic relative and part 
of the latter’s familia: see Dupont (n 118) at 105.
129 See Dupont (n 118) at 58, 105.
130 G Forsythe A Critical History of Early Rome (Berkeley, 2005) at 221; Mousourakis (n 17) at 
272; Thomas (n 14) at 404; R van den Bergh “Who was dependent upon whom?” (2005) 11 (1) 
Fundamina at 347-361.
131 The relationship between patron and client. On patronage, see Van den Bergh “The patronus as 
representative” (n 13) at 162-163.
132 Heichelheim, Yeo & Ward (n 118) at 38. Referred to as the “foundation of justice”, fides 
embraced “being true to one’s word, the paying of one’s debts, the keeping of sworn oaths, and 
the performance of obligations assumed by agreement”; see Heichelheim, Yeo & Ward (n 118) at 
46; Van den Bergh (n 13) at 163, esp nn 27 and 28.
133 In early times, clients included foreigners, either from conquered territories or who wished to live 
in Roman territory and become Roman citizens, freed slaves and Romans who were unable to 
make a living or protect themselves and their property. See Heichelheim, Yeo & Ward (n 118) at 
38-39.
134 Loosely meaning “friendship”. See Crook (n 16) at 93-94; Van den Bergh (n 13) at 165.
135 Crook (n 16) at 93.
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in mine) and patronage of higher status to lower ... It was the patron who came to the legal 
rescue of his client, paid his money down for litigation, paid his debt to prevent him being 
haled off, stood as his representative; you might hesitate to ‘lay the hand’ on a humble 
plebeian with his patron standing by.
The significance of patronage may also be understood in the context of the two 
social and political classes of Roman citizens, namely the patricians and the 
plebeians.136 The patricians were mostly wealthy aristocrats and noblemen,137 while 
the plebeians were mostly poor urban and rural persons.138 Initially, wealthy persons 
had sumptuous homes in town and villas on country estates.139 while subsistence 
farmers and pastoralists, with modest needs, lived comfortably in straw and mud 
huts on small plots.140 However, with the expansion of the Roman Empire, continual 
war took its toll on the economy. In time, many of the wealthy, with their lavish 
lifestyles, became severely over-indebted.141 Poor farmers who had been forced 
to join the army often returned from war to find that their farms had been looted 
by the enemy or badly managed or even stolen by dishonest neighbours.142 Those 
who borrowed money to pay taxes or to buy seed or implements suffered under the 
harsh debt enforcement laws, emerging as “the landless poor”.143 As a result, many 
returned to the army, sold or hired themselves out as gladiators or sold or hired out 
their children or moved to the city.144
The influx of the poor to the cities caused high-rise tenement blocks, called 
insulae, designed for letting, to be hastily constructed. Living conditions were 
overcrowded, unsanitary, and sometimes hazardous due to poor construction. 
Rentals, food prices and the rate of unemployment were high.145 These tenants lived 
an unsettled existence, using the insulae as temporary accommodation without a 
household shrine and gods.146 At the same time, overseas conquests created new 
markets which resulted in agricultural operations becoming large-scale and capital-
intensive, with some of the wealthy generating even more wealth for themselves.147 
Poverty-stricken Roman citizens and foreigners became the clients of wealthy Roman 
136 Differentiation and conflict between these two classes continued from about 500 BC until 287 BC, 
with the passing of the lex Hortensia. See Heichelheim, Yeo & Ward (n 118) at 39; Forsythe (n 
130) at 157; Tellegen-Couperus (n 120) at 7; Van den Bergh (n 13) at 162.
137 Who monopolised the senate, held high positions and, as pontiffs, were the custodians and 
interpreters of the sacred laws in the early Republic: Heichelheim, Yeo & Ward (n 118) at 55.
138 Although some became wealthy and powerful.
139 Moore (n 125) at 86, 87, 93; Dupont (n 118) at 41ff.
140 Heichelheim, Yeo & Ward (n 118) at 131-132; Dupont (n 118) at 32ff; Moore (n 125) at 93.
141 Heichelheim, Yeo & Ward (n 118) at 54; Dupont (n 118) at 41 refers to it as “opulent poverty”.
142 Heichelheim, Yeo & Ward (n 118) at 56.
143 Dupont (n 118) at 44-45; Heichelheim, Yeo & Ward (n 118) at 56.
144 Crook (n 16) at 61; Heichelheim, Yeo & Ward (n 118) at 65.
145 Moore (n 125) at 144-145, 150; Heichelheim, Yeo & Ward (n 118) at 134.
146 Moore (n 125) at 150.
147 Heichelheim, Yeo & Ward (n 118) at 132-133.
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patrons. Urban clients were at their patrons’ “beck and call” and were expected to 
give them political support in return for food, money, or clothes; rural clients, mostly 
peasants, were exploited in “humiliating servitude”.148
Widespread discontent amongst the urban poor in the latter part of the second-
century BC caused political upheaval and conflict with access to land being a main 
issue.149 As Dupont explains:150
[for a peasant,] loss of his land spelled the loss of his house, his family, his household gods, 
the tombs of his ancestors, and his dignity … Tiberius Gracchus … spoke on their behalf as 
follows:
The wild beasts that roam over Italy have, every one of them, a cave or lair to shelter in; 
but the men who fight and die for Italy enjoy only the light and air that is common to all 
above their heads; having neither house nor any kind of home they must wander about 
with their wives and children … for not a man of them has a hereditary altar; not one of all 
these many Romans has an ancestral tomb … Though they are styled masters of the world, 
they have not a single clod of earth to call their own. 
This speech portrays the stark realities of poverty and homelessness and the socio-
economic necessities of access to land, security of tenure and access to adequate 
housing and their direct connection with upholding human dignity. It is submitted 
that it is also strikingly reminiscent in a number of respects of issues which are 
relevant in the current South African socio-economic context.151 
7 Comment and conclusion 
The harsh Roman debt enforcement laws originally provided for imprisonment, 
slavery and possibly even death as consequences for defaulting debtors. The 
developed law permitted execution against assets. Although some types of assets 
came to be exempted from execution, these never included the home.152 However, a 
Roman person’s home held not only socio-economic but, more importantly, religious 
significance for it housed not only the living residents but also the spirits of the 
ancestors as well as the household gods and it included the mandatory hereditary 
148 Mousourakis (n 17) at 271.
149 See Heichelheim, Yeo & Ward (n 118) at 134-135, 155 (for an account of the contributing factors).
150 Dupont (n 118) at 45. Cf Plutarch Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus 9. 
151 See, eg, the facts and circumstances in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue 
Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC); Schubart Park Residents’ Association 
v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2013 (1) SA 323 (CC). See, also, the comments 
expressed by D Bilchitz & D Mackintosh “Opinion: Judges sidestep the law and fail to protect 
the vulnerable” available at http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2013/03/08/judges-sidestep-the-law-
and-fail-to-protect-the-vulnerable (accessed at 23 Apr 2014).
152 See 2, supra.
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altar.153 For these reasons, Roman debtors would very likely have avoided the loss of 
their home at all costs. 
It is evident that, in terms of Roman law, a debtor could avoid the harsh personal 
and proprietary consequences of the debt enforcement laws and save his home by 
“working off the debt”, often surrendering himself in nexum, or contractual bondage, 
to the creditor.154 Patron-client relationships often formed between a creditor and 
his debtors. It was also common for patronage to develop between third parties 
and debtors to whose aid the former came by paying their debts on their behalf to 
creditors and thus forming an obligation, in a broader sense, between them. The 
concept of amicitia, between persons of equal status, might also have formed the 
basis of a third party paying the debt or intervening on the debtor’s behalf. These 
relationships not only arose out of, but also contributed to, the complex but cohesive 
and, in a large measure, mutually supportive fabric of Roman society.155
Debt relief measures which became available to Roman debtors included cessio 
bonorum, the surrender of assets which brought with it the beneficium competentiae 
and which effectively provided immunity from action by creditors for unpaid 
debts.156 In the time of Justinian, a majority vote by creditors could bring about the 
granting of a moratorium to a debtor and it was possible for a debtor to approach 
the Emperor for a moratorium.157 Further, forming part of the law of contract, dilatio 
provided a means by which the majority of creditors could grant a moratorium to 
a debtor.158 With the development of the legal concept of mortgage, Justinian put 
protective mechanisms in place to allow for the delay of foreclosure by a creditor 
for at least two years after judgment had been granted and, in appropriate cases, 
for foreclosure to occur only by judicial decree and, later, only by imperial decree. 
Further, a debtor could redeem the property within the two year-period succeeding 
the creditor having become owner of it, by paying the outstanding debt and other 
charges.159 These developments, it is submitted, must have impacted on a debtor’s 
ability to retain or to redeem his home.  
Two observations may be made regarding the position in the Roman, relative to 
the contemporary South African, context. First, submission in a servile relationship 
to one’s creditor to escape the consequences of default, including execution against 
one’s home, is not an option according to the modern South African law. It would be 
regarded as contra bonos mores, as was indicated by the Appellate Division (as it was 
then called) in Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes,160 in relation to the illegality of requiring 
153 See 6, supra.
154 See 2, supra.
155 See 6, supra.
156 See 3, supra.
157 See 3, supra.
158 See 4, supra.
159 See 5, supra.
160 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) (hereafter referred to as Sasfin v Beukes).
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a person to work solely to service his debt.161 Secondly, modern societal structures 
differ markedly from those which existed in Roman times and they lack the support 
mechanisms, based on familial, religious, cultural, social, economic and political 
beliefs, concepts and alliances, on which Roman debtors could commonly rely to 
avoid the forced sale of their homes. Therefore, despite the harsh debt enforcement 
laws, considering the context within which the laws operated, and not simply the 
provisions of the laws themselves, may lead one to regard the position in Roman 
times as tending more towards protection of a debtor’s home against forced sale than 
is the case in terms of current South African law.  
However, it is submitted that there are discernible parallels which may be drawn 
between, on the one hand, aspects of communality and mutual interdependence 
and support in the concepts of patronage and amicitia and, on the other hand, the 
concept of ubuntu, which forms part of the fabric of South African law and society, 
as acknowledged in this post-Bill of Rights era. Section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution 
requires a court when interpreting the Bill of Rights “to promote the values that 
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom”.162 The duty to promote emphasises that “transformative constitutionalism” 
and “a socially interconnected and embodied concept of humanity” are envisaged.163 
Significant, in this context, is the concept of ubuntu which is recognised as being one 
of the values that section 39(1) requires to be promoted.164 
161 Sasfin v Beukes (n 160) at 13H-I. See, also, references to peonage, in K Gross “The debtor as 
modern day peon: A problem of unconstitutional conditions” (1990) 66 Notre Dame L Rev at 165-
205.
162 In terms of s 39(1)(a) and (b), a court must also consider international law and it may consider 
foreign law. In terms of s 39(3), “[t]he Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other 
rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, 
to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill”. On interpretation of the Bill of Rights, see IM 
Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Bill of Rights Compendium (Durban, 1997- ) in 
par 1A9.
163 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (Cape 
Town, 2010) at 98-99.
164 See L du Plessis “Interpretation of the Bill of Rights” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (Cape Town, 2002-) at 32-130; TW Bennett “Ubuntu: An 
African equity” (2011) 14 PELJ at 30-61; Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers 
(Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC) in pars 23 and 61. On ubuntu, see, also, R English “Ubuntu: The 
quest for an indigenous jurisprudence” (1996) 12 SAJHR at 641-648; Y Mokgoro “Ubuntu and the 
law in South Africa” (1998) 1 PELJ at 15-26; I Kroeze “Doing things with values II: The case of 
Ubuntu” (2002) 13 Stell LR at 252-264; D Cornell “A call for a nuanced jurisprudence: Ubuntu, 
dignity and reconciliation: Post-apartheid fragments: Law, politics and critique” (2004) 19 SAPL 
at 666-675; and M Pieterse “Traditional African jurisprudence” in CM Roederer & D Moellendorf 
(eds) Jurisprudence (Cape Town, 2004) at 438-462.
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In S v Makwanyane165 Mokgoro J associated ubuntu with concepts such as 
“humanity” and “menswaardigheid” (“human dignity”)166 and Langa J described 
ubuntu as capturing, conceptually167
a culture which places some emphasis on communality and on the interdependence of 
the members of a community. It recognises a person’s status as a human being, entitled to 
unconditional respect, dignity, value and acceptance from the members of the community 
such person happens to be part of. It also entails the converse, however. The person has a 
corresponding duty to give the same respect, dignity, value and acceptance to each member 
of that community. More importantly, it regulates the exercise of rights by the emphasis it 
lays on sharing and co-responsibility and the mutual enjoyment of rights by all.
In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers, in a judgment espousing the 
correct approach to be adopted in relation to eviction of unlawful occupiers from 
their homes, Sachs J stated:168
The spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the population, 
suffuses the whole constitutional order. It combines individual rights with a communitarian 
philosophy. It is a unifying motif of the Bill of Rights, which is nothing if not a structured, 
institutionalised and operational declaration in our evolving new society of the need for 
human interdependence, respect and concern.
It is submitted that similar considerations, if applied in the context of forced sale of 
debtors’ homes (given the emphasis placed by South African courts in such matters 
on the debtor’s right to have access to adequate housing as provided by section 26 of 
the Constitution), would reflect similar societal support to that evident in the Roman 
context. 
This article highlights certain aspects of Roman law and societal values and 
structures which may be regarded as factors which effectively caused a debtor and 
his family to remain in their home or at least to continue to have access to one. It is 
consequently submitted that these aspects of Roman law, which effectively protected 
the debtor’s home from forced sale, have not only historical value as sources of 
South African law but also significant comparative value. They were aspects of a 
legal system and procedures that operated in another time, and in a society which, 
although markedly different, nevertheless reflects at least some similar needs and 
priorities as those of ours today. 
165 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) in pars 130-131, 223-227, 237, 307-313, 516.
166 S v Makwanyane (n 165) in par 308. See, also, Rautenbach in par 1A11.
167 S v Makwanyane (n 165) in par 224. Mahomed DP also refers to ubuntu in his judgment in S v 
Makwanyane (n 165) in par 263.
168 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) (hereafter referred to as 
Port Elizabeth Municipality), in par 37 (footnotes omitted), cited by Liebenberg (n 163) at 99. See 
also IM Rautenbach “Fundamental Rights” (revised by L Stone) in The Law of South Africa vol 
10 (Durban, 2008) in par 286.
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Janus, the Roman spirit of the door, is traditionally depicted as having two faces 
in order that he might simultaneously guard the home against intrusion from without 
and watch over and protect members of the household within.169 Casting our eyes 
abroad, we note that the European Commission Services proposed, with regard to 
forced sale of a debtor’s home, that170
common sense and humanity should always prevail at all levels … and throughout the whole 
procedure. In particular, the full economic and social situation of the defaulting borrower 
should be taken into account, and the implications of a given repossession should be 
carefully assessed, notably when a primary residence is at stake. For example, losing the 
family home after having lost one’s job has intolerable social and human implications for 
both borrowers and their families. In these critical economic times our society must put the 
human dimension at its very heart.
As we return our gaze homewards, we are reminded of the constitutional imperative 
to “infuse elements of grace and compassion into the formal structures of the law”171 
and the spirit of ubuntu is brought home to us as a vital key to the building of our 
nation.
ABSTRACT
In the last decade, the Constitutional Court has recognised that the sale in execution 
of a debtor’s home potentially infringes the debtor’s right to have access to adequate 
housing in terms of section 26 of the Constitution. The position is now that, in every 
case in which execution is sought against a debtor’s home, judicial oversight is 
required to determine whether execution is justifiable, taking into account “all the 
relevant circumstances” in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. Last year, the 
European Union issued a directive to its member states requiring forbearance in 
matters concerning foreclosure against residential property. Against this contextual 
background, this article explores the ways in which execution against a debtor’s home 
was dealt with according to Roman law, a common source of many contemporary 
legal systems. Initially, substantive and procedural rules relating to debt enforcement 
permitted execution only against a debtor’s person. Subsequently, the law developed 
to provide for execution against a debtor’s property. Collective debt enforcement (or 
insolvency) rules and procedures evolved, as did principles pertaining to mortgage 
and a creditor’s rights of real security. Certain types of assets came to be regarded as 
exempt from execution in the individual and collective debt enforcement processes, 
169 See Rose (n ***) supra.
170 See Commission Staff Working Paper National Measures and Practices to Avoid Foreclosure 
Procedures for Residential Mortgage Loans SEC(2011) 357 final available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/credit/mortgage/sec_2011_357_en.pdf. (accessed 31 Mar 
2011) at 11. This working paper led to the proposal which culminated in the EU Directive referred 
to in (n 9) supra.
171 See Port Elizabeth Municipality (n 168) in par 37.
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but there was no formal exemption of the debtor’s home. However, it is submitted, 
a study of the relevant legal principles and procedures as applied in their historical 
and socio-economic context ‒ especially in light of the revered status of the familia, 
including the ancestors, the household gods and the requisite hereditary altar as well 
as the complex societal relationships ‒ reveals the discernible, albeit indirect and 
subtle, consequence of providing protection for an impecunious debtor against the 
loss of his home at the instance of a creditor.
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DENIS O’BRYEN: (NOMINALLY) SECOND 
MARSHAL OF THE VICE-ADMIRALTY 
COURT OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, 
1806-1832
JP van Niekerk* ** 
1 Introduction
The first marshal of the Vice-Admiralty Court at the Cape of Good Hope having 
been historically a controversial figure,1 I was greatly surprised when it turned out 
that the second and long-serving holder of the office, Denis O’Bryen,2 was likewise 
considered to have been a personality of some note. An Irish-born dramatist, political 
1 See my “George Rex of Knysna: A civil lawyer from England and first marshal of the Vice-
Admiralty Court of the Cape of Good Hope, 1797-1802” (2010) 16(1) Fundamina (editio 
specialis: Libellus ad Thomasium. Essays in Roman Law, Roman-Dutch Law and Legal History) 
486-513.
2 There are also alternative spellings of his name (Dennis) and surname (O’Brien, O’Bryne and 
O’Bryan), but O’Bryen himself seems to have preferred the (now) more unusual version.
* Professor, Department of Mercantile Law, School of Law, University of South Africa.
** I should like to dedicate this article to the memory of my former colleague, AB (Basil) Edwards, 
14 Nov 1930-15 Jan 2014, who wrote so engagingly about Mr Blane’s involvement in an episode 
of jurisdictional head-butting: see “A conflict of jurisdiction” (1972) 12(1) Codicillus 42-43 and 
further nn 23 and 183-184 below.
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pamphleteer, and confidant and aide to the prominent Whig politician Charles James 
Fox, his life merited a brief entry in the British Dictionary of National Biography.
However, I was to discover that there was more to his appointment as Admiralty 
marshal at the Cape than at first appeared.3
2 Background
2 1 The establishment and jurisdiction of the second Cape 
Vice-Admiralty Court
When the British re-occupied the settlement at the Cape of Good Hope in January 
1806, they soon recognised the need to re-establish a local Vice-Admiralty Court; the 
one that had operated during the First Occupation had been closed down in 1803.4 
In the absence of such a court, several Anglo-Dutch and some purely British prize 
issues flowing from the Occupation5 and those likely to arise locally from the war 
being waged against France at that time, could only be resolved inconveniently and 
at great expense by the Court of Admiralty in London.6
The instructions issued in August 1806 to the first permanent governor of the 
Cape after re-occupation, the Earl of Caledon, referred to his receiving an Admiralty 
Commission constituting him Vice Admiral of the settlement at the Cape.7 The royal 
instructions, issued in September 1806 by Letters Patent under Privy Seal to the 
Lords of Admiralty, to appoint a Vice Admiral at the Cape explained that it would 
be advantageous “to have a Court of Vice Admiralty settled there”. It specifically 
authorised and empowered the Lords to do so (it appeared that they might have 
3 I was greatly assisted in my search for the story behind O’Bryen’s appointment by correspondence 
during Apr 2014 with Prof David O’Shaughnessy, School of English, Trinity College Dublin. He 
provided me with valuable background information on O’Bryen’s early life as well as a copy of a 
draft piece entitled “Making a play for patronage: Dennis O’Bryen’s A Friend in Need Is a Friend 
Indeed (1783)” subsequently appeared in (2015) 39 Eighteenth-Century Life at 183-211.
4 See AB Edwards The History of South African Law: An Outline (Durban, 1996) at 75 n 233 and 
79 n 249; DH van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Hollandse Reg (Durban, 1983) at 449.
5 Some of these were eventually determined by the London Court of Admiralty in 1809 (see, 
eg, George McCall Theal (ed) Records of the Cape Colony 36 vols (Cape Town, 1897-1905) 
(hereafter RCC) vol 7 at 350-351), but even by 1819 others had not yet been finally resolved (idem 
vol 12 at 183).
6 See, eg, idem vol 5 at 413, concerning the ship Fortuna, sailing under Mecklenburg colours en 
route to Batavia. She was detained in Table Bay in May 1806 and her papers, together with other 
supporting documentation, were “transmitted ... to His Majesty’s Court of Admiralty [in London] 
for adjudication”. Subsequently Sir David Beard, commandant at the Cape, was compelled to 
deny in a letter to the secretary of state Viscount Castlereagh that he had taken it upon himself to 
decide this prize cause and to appropriate the prize property (idem vol 6 at 158).
7 Idem vol 6 at 15-16.
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had no such power in respect of newly conquered territories) by appointing a Vice 
Admiral and also a Vice-Admiralty judge and other proper officers required for the 
functioning of a Court of Vice Admiralty at the Cape, and to issue such commissions 
as would be necessary.8
The first Admiralty judge to be appointed and sent out from London after the 
Second British Occupation of the Cape was Winchcombe Henry Hartley, who 
served from 1806-1810.9 The second person to occupy the office was George 
Kekewich, at the time the King’s advocate in the settlement. He sat as judge, at first 
temporarily,10 and then permanently, from June 1811 until 1827.11 Although at times 
8 Idem vol 6 at 31-32.
9 Hartley, a barrister and fellow of the Honorable Society of Lincoln’s Inn and residing in Great 
Russell Street in Bloomsbury, was appointed to the post in Nov 1806, but only arrived at the Cape 
the following year (idem vol 6 at 51), on the same ship as Alexander du Pré, Earl of Caledon, the 
first (permanent) governor from May 1807 to Jul 1811. Although his annual salary was ₤6 000 
(paid out of the penalties and forfeitures levied by his Court, or, if that was insufficient, out of the 
fund arising from the sale of old naval stores), Hartley soon complained to Castlereagh about his 
income. He had already requested an appointment in any other vacant office in view of the fact 
that his salary was smaller than that of his predecessor or of Admiralty judges elsewhere (idem vol 
6 at 64). He had also signed a memorial to governor Caledon requesting that civil servants be paid 
from the date of their appointment in England rather than only from the date of their arrival at the 
Cape (see Peter Philip British Residents at the Cape 1795-1819. Biographical Records of 4 800 
Pioneers (Cape Town, 1981) at 168). In 1808, when Hartley returned temporarily to England “for 
the arrangement of some Matters essentially affecting his Office”, the King’s advocate, Andrew 
Cassels, acted in his place as Admiralty judge despite governor Caledon questioning whether such 
an absence or substitution was permissible (see Theal RCC (n 5) vol 6 at 235-237). The view of 
the law advisor in London, in the person of Sir (Dr) John Nicoll, was that the judge of the Cape 
Vice-Admiralty Court did have the right to absent himself without the governor’s permission, 
and that according to the express terms of his patent he could appoint a deputy or surrogate, in 
which appointment the governor’s acquiescence was unnecessary (idem vol 6 at 303-304 and 
311). Cassels’ temporary appointment came at a time when he was seriously ill and he died shortly 
afterwards, in Jan 1809 (Philip at 62; Theal RCC (n 5) vol 6 at 387-388 and 408 and vol 7 at 18-19, 
302 and 492).
10 In Jun 1810 the appointment was announced of Kekewich, “Surrogate Judge” of the Vice-
Admiralty Court, as assessor to the court of Appeals in criminal cases (Theal RCC (n 5) vol 7 at 
287) and in a letter written by Governor Caledon in the same month, he is referred to as the King’s 
advocate and “acting Surrogate” in the Admiralty Court (idem vol 7 at 301).
11 Kekewich (1778-1862), also a barrister in the High Court of Chancery (he compiled A Digested 
Index to the Earlier Chancery Reports (London, 1804)) and member of the Honorable Society 
of Lincoln’s Inn, arrived at the Cape in Dec 1809 (having been appointed in Jun) as the King’s 
advocate in the settlement. In 1810, he was also appointed as an assessor in civil and criminal 
cases in the Court of Appeals. His second marriage, in Jan 1812, was to Catharina Cornelia 
de Waal. Her younger sister was married to Thomas Rowles, a practitioner (proctor and, more 
specifically, from 1807, the King’s proctor) in the local Vice-Admiralty Court from 1800 (he was 
one of the few barristers to practise in the Court during both British occupations), also active 
in other courts (including the Court of Appeals), and on occasion also acting judge during his 
brother-in-law’s absences from the colony (see, eg, Theal RCC (n 5) vol 31 at 364, 371 and 
372 and vol 32 at 181 and 185). On Rowles, see Philip (n 9) at 365. Upon the establishment of 
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the focus of controversy,12 the Court was never really busy13 and the possibility of its 
discontinuance was even raised.14
Upon the creation of the new Cape Supreme Court in 1828,15 the Chief Justice – 
the first appointee being Sir John Wylde16 – was also appointed to serve as the judge 
the new Supreme Court in 1828, and the appointment of Chief Justice Wylde as the Admiralty 
judge, Kekewich (who was not then also appointed as Admiralty judge, as Van Zyl (n 4) at 451 
would have it) became the third puisne judge in the new Court (alongside Menzies and Burton), 
in which capacity he served until his retirement and return to England in 1843. On Kekewich, 
see Philip (n 9) at 216-217; AA Roberts A South African Legal Bibliography (Pretoria, 1942) at 
367; Stephen Girvin “The establishment of the Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope and its 
history under the chief justiceship of Sir John Wylde. Parts I and II” (1992) 109 SALJ 291-306 and 
652-665 at 303-304 and 654-655 and 664 respectively (Girvin observing that Kekewich was the 
weakest of the four appointments to the Cape bench and that his appointment was anomalous and 
disappointing “as he had been criticized in his previous position as judge of the Vice-Admiralty 
court and assessor”).
12 In 1814, eg, allegations were levelled at the Court about its perceived improper conduct in slave 
cases. It was alleged that it had released arrested slavers on their payment of sums of money; 
had granted local inhabitants the slaves taken from them and, in one case, had withheld a ship’s 
papers until payment of a “gratuity” to the Court even though there was no charge against her. In 
correspondence between Kekewich and the colonial government, he refuted these “unsubstantiated 
charges” vigorously (Theal RCC (n 5) vol 9 at 487-490).
13 On the death of Thomas Rowles in 1826, the Court of Appeals was left without a secretary or an 
assessor in civil cases. Governor Somerset temporarily appointed Kekewich – who had served in 
that capacity in criminal cases – to the vacancy (idem vol 26 at 72). The reasons for his permanent 
appointment were that he was one of few English lawyers in the colony and that although he served 
in the Vice-Admiralty Court, other tasks, including the proper formulation of local ordinances, 
could be assigned to him since he had “little or nothing to do in his Court”. However, Kekewich 
declined to offer his assistance in this regard and the appointment of someone from England was 
requested (idem vol 26 at 407-408).
14 Especially after the Peace Treaty of Amiens in 1814, the Court’s principal jurisdiction, that in prize 
matters, became largely dormant, leading the then governor Lord Charles Somerset to suggest in 
Nov 1816 that the Vice-Admiralty Court might be discontinued at the Cape (idem vol 11 at 159). 
However, London thought otherwise, referring, somewhat obliquely, to the Court’s importance to 
naval officers and men (idem vol 11 at 214 and 330). This left Somerset still dissatisfied and in 
May 1817 he noted the absence of a pertinent reply to his suggestion “relative to the Court of Vice 
Admiralty here, for the continuance of which I can see no necessity” (idem vol 11 at 336).
15 See, generally, Girvin (n 11).
16 Wylde (1781-1859) was Chief Justice and therefore Admiralty judge until his death. He had 
been judge-advocate of New South Wales from 1816 and had also been appointed to the Vice-
Admiralty Court there. On his appointment as Chief Justice of the Cape Supreme Court and also, 
separately, as judge of the local Vice-Admiralty Court (see, eg, Theal RCC (n 5) vol 32 at 25, 152 
and 171), Wylde wrote to Viscount Goderich, the secretary of state, in Aug 1827 requesting that 
he be allowed the fees formerly payable to the Admiralty judge. He mentioned that the business 
of the Vice-Admiralty Court involved “delicate questions on the subject of slaves” and amounted 
to a “material addition” to his already extensive duties as Chief Justice. He also referred to the 
fact that chief justices in other colonies received separate remuneration for performing the duties 
of Admiralty judge. This request, together with others, was ultimately refused (see idem vol 32 
at 252-254). Although he enjoyed good health for most of his long legal career, the first signs of 
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in the local Vice-Admiralty Court. In 1891, when Vice-Admiralty courts were finally 
abolished,17 Lord Henry de Villiers was accordingly the last specifically appointed 
Admiralty judge at the Cape.
At the risk of unnecessary repetition, it may be apposite briefly to identify the 
main features of Vice-Admiralty courts, including the one at the Cape of Good 
Hope.18
First, they were imperial (British) and not colonial courts and have to be 
distinguished, in the case of the Cape, from the local Council of Justice (Raad van 
Justitie) and its successor, the Cape Supreme Court. The judge of the local Vice-
Admiralty Court was therefore not, as such, a colonial judge, even if, subsequently, 
the local Chief Justice was also appointed by the British Admiralty as the local 
Admiralty judge.
Secondly, the Cape Vice-Admiralty Court did not, like the Council of Justice 
and later the Supreme Court, apply local Roman-Dutch law, but English law. More 
particularly, it applied English maritime and Admiralty law that, even though it often 
displayed its civil-law origins, certainly no longer resembled the applicable local 
law.
Thirdly, Vice-Admiralty courts exercised a permanent instance jurisdiction of 
variable scope at different times over various questions of maritime law such as 
the carriage of goods by or collisions at sea, or the claims of seamen and salvors. 
In addition, it could also exercise a prize jurisdiction, which was unusual in that it 
was limited in both scope and duration by the terms of the Commission conferring 
the jurisdiction on it.19 A Prize court, therefore, was simply an Admiralty (or 
Vice-Admiralty) court exercising, for the time being, a specially conferred prize 
jurisdiction.
Fourthly, the permanent Cape Vice-Admiralty Court should be distinguished 
from an ad hoc, temporary court, generally known as a Piracy Court or Commission 
Court (because it was constituted in every case by a Commission20 and comprised 
his failing health came in his seventy-fifth year, in Sep 1855, when Wylde suffered a stroke while 
delivering judgment in a slave-trading case as Admiralty judge. On Wylde, see Roberts (n 11) at 
384; Girvin (n 11) at 295-298 and 662; and F St LS “Sir Johyn Wylde” (1933) 50 SALJ 284-297.
17 See, further, n 220 below.
18 For more detail, with references, see Van Niekerk (n 1) at 499-504.
19 The British authorities seem to have been caught unawares by the War of 1812 with the United 
States. As a result, the detention of American ships at the Cape in 1813 caused “considerable 
embarrassment and difficulty” because the local Vice-Admiralty Court received no orders (ie, 
from a Commission conferring prize jurisdiction on it) enabling it to proceed to their condemnation 
(Theal RCC (n 5) vol 9 at 176-177 and 222).
20 The absence of such a Commission and the Vice-Admiralty Court’s perceived lack of criminal 
jurisdiction caused severe problems and heated debate in 1825. The reason was that British seamen 
and others accused of mutiny or murder at sea could be, and were, tried by the local colonial 
court applying “Dutch law” rather than by a (local) British court applying English criminal law 
(see, eg, Theal RCC (n 5) vol 23 at 9, 451-454, 471-472, 481, 485-486 and 497-498). By Apr 
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a body of Commissioners) but also confusingly referred to simply as an Admiralty 
Court.21 This Court had criminal jurisdiction over (serious) offences committed on 
the high seas, including, therefore, piracy, and was made up of seven Commissioners, 
the judge of the local Vice-Admiralty Court being but one of the members.
Fifthly, despite its name and the involvement of the Admiralty in its establishment 
and the appointment of its judges, a Vice-Admiralty court was not a naval court. In 
this respect, therefore, it should be distinguished from naval courts-martial, which 
had jurisdiction over naval (as opposed to maritime) matters such as those relating to 
the discipline of officers and seamen of the Royal Navy.
Despite the differences between the Cape Vice-Admiralty Court and the local 
colonial courts – first, the Council of Justice and later the Cape Supreme Court – 
one common but complicating factor was that their jurisdictions overlapped. Some 
maritime matters could be heard in either court and claimants could often choose 
in which one to lodge their claims. The success or failure of those claims could 
well depend on their choice because the courts applied different laws and followed 
distinct procedures. In addition, if there were several claimants, the same matter 
could even be heard simultaneously but separately in the two courts.22
Even at an early stage many instances of jurisdictional clashes between the 
two courts were brought to the attention of the authorities,23 but the problem was 
1826, the authorities in London acknowledged “that a competent jurisdiction should be forthwith 
established” at the Cape and instructed the Admiralty to issue an appropriate Commission for 
that purpose (idem vol 26 at 263). However, that seems not to have happened. In Aug 1827 the 
report of the Commission of Enquiry into the administration of justice at the Cape observed in 
respect of criminal law and jurisprudence that the criminal jurisdiction exercised by the Council 
of Justice over crimes committed in the colony had been extended, on rather doubtful authority, 
to those committed on ships when at sea or anchored in the harbours of the colony, and that no 
Commission of Piracy had yet been issued superseding that jurisdictional cognizance (idem vol 
33 at 53).
21 See Van Zyl (n 4) at 445.
22 To clarify, the Vice-Admiralty Court exercised not only concurrent jurisdiction in some matters, 
but also a separate and exclusive jurisdiction in others, (see, eg, the instructions to the Commission 
of Enquiry into the Cape in Theal RCC (n 5) vol 15 at 239). The same was, of course, true of the 
Council of Justice.
23 In May 1808, eg, the Vice-Admiralty Court in the person of its deputy marshal and the Council 
of Justice represented by the sheriff were involved in a quite undignified judicial boat race across 
Table Bay when both attempted to be the first to arrest, and hence assert jurisdiction over, a 
suspected slaver, the Portuguese ship Rosalia. On arriving at the ship, the deputy marshal pushed 
the sheriff away and was thus first on board, but each claimed and, assuming a plea of prior capture, 
instituted proceedings against the ship in his own court. The Council of Justice complained to 
the governor that the Admiralty marshal had impeded the sheriff in the execution of his duties. 
Ultimately the Vice-Admiralty Court ordered the release of the Rosalia while the Council of 
Justice condemned her, but after an investigation, decided not to proceed any further (see Theal 
RCC (n 5) vol 6 at 330-331; Edwards (n 4); and HB Giliomee “Die administrasietydperk van Lord 
Caledon 1807-1811” in (1966) no 2 Archives Year Book for South African History 213-366 at 254-
255 (referring to the clash as a “komiese situasie” causing the governor “groot verleentheid”).
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not addressed and continued to arise from time to time.24 When the issue was 
brought to their attention in 1820, the view of the authorities in London was that 
the Vice-Admiralty Court’s jurisdiction over certain matters was settled and could 
not be contested by the local colonial court, even if it did possess an overlapping 
jurisdictional power. In short, the prior jurisdiction of any of the two courts could 
not be superseded. While that seemingly settled the matter in practice,25 it did not 
eliminate the continuing concurrency of jurisdiction of the two courts in appropriate 
cases.26 A further suggestion, in 1822, that a newly reformed colonial court should 
be vested with Admiralty jurisdiction “by which means past collisions would be 
avoided”,27 was not fully realised when the Cape Supreme Court was established 
in 1827.28 The Vice-Admiralty Court continued to exist and exercise its distinct 
jurisdiction as before, but at least now the Chief Justice, who was also as such the 
Admiralty judge, could himself properly manage any jurisdictional collisions. The 
conflict continued even when, in 1891, the local colonial court was vested with 
Admiralty jurisdiction, since that court had to apply different laws, depending on 
which jurisdiction (civilian or Admiralty) it was exercising.29
24 For instance, in 1818, in connection with the jurisdiction over slaves either taken from captured 
slavers or abandoned by the masters of such ships (see, eg, the correspondence in Theal RCC 
(n 5) vol 11 at 475-480 and vol 12 at 1-4). In 1821, again, the Council of Justice’s John Truter 
complained to the governor about the Vice-Admiralty Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. In 
consequence, the deputy marshal was prevented from advertising the sale of a vessel that had 
already been sold by order of the Council of Justice. In response, Admiralty Judge George 
Kekewich complained about this “prohibition”, causing the governor to bring the matter to the 
attention of the authorities in London, because it not only had judicial implications – appeals, eg, 
went to different courts – but also financial implications for the colonial government which would 
get nothing out of Admiralty confiscations but one-third of the value of Council of Justice sales 
(see idem vol 13 at 371-375, 377-384, 421-436, 441-442, 451-453 and 464).
25 In evidence given before the Commission of Enquiry into the judicial system at the Cape in Aug 
1825, John Truter of the Council of Justice explained, on the issue of the jurisdictional conflict, 
that “at present a mutual understanding prevails between myself and the Judge of the Court of 
Vice Admiralty that we should prevent any open conflict of our jurisdictions in these cases by 
private conference at the outset” (idem vol 33 at 262-263).
26 See idem vol 13 at 486-487 and vol 14 at 117-118.
27 Idem vol 14 at 86 in a memorandum on the reformation of the judicial structure at the Cape, 
and idem vol 14 at 372 where a letter from Bathurst referred to “the tendency to collision, 
from a concurrency of Jurisdiction, between the present Colonial, and Vice Admiralty Courts 
at the Cape”. The solution recommended by the Commission of Enquiry in 1826 was that the 
commencement of action in either of the courts should be sufficient a bar to all other proceedings 
for the same cause of action (idem vol 28 at 9-10 and 21-22).
28 There is no mention of the Vice-Admiralty Court or of Admiralty jurisdiction in the Charter of 
Justice of 1827 (idem vol 32 at 274-292). The reason is readily apparent: the Vice-Admiralty 
Court was not a colonial court within the purview of the Commission appointed to reform the 
local judicial system.
29 See, further, Christopher Forsyth “The conflict between modern Roman-Dutch law and the law 
of Admiralty as administered by South African courts” (1982) 99 SALJ 255-270.
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The matter was finally resolved only in the late twentieth century when the law 
to be applied in the resolution of particular maritime issues was prescribed by statute, 
a compromise solution not acceptable to all, given that South African law, drawing 
on its subsidiary common law, was retained in respect of some maritime matters.30
2 2 The Admiralty marshal
After the judge and the registrar, the Admiralty marshal was the most important 
official in any Vice-Admiralty court and, by the nature of his duties, also the one 
most in the public eye.31
The marshal’s main duty was to serve Admiralty processes. After a plaintiff had 
met the necessary requirements regarding the nature and, in the case of an action 
in rem, the object of his claim, the Court’s registrar issued a warrant to the marshal 
directing him to arrest the ship or cargo in question or, in the more unusual case of an 
action in personam, to serve it upon the defendant. The marshal or his deputy served 
the warrant, in the case of a vessel, “in the time-honoured manner of exhibiting the 
original and holding it to the mainmast, then nailing a copy in its place”.32 He then 
executed a certificate of service, commonly called the marshal’s return, which was 
filed in the Court’s registry together with the original warrant. In the case of an 
action in personam, where the warrant was for the arrest of a person, the marshal 
exhibited it and took the defendant into custody, from which he was released upon 
the provision of security.33
Once a ship was arrested, the marshal, if necessary left a member of his staff 
on board to prevent her sailing from the Court’s jurisdiction and to protect her from 
damage or pillage while in custody. In the case of arrested cargo, the marshal had to 
see to its discharge and warehousing. Failing in his duty to protect arrested property 
from damage could lay the marshal open to a claim in damages.34
30 See s 6(1) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983 and, eg, John Hare Shipping 
Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2 ed (Cape Town, 2009) at 14-29.
31 See, further, FL Wiswall The Development of Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice since 1800. An 
English Study with American Comparisons (Cambridge, 1970) at 12-13, 16, 47-48 and 121; ES 
Roscoe A Treatise on the Jurisdiction and Practice of the Admiralty Division of the High Court of 
Justice ... (London, 1878) at 7.
32 Wiswall (n 31) at 13. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, it became the practice for the 
warrant of arrest to be served in actions in rem by the plaintiff’s legal representative. However, in 
The Solis (1885) 5 Aspinall’s Maritime Law Cases 368, the Court observed in passing that only 
the marshal had the right to board a ship and nail a writ of summons in rem to the mast and that 
the representative might be trespassing if he tried to do so.
33 Later, the defendant was merely served with an instrument called a “monition”, addressed to the 
marshal and commanding him to cite the defendant personally and “admonish” him to appear in 
court (Wiswall (n 31) at 63).
34 See The Hoop (1801) 4 C Rob 145, 165 ER 566 for an instance of a successful claim against the 
Admiralty marshal for the compensation of loss sustained by pillage and theft whilst the property 
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Once a ship or other maritime property had been condemned by the Admiralty 
court, the marshal had the duty of arranging for a sale in execution. He had to 
appraise, advertise and then sell the property by auction. Before 1840, the Admiralty 
marshal was not salaried, but received his income from fees, including a brokerage 
fee that was customarily charged on the sale of maritime property.
The marshal also had other public duties, including appearing at official and 
public ceremonies – such as piracy executions or judicial processions – where he 
bore the Court’s silver oar mace.35
3 O’Bryen’s early life
Denis O’Bryen36 was born in Ireland in 1755. He qualified as a surgeon, moved to 
London and in the 1780s relinquished the practice of his profession and turned his 
hand to writing and a political career. As will be apparent, these two pursuits were 
closely linked.37
He first gained notoriety with the publication, in 1782, of a satirical and sarcastic 
pamphlet entitled A Defence of ... the Earl of Shelburne, from the Reproaches of His 
Numerous Enemies ... .38 He had written it anonymously but in the hope of preferment 
from one (the Rockingham) faction of the liberal Whig party and of gaining the 
attention of one of the party’s rising stars, Charles James Fox. It was an immediate 
success, selling out quickly and necessitating several reprints. In a portent of what 
was in his custody. The Court rejected the marshal’s defence that he was unable to protect the 
property properly because his fees were too small. The Court thought that if arrested property 
were lost or damaged, the marshal had at least to show that this had not been through any default 
of his own. If indeed his fees were insufficient to enable him to provide proper security, this 
should be raised with relevant authorities, but could not be relied on as a defence.
35 See my “The story of the silver oar maces of the Vice-Admiralty Court of the Cape of Good Hope” 
(2012) 18(1) Fundamina 135-173.
36 For general biographical details on him, see Thompson Cooper sv “O’Bryen, Dennis” in 
Dictionary of National Biography vol 41 (London, 1895) 340 at 340; Gail Baylis sv “O’Bryen, 
Dennis” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004, online ed 2007, accessed 28 Aug 
2013); Biographical Dictionary of the Living Authors of Great Britain and Ireland ... (London, 
1816) sv “O’Bryen Denis” at 255-256; and O’Shaughnessy (n 3).
37 O’Shaughnessy (n 3) mentions his blurred transition from political pamphleteer to confidant to the 
upper echelons of Whig society, and the complicated story of how he made his way as a bankrupt 
Irish immigrant in a class-conscious metropolitan London.
38 The pamphlet attacked Irish-born William Petty, the Earl of Shelburne, secretary of state from 
Mar to Jul 1782 and then, succeeding the Marquess of Rockingham, Prime Minister until Apr 
1783 during the short-lived Whig administration and the last months of the American War of 
Independence. Shelburne was, somewhat controversially and in opposition to other Whig 
luminaries, including Charles James Fox, a friend of America with whom he secured peace. The 
pamphlet provoked a reply from Petty entitled A Short but Serious Reply to the Author of A 
[Mock] Defence of the Earl of Shelburne ... (London, 1782).
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was to transpire later in his life, it brought O’Bryen “a secret pension” from the Duke 
of Portland in April 1783.39
Next came his only play, the comedy A Friend in Need is a Friend Indeed, 
performed nine times at the Haymarket Theatre in London during July and August 
1783. Further performances were shelved when O’Bryen fell out publicly with the 
theatre’s manager over financial arrangements. Although unfavourably reviewed and 
never printed, it did serve O’Bryen well, also financially, given that he had been 
declared bankrupt in 1780. Containing several “caricatural allusions” to and in 
defence of the controversial Charles James Fox, it “facilitated his rise to a position 
of substantial political influence in London” and, more particularly, in Whig inner 
circles.40 It was a further attempt to gain the patronage of Fox, a prominent Whig 
politician, leader and statesman at the time. The latter’s hedonistic lifestyle of 
drinking, gambling and womanising,41 as well as his opposition to the American 
war and support of the French revolution, made Fox a controversial public figure.42 
However, as we shall see, O’Bryen’s constant support of Fox was to prove fruitful.
In the course of the following decades, O’Bryen wrote and published various 
works, many of a political nature and showing his liberal alliances. These include 
A Gleam of Comfort to This Distracted Empire, demonstrating the Fairness and 
reasonableness of national Confidence in the present Ministry ... (1784), another 
ironical work on and critique of the Tory government that had taken over from the 
Whigs. This government was headed by William Pitt the Younger, an arch rival of 
Fox. Another work was A View of the Treaty of Commerce with France, signed ... . 
September 20, 1786 ... (1787) concerning a treaty signed by the Pitt administration. In 
39 Ralph A Manogue “James Ridgway and America” (1996) 31 Early American Literature 264-288 
at 265. Portland succeeded Shelburne and served as Whig Prime Minister from Apr to Dec 1783.
40 On the play and O’Bryen’s intention of using it to gain political advancement, see, especially, 
O’Shaughnessy (n 3).
41 During the 1780s and 1790s, Whig supporters met at Devonshire House, the West-End home 
of Georgiana Cavendish, the Duchess of Devonshire, who was also said to have had an affair 
with Fox of whom she was at least a close friend (see, generally, Amanda Foreman Georgiana, 
Duchess of Devonshire (London, 1999) and, also for a general background, Arthur Aspinall Lord 
Brougham and the Whig Party (London, 1927)).
42 Elected to Parliament in 1768, Fox gradually gravitated to the radical Whig party in the 1770s. 
When the reformist Rockingham administration came to power in Mar 1782, Fox became secretary 
of state for foreign affairs and, with Lord North, leader of the House of Commons in 1783. The 
Fox-North coalition was in office from Mar to Dec 1783, when it was defeated in the House of 
Lords after royal interference, the King nominating William Pitt as Prime Minister. As a result of 
Fox’s opposition to measures Pitt sought to push through in the House of Commons, Parliament 
was dissolved in Mar 1784. Fox lost the election and Pitt was returned with a substantial majority. 
The surviving supporters of the Whig party increasingly called themselves Foxite, after the 
leader of the most important faction, rather than Whig. In the 1790s, Fox continued opposing 
the curtailment of civil liberties by the Pitt government. On Fox (1748-1806), see LG Mitchell 
sv “Fox, Charles James” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004, online ed 2007, 
accessed 9 Apr 2014).
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1788, upon King George III’s illness, O’Bryen anonymously published The Prospect 
before Us, being a Series of Papers upon the Great Question. The “great question” 
was the regency crisis, which continued from October 1788 to March 1789. Not 
surprisingly, O’Bryen supported the demands of the Prince of Wales that he be given 
full rights of regency. The prince was a friend and gambling companion of Fox, 
and the latter’s support of parliamentary reform and a curtailment of executive and 
monarchial power had resulted in deep animosity between Fox and the King.43
In addition, O’Bryen was an irrepressible writer of letters to newspapers on 
various topical and invariably political issues, so much so that he is considered a 
“journalistic figure” of the period.44 His political writings reflected his activism as 
a supporter of the Whig cause and of Fox; and he has been described as being “of 
some help to Fox and his friends with their newspaper problems”, that is, the attacks 
on Fox’s lifestyle and views by the London press.45 O’Bryen continued to fire off 
missives to the press throughout his life. In 1820 he admitted being “in the course of 
my life, and still an occasional correspondent of several papers ... like thousands of 
others”, but denied ever having had any ownership, managerial employment or other 
concerns in any newspaper.46
Then, of course, there are also numerous but scattered pieces of correspondence 
with and from O’Bryen. There are several references in published sources to 
archival materials47 containing correspondence between O’Bryen and Fox and also 
43 When the King’s “madness” returned in 1810, O’Bryen’s pamphlet was reproduced with a new 
preface under the title The Regency Question, being a Re-publication of Papers written during 
His Majesty’s Illness in 1788 ... . Ultimately, the Prince of Wales became regent only in 1811 and 
succeeded his father as George IV only on his death. On George III (1738-1820), see, generally, 
Christopher Hibbert George III. A Personal History (London, 1998).
44 See Richmond P Bond’s review of Lucyle Werkmeister The London Daily Press 1772-1792 
(Lincoln, Neb, 1963) in (1964) 63 J of English and Germanic Philology 526-527.
45 Loren Reid “Charles Fox and the London Press” (1961) 47 Quarterly J of Speech 390-397 at 
391 n 4. O’Bryen was, eg, a “long time associate” of Henry Bate (1745-1824), who was “the 
most prominent and the most notorious newspaper editor in London during the 1780s” and who 
“published an unprecedented volume of scurrilous material in his paper”, the Morning Herald, a 
newspaper militantly pro-Foxite. Bate’s “constant involvement in fist fights and duels won him 
the nickname the Fighting Parson” and in Sep 1780 O’Bryen was his second in his duel with one 
of the owners of the paper. See, further, Bonnie Ferrero “The Morning Herald and its first three 
editors” (2005) 11 Media History 165-175 at 168; Hannah Barker sv “Dudley, Sir Henry Bate” in 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004, online ed 2007, accessed 19 May 2014).
46 12 Oct 1820 The Times at 3.
47 For instance, British Museum Add MSS 46565, 47566, and 47591 (see, eg, Richard E Willis 
“Fox, Grenville, and the recovery of opposition, 1801-1804” (1972) 11 J of British Studies 24-43 
passim).
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other Whig supporters and acquaintances such as Sheridan,48 Burke,49 Lord Grey,50 
Thomas Erskine,51 and the Prince of Wales. O’Bryen had become an important if 
not completely indispensable cog in the Whig party machinery.52 Working for the 
party under the supervision of William Adam, a political manager, O’Bryen, “if not 
in receipt of regular payments from [Whig] party funds in this period, was a close 
associate of Fox and was employed by the party for various purposes with great 
regularity”, and continued to act for the party into the next century. His services 
brought him financial reward, of which he appeared to be in constant and dire need; 
he had apparently been given “an annuity” out of party funds while it was in office 
in 1782,53 and in the first decade of the nineteenth century, the party undertook a 
subscription to relieve O’Bryen of his debts.
It is not surprising, then, that Denis O’Bryen is today described as being 
closely connected to Fox and the Whigs: he is variously referred to as “[t]he Foxite 
Whig pamphleteer”,54 Fox’s “secretary”,55 his political and election “agent at 
48 Richard Brinsley Butler Sheridan (1751-1816) was an Irish playwright (he is best known for 
The Rivals (1775) and School for Scandal (1777) and as the creator of Mrs Malaprop), poet, 
theatre owner and manager, and politician. An admirer and later friend of Fox, he was a Whig 
member of Parliament for many years (1780-1812), under-secretary of state (1782-1783) and 
with Fox the secretary (see n 42) and treasurer of the Navy (1806-1807) in Lord Grenville’s 
government. O’Bryen has been called an “[i]ntimate” of Sheridan’s (Manogue (n 39) at 285). In 
1806, O’Bryen secured a ₤400 loan for Sheridan and in 1816, when Sheridan was in ill health and 
as usual in financial trouble, “a friend”, Denis O’Bryen, wrote a letter to the Morning Post calling 
on Sheridan’s former fellow politicians to come to his aid (see A Norman Jeffares sv “Sheridan, 
Richard Brinsley” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004, online ed 2008, accessed 
9 Apr 2014). In yet another quirk of history, and not unrelated to the story of O’Bryen himself, 
Sheridan managed to arrange a post for his ailing son Thomas (1775-1817) at the Cape of Good 
Hope. Thomas arrived in Jun 1815 and was appointed colonial paymaster and assistant deputy 
adjutant general, which offices he held until his death (see Philip (n 9) at 378). In 1832, his widow 
received a pension of ₤300 from colonial funds (R Montgomery Martin History of the British 
Colonies Vol IV: Possessions in Africa and Australasia (London, 1835) at 130).
49 Edmund Burke (1729-1797) was an Irish-born author and politician. He represented the Whigs in 
Parliament 1765-1794. As a supporter of the American revolutionary cause and, later, an opponent 
of the French Revolution, he became a leading figure in the conservative faction of the Whig 
party (the “Old Whigs”), in opposition to the “New Whigs” led by Fox. In Feb 1790, O’Bryen and 
others arranged a meeting to mend the breach between Burke and the Fox-supporting Sheridan, 
the outcome of which was an agreement not to discuss the subject of the French Revolution in the 
House of Commons. On Burke, see Paul Langford sv “Burke, Edmund” in Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (2004, online ed 2012, accessed 16 Jul 2014).
50 About whom more in due course (see n 81 below).
51 About whom likewise more shortly (see n 60 below).
52 For what follows, see Donald E Ginter “The financing of the Whig party organization, 1783-
1793” (1966) 71 American History Review 421-440 at 431.
53 Maybe this was the “secret pension” referred to in the text to n 39 above.
54 Manogue (n 39) at 265.
55 Idem at 285.
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Westminster”,56 and a “zealous political partisan” of Fox with whom he was “on 
terms of great intimacy”.57 In short, O’Bryen was more than “a bit player in Whiggish 
politics”; he was “an important figure in the Whig world over a period of decades”.58
However, in attaining this position of political importance, O’Bryen did more 
than merely put pen to paper.
In November 1782, for instance, he fought a duel59 in Brighton with the lawyer, 
Thomas Erskine, already an established figure in legal and Whig political circles.60 
Their disagreement and its eventual favourable and magnanimous resolution appear 
to have been carefully calculated by O’Bryen with a view to gaining maximum 
political advancement in a cliquish Whig world.61
In June 1786, O’Bryen was involved as a witness for Fox in a civil trial in 
the Court of Common Pleas.62 Fox had demanded compliance from Corbet, the 
high bailiff of Westminster, with a writ issued by the Court of Exchequer to return 
himself and another as elected members of Parliament for the City of Westminster, 
but compliance was delayed. Fox won the case and received the ₤2 000 damages he 
had claimed for losses caused and expenses incurred.63
56 LG Mitchell “Foxite politics and the Great Reform Bill” (1993) 108 English Historical Review 
338-364 at 362.
57 Cooper (n 36). According to O’Shaughnessy (n 3) it appears from their correspondence that “Fox 
lent on O’Bryen for judicious decision-making grounded in their friendship” and that O’Bryen 
could not only offer “judgment” to accompany Fox’s flamboyant personality, but also protect Fox 
from the frequent personal attacks upon him by the press and political opponents. Correspondence 
between the two indicates a strong personal friendship going beyond a mere political alliance and 
involving an exchange of gifts and social invitations to the Fox home.
58 O’Shaughnessy (n 3).
59 His second known involvement in a duel (see n 45 above).
60 Thomas Erskine (1750-1823), who, being the “son of a nobleman ... was entitled to a degree 
without examination”, soon became a prominent junior lawyer in the 1770s. He was a leading 
member and later leader of the Bar in the 1780s, an associate and supporter of Fox, and gained 
further prominence defending radical politicians and activists in the 1790s (cf, eg, his involvement 
in the O’Connor treason trial discussed at n 67 below). He was Lord Chancellor from Feb 1806 to 
Apr 1807. On Erskine, see David Lemmings sv “Erskine, Thomas, First Baron Erskine” in Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography (2004, online ed 2008, accessed 19 May 2014).
61 See O’Shaughnessy (n 3) for this. With O’Bryen’s permission, Erskine fired the first shot but 
missed. O’Bryen then simply fired his pistol into the air. Erskine, relieved to escape unharmed (he 
had in fact had a will drawn up beforehand in anticipation of an unfavourable outcome), called 
O’Bryen a man of honour and likewise fired his second pistol into the air.
62 Fox v Corbet, reported in 22 Jun 1786 The Times at 3.
63 Fox, having lost to Lord Samuel Hood but having beaten Sir Cecil Wray and in the process having 
gained sufficient seats to become a member of Parliament, was barred from taking his seat until 
after an official scrutiny. (At the time, it was possible for there to be more than one member per 
constituency, eg, at Westminster there were two members, Fox with Hood in 1784-1788 and 1790-
1797 and with Wray in 1782-1784.) Fox’s barring was a delaying tactic by the Pitt government. 
After several months, the House of Commons intervened and voted to allow Fox his seat. Fox 
nevertheless sought recompense by bringing the civil action (see Foreman (n 41) at 156).
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Many years later, in 1798, O’Bryen was heavily involved in two trials64 that 
showed not only his Whig connections but also that he remained “a proud and 
patriotic Irishman with a fervent interest in promoting his country”.65
The first was the political trial66 of Arthur O’Connor67 and four other Irishmen 
for high treason.68 They appeared before the Court held under Special Commission 
at Maidstone, on 21 and 22 May 1798. At the time, United Irishmen were hoping to 
receive the help of France in a planned rebellion that ultimately proved unsuccessful. 
The indictment against the accused included three separate acts of treason: 
“compassing” the King’s death; aiding and comforting the King’s enemies; and 
persuading and engaging the French government and subjects to invade Britain with 
force. After two marathon sessions,69 and having heard the evidence for the prisoners 
from a galaxy of liberal political luminaries – Fox, Sheridan, Erskine, Lord John 
Russell and Lord Thanet – the jury took just forty minutes to find one of the accused 
64 O’Bryen, it seems, may have been personally quite familiar with litigation and may well have 
been the “Dennis O’Bryen” involved in the following legal proceedings (this information comes 
from the website of the National Archives (NA), Kew, available at http://www.nationalarchives.
gov.uk (accessed 10 Apr 2014): (1) 16-19 Sep 1778, Henry William Smallwood, of Staple Inn, and 
Eleanor his wife (nee Perkins) releases [sic] Dennis O’Bryen, surgeon, of Norfolk Street, Strand: 
Robert Carter of Market Court, Covent Garden, witnesses the release (MJ/SP/1778/09/080: 
Middlesex Sessions of the Peace, Session Papers, Sep Gen Sessions, in the London Metropolitan 
Archives); (2) 1798, Dennis O’Bryen & Ano v Mary Woodifield & James Speller (C 12/1426/10 
in the NA); and (3) 1800: Dennis O’Bryen pltf v Francis Dashwood SMP dfdt (C 13/480/4 in the 
NA).
65 O’Shaughnessy (n 3). O’Bryen’s name is included in Samuel Simms “A select bibliography of the 
United Irishmen, 1791-8” (1938) 1 Irish Historical Studies 158-180 at 166.
66 One of many during the 1790s: see FK Prochaska “English state trials in the 1790s: A case study” 
(1973) 13 J of British Studies 63-82. They often concerned charges of seditious libel and were 
viewed by the Whigs as attacks on freedom of speech and the press (idem at 71 n 30, referring to 
a letter from Fox to O’Bryen).
67 Arthur O’Connor (1763-1852) was an Irish nationalist and from 1796 a leading member of the 
United Irishmen, a group planning their own revolution and seeking French aid for this. With 
Lord Edward Fitzgerald, he acted as an emissary and travelled to France in mid-1796. The result 
was an abortive landing of the French fleet at Bantry Bay. After being jailed for most of 1797, 
O’Connor was back in England in Feb 1798, en route to seek further French aid in support of 
an Irish revolution, but he was arrested with others on charges of treason. O’Connor had a long-
lasting friendship with Sheridan and political connections among the Foxites, including with Fox 
himself. On O’Connor, see James Livesey sv “O’Connor [formerly Conner; later Condorcet-
O’Connor], Arthur” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004, online ed 2013, accessed 
29 May 2014).
68 See R v O’Coigly, O’Connor, Binns, Allen & Leary (1798) 26 State Trials 1191, (1798) 27 State 
Trials 1; also “Trial for High Treason ... Maidstone, Kent in 1798”, available at http://freepages.
genealogy.rootsweb.anchestry.com (accessed 29 May 2014). On how the trial was reported in 
the press, see CC Barfoot “Reporting a treason trial in 1798” (1994) 2 Studies in Newspaper and 
Periodical History 45-58.
69 Proceedings lasted sixteen hours on the first day (from 7 am to 12 pm) and more than seventeen 
hours on the second day (from 8 am to 2 am).
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guilty70 and the others, including O’Connor, not guilty. Although he attended the 
trial, it does not appear that O’Bryen testified.
O’Connor was immediately rearrested and held in custody for more than five 
years on other charges. His attempt to leave the Court on being found not guilty, 
viewed by the authorities as an attempt to escape being rearrested, was accompanied 
by a violent disturbance in the courtroom. O’Bryen was heavily implicated in starting 
this fracas and consequently charged, together with others, with inciting a riot and 
with a range of other misdemeanours.
R v Earl of Thanet, Ferguson, Browne, O’Brien & Thompson71 was tried in the 
King’s Bench on 25 April 1799 and was a high-profile affair. It involved several 
leading legal lights,72 and was described, rather hyperbolically, by the attorney-
general as concerning the commission of “an offence which appears to me to be one 
of the most heinous, the consideration of which has been offered, in the history of 
our law, to the decision of a jury”.
There were a number of witnesses for the accused, including Sheridan.73 With 
regard to O’Bryen, he stated that he knew him intimately and confirmed that he was 
“a strong man” who could, had he wanted to, have assisted O’Connor in escaping, 
but was instead arguing with the officials present.74 From the evidence presented,75 so 
70 In the absence of mitigating circumstances, James O’Coigley (or Quigley), received the “usual 
sentence” for high treason and was executed near Maidstone on 7 Jun. The usual sentence, 
according to Barfoot (n 68) at 54, was for the prisoner “to be hanged, but not until he be dead; to 
be taken down while still alive, and then to have his heart and bowels taken out and burnt before 
his face; his head to be severed from his body; and his body to be divided into four quarters”.
71 (1799) 27 State Trials 821 (KB). The accused were the Rt Hon Sackville Tufton, the ninth Earl 
of Thanet; Robert Ferguson, Esq, a barrister; Gunter Browne, Esq; Dennis O’Brien, Esq; and 
Thomas Thompson.
72 Counsel for the Crown included attorney-general Sir John Scott (afterwards Lord Chancellor 
Eldon), Mr Law (afterwards Lord Ellenborough and Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench), 
Mr Garrow and Mr Wood (both afterwards barons of the Exchequer), and Mr Abbott (afterwards 
Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench). Counsel for the defendants included Thomas Erskine 
(afterwards Lord Chancellor Erskine: see n 60 above), Mr Gibbs (afterwards Lord Chief Justice 
of the Court of Common Pleas), and Mr Best (afterwards a judge on the King’s Bench).
73 Although some sources suggest that Sheridan may have organised the riot, others assert that it was 
his intervention (asking the judges why, if O’Connor had been acquitted, he was still being held) 
that restored order in the courtroom, an action that resulted in Sheridan’s not being prosecuted 
with the others.
74 See at 924 of the report.
75 Eg, there was no evidence for the prosecution of any contact between O’Bryen and Thanet in 
court during the trial (idem at 837, 850-851), although he was present in the witness box, standing 
by Sheridan, Fox and others (idem at 862); and although O’Connor had on one occasion leaned on 
O’Bryen over the bar (idem at 839). He had also been present in court at the time of O’Connor’s 
acquittal and had conversed with him (idem at 859), and had then enquired from the officials 
whether there was a (new) warrant against O’Connor after his acquittal (idem at 851); however, 
O’Bryen had left the courtroom just before O’Connor tried to make his alleged escape (idem at 
865).
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the defence argued, it appeared that although present, O’Bryen could not be proved 
to have been actively involved in any riotous acts.76
Although two of the accused were found guilty and two others were acquitted,77 
O’Bryen was found not guilty.
The end of his direct and active involvement with Fox and the Whigs was, 
however, not many years away. When the Pitt government resigned in February 
1801, Fox “returned” to active politics. On Pitts’ death in January 1806, he entered 
into an understanding with the Grenville faction of the Whig party, which took office 
as the “ministry of all talents” in January 1806, with Fox again being appointed as 
foreign secretary.
However, by then Fox was already ill and he died in September 1806. On the 
death of his friend and patron, O’Bryen wrote a letter to The Times, modestly putting 
himself forward by raising the prospect of his being asked to stand for election to 
the vacant seat in Westminster. He observed that “[a] fit successor to him, who is 
no more, one cannot expect; for his equal is not in the creation”, but nevertheless 
claimed to be worthy of consideration as such “on the score of the connection that 
for twenty-five years bound me to the cause and service of that illustrious person”.78
Nothing came of this. The Whigs were in power for only a few more months 
but by then O’Bryen had already secured another advancement from his Whig 
connections.79
On 30 August 1806, The Times80 announced that Lord Howick81 had appointed 
Denis O’Bryen, Esq, “to the office of Marshal of the Vice Admiralty Court of the 
76 More specifically there was no evidence from his conduct in court of any evil design, much less of 
a concerted one with the other defendants. He was not implicated at all in the riot, nor concerned 
in any violence or disturbance whatsoever. In short, the defence suggested, as far as O’Bryen was 
concerned, “there is literally no proof to be answered” (idem at 883 and see, also, at 905).
77 Thanet was fined ₤1 000 and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment in the Tower of London; 
Ferguson was fined ₤100 and imprisoned for one year, while Browne and Thompson were 
acquitted with the prosecution’s consent. The conviction must be seen in the light of the evidence 
showing the riotous conduct of Thanet and Ferguson and the explanation by Lord Kenyon in his 
summing up for the jury. He observed that there was no doubt that O’Connor was not entitled 
to be discharged, because when a verdict of acquittal is entered, the judge may order the party 
in question to be detained and compel him to answer other charges that may have been brought 
against him (idem at 940).
78 17 Sep 1806 The Times at 2.
79 He had already received an annuity (1782), a pension (1783) and debt relief (early in the nineteenth 
century) from the Whigs for services rendered (see nn 39 and 53 above).
80 At 2.
81 Charles Grey, the second Earl Grey (1764-1845), known as Viscount Howick from 1806-1807 
when he was First Lord of the Admiralty, and first elected to Parliament in 1786, became a 
member of Fox’s Whig party (he supported Fox in the regency crisis 1788-1789), and later one of 
its leaders in opposition to Pitt. Grey entered the cabinet as the First Lord of the Admiralty in Feb 
1806 despite his inexperience in naval affairs. It was in that capacity that he appointed O’Bryen 
as Admiralty marshal. On Fox’s death in Sep 1806, he succeeded him as foreign secretary and 
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Cape of Good Hope”. The report continued that when his lordship had communicated 
his appointment to O’Bryen, he enhanced its value by the assurance that O’Bryen 
owed it to “the particular request of Mr Fox, as a return for his long, zealous, and 
faithful attachment”. The office was said, the report continued, to be of considerable 
emolument “and can be executed by Deputy”. By the time O’Bryen gained entry into 
the Dictionary of National Biography, his appointment in 1806 “to the patent office 
of marshal of the Admiralty [sic] at the Cape of Good Hope, worth, it was said ₤4 
000 per annum”, was described as a “lucrative sinecure”.82
Clearly O’Bryen’s appointment as marshal of the Vice-Admiralty Court at the 
Cape of Good Hope was not an ordinary appointment involving his translocation to 
the settlement to take up his duties there. Some explanation of sinecure appointments 
and patent offices is therefore required.
4 Patent offices and colonial appointments
Until well into the nineteenth century, a “complex and unsystematic” system of 
patronage existed in respect of various public offices and positions in the United 
Kingdom.83
The system included not only the bestowal of honours (knighthoods, peerages, 
court appointments and nominations to various chivalrous orders), but also the 
nomination to salaried offices – so-called salaried patronage. Nominations were 
usually for life and were not revocable, at least not legally. They were for important 
posts involving the performance of serious and demanding duties, as well as the most 
glaring of sinecures.84 Public servants were so appointed, often with no or inadequate 
qualification for their posts; they received little if any official remuneration or salary 
and derived their income from fees and gratuities levied on the public for the services 
leader of the Foxite faction of the Whigs and hence also of the House of Commons, holding those 
positions until Mar 1807 when the Whig government resigned. During the “talents ministry”, Fox 
had secured an earldom for Grey’s father, Genl Sir Charles Grey (1729-1807). In Apr 1806 Grey 
himself adopted the “courtesy title Viscount Howick”, which he used until his father died in Nov 
1807, when he inherited the earldom as the second Earl Grey and entered the House of Lords. 
There he remained in opposition until his appointment as Whig Prime Minister in Nov 1830 
after the resignation of the Duke of Wellington’s government, a position he held until Jul 1834. 
He is the Earl Grey after whom the bergamot-oil flavoured tea blend was named. On Earl Grey, 
see, further, EA Smith sv “Grey, Charles, second Earl Grey” in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography (2004, online ed 2009, accessed 10 Apr 2014). On the involvement of the Grey clan in 
affairs at the Cape of Good Hope, see, further, n 175 below.
82 Cooper (n 36).
83 JM Bourne Patronage and Society in Nineteenth Century England (London, 1986) at 13. Much of 
what follows in the following five paragraphs is drawn from this source.
84 The term “sinecure” is derived from “sine” (without) and “cura” (care or duty) and refers to an 
appointment to a salaried office that involves little or no responsibility or active service or labour 
on the part of the appointee. Originally of ecclesiastical origin (a benefice without the obligation 
of caring for souls), it was later also applied to secular offices.
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they rendered in the performance of their duties.85 For monarchs and governments 
the system was a powerful means of distributing patronage or rewarding or securing 
political support.
There were, broadly, two methods of appointment: by Letters Patent under the 
Great Seal, or by Warrant under the King’s Sign Manual.86 An appointment to an 
office by the former method was referred to as an appointment to a patent office.
As from the end of the eighteenth century, hesitant and ineffectual steps 
were taken to suppress sinecures, reform the system of patronage, and transform 
the “civil service” in an attempt to eradicate maladministration and inefficiency.87 
Public pressure for reform was kept up by a series of Black Books and Red Books, 
the product of the radical press, authored anonymously by “A Commoner”. These 
books were highly critical of complex, secretive and wasteful financial management 
and state expenditure and included a detailed list of “Pensions, Sinecures, Places, 
Compensation and Emoluments” in the United Kingdom and the colonies, as well as 
a financial review of the income and expenditure of the civil list, Britain’s finances 
and debt, and Crown revenues.
The first pertinent step towards reform was the appointment of a House of 
Commons Select Committee on Sinecures in 1810, about which more shortly. It 
found that there were 242 sinecures in the Kingdom and the colonies. However, 
general legislative reform failed and a series of legislative measures dealt in piecemeal 
fashion with the issue. Nevertheless, by 1834 there had been steady growth in the 
numbers employed by the government in its executive department or “civil” service, 
and there were only 108 sinecures left, most of which were already destined for 
extinction in due course. By 1850, “[s]inecures had lapsed into irrelevance”.88
Crown and government patronage, even if shorn of sinecures, its most 
objectionable feature, which continued to be the medium through which public 
services were recruited, slowly faded from public debate. By the mid-nineteenth 
century, increased regulation and re-organisation of the public service in the cause 
of efficiency came to restrain the free exercise of patronage. The result was the 
85 Bourne (n 83) at 13-14.
86 This is explained by the guide entitled “Royal grants in Letters Patent and charters from 1199”, 
available at http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/records/research-guides (accessed 27 Jun 2014) 
as well as by the several Parliamentary Papers referred to below. Letters Patent is a type of legal 
instrument in the form of a published, written order or proclamation by the Crown or government 
granting, eg, an office, right, property, monopoly, or title, to a private individual or a public body. 
The term (litterae patentes) refers to “open” or “accessible” letters (in the sense of writing or the 
letters of a word, and not in the sense of an epistle, hence “letters” not “letter’ patent), as opposed 
to sealed and private letters (litterae clausae); letters readable by everyone in that the seal was 
attached pendent from the document and not “sealing” or “closing” it. Collections of royal Letters 
Patent were taken up (“enrolled”: sheets of parchment were sewn together to form a continuous 
roll) in Patent Rolls.
87 Bourne (n 83) at 20-24.
88 Idem at 167.
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appointment of those suitably qualified for office and hence “efficient” patronage.89 
By 1870 the “onslaught of merit” had seen the arrival of “open competitive entry”.90
Included in the system of patronage and the list of sinecures produced in 
attaining these reforms, were various judicial offices.91 They were likewise reformed 
in the first half of the nineteenth century,92 as part of a broader reform of the judicial 
system generally.
Briefly, as far as the superior common-law courts were concerned,93 numerous 
inferior offices in these courts were either absolute sinecures in that the appointee 
himself did no work but earned an income from fees generated by a deputy to whom 
his duties were delegated, or partial sinecures. Reforms were aimed at the elimination 
of judicial offices that were sinecures, and the introduction of a greater reliance on 
salary-based compensation as well as a regulation of the collection of, and a cap on, 
fees by the holders of such offices. These measures were introduced piecemeal, for 
instance by the Common Law Courts (England) Act, 1830;94 the Court of Exchequer 
89 Idem at 31; there was no advantage “in appointing an idle, incompetent, epileptic, aristocratic 
bastard to a post of real responsibility” (idem at 167).
90 CI Hamilton “John Wilson Croker: Patronage and clientage at the Admiralty, 1809-1857” (2000) 
43 The Historical J 49-77 at 63.
91 For a description of how – slowly and “extremely burdensome and wearing to both protégé 
and patron”, and with little if any political significance – the patronage system operated at the 
Admiralty, see ibid.
92 See James E Pfander “The chief of the court: Article II and the appointment of inferior judicial 
officers” (2012) Faculty Working Papers, Northwestern University School of Law, available at 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/facultyworkingpapers/224 (accessed 20 Jun 
2014) at 13-18 for a succinct summary of the background to common-law courts. The following 
exposition is heavily reliant on this source. For the reform of civilian courts, see, eg, Wiswall (n 
31) at, eg, 36, 41-42, 57-59 and 80; Anthony Hugh Manchester “The reform of the ecclesiastical 
courts” (1966) 10 Am J of Legal History 51-75; and RB Outhwaite The Rise and Fall of the 
English Ecclesiastical Courts, 1500-1600 (Cambridge, 2006) at 104 et seq.
93 These were the Court of the King’s Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, and the Court of the 
Exchequer. (Other courts included the Court of Chancery and various civil-law courts such as 
the various ecclesiastical courts and the Admiralty Court.) Officers of these courts received (1) 
salaries, paid by Parliament; (2) an income derived from fees (paid by litigants as part of the cost 
of litigation and irrespective of the outcome of litigation; by contrast, Admiralty judges’ judicial 
fees depended on the outcome, and earned them a substantial fee when condemning a vessel 
as prize but less otherwise!); and (3) an income from the appointment of individuals to offices 
within the judge’s “gift” or patronage, which grew with the length of the judge’s service as offices 
became vacant and required re-appointment. Unless he decided to keep an office for himself as 
an additional income, a judge could either sell the relevant office(s) outright (bargaining with the 
purchaser in the expectation that the appointment to a sinecure would provide an annuity for the 
individual appointed), or he could appoint a member of his own immediate or extended family or 
his circle of friends to the post. It is estimated that the relevant chief justices and the Chancellor in 
particular earned quite considerably more from fees and patronage than from their direct salaries. 
See, further, Pfander (n 92) at 13-18.
94 11 Geo IV & 1 Will IV c 58. It regulated the receipt and future appropriation of fees and 
emoluments receivable by officers of the superior courts of common law. The object of the Act, 
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(England) Act, 1832;95 the Lord Chancellor’s Pension Act, 1832;96 and the Superior 
Courts (Officers) Act, 1837.97
For present purposes, though, the focus is on the system of patronage in colonial 
appointments, including judicial patent offices.98
At the end of the eighteenth century, most senior colonial officials received no 
stipends or very small ones and were expected to live on fees levied on the public 
they served. The fee-earning colonial office was regarded as a form of property, 
which could be conferred by the Crown or the government on a subject or supporter. 
according to the decision in Clarke & Another v Richards (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 351, 160 ER 143, 
was to provide the means of paying the officers of the various courts of justice by salaries instead 
of fees. See, also, the explanatory and amending Officers of Common Law Courts Act, 1831 (1 & 
2 Will IV c 35).
95 2 & 3 Will IV c 110, which sought to better regulate the duties performed by the officers on the 
plea or common-law side of the Court of Exchequer. The measure was said in the decision in 
Clarke & Another v Richards (1835) 1 Y & C Ex 351, 160 ER 143 to be aimed at distributing the 
duties of the officers of the Court of Exchequer and giving them appropriate names.
96 2 & 3 Will IV c 111. Despite its (subsequently conferred) title, the Act also abolished certain 
sinecure offices (they are listed in s 1 and include offices of the keeper or clerk of his Majesty’s 
Hanaper, the patentee of the Subpoena Office, the registrar of affidavits and ten other equally 
arcane ones) connected with the Court of Chancery. In terms of s 2, though, the Act was not to be 
construed to determine (abolish) any of these offices at the time held in possession or reversion 
by any person appointed to them before Jun 1832 until the death or resignation of that person. It 
was followed by the Lord Chancellor’s Offices Act, 1833 (3 & 4 Will IV c 84) which provided for 
the appointment by the Crown of “competent” persons to perform the duties of certain of those 
abolished offices connected with the Court of Chancery as and when they became vacant, and also 
for current and future office-holders to be paid by salary in full satisfaction of their services and 
expenses incident in its performance.
97 7 Will IV & 1 Vict c 30. The preamble observes that the duties of many officers in these courts 
have wholly or in part ceased, or are executed by deputy, and that the offices have, because of 
changes in the law, become useless and inapplicable to present practices and proceedings, but 
that the fees in respect of those offices continue to be payable by litigants. Further, it noted that 
the continuance of sinecures and useless offices tends to impair the effective administration of 
justice and to impose unnecessary burdens and costs on the public and litigants in those courts. 
The Act therefore abolished certain offices in the superior courts of common law (they are listed 
in Sched A to the Act and the more than forty-five offices mentioned there include, in the Court of 
Queen’s Bench, eg, those of the clerk of rules, the clerk of papers, the signer of writs, the clerk of 
declarations, the clerk of errors, the clerk of the outer treasury, and “the bagbearer to the Custos 
Breviorum”), and in the Court of Common Pleas as well as in the Court of the Exchequer, the 
offices of prothonotary (on the latter, see generally RW Bentham & JM Bennett “The office of 
prothonotary. Its historical development in England and in New South Wales” (1959) 3 Sydney LR 
47-70). The Act made provision for a more effective and uniform appointment, at fixed salaries, 
of masters or principal officers of those courts to perform the duties and exercise the powers and 
authority connected to the abolished offices.
98 See, in particular, JH Parry “The patent offices in the British West Indies” (1954) 69 English 
Historical Review 200-225 which provides valuable background information on the patent office 
system as it operated in the colonial context. On patronage in the East India Company, see Bourne 
(n 83) at 180-185.
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The monarch or government ministers regularly used their powers of patronage, at 
home and abroad, to gratify friends, clients and supporters.99
Appointment was without reference to the relevant colonial authorities – either 
the Colonial Office or the governor of the colony in question – by Letters Patent 
under the Great Seal. Further, the appointment could not be cancelled except for the 
gravest cause and by due process of law. In short, a colonial patent office appointment 
involved no fixed and secure salary but also no ready dismissal.
Nor could the Crown or government always ensure proper or even personal 
performance, especially in distant colonies. Appointees often arranged for the 
performance of any duties involved in the office by deputies, so that fee-earning 
offices in colonies became in effect life sinecures.
Colonial offices were often granted by Letters Patent100 to men who had 
obligations or duties in England, had no intention of leaving England and residing 
abroad, and who performed their colonial duties by deputy. In 1821 the Red Book101 
observed sarcastically that “[m]any Honourable and Right Honourable Gentlemen 
fill the offices of clerks, harbour-masters, naval officers, tide-waiters, collectors, 
comptrollers, surveyors, &c. in places and countries which they have never seen 
except on the map, if they have seen them even there”. Such deputies either retained 
a share of the fees of the office and remitted the remainder to their principal in 
England, or otherwise paid their principals a fixed annual lump sum, giving security 
for it and for the proper execution of the office.
Offices patented in the colonies covered a wide spectrum, several of them being 
judicial offices.102 The only senior officials who remained, as a class, outside the 
system, were colonial governors and judges, who were appointed by Commissions 
under the Great Seal, received stipends and were not allowed to serve by deputy.
Clearly the system of patent offices had serious defects.103 Neither the authorities 
in London nor the colonial governor and his administration could effectively control 
99 Bourne (n 83) at 28 points out that colonial patronage and colonial appointments “were an 
important addition to the arsenal of ministerial patronage”.
100 The procedure for appointing officials by Letters Patent was slow and complicated and involved 
the patentee in considerable expense, which he sought to recover, directly or through his deputy, 
from the collection of fees (see Parry (n 98) at 201).
101 The Extraordinary Red Book: An Account of all Places, Pensions, Sinecures, Grants, &c ... to 
February 1821 4 ed (London, 1821) at vii-viii.
102 For example, as appears from Parry (n 98) passim, in the West Indies the offices of colonial 
secretary, provost-marshal, clerk of the naval office, and chief clerk and registrar of the various 
courts were often patent offices.
103 For an informative decision on how the patent system operated, which also illustrated the many 
abuses that occurred in connection with it, see R v Vaughan (1769) 4 Burr 2494, 98 ER 308. It 
concerned an attempt to bribe a Privy Councilor (the Duke of Grafton, First Lord of the Treasury 
at the time) to procure a patent for the reversion of the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court 
of Jamaica. The Court referred to the office as one that “had been sold, devised, leased, and very 
badly executed by deputy” (at 2496, 309) and one that “is granted by letters patent under the 
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the appointment of patent officers or the manner in which they, or their deputies, 
executed their duties, let alone speedily remove the patentees or their deputies from 
their offices when that was desirable. Not only were incompetent persons appointed 
to the offices; they, in turn, often appointed incompetent and corrupt deputies to 
perform their duties locally. Furthermore, patentees themselves often had little 
control over or indeed any contact with their deputies. Business between them 
was increasingly handled by brokers, who charged a commission, for instance for 
obtaining the services of a deputy who was often merely the highest bidder for the 
appointment. Finally, patentees were usually well able to defend their privileges 
and profits against any complaints. They were often supported and defended by the 
relevant minister or governmental institution that had supported their appointment 
and had a vested interest in defeating colonial attempts to have patentees removed 
or controlled. Thus, the Lords of the Admiralty, who appointed Vice-Admiralty 
judges and court officials in the colonies, and the Commissioners of Customs who 
appointed customs officers there, could be relied on to support their appointees 
against gubernatorial censure.104
However, growing opposition in the course of the eighteenth century increasingly 
focused on the abuses inherent in the system such as the appointment of non-resident, 
absent patentee officers and the tendency of patent officers and their deputies to 
demand excessive fees for their services.
The first reaction to complaints and the first steps towards reform came in the 
form of the Colonial Leave of Absence Act, 1782.105 It provided that every holder 
of a colonial office conferred by royal Letters Patent had to reside in the colony 
and perform his duties in person, unless he received leave of absence, which had 
to be granted by the governor of the colony.106 However, the Act applied only 
Great Seal of England” and therefore governed by the common law (at 2500, 311). In rejecting 
the defence’s contention that “[t]he solicitation to take money for an office in the colonies, is no 
offence”, and finding for the Crown that such an attempt was a misdemeanour at common law and 
punishable as such, Lord Mansfield thought (ibid) that even “[i]f these transactions are believed 
to be frequent, it is time to put a stop to them. A minister trusted by the King to recommend fit 
persons to offices would betray that trust, and disappoint that confidence, if he should secretly take 
a bribe for that recommendation”. See, also, eg, Blankard v Galdy (1793) 4 Mod 215 and 222, 87 
ER 356 and 359; (1794) Holt KB 341, 90 ER 1089; (1795) 2 Salk 411, 91 ER 356, concerning the 
purchase of the office of provost-marshal in Jamaica and the inapplicability of English statutes 
prohibiting such an act.
104 Parry (n 98) at 205.
105 22 Geo III c 75. It is also known as Lord Shelburne’s Act; he was secretary of state at the time (see 
n 38 above).
106 Section 1 prevented the granting “in future” of any “Patent Office” to be exercised in any Crown 
colony for any longer term than during such time as the grantee or appointee discharged the duty 
concerned in person and behaved well in it. It referred to the practice of “granting offices in 
colonies to persons residing and intending to reside in Britain that had long been complained of 
in the colonies as causing inconveniences from a neglect of duty”. In terms of s 2, if the patentee 
was wilfully absent without leave or neglected the duties of his office, the governor was permitted 
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prospectively107 and excepted patents already issued. It was resented by those who 
could benefit by the system; loopholes were soon found108 and the Act was rendered 
practically ineffective. 
Consequently, the colonial patent office system expanded greatly during the last 
decades of the eighteenth and first decade of the nineteenth century. It had become an 
important political tool, frequently used to thank supporters and loyal party members. 
It was therefore, not surprisingly, increasingly the system’s financial implications 
and its burden on public funds, rather than the abuses linked to it or its administrative 
inefficiency, which became the focus of those intent on reforming it.
In 1821, the Red Book109 estimated that the value of sinecures in the colonies 
amounted to nearly ₤100 000 per annum, “exclusive of those in the Cape of Good 
Hope, the Isle of France and Malta, which probably amount to as much more”.
It was also on the grounds of financial concerns that the first effective attack on 
colonial patent offices was launched.110 The House of Commons Select Committee 
on Public Expenditure of the United Kingdom, appointed in 1806, produced a series 
of reports. Its third report of 1807 dealt with offices, places, sinecures and pensions,111 
but only in the United Kingdom itself.112 This and the other reports caused the House 
of Commons to pass a series of resolutions calling for the abolition or reduction of 
such sinecures, although regard was to be had to existing interests. It set up a further 
select committee to consider what offices came within the purview of its resolutions.
This select committee, the Select Committee on Sinecure Offices, was again 
chiefly concerned with such offices in the United Kingdom itself. However, it 
to remove him.
107 Section 4 made it clear that nothing in the Act “shall operate to the prejudice of any subsisting 
Grant of such Office or Offices”.
108 For instance, appointments were made otherwise than by the specifically mentioned Letters Patent 
(eg, by the seal of the colony) so that they were not covered by the Act, or some high authority in 
London simply ordered the governor to grant the patentee leave of absence.
109 See (n 101) at vii.
110 The attack on sinecures in the political system, begun by Whigs in order to undermine the Tory 
King in the 1780s, eventually succeeded through the quite unobtrusive efforts of Tory governments 
in the nineteenth century (see Bourne (n 83) at 19-21 for considerable detail on the suppression of 
sinecures).
111 House of Commons Select Committee on Public Expenditure, Third Report (1807). This and all 
the other Parliamentary Papers referred to below are accessible online at http://0-parlipapers.
chadwyck.co.uk.
112 It reported on various forms of patronage. It referred, at various places in its report to, eg, “an 
ambiguous and middle class, partaking in the nature of Pensions, in as much as no service is 
performed, but still ranking under the head of Offices, from the name of official business having 
been continued after the functions are become extinct and obsolete”, that is, the appointed official 
was still remunerated although the functions and office had become obsolete. Such sinecures, it 
pointed out, were given as pensions (“to secure a honourable retreat”), or as an accompaniment to 
a peerage for the reward of personal service, and were difficult to distinguish from offices “such 
as are wholly or chiefly executed by Deputy”.
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also heard evidence concerning patent offices in the colonies and had before it the 
voluminous returns of those offices sent by colonial governors in accordance with 
instructions issued in 1808. This Committee’s first report, in 1810,113 mentioned the 
colonies in passing and observed that despite the residential requirement of the Act 
of 1782, the duties attached to many offices continued to be performed wholly by 
deputy. The patentees, it observed, “enjoy perfect sinecures”.114
This Committee’s second report, in 1811,115 contained more detail on colonial 
patent offices, and on116 colonial officers appointed by the Admiralty, most of 
whose duties were performed by deputy. These included, in the various colonial 
Vice-Admiralty courts, seventeen registrars and fourteen marshals,117 most of 
whose duties were performed by deputies. The exact amount of their salaries or 
emoluments, which stemmed from fees and thus depended on the quantity of 
business transacted in the courts,118 was unknown but, the Committee pointed out, 
it was clearly more than enough to remunerate the persons performing the duties of 
the office. The committee’s third report, in 1812,119 contained further detail on the 
about 100 colonial patent offices, many of which, including some important ones, 
were served by deputies.120
Although the evidence before the Select Committee on Sinecure Offices 
afforded the first clear and detailed account of the way in which the patent office 
system operated, the Committee did not recommend any specific action on colonial 
patent offices. However, its reports did draw public attention to the many abuses of 
the system, in particular the repeated evasions of the Act of 1782.
In 1814, after earlier failed attempts in 1812 and 1813, legislation was eventually 
passed to address the issue. The Public Offices in Colonies Act, 1814121 sought 
to address the loopholes in the Act of 1782. First, it required the occupants of all 
colonial offices, in whatever way granted, to reside in the colonies concerned.122 
Next, it restricted and controlled the power of colonial governors to grant leave 
113 House of Commons, Select Committee on Sinecure Offices, First Report (1810).
114 Since the income of these colonial offices arose altogether from fees payable in the colonies, the 
matter was not regarded as within the Committee’s scope, which was aimed at reducing public 
expenditure in the United Kingdom, and it therefore did not make any recommendation to regulate 
or abolish them.
115 House of Commons, Second Report from the Select Committee on Sinecure Offices (1810-1811).
116 At 60.
117 See app 4 at 89-91.
118 I shall return to the information the report provided on the Cape Vice-Admiralty Court shortly (see 
n 132 below).
119 House of Commons, Third Report from the Select Committee on Sinecure Offices (1812).
120 The information on officers of Vice-Admiralty courts abroad contained in app 5 to the third report 
is essentially the same as that contained in app 4 to the second report.
121 54 Geo III c 61.
122 Section 1 referred to offices “granted, either by Patent under the Great Seal, or by Commission 
under His majesty’s Sign Manual, or by any other Commission, Warrant or Instrument”.
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of absence by requiring governors, under threat of a financial penalty, to report on 
any leave granted to the secretary of state, who then had to confirm it.123 It also 
required annual reports to be laid before the House of Commons on persons holding 
offices in the colonies who had been appointed after the passing of the Act but who 
were not present there to carry out their duties.124 However, this Act too applied 
only prospectively and did not affect patent office holders appointed before it was 
passed.125
These strengthened measures ensured the proper enforcement, for the first time, 
of the requirement that colonial officials reside in the relevant colony and work 
for a living themselves. So successful was it that the patent office system almost 
disappeared from colonial appointments in the twenty years following its passage. 
No fresh patents of the old type were issued, and as existing patent holders died, the 
successors appointed had to carry out their duties in person. Nevertheless, appointees 
were still usually remunerated by fees rather than by fixed salaries.
In 1817, the Select Committee on Finance,126 investigating the United Kingdom’s 
income and expenditure and ways in which the latter could be reduced without any 
detriment to the public interest, referred to sinecures and the costs incurred “by 
the continuance of Offices, either wholly useless, or the Salaries of which appear 
disproportionate to their actual duties”. In respect of colonial offices, it observed 
that it possessed insufficient information to be able to present a full picture.127 
Nevertheless, it thought that the general principles applicable in dealing with them 
appeared to be, first, enforcing the principal’s residence and personal performance, 
and secondly, reducing remuneration to an amount that was fair and sufficient for the 
performance of services in the office.
In the years 1833, 1834, and 1835, further select committees were appointed to 
report on progress in the abolition of sinecures, in both the United Kingdom and the 
colonies. The first report128 foresaw the imminent and natural end of the system. In 
the next year, it was recommended129 that although very few patentees survived, the 
123 Sections 2 and 3.
124 Section 4.
125 Section 5.
126 House of Commons, First Report from the Select Committee on Finance (1817).
127 For instance, on the value of such colonial offices, it pointed out that in some cases this depended 
on fluctuating fees, while for others there were incomplete returns. However, the Committee 
estimated the annual income then derived from such offices at between ₤90 000 and ₤100 000.
128 House of Commons, Report of Select Committee on Sinecure Offices (1833).
129 House of Commons, Report from Select Committee on Sinecure Offices; with Minutes of Evidence 
and Appendix (1834). Interesting, given the topic of this article, are the observations in this report 
(at 5-6) on the office of marshal of the Admiralty Court in England. The office, it appeared, was 
held by the then possessor under a grant during the pleasure of the Crown, while its duties, both 
of a constant and important nature, were almost entirely discharged by deputy. The Committee 
recommended that the office be immediately revised and the marshal be required to perform his 
duties in person. The remuneration from the marshal’s office was derived from fees and varied 
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abolition of existing patent offices and the provision of a pension for official services 
in lieu of sinecures should be considered. The figures provided in the last report,130 
as in the earlier ones, clearly highlighted the demise of the colonial patent office 
system. In 1812, of seventy-one offices in the colonies, some were sinecures and 
in others, deputies performed the duties. By 1835, twenty-four had been abolished, 
thirty had been remodelled and new arrangements made, one was vacant and new 
arrangements for it were contemplated, and of the remainder, none of which was in 
any Vice-Admiralty court, only four were held by persons not resident in the relevant 
colony.
Thus, the system of colonial patent offices came to an end, and was replaced 
by a professional colonial service, staffed by salaried men who devoted themselves 
fully to colonial administration.
5 O’Bryen’s appointment as Admiralty marshal at the 
Cape
Denis O’Bryen’s appointment as marshal of the Vice-Admiralty Court at the Cape of 
Good Hope in 1806 was therefore a patent office appointment. Throughout the period 
during which he held the office, until his death in 1832, O’Bryen never visited, let 
alone resided at, the Cape,131 but a succession of deputies performed the duties of the 
office. This much appears from various official sources, as well as from O’Bryen’s 
own accounts.
As far as the former are concerned, the second report by the Select Committee 
on Sinecure Offices132 in 1811 contains, in an appendix,133 a list of colonial offices to 
which appointments had been made by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 
with an indication of whether the duties involved were performed personally or by 
deputy. In respect of the Cape, there is reference to “Dennis O’Bryen, Gentleman, 
Marshal, appointed 24 Nov 1806”.134 There is no entry for him under the heading 
from year to year, sometimes falling short of a reasonable annual salary and at other times greatly 
exceeding that standard. It recommended that the marshal receive a fixed salary on a scale not 
more than adequate to ensure the discharge of the duties of the office by a competent person, and 
that the fees collected be paid over to a government fund. From an appendix (at 11) it appears 
that the “marshal and serjeant-at-mace of the Admiralty Court” referred to was Hugh Lindsay, 
appointed in 1815, and that the emoluments he derived from his office in 1833 amounted to 
₤1 200, subject to the remuneration to be given to his deputy.
130 Report from the Select Committee on Sinecure Offices [in the Colonies and into returns ordered in 
1834]; with the minutes of evidence (1835).
131 Even though Philip (n 9) at 307 refers to him as being a British resident there.
132 See n 115 above.
133 Appendix 4 at 89-91.
134 Also listed – as Admiralty appointees – are the Earl of Caledon (as Vice Admiral), Winchcombe 
Henry Hartley (as judge, also giving details of his salary: see n 9 above), William Grey (registrar, 
in respect of whom alone there was an entry identifying the deputy who executed his office: see 
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“by whom [office] executed; and the names of the deputies, where known”, but that 
must be taken to mean that the relevant information was unknown to the Committee 
at the time, not that there was no deputy and that O’Bryen performed the duties 
personally.135
The Red Book published in 1821136 contains information on sinecure offices 
connected to the Cape. It mentions “Denis O’Brien” as “Marshal, Cape of Good 
Hope” [sic] and notes that his salary was “believed [to be] about ₤800”.137
More informative, though, are O’Bryen’s own explanations of his appointment. 
They provide some insight into the surrounding circumstances and his appreciation 
of the office, the duties it entailed and the benefits it conferred.
further n 174 below), George Kekewick (King’s advocate: see again n 11 above), and William 
David Jennings (King’s proctor, appointed in Jun 1809). The information contained in app 5 to 
the Committee’s third report a year later (see n 120 above) is identical, except that it mentioned 
that the office of King’s advocate at the Cape no longer appeared in the latest return. It was further 
noted that although the Committee had been informed that several of the office-holders listed were 
at the time resident in the UK, it did not know precisely how many were, because information 
on residence or non-residence was not required in the returns from the Office of the Admiralty, 
a further possible explanation the lack of information on O’Bryen mentioned below (in n 135).
135 A footnote explains that whether the various offices were executed by the principal or by a deputy 
was known only in the instances so noted in the appropriate column, which were ascertained from 
returns from the respective Vice-Admiralty courts, and which returns were only periodic.
136 See n 101 above.
137 Idem at 190. Earlier editions – 1 ed (1816) and 2 ed (1817) – made no mention of O’Bryen. 
Other holders of Cape sinecures (not all of whom were necessarily non-resident there) included 
in the 4 ed were: (1) T Peregrine Courtenay, MP, secretary to the Board of Control, receiving an 
estimated ₤750 in respect of the office of agent [in the UK] for the Cape (at 103); (2) F Dashwood, 
receiver general at the Cape, earning ₤4 000 (see also Philip (n 9) at 88-89, mentioning that 
Francis Dashwood was married to Lady Ann, the daughter of the seventh Earl of Lauderdale, 
had arrived at the Cape in 1797, was receiver of revenue 1807-1819, president of the Lombard 
Bank 1808-1814, and collector of customs at Cape Town from 1819) (at 109); (3) James Nagle, 
suppressed deputy commissary of the Cape, earning ₤100 (at 187); (4) Lord Charles Somerset, 
governor, who earned an estimated ₤14 000; (5) R Spencer, vaccinating surgeon (Philip (n 9) at 
397 has Richard Spencer as garrison surgeon at the Cape from 1806, surgeon to the governor’s 
household from 1808, and vaccinating surgeon from 1811 until he left the Cape in 1817) (at 220); 
(6) JA Truter, who earned ₤6 000 as Chief Justice and ₤4 000 as president of the Orphan Chamber 
(at 232); and (7) “Mr Zeerogel, storekeeper”, earning ₤1 500 (at 248). It must be borne in mind 
that the information contained in the Red Book was not always correct or complete. In respect of 
the last-mentioned appointment, eg, the reference is probably to Aegidius Benedictus Ziervogel 
(1762-1818), a Swedish immigrant, who was interpreter, translator and vendue master in the Cape 
Vice-Admiralty Court (and probably elsewhere too) from 1800 and again from 1807. He was 
the grandfather of EB (Egidius Benedictus) Watermeyer (1824-1867), later a judge in the Cape 
Supreme Court.
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From a letter138 to William Windham, at the time secretary of state for war and 
the colonies,139 written on 11 October 1806, some two months after his appointment 
in August as Admiralty marshal, it appears that O’Bryen was not quite satisfied and 
obliquely asked for a further or better appointment in addition to or instead of that 
one.
He addressed the letter to Windham, although he realised that he obviously had 
an “abundance of clients for the widest range of your possible patronage”. However, 
O’Bryen explained, the “peculiarities in my misfortune”, including the expenses 
incurred in services rendered to Fox and his party over a period of many years, as 
well as his advanced age (of fifty-one years) which militated against his seeking a 
fresh career and fortune, left him no choice but to make such a direct request.
In support of his request for what he termed “proper recompense”, O’Bryen 
referred in his letter to Fox’s favourable disposition towards him and to the fact that 
he had made the same request to Fox140 in February 1806. He pointed out, further, 
that “when Lord Howick gave me the office at the Cape” he had added that although 
Lord Grenville had nothing further to offer him at the time, as soon as something 
turned up he (O’Bryen) would have it.
As far as “the Marshalship of the Vice Admiralty Court at the Cape” was 
concerned, O’Bryen stressed that Lord Howick was aware that he was thankful for 
it, but “even his Lordship’s good will cannot make the office better than its nature 
admits”. The office, he pointed out, in time of peace offered little recompense and even 
in time of war its benefits were doubtful.141 A better, but probably still inadequate,142 
appointment, he ventured to suggest, was to “a sister but superior office in the same 
court, that of Registrar”, the income from which he had ascertained was greater.
138 This letter is included in app 1, item 2 at ii-viii in his Narrative, a pamphlet published around 1820 
(see n 155 below for further details).
139 Windham held the post briefly from Feb 1806 to Mar 1807 in Lord Grenville’s Whig government. 
Although he addressed his letter to Windham, O’Bryen suggested elsewhere (see app 4 at xviii-
xix in his Narrative) that it was aimed “generally at the ministerial survivors of Mr Fox”. He 
alluded in it to the fact that his repeated requests during the previous six months for an answer to 
his application had produced no response.
140 Also to others who, it seems, had forwarded the correspondence to Windham who had, in turn, 
asked O’Bryen to state his case. Fox, it should be remembered, died in Sep 1806.
141 O’Bryen was naturally aware that his income from the office depended on fees earned by the 
marshal and that the Vice-Admiralty Court’s main business consisted in the exercise of its prize 
jurisdiction.
142 He explained that even “if the office of Marshal, inferior in every way, to the Registrar, were equal 
to the latter in emolument”, which it was not, the prospect of getting rid of his financial burdens 
would not be good. The letter contains several references to his parlous financial state and to the 
fact that during the previous eight years his general body of creditors had “granted to me three 
suspensions of all claims”, something that had occurred through the intervention of Fox and with 
the promise that on the change of government his (O’Bryen’s) position would change for the 
better.
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Not having had a response to his earlier request, despite having been assured 
verbally that the matter would be settled soon, O’Bryen again wrote to Windham 
some months later, on 10 March 1807.143 He expressed himself “still in hope of 
a better sinecure appointment” and restated and expanded on his reasons for his 
request,144 and also offered to meet with Windham in person.
O’Bryen’s entreaties were to no avail. There were, it seems, other more 
meritorious or, probably, more influential candidates to be considered145 and, in any 
event, the Whigs were soon out of office.
An aspect of his appointment that clearly troubled O’Bryen was the low financial 
return from it and the perception held by others that it was in fact a rather lucrative 
position, at a time when he constantly had to fight off creditors. In a letter to colonel 
McMahon, secretary to the Prince of Wales, dated 8 March 1809,146 he wrote that “my 
patent office, given to me a few days before Mr Fox’s death – this grand provision for 
a life of service, characterized by Mr Fox as ‘admitting no competition on the score 
of merits’ – this valuable appointment that was to sweep away the accumulations of 
near thirty years difficulties and to be the source of solace in approaching age, has 
yielded to me, in all, from the first hour to this day, no less a sum than two hundred 
pounds”.
A further source of some importance in this regard is the evidence O’Bryen gave 
to the Select Committee on Sinecure Offices by way of a letter dated 31 March 1811 
in response to questions the committee had sent him a few days before.147 In a general 
introductory statement, O’Bryen explained that for his services to the government, 
he had “received in 1806, towards a compensation”, the office of Marshal of the 
Vice-Admiralty Court at the Cape, and then somewhat sarcastically continued that 
although he had never foreseen that he would be “over-hauled for my treasures 
hence”, he would nevertheless “in respectful obedience” answer the questions posed.
His answers seem to indicate that O’Bryen had but an imprecise idea of the 
nature of the office to which he had been appointed, but was fully informed of its 
financial implications. Questioned on the duties of the Admiralty marshal at the 
Cape, he merely replied that they were the same as, but of a lesser extent than, those 
143 This letter is included in app 1, item 3 at viii-ix in his Narrative (see n 155 below).
144 He referred again to Lord Howick’s statement on 12 Aug 1806 that as soon as Lord Grenville had 
something to give, he would give it to him (O’Bryen), a statement that was made on the very day 
after his Lordship had nominated him to the office of Admiralty marshal at the Cape and when he 
was engaged in sending him his thanks. He also mentioned a remark by Lord Grenville that (the 
by then seriously ill) Fox’s mind should be freed from uneasiness on the score of O’Bryen as soon 
as possible.
145 In May 1807, the office of registrar of the Cape Vice-Admiralty Court was granted to William 
Grey (see further nn 134 above and 176 below).
146 It is included in Arthur Aspinall (ed) The Correspondence of George, Prince of Wales, 1770-1812 
vol 6 (London, 1971) at 371. I thank David O’Shaughnessy for this reference.
147 The questions and O’Bryen’s answers are included as app 5 at xx-xxiii in his Narrative (n 155 
below).
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of the marshal of the Admiralty Court in Doctors’ Commons. He explained that his 
health, age and private affairs did not allow him to perform any of the duties in 
person, but that he had availed himself of the power, expressly vested in him by his 
patent, of providing “a capable deputy”. He stressed that that diminished “my own 
possible gains by a proportionate remuneration to my substitute”. He had appointed 
his deputy himself and in reply to the question whether the appointment had been 
approved by anyone, he merely and, as will appear, quite prophetically, explained 
that the nature of this appointment made it probable that the Court “would disapprove 
of an incompetent delegate”. In reply to the question whether he or his deputy had 
any custody of public money or records, O’Bryen could do no more than respond 
that he was not aware that any such custody constituted any part of the duties of the 
office, with the exception of records of the office business. Finally, he indicated that 
the deputy had given him security for the faithful execution of his deputation, but 
that he himself had never been asked to give any security.
In regard to the income earned from his office, he stated that neither he nor, as 
far as he knew, his deputy had ever received one shilling “under the name of salary” 
as the office did not come with a salary148 and he was given to understand “that in 
peace it is not worth one farthing”.
The total amount of all the emoluments he had received in the nearly five 
years since his appointment in August 1806, was ₤2 193 16s 3d, of which half had 
been retained by his deputy.149 The emoluments of his office, he explained further, 
arose entirely from naval captures and not a shilling came from any other source. 
In addition, the capture of Mauritius in 1810 and the prospect of a Vice-Admiralty 
court being established there would ensure that his “office necessarily becomes in 
most strict and liberal sense of the designation, an office sine cura”.
On 12 October 1820, at the time when he faced widely reported criminal charges 
of conspiracy150 that had drawn no doubt unwelcome attention to himself, O’Bryen 
felt obliged to write a letter to the press correcting certain impressions created by 
earlier reports. One of these was that he held, or had held, “a sinecure place under 
the present government”.151 “The only office which I possess”, O’Bryen explained, 
“is a colonial appointment, conferred upon me more than 14 years since by Lord 
148 The income to be derived from it depended on the fees collected by the marshal, or his deputy, in 
the performance of his duties.
149 He pointed out that if the regulations introduced into the Admiralty Court in London (unjustifiably, 
in his view) had been in force during the whole period of his Cape appointment, he would have 
received less than ₤700. He further observed that the rights and perquisites of which his office had 
(contrary to the practice of all other Vice-Admiralty courts) been stripped, had been claimed by 
his representatives at the Cape, but whether anything would come of that claim depended on the 
outcome of litigation. I could find no evidence of any such litigation.
150 See, further, n 164 below.
151 See 12 Oct 1820 The Times at 3; the same letter had also appeared the previous day in the Morning 
Chronicle (see app 2 at ix-x of his Narrative (n 155) below).
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[Howick] (when his Lordship was First Lord of the Admiralty), at the instance of 
Mr Fox”.
However, the attacks continued.
In a reply to this letter the following day,152 one Charles Pearson153 seemed to 
suggest that O’Bryen’s denial of holding a sinecure office was misleading. “As the 
place alluded to is a most lucrative situation, and as, if there are any duties belonging 
to it, they are, or ought to be, performed at the Cape of Good Hope – and as Mr Denis 
O’Bryen has enjoyed the benefits of the appointment for 14 years, and has not, I 
believe, been ever near the Cape – I should have conceived myself justified in calling 
the situation a sinecure place”. Nevertheless, he then sarcastically begged O’Bryen’s 
pardon for calling him a “sinecurist” and sought to correct his “error” by admitting 
that “he fully earns all that he receives”.
On 17 October 1820, there was a personal attack on O’Bryen in the House of 
Commons,154 again because of his pending conspiracy trial. In response O’Bryen, 
perceiving his social and political standing to have been damaged, resorted to his pen 
and to publication. By the end of November there appeared, in a severely limited run 
of only six copies, “further circulation ... [to] depend upon circumstances”, a pamphlet 
entitled A Narrative by Mr Denis O’Bryen, in consequence of the attack made upon 
him by the Hon HG Bennett, in the House of Commons. For present purposes I need 
only focus on the two observations in it on his patent office appointment. O’Bryen 
explained that a few days after the death of Fox, on 13 September 1806, a political 
adversary but personal well-wisher of his in Pitt’s administration “stated his regret 
at my position; warned me of certain disappointment from my post at the Cape; and 
advised me to ask for a particular situation which he described, being in the patronage 
of the Colonial Secretary of State”.155 This explains, therefore, his correspondence to 
Windham referred to earlier. Elsewhere156 he refers again rather disparagingly to “my 
mockery of an office at the Cape” that he had wished to exchange for “something 
efficient”.
152 See 13 Oct 1820 The Times at 3.
153 Who was involved as “the attorney in the cause” in the prosecution of O’Bryen for conspiracy 
(see n 164 below).
154 By Henry Grey Bennett (1777-1836), an active and radical Whig MP who was at the time involved 
in the Whig opposition’s planned campaign against civil list expenditures and had obtained details 
of pensions and other benefits so granted. “He pointed to ministerial involvement in sanctioning 
the scurrilous letters and publications of Denis O’Bryen and others [Franklin] on the queen 
[Caroline]”: see http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volumme/1820-1832 (accessed 26 Jun 
2014). For an account of the debate, see, further, House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers, 
Hansard 2nd Ser vol 3 cols 757-783.
155 At 21.
156 At 47.
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Even in the year before his death, O’Bryen was still bitter about his appointment. 
In a letter in August 1831, he again observed that it had “turned out to be a mere 
mockery”.157
Clearly, then, O’Bryen’s patent office appointment as marshal of the Vice-
Admiralty Court at the Cape was a great disappointment to him. He had expected, 
and had been led to believe, that he would receive something worth much more, an 
expectation no doubt supported as much by his own evaluation of the services he had 
rendered to the Whigs as by his always-dire financial situation. The fact that he had 
to defend this disappointment publicly only added insult to injury.
6 O’Bryen’s later life
A recurring theme throughout his life was Denis O’Bryen’s continuous financial 
distress. He perpetually struggled to escape from the clutches of creditors and by 1806 
had already done so on three occasions.158 In 1811 the Whig party had to provide him 
with financial relief159 and in 1814 he appears to have landed in the Fleet insolvent 
debtors’ Prison.160 In May 1832, only a few months before his death, O’Bryen was 
again in court as a debtor. The newspaper report of his appearance describes him as 
someone who “had for many years been in the employment of Government” and 
who had received up to the last quarter of the Duke of Wellington’s administration,161 
₤1 400 a year, and from that time ₤500 a year, but who was now unable to account 
for the manner in which he had disposed of his property.162
O’Bryen continued to be indirectly involved in politics and a supporter of the 
Whig cause,163 not always without serious consequences.
In February 1821 O’Bryen, together with one Franklin, was charged with 
conspiracy.164 The charge involved the production and display of seditious handbills 
157 See a letter dated 31 Aug 1831 to Lord Grey, BL Add MSS 51592 fols 53-54, referred to by 
O’Shaughnessy (n 3) n 13.
158 See n 142 above.
159 See n 53 above.
160 See the Fleet Prison returns to the House of Commons of 29 Jun 1814 where the name of “Denis 
O’Bryen” appears in a list of fees (being a “[c]opy of the printed table of fees hung up in the said 
prison”) paid, since 10 Jul 1813, in the Fleet Prison by any person who at the time of the payment 
was confined there: see (1813-1814) House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers (320).
161 Wellington’s administration resigned in 1830.
162 See 24 May 1832 The Times at 4. The report states that although there was some suspicion that a 
solicitor, Lomax, who had married O’Bryen’s niece, had benefited from his connection with the 
insolvent, that could not be proved, nor could the insolvent’s assertion that he had been the victim 
of a conspiracy.
163 See, eg, 4 Mar 1819 The Times at 3.
164 Details of the trial appear from George Henry Borrow Celebrated Trials, and Remarkable Cases 
of Criminal Jurisprudence: From the Earliest Records to the Year 1825 vol 6 (London, 1825) at 
435-443. For further information, see 2 Oct 1820 The Times at 3; 13 Oct 1820 The Times at 3; 18 
Oct 1820 The Times at 3 (an editorial); 19 Oct 1820 The Times at 4; 28 Oct 1820 The Times at 3; 
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in 1818 and 1819. A warrant was obtained to search O’Bryen’s house and on the 
evidence obtained from a billsticker, a warrant for his arrest was issued on 17 
October 1820. Although he voluntarily appeared before a Bow Street magistrate 
on 18 October, O’Bryen was too ill to be questioned and the examination was 
postponed. After an indication that the charge against him might be dropped, the 
matter nevertheless proceeded and O’Bryen and Franklin were brought to trial on 21 
February 1821.165
While the production and posting of the treasonable placards and Franklin’s role 
were never in question, O’Bryen’s involvement was. His defence admitted that while 
O’Bryen was intimately acquainted with Franklin whom he had received at home, 
one could not infer the required guilt from that circumstance alone.166 Various public 
figures were then called on to testify to O’Bryen’s character.167 The jury speedily168 
returned a verdict of not guilty.
During the 1820s, O’Bryen remained a paid-up member of the Royal Society 
for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce.169 For most of the 
latter part of his life, he resided at various addresses in Craven Street in the Strand.170
30 Nov 1820 The Times at 2; 22 Feb 1821 The Times at 3 (an abbreviated law report: R v O’Bryen 
& Another); and 23 Feb 1821 The Times at 3 (the full law report).
165 O’Bryen was charged with “conspiracy to excite sedition and disaffection against the person and 
government of his late and present Majesty; and in order to effect such conspiracy, for having 
published divers seditious and treasonable handbills and placards, from the year 1818 to the present 
period” and “conspiracy to vilify and disgrace certain persons who have been distinguished as 
friends of her Majesty during the late proceedings”. Franklin was also charged with treason, but 
did not plead.
166 The evidence had simply not connected O’Bryen in any way with Franklin’s conduct nor had it 
established any involvement in the production and display of the handbills. Mere knowledge, 
or even possession, of the placards was not proof of the required guilt or of a guilty connection. 
Further, the defence pointed out that one of the placards produced in fact contained a “gross attack 
on the character” of that great statesman, the late Fox, and observed that the jury was quite aware 
“that Mr O’Bryen had, for a long time, been intimately connected with Mr Fox, and honoured 
with his friendship. He had been, and still was, on terms of intimate acquaintance with many 
eminent men, friends of that great man”.
167 These included the Duke of Bedford (John Russell, the sixth Duke of Bedford (1766-1839), 
Whig politician, MP for Tavistock 1788-1790, member of the “ministry of all talents” under 
Lord Grenville 1806-1807, and father of Prime Minister John Russell, the first Earl of Russell; 
Russell Square, WC1, was named after the earls and dukes of Bedford who owned the area in the 
eighteenth century); Lord Holland; Lord Erskine (see n 60 above); and Sir J Macintosh. However, 
these witnesses could only testify on their knowledge of O’Bryen as a member of the Whig party 
before 1806, “not having had any acquaintance with him for several years hence”.
168 They did not even leave the courtroom but merely “turned round in the box” and consulted 
together for a few moments.
169 As appears from its annual Transactions during this period, from (1821) vol 39 up to (1831-
1832) vol 48 where his name – “O’Bryen, Dennis, Esq, Craven-street” – appears in the list of 
contributing members.
170 For details, see GH Gater & EP Wheeler (eds) Survey of London; Volume 18: St Martin-in-the-
Fields; II: The Strand (London, 1937) at 27-39, ch 4: “Craven Street and Hungerford Lane”, 
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Ill171 and insolvent, Denis O’Bryen, in life nominally the marshal of the Vice-
Admiralty Court at the Cape of Good Hope, died at Margate on 13 August 1832 at 
the age of seventy-seven years. He is remembered not for his marshalship, but rather 
for his connection to Charles James Fox, one that ultimately brought him far less 
than he had expected and hoped for.172
7 Denis O’Bryen’s rival and his deputies
Despite his none too subtle suggestions, O’Bryen was not appointed to the other and 
more lucrative patent office vacant in the Cape Vice-Admiralty Court at the time, 
that of registrar. The reason, or at least one of the reasons, was that Lord Howick, 
who as First Lord of the Admiralty had appointed him to the office of marshal in 
August 1806, had someone else in mind, someone close to himself and therefore, 
no doubt, if not more deserving then at least more “appropriate” and “entitled” to 
appointment as registrar. That someone was his own younger brother, William.
Charles Grey (1763-1845) was known as Lord or Viscount Howick from April 
1806 to November 1807. On the death of his father, General Sir Charles Grey (1729-
1807), and as eldest surviving son, he inherited the earldom and became the second 
Earl Grey.173 He was a member of the prominent Scottish Grey family,174 which had 
several connections with the settlement at the Cape.
A younger brother of Charles and third son of Sir Charles, Henry George Grey 
(1766-1845), was commander of the British forces and lieutenant governor at the 
Cape from 1807.175 In May 1807, Charles Grey, Lord Howick, appointed another 
available at http://www.british-history.ac.uk (accessed 10 Apr 2014). In 1820, in a letter to The 
Times, O’Bryen referred to his “42 years’ residence in this street” (see 12 Oct 1820 The Times at 
3). He appears to have left his final residence (at no 21) shortly before his death (see 24 May 1832 
The Times at 4, referring to him as “late of Craven St”).
171 At the time of the final insolvency proceedings against him, he was reportedly in “a state of 
apparent imbecility” (see 24 May 1832 The Times at 4).
172 His obituary in the (Jul-Dec 1832) 152 pt 2 Gentleman’s Magazine & Historical Chronicle at 
188-189 referred to him merely as “an intimate friend of the Rt Hon J Fox”. O’Bryen’s political 
correspondence was sold by auction a year or two after his death and appears to have ended up all 
over the world. For instance, an undated but autographed letter from O’Bryen concerning his duel 
with Erskine (see n 59 above) is housed in the Special Collections of the Florida State University 
Libraries in Tallahassee, Fl (see http://fsuarchon.fcla.edu/inded (accessed 9 Apr 2014)).
173 See, again, n 81 above.
174 See, generally, for what follows, William Courthope (ed) Debrett’s Complete Peerage of the United 
Kingdom ... (London, 1839) at 172-173; Sir Egerton Brydges Collins’s Peerage of England ... vol 
5 (London, 1812) at 691-693; E Mackenzie An Historical, Topographical, and Descriptive View 
of the County of Northumberland ... 2 ed vol 1 (London, 1825) at 427-429; Paul David Nelson Sir 
Charles Grey, First Earl Grey: Royal Soldier, Family Patriarch (Madison, NJ, 1996) passim.
175 Henry George acted as governor from Jan to May 1807, before the arrival of the Earl of Caledon, 
and again from Jul, after Caledon’s departure from the settlement, until Sep 1811, when Grey 
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younger brother, William, to the office of registrar of the Vice-Admiralty Court at the 
Cape.176 William Grey (1777-1817), Sir Charles’s sixth son, a lieutenant colonel in 
the army by 1803,177 received his appointment as registrar from his elder brother in 
May 1807, such favouritism not going unnoticed, at least in later years.178
William Grey occupied the office of registrar until his death in August 1817. 
Throughout the period of his appointment as registrar,179 there was always a deputy 
at the Cape who performed his duties for him. The deputy registrar from 1807 to 
1813 was Henry Buckton,180 and from 1813 to 1817 it was George Cadogan, who 
after that became registrar until 1837.181
 returned to England (see, also, Philip (n 9) at 155). He should be distinguished from the unrelated 
Henry George Grey (1812-1898), governor of the Cape 1854-1861.
176 Another brother, Sir Charles’s fourth son, George (1767-1828), a flag captain in the Royal Navy 
1781-1804 and dockyard commissioner at Portsmouth for twenty-two years (1806-1828), was 
appointed marshal of the Vice-Admiralty Court at Barbados (see his obituary in (Jul-Sep 1828) 
144 Gentleman’s Magazine & Historical Chronicle at 371-372).
177 Nelson (n 174) at 152 observes that when only seventeen and already an army captain, William 
was created a naval officer of St Lucia through his father’s influence and manipulation, which he 
exercised to advance all his sons’ careers.
178 In The Spectator of 31 Dec 1831 at 35, in a piece entitled “Spectator’s anatomy of the peerage” 
“Table IV: General view of the distribution of public money and offices among the peerage and 
its connections” contains lists showing “how the country may be said to have been occupied by 
the Aristocracy” and how relatives and connections of peers have taken possession of public 
money and offices, “both laborious and sinecure”. The lists are stated to focus on “that patronage 
which emanates immediately from the Government”. Concerning Earl Grey’s family (at 39), 
“there have been in place” the father, Sir Charles Grey, governor of Guernsey; Sir George Grey, 
Commissioner of the Navy; Sir George Grey, Admiralty marshal of Barbados; and “the Hon W 
Grey, Principal Registrar of the Court of Admiralty, Cape of Good Hope”.
179 In several sources he is described as being the registrar 1807-1808 and then the “principal 
registrar” 1809-1817 (see, eg, the listings for the relevant years in the African Court Calendar) 
and it is possible that he may in fact have been resident here for the first period: see Philip (n 9) 
at 155 according to whom he “may have arrived on 21 May 1807 in the suit of Lord Caledon in 
HMS Antelope”.
180 Buckton was appointed a notary public, and deputy registrar and also (for a short period: see n 183 
below) deputy marshal and examiner of the Cape Vice-Admiralty Court in Jun 1807, and in Mar 
1810 he was appointed commissioner for appraisal and sale in the Court. In the second report of 
the Select Committee on Sinecure Offices (1811) (n 115 above), William Grey’s office as registrar 
is stated to be “executed by Henry Buckton as deputy”. Buckton returned to England in Mar 1814, 
but possibly not permanently as there is mention of a Henry Buckton as a proctor in the local 
Admiralty Court 1824-1835 and as acting procurator-general 1827-1835 (see Philip (n 9) at 45).
181 Cadogan is mentioned as a proctor in the Court 1809-1813. In Nov 1812, governor Cradock was 
instructed to recognise him as agent for American (prize) property at the Cape, but in Aug 1813 
he was still awaiting his formal commission (see n 19 above). He was appointed notary public at 
the Cape in Mar 1817 (and had been so appointed in England in 1809) and opened his office at 33 
Plein Street in partnership with Francis Lind (see Philip (n 9) at 49).
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What, then, may be said about Denis O’Bryen’s deputies at the Cape? Their 
brief story182 is an example, if any were required, of the defects in the colonial patent 
office system, at least in those cases where the appointee was not resident in the 
colony in question.
First there was Henry Buckton. Although deputy registrar of the Court, it 
appears that Buckton also acted as deputy marshal for a short period from June 
1807, maybe before O’Bryen could appoint someone to represent him at the Cape. 
He appears to have occupied the office until sometime in the following year,183 when 
Archibald William Blane became deputy marshal. Blane occupied various offices at 
the Cape,184 but will probably be best remembered for his role as deputy Admiralty 
marshal in the jurisdictional conflict that arose in the Rosalia matter in May 1808.
More interesting, and possibly the first deputy marshal appointed by O’Bryen 
himself, was William Bentinck. He, too, held various colonial offices in Cape Town 
and later became an influential figure in Cape affairs185 until his return to England on 
182 Background information about the appointments that follow were garnered from the entries of 
the personnel of the Vice-Admiralty Court under the headings “civil” or “judicial establishment” 
in the relevant issues of the African Court Calendar (1801-1826); the South African Almanack 
& Directory (1827-1839); the Cape of Good Hope Almanack & Annual Register (1840-1863); 
the Cape Town Directory (1865-1869); the General Directory of the Cape of Good Hope (1870-
c1900); as well as from the South African Commercial Advertiser (1824-1856).
183 There is a reference (in a letter from Cradock to Lord Bathurst 17 Apr 1814) to irregular occurrences 
that took place in Aug 1808, under the Caledon administration, “wherein the name of Mr Buckton, 
the Deputy Marshal of the Court, is strongly mentioned”, irregularities subsequently refuted by 
George Kekewich (see Theal RCC (n 5) vol 9 at 487-490 and n 12 above). Unless Buckton and his 
successor Blane’s (possibly temporary) appointments as deputy marshal overlapped (or rotated?), 
the date Aug 1808 may be wrong, given Blane’s involvement in the Rosalia matter in May 1808.
184 Blane arrived in Dec 1807, was immediately appointed as a clerk in the colonial secretary’s office, 
took the oath as a sworn translator in Feb 1808 (see Theal RCC (n 5) vol 22 at 451-452), and was 
appointed in that capacity to the Court of Appeals in Feb 1811. He was also collector of stamp 
duties from May 1811. Blane left the Cape for Mauritius (where he occupied several governmental 
posts including those of collector of customs and government secretary: see, eg, idem vol 21 at 
268) and thence moved to New South Wales where he became deputy governor of the Australian 
Agricultural Co. He died in Nov 1852, aged sixty-two years at Booral, Port Stephens (see Philip 
(n 9) at 32; “Blane, AW” at http://thepeerage.com (accessed 22 May 2014); and his obituary in 
17 Nov 1852 Maitland Mercury and Hunter River General Advertiser, NSW, available at http://
trove.nla.gov.au (accessed 22 May 2014)).
185 Bentinck arrived at the Cape from London in Dec 1808 (Theal RCC (n 5) vol 21 at 401) and 
served as auditor of accounts, later auditor-general, from that time (he was absent on leave for 
an extended period from 1812) until at least the end of 1827 (see idem vol 6 at 318 and vol 35 at 
25). He was also the second member of the Council of Justice from Aug 1814 (see I Farlam “The 
origin of the Cape Bar” (Apr 1988) Consultus 36), and a member of the governor’s Advisory 
Council from 1825 (see Theal RCC (n 5) vol 21 at 184-185). See, further, Philip (n 9) at 25.
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pension in January 1833.186 Bentinck served as deputy marshal in the Vice-Admiralty 
Court from 1809 until 1812.187
The last but most controversial of the four deputy marshals during O’Bryen’s 
tenure was William James Birkwood. He was appointed to the office in March 1812 
and as from 1815 was simultaneously the clerk to the collector of customs. This 
eventually caused problems for both Birkwood188 and his principal in London, Denis 
O’Bryen.
In 1820, a shortfall was discovered in the public revenue “owing to the 
misconduct and peculation” of “Mr W Birkwood, a clerk in the office of the 
Collector of Customs”.189 Birkwood was prosecuted before the Council of Justice at 
186 In Jun 1827, on being offered an (a further?) appointment?) as auditor-general at the Cape (at 
a much reduced salary), Bentinck, then “[o]f all the civil officers sent out from England ... the 
servant of the longest standing at the Cape establishment” (Theal RCC (n 5) vol 31 at 442-443), 
replied (from London) that his state of health was such that he could not accept. He had held the 
position for nineteen years and had also been a member of the Council of Justice (which was about 
to be abolished) for thirteen years, and a member of the Advisory Council since its establishment. 
He therefore expressed the wish to retire. His request was granted and he retired on pension 
(idem vol 32 at 14 and 36; Montgomery Martin (n 48) at 130, mentioning that Bentinck, the “late 
Auditor-General”, received a pension of £500 in 1832).
187 An interesting aside to Bentinck is that he fathered illegitimate twins, Walter and Portland 
Bentinck, born 9 Dec 1815 (see “Walter Bentinck” http://www.southafricansettlers.com (accessed 
23 May 2014); VC Malherbe “In onecht verwekt: Law, custom and illegitimacy in Cape Town, 
1800-1840” (2005) 31 J of Southern African Studies 163-185 at 174). Walter jnr died shortly 
after birth while Portland was adopted by a local merchant Francis Shortt (himself an interesting 
and controversial figure as partner in the shipping firm Shortt & Berry (see, further, Philip (n 
9) at 380 on his Cape business activities and on the partners’ subsequent fate in Australia; see 
Barry John Bridges Aspects of the Career of Alexander Berry, 1781-1873 (DPhil thesis, Univ of 
Wollongong, (1992)). Portland (“Polly”) Bentinck, surnamed Shortt (1815-1885), settled outside 
Pietermaritzburg in Natal on a farm called Shortts’ Retreat in the 1840s. The farm became an 
overnight stop on the ox-wagon route to Durban and became known as Polly Shortt’s Place. It 
is still well known to South Africans as “Polly Shortts”, a famous landmark on the Comrades 
marathon route (see the rather confusing description by Anne Lehmkuhl of the Comrades 
marathon and the Shortt family in http://archiver.rootsweb.ancestry.com (accessed 2 May 2014)). 
Francis Shortt should be distinguished from the Scottish military physician Thomas Shortt who 
was on St Helena at the time of Napoleon’s death, attended his post-mortem autopsy in 1821 and 
drew up the official autopsy report on the cause of his death (see Ben Weider & Sten Forshufvud 
Assassination at St Helena Revisited (New York, 1995) at 231, 321, 386 and 395, and Arnold 
Chaplin A St Helena Who’s Who, or a Directory of the Island during the Captivity of Napoleon 
(London, 1919) at 126).
188 On Birkwood, see Philip (n 9) at 28. On occasion he is referred to as Berkwood. Thus, the Vice-
Admiralty Court’s mandate, dated Mar 1821, which was addressed by registrar Cadogan to 
“William James Berkwood Esquire, Deputy Marshal of the Vice Admiralty Instance Court at the 
Cape of Good Hope”, authorised him to serve a copy of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court 
on the captain of an East Indiaman suspected of having breached navigation and customs laws 
(see Theal RCC (n 5) vol 13 at 425-426 and 455-456).
189 There had been similar problems in that office before, eg in 1808 when a customs official had 
retained and used for the settlement of his private accounts, money collected as customs duties 
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the instance of the collector of customs Charles Blair190 and was ordered to render 
an account and vouchers for the deficiency. The order was confirmed by the Court of 
Appeals in January 1822, but in September 1825 when he had not complied with it, 
Birkwood was condemned by the Council to civil imprisonment, with a view to the 
final resolution of “this long outstanding Case”.191
Earlier Earl Bathurst, the secretary of state for war and the colonies, had called 
on Blair to make up the deficiency. Blair requested a delay so that governor Somerset 
could explain what had happened. It was also pointed out that it was uncertain 
whether the security he was required to provide to the amount of the deficiency 
could be furnished.192
Blair also wrote an explanatory “Memorial” to the Treasury in August 1826193 
in which he pointed out that he was being called on to make good a shortfall that 
arose from the delinquency of a clerk he had not nominated or appointed. He did not 
after an express order to pay it in (see Basil James Trewin Leverton “Government finance and 
political development in the Cape 1806-1834” in (1961) Archives Year Book for South African 
History 291-359 at 313-314).
190 Blair was appointed collector of customs in Dec 1808 and served in that capacity and as port 
captain and harbour master until 1820 (see Philip (n 9) at 30-31). Blair himself was not above 
shady dealings and was in 1825 implicated by the Commission of Enquiry into the Cape in the 
exploitation for personal gain of the system of “apprenticing” and distributing among colonists 
the slaves “liberated” from slave ships condemned as prize by the Vice-Admiralty Court. Between 
Dec 1808 and Dec 1816, twenty-seven ships were thus arrested and brought before the Vice-
Admiralty Court and more than 2 100 slaves were indentured as apprentices by Blair as collector 
of customs (see, further, Christopher Saunders “Liberated Africans in [the] Cape colony in the 
first half of the nineteenth century” (1985) 18 International J of African Historical Studies 223-
239 at 224 and 226-227; Theal RCC (n 5) vol 19 at 273 and 279).
191 See the letter written on 8 Sep 1825 by the governor Lord Charles Somerset to Earl Bathurst 
(Theal RCC (n 5) vol 23 at 49-50).
192 See the letter by acting (from Mar 1826-Sep 1828) governor major-general Richard Bourke to 
Earl Bathurst, 11 Aug 1826 (idem vol 27 at 255-256), pointing out that it was uncertain whether 
on Blair’s death any personal security would be available and that a stoppage of his salary, for 
which authority of the Treasury would be required, would be the only way to provide security. In 
another letter, dated 4 Aug 1826, Bourke had explained to Sir Richard Plasket, secretary to the 
government, that on leaving the colony for England (before Bathurst’s letter arrived), Somerset 
had acquainted himself with every circumstance connected with the matter in order to fully 
explain Blair’s position to both Bathurst and the Lords Commissioner of the Treasury on his 
arrival in London (idem vol 27 at 256-257).
193 See idem vol 27 at 257-258. Blair pointed out that on arrival after his appointment as Collector of 
Customs at the Cape in 1808, he had found a clerk and cashier “fixed as part of the establishment”. 
On the death of that officer, the colonial government had named a successor, and on his retirement, 
it had appointed James Birkwood in April 1815. In November 1819, Birkwood admitted to Blair 
that there was a shortfall in the cash received from custom dues, in an as yet undetermined amount. 
Blair then immediately requested a special accountant to examine the books of the Customs House 
and to report on the amount of the deficiency. This investigation revealed that Birkwood had paid 
in less than he had collected and received; and that the deficiency amounted to 15 098 rixdollars, 
4 skillings and 3 stivers in Cape currency.
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consider himself obliged to do so, and the opinions of three eminent counsel (one of 
whom was the solicitor-general) confirmed his “irresponsibility”. In this he was fully 
supported by the colonial government.194
Birkwood himself was dismissed from his customs office by a notice in the 
Cape Gazette on 19 November 1819, and someone else was appointed in his place.
That caused a problem for the colonial government, however, for Birkwood 
still held the office of deputy marshal of the Vice-Admiralty Court. The governor 
approached the Admiralty judge, George Kekewich, concerning the damage that 
might be done to the Court’s name if it retained Birkwood in its employment.195
However, Kekewich realised that the crux of the problem was that Birkwood 
had not been appointed by the Court. He explained “that the Office of Marshal is 
a patent appointment and that by that Patent the Marshal possesses the sole Power 
of appointing his deputy”. In these circumstances, he did not consider himself 
competent to remove an officer from the Court in which he presided and “against 
whom there exists no charge of delinquency”.196
This left the local government in a quandary. Even if it believed that Birkwood 
ought to be removed as deputy marshal, it did not wish to interfere with the Vice-
Admiralty Court “whose freedom from the control of this Government appears 
to have been recognized by the opinion of the Attorney General contained in [a] 
despatch to Lord Caledon” as long ago as March 1808. It was also not clear whether 
the colonial government itself could suspend the deputy appointed by the holder of a 
patent office, and if so in what circumstances.197 It accordingly informed Kekewich in 
August 1826198 that it had referred the matter to London for advice and instructions.
Some months later, in June 1827, the secretary of state replied that the Lord High 
Admiral, when the matter was referred to him, had ordered Birkwood’s dismissal 
from his office of deputy marshal of the Vice-Admiralty Court at the Cape of Good 
194 Thus, on 17 Nov 1826, with reference to a letter from Bathurst enquiring whether he wanted to 
make any representation on Blair’s liability to make good the shortfall, governor Somerset replied 
that he had the strongest grounds for considering Blair to be “a gentleman of the most rigid honour 
and integrity” and that the deficit in question had “occurred solely from the dishonesty of a man 
who had the art to obtain Blair’s fullest confidence which he basely betrayed” (idem vol 28 at 
329-330).
195 See the letter of 22 Aug 1826 from Richard Plasket, government secretary, to Kekewich (idem vol 
27 at 332) and the letter of 6 Sep 1826 from major-general Richard Bourke, acting governor, to 
Earl Bathurst (idem vol 27 at 330-331).
196 See the letter of 24 Aug 1826 from Kekewich to government secretary Sir Richard Plasket (idem 
vol 27 at 332). From this, it is not clear whether Kekewich would have removed Birkwood if there 
had been a charge.
197 See the letter of 6 Sep 1826 from major-general Richard Bourke, acting governor, to Earl Bathurst 
(idem vol 27 at 330-331). Bourke stressed, however, that in the Cape colony it would be “peculiarly 
inexpedient to retain a defaulter in the public service”.
198 See the letter of 31 Aug 1826 from Plasket to Kekewich (idem vol 27 at 333).
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Hope.199 In London the Admiralty informed the Colonial Office accordingly,200 and 
later also informed it “that it appears by a communication from the Marshal of the 
Vice-Admiralty Court at the Cape of Good Hope [ie, from Denis O’Bryen], that he 
will as soon as practicable dismiss Mr Birkwood from his office of Deputy Marshal 
of that Court, and appoint another in his room”.201
Whether O’Bryen in fact ever did dismiss his deputy Birkwood, or whether the 
Admiralty’s order in this regards sufficed, is not clear. A new marshal was appointed 
only in 1837,202 another indication that at the time the Vice-Admiralty Court was 
certainly not very busy. Of Birkwood himself little is known, except that he died in 
July 1847 at the age of 68.203
8 O’Bryen’s successors and the end of the Vice-
Admiralty Court
After the patent office appointment of Denis O’Bryen came to an end on his death 
in 1832, some five years elapsed before the office of marshal of the Cape Vice-
Admiralty Court was filled.
James Bance was appointed in July 1837 in the place of O’Bryen204 and served 
as Admiralty marshal until 1852. He was a retired lieutenant in the Royal Navy205 
and had also been, from 1826, the port captain at Cape Town,206 which was no 
doubt his main appointment. Married to the eldest daughter, Sarah, of influential 
local businessman and politician John Bardwell Ebden in 1828,207 Bance was well 
connected until his death in 1866 at the ripe old age of eighty-four years.
199 See the letter of 6 Jun 1827 from secretary of state, Viscount Goderich, to acting governor Bourke 
(idem vol 30 at 441).
200 See the letter of 12 Jun 1827 from John Barrow, who was at the Cape from 1797-1804 and who 
was subsequently second secretary to the Admiralty 1804-1844, to RW Hay, who was permanent 
under-secretary in the Colonial Office from 1825-1836 (idem vol 30 at 524).
201 See the letter of 21 Jun 1827 from Barrow to Hay (idem vol 32 at 35).
202 Birkwood’s name still appears as deputy marshal in the 1831 South African Almanack.
203 See Jul-Sep 1847 South African Commercial Advertiser.
204 The (Jan-Apr 1838) 25 (NS) Asiatic J and Monthly Register at 47 (in its Register) announced that 
on 20 Jul 1837 “lieut James Bance, RN” had been appointed to be marshal of the Vice-Admiralty 
Court of the Cape of Good Hope “in room of Mr Dennis O’Bryan dec. (appointed by Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty)”.
205 See William R O’Byrne (ed) A Naval Biographical Dictionary (London, 1849) at 44 for his full 
naval career.
206 See Theal RCC (n 5) vol 23 at 493; vol 24 at 63 and 139; vol 28 at 491; vol 30 at 55-56 (where he 
is described as “zealous, active, intelligent and economical”) and at 70 (where it is explained that 
on the appointment of Bance as port captain, the existing office of deputy port captain had been 
abolished altogether).
207 See http://www.geneall.net (accessed 22 May 2014).They had ten children. On Ebden, see Marian 
George “John Bardwell Ebden, his business and political career at the Cape, 1806-1849” in (1986) 
no 1 Archives Year Book for South African History 1-99.
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Next came Daniel J Cloete, marshal for a brief period from 1853 until 1856, 
who was also, significantly, high sheriff of the Supreme Court.208 Apart from his own 
judicial connection, Cloete’s brother was Judge Hendrik Cloete while his daughter 
Janette married Mr, later Judge, Cole.209
Henry Walker, of whom little is known,210 was the next marshal, until 1873. 
Significantly, during his tenure of office, there was again a deputy marshal, Samuel 
Bushell.211 He was appointed in that capacity in 1864 and is mentioned until at least 
1878.212
In 1874 another naval man, Jan Marthinus Hoets,213 was appointed to the office, 
but appears to have served only until 1878. A well-to-do businessman at the Cape,214 
he was also involved in various shipping matters, for instance as a ship surveyor.215 It 
208 This may have been another step, or at least have aided, in avoiding the jurisdictional conflict 
between the two courts (see at n 22 et seq above). See further, eg, the advertisement of the sale of 
a ship, in execution of a Supreme Court judgment in Jul 1853, signed by “Daniel J Cloete, High 
Sheriff” (http://archiver.rootsweb.ancestry.com (accessed 26 May 2014)); (Apr-Jun 1854) South 
African Commercial Advertiser in which the marriage on 9 May 1854 is announced of the eldest 
daughter of “Daniel J Cloete Esq, High Sheriff of the Colony”.
209 See F St LS “The Honourable Mr Justice Alfred Whaley Cole” (1935) 52 SALJ 1-11 at 10, 
referring to “Mr DJ Cloete, for many years Deputy Sheriff and brother of Judge Cloete and genl 
Sir AJ (Josias) Cloete”. It is unclear whether our Cloete was the “DJ Cloete” whose insolvent 
estate resulted in litigation at various times. See Ebden v Anderson (1854) 2 Searle 64 (where the 
trustee of DJ Cloete’s insolvent estate had transferred immovable property to the plaintiff in Jun 
1851) and In re Cloete, Ex parte Jones (1881) 1 SC 85 (which concerned the insolvent estate of DJ 
Cloete of Cape Town, “since deceased”, that had been surrendered as insolvent in Nov 1849, for 
which a discharge had been obtained in Oct 1850, and that again became insolvent in Dec 1870).
210 A daughter of “Henry Walker” was christened in Mar 1843 (see Jan-Mar 1842 South African 
Commercial Advertiser); his youngest son died in Nov 1855 (see Oct-Dec 1855 South African 
Commercial Advertiser); and Walker v Executors Walker (1874) 4 Buch 144 concerned an action 
to set aside and have declared invalid the will of “the late Henry Walker”.
211 Bushell, who was born in Dover in 1811 (see http://www.southafricansettlers.com (accessed 23 
May 2014)) and whose son was born in Jul 1854 (see Jul-Sep 1854 South African Commercial 
Advertiser), died on 27 Sep 1894 at the age of seventy-three (according to his gravestone in the 
Mowbray Old Cemetery, Cape Town (see http://www.eggsa.org (accessed 23 May 2014)). It is a 
statistical aberration, surely, that all five deputy Admiralty marshals at the Cape bore surnames 
starting with “B”.
212 There is also mention of a WM Jennings as deputy Admiralty marshal in Port Elizabeth in 1872-
1873.
213 Captain Hoets (1821-1881) was married to the daughter of John James Centlivres Chase, an 1820 
British settler and attorney and notary at the Cape (see, further, http://southafricansettlers.com 
(accessed 28 May 2014) and (Sep-Dec 1836) 21 (NS) Asiatic J and Monthly Register at 117). 
There is a photo of Hoets and his wife at http://www.myheritage.com (accessed 27 May 2014).
214 He was, eg, Turkish vice consul in Simon’s Town (see Tom Wheeler Turkey and South Africa: 
Development of Relations 1860-2005 (South African Institute of International Affairs Report no 
47, nd) at 4); and donated fish specimens to the South African Museum (see the Catalogue of the 
Specimens in the Collection of the South African Museum. Part I: The Mammalia (Cape Town, 
1861) at 82).
215 Early in 1864, Hoets surveyed and wrote a report on the American Confederate bark Tuscaloosa, 
FUNDAMINA_21_1_15.indb   182 2015/06/10   13:26:12
183
may well have been that he accepted the appointment as Admiralty marshal at a time 
when his own business fortunes were on the wane.216
The last marshal of the Cape Vice-Admiralty Court, from 1881 until 1891, was 
Hugh Marchant Penfold, again a retired naval officer. A nautical assessor at the Cape 
and also port captain217 for seventeen years, Penfold was a friend and roommate of 
Cecil John Rhodes.218 He retired in 1896 for reasons of ill health.219
In 1891, the system of British Vice-Admiralty courts in colonial possessions 
came to an end. Vice-Admiralty courts were abolished and in most cases the local 
Supreme Court was endowed with Admiralty jurisdiction. This was in terms of the 
Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890220 which was passed in July 1890 and which, 
with a few exceptions, came into force in every British possession, including the 
the Alabama’s tender and formerly a Union vessel Conrad captured as a prize by the Alabama. The 
bark and her equipment and cargo were controversially allowed to enter Simon’s Town for repairs 
and supply (see my “The story of the CSS (“Daar kom die ...”) Alabama: Some legal aspects of 
her visit to the Cape of Good Hope, and her influence on the historical development of the law of 
war and neutrality, international arbitration, salvage, and maritime prize” (2007) 13 Fundamina 
175-250 at 201 and 207-210). The report, dated 13 Jan 1864, was forwarded by the US consul 
Walter Graham, who had appointed Hoets for that purpose, to governor Wodehouse (see US Dept 
of State Correspondence concerning Claims against Great Britain vol 4 (London, 1869) at 240-
241). Ten years later, in Gifford v Table Bay Dock and Breakwater Management Commission, The 
China (1874) 4 Buch 96, Hoets gave evidence in a matter concerning the liability of the harbour 
board for a ship that had fallen off a patent slip. He declared (at 101-102) that he had “assisted at 
slipping a good many vessels at the Simon’s Town patent slip”. He conceded that nobody might 
have been to blame for the accident, but observed that “[s]hips ought to be insured against risks 
of this sort”. See also Poultney v Van Santen (1874) 4 Buch 76, from which it appears that Hoets 
was a ship surveyor in Simon’s Town.
216 See Anderson & Co v Hutton & Co (1875) 5 Buch 73, in which it appeared on the sequestration 
of his partnership with John Thomas Hutton in a shipping and landing agency, that Hutton had 
attended to the paper work while Hoets performed all the outdoor work; and where it was accepted 
that unlike Hutton, “Hoets honestly, diligently and labouriously [sic] attended to his department”.
217 In which capacities he signed the findings of courts of enquiry held in Cape Town into marine 
accidents.
218 Penfold was born in London in 1840 (see Armorial Families: A Directory of Gentlemen of Coat-
Armour, 1905 vol 5 at 1073 available at http://www.movaco.com (accessed 14 Apr 2014)) and 
came to the Cape at an unspecified date (his second son was stillborn in London in May 1876, and 
he divorced his second wife in Cape Town in 1885). He shared quarters with Rhodes in Adderley 
St and taught him to yacht, and it was through Rhodes’s intercession that he was appointed as 
port captain (see “Marchant Penfold (1): Genealogy” at http://www.werelate.org (accessed 14 
Apr 2014); and “Marchant Hugh Penfold (1840-1902) – Genealogy” at http://www.geni.com 
(accessed 14 Apr 2014)).
219 Penfold suffered from asthma and Rhodes sent him to Kimberley to become a director of the De 
Beers Consolidated Mining Co. He was involved (trapped) in the siege of Kimberley (ibid). He 
returned to Cape Town where he died in Mar 1902 (see his gravestone in the Maitland Cemetery, 
available at http://www.eggsa.org (accessed 23 May 2014)).
220 53 & 54 Vict c 27. The Act is reproduced in (1890) Cape JL 241-252. See, generally, DG Scott 
“Admiralty jurisdiction in South Africa prior to 1983” (2002) 7 Fundamina 204-212.
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Cape, on 1 July 1891.221 As from the latter date, it abolished existing British Vice-
Admiralty courts in the colonies,222 including, therefore, the Vice-Admiralty Court 
of the Cape of Good Hope. 
In the place of the abolished Vice-Admiralty courts came colonial courts 
exercising an Admiralty jurisdiction. They were to be called Colonial Courts of 
Admiralty.223 These courts were part of the ordinary local judicial system – in practice 
they were the local Supreme Court or its equivalent – and as such independent of any 
Imperial control. In short, in 1891 the system of British Vice-Admiralty courts was 
replaced by one of local Admiralty courts.
As regards the Admiralty marshal, an officer of the local Supreme Court224 then 
performed the relevant duties where the court exercised that jurisdiction.
Abstract
Denis O’Bryen’s appointment as marshal of the Vice-Admiralty Court at the Cape 
of Good Hope in 1806 resulted from his political activism in England during the 
preceding decades. It must be understood in the context of the system of colonial 
patent office appointments that operated at the time.
221 Section 16. The exceptions were provided for in sched 1.
222 Section 17. Specific provision was made for pending proceedings and appeals. In terms of s 9(1), 
the power was retained lawfully to establish (or re-establish, in the case of abolished courts) ad 
hoc Vice-Admiralty courts “by commission under the Great Seal”.
223 Section 2(1) of the Act provided that every court of law in a British possession which had 
been declared under the Act to be a court of Admiralty, or if no declaration was in force in the 
possession, every court with “original unlimited civil jurisdiction”, would be a court of Admiralty. 
It would exercise the jurisdiction mentioned in the Act, and would in respect of such jurisdiction 
be referred to in the Act as a Colonial Court of Admiralty. Accordingly, in the Cape, where there 
was no such declaration, the Supreme Court became a Colonial Court of Admiralty when called 
upon to exercise its Admiralty jurisdiction.
224 Hercules Tenant, high sheriff of the Cape Supreme Court from 1889, was, somewhat belatedly but 
no doubt in response to the outbreak of the South African War, appointed in 1899 by the Court as 
marshal “under its admiralty jurisdiction” (see Anon “Mr Hercules Tenant, CMG” (1909) 26 SALJ 
341-344 at 343).
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SUETONIUS ON THE LEGISLATION OF 
AUGUSTUS (AUG 34)
David Wardle*
1 Introduction
In the course of writing a detailed literary and historical commentary on Suetonius’ 
Augustus that gives due attention to the biographer’s compositional techniques while 
illuminating his thought and the structuring of his material, I had to pay careful 
attention to Augustus’ short and deceptively simple chapter on legislation. This 
article sets out the problems of legal and historical interpretation of the biographer’s 
words. It also proposes a possible solution to these problems, based on a broad 
understanding of how Suetonius assembled his material and a specific study of the 
moral legislation that interested him.
Suetonius’ treatment of the vita publica of Augustus contains a lengthy section 
on the emperor’s achievements in the field of law and order.1 He starts Chapter 
32 with some of the major security issues facing the emperor in the mid-thirties 
BC and immediately after the civil wars. The latter part of Chapter 32 deals with 
various measures, most of which were contained in the lex Iulia iudiciaria, which 
were introduced by Augustus to improve the delivery of justice in Rome. Chapter 
33 then presents a highly selective account of the emperor’s own jurisdiction, which 
1 The terminology chosen by JM Carter Suetonius. Divus Augustus (London, 1982) at 137.
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focuses on two cases heard before his own tribunal under the process cognitio 
extraordinaria.2 This leads directly into the chapter at issue: 
leges retractauit et quasdam ex integro sanxit, ut sumptuariam et de adulteriis et de pudicitia, 
de ambitu, de maritandis ordinibus. hanc cum aliquanto seuerius quam ceteras emendasset, 
prae tumultu recusantium perferre non potuit nisi adempta demum lenitaue parte poenarum 
et uacatione trienni data auctisque praemiis. sic quoque abolitionem eius publico spectaculo 
pertinaciter postulante equite, accitos Germanici liberos receptosque partim ad se partim 
in patris gremium ostentauit, manu uultuque significans ne grauarentur imitari iuuenis 
exemplum. cumque etiam inmaturitate sponsarum et matrimoniorum crebra mutatione 
uim legis eludi sentiret, tempus sponsas habendi coartauit, diuortiis modum imposuit.3 (He 
revised laws and sponsored some from scratch, for example laws on expenditure, adultery 
and chastity, bribery and what orders should marry. Because he had modified the last more 
severely than the rest, he was not able to carry it through in the face of the disruption caused 
by those protesting without in the end removing or reducing part of the penalties, allowing 
a three-year period of grace and increasing the rewards. Despite this, when the equites 
persistently demanded its repeal at a public entertainment, he summoned the children of 
Germanicus and exhibited them, taking some of them to himself and with others on their 
father’s lap, by his gestures and expression indicating that they should not consider it a 
burden to imitate the example of the young man. When he realised that the force of the law 
was being evaded even by betrothal with immature girls and by frequent changes of wife, he 
shortened the period allowed for betrothals and limited divorce.)
Good though Carter’s commentary is, it tells his readers what Carter thinks they 
ought to know about a given subject rather than illuminates or evaluates what 
Suetonius says. Of the three and three-quarter pages of Carter’s commentary on 
Chapter 34 specifically, approximately half discusses the contents of the laws to 
which Suetonius did not refer, as well as Augustus’ intentions with regard to the 
field of marriage and divorce law, an important topic for anyone studying the reign 
of Augustus, but again not what Suetonius is interested in here.4 More recently, in an 
appendix to his excellent edition of Cassius Dio, Michael Swan provided a skeleton 
commentary on some lemmata from the chapter, which makes a useful contribution 
towards understanding Suetonius’ version of a subject that Dio treats very differently 
in his essentially annalistic framework.5 In his somewhat idiosyncratic piece in the 
2 R Orestano “La ‘cognitio extra ordinem’: una chimera” (1980) 46 Studia et Documenta Historiae 
et Iuris 236-247: in reality only cognitiones extraordinariae and iudicia extraordinaria existed.
3 The text is that of M Ihm C Suetoni Tranquilli de vita Caesarum (Leipzig, 1907), the standard 
text; the translation is my own, see D Wardle Suetonius: Life of Augustus (Oxford, 2014).
4 Other commentaries are either cursory (MA Levi C Suetoni Tranquilli. Divus Augustus (Florence, 
1951) or antiquated in many details (ES Shuckburgh C Suetoni Tranquilli. Divus Augustus 
(Cambridge, 1896). The recent larger-scale work by N Louis Commentatire historique et 
traduction du Divus Augustus de Suétone (Brussels, 2010) has no detailed or up-to-date legal 
bibliography.
5 PM Swan The Augustan Succession. An Historical Commentary on Cassius Dio’s Roman History 
Books 55-56 (Oxford, 2004) esp at 369-371.
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Aufstieg,6 Leo Ferrero Raditsa rightly highlighted the gap that had emerged by the 
late 1970s between scholars of Roman history and those of Roman law, making each 
field harder to understand. From the perspective of the early twenty-first century, 
the position has improved, for example through the works of Jane Gardner, Thomas 
McGinn and Susan Treggiari, but their approach is not the historiographical one that 
I pursue here.7
A feature of both Suetonius’ Lives and the Historia Augusta are sections 
that provide résumés of imperial legislation and illuminate the different authors’ 
competence in dealing with an important aspect of the emperor’s work.8 Richard 
Bauman has identified two kinds of résumé, which he calls respectively “diffuse” 
and “concise”, Chapter 34 being an example of the latter.9 Appropriately in the 
Augustus, given that Augustus reigned at an early time in legislative development 
under the Principate, the emphasis is on leges rogatae rather than senatus consulta, 
edicta, decreta or rescripta.10 Bauman conjectures that Suetonius had access to a 
comprehensive collection of Augustan legislation in the form of commentarii kept 
in the imperial library, of which Suetonius was putatively librarian before becoming 
Hadrian’s ab epistulis.11 However, this hardly fits in with the general pattern of 
Suetonius’ reading, with its excerption of annalistic histories and use of contemporary 
sources whose names he parades before his readers.12 What kind of material the 
6 LF Raditsa “Augustus’ legislation concerning marriage, procreation, love affairs and adultery” 
Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II 13 (Berlin, 1980) 278-339. 
7 Eg, JF Gardner Family and Familia in Roman Law and Life (Oxford, 1998); TAJ McGinn 
Prostitution, Sexuality, and the Law in Ancient Rome (Oxford, 1998): idem “The Augustan 
marriage legislation and social practice: Elite endogamy versus male marrying down” in J-J 
Aubert & B Sirks (eds) Roman Law as a Reflection of Social and Economic Life (Ann Arbor, 
2002) 46-93; and idem “Something old, something new ... Augustan legislation and the challenge 
of social control” (2008) 22 Ancient History Bulletin 1-32; SM Treggiari Roman Marriage. Iusti 
coniuges From the Time of Cicero to the Time of Ulpian (Oxford, 1991).
8 See RA Bauman “The résumé of legislation in Suetonius” (1982) 99 Zeitschrift der Savigny-
Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abteilung at 81-127.
9 According to Bauman (n 8) at 84-86, Suetonius concentrates his references to leges in chapters 32 
to 37, mostly treated in his “diffuse” way. Bauman conjectures (at 92-93) that the practice of résumé 
was known in the late Republic, although the lengthy ramblings of Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
on family law (2 24 7) are not a good model for Suetonius’ practice; and the periocha of Livy 
Book 89, which postdates Suetonius, is no guide to the scale or treatment that Livy accorded 
Sulla’s legislation. In practice, every annalistic historian who included legislation in his works 
will have had to précis and transform the legal material to meet the genre’s requirements; the 
meagre fragments of the annalists do not permit us to say whether any writer from the Republic or 
Early Empire preceded Suetonius in treating legislation topically, rather than in its chronological 
place in his narrative. 
10 Bauman (n 8) at 89-91.
11 For the best account of Suetonius’ career, see GB Townend “The Hippo inscription and the career 
of Suetonius” (1961) 11 Historia 99-109. 
12 See, eg, D Wardle An Historical Commentary on Suetonius’ Life of Caligula (Brussels, 1994) 
esp at 62-63, and AF Wallace-Hadrill Suetonius (London, 1983) at 63-64, for the particular 
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annalistic historians could provide on Augustus’ legislation, and how they scattered 
it throughout their narrative, is best demonstrated by Dio. 
2 Suetonius’ selection of Augustan moral legislation for 
discussion
As often in Suetonius, the first word of the chapter, leges, signals to the reader a 
change of topic, here from imperial first- and second-instance jurisdiction to leges 
rogatae. When dealing with a period of dominance as long as that of Augustus, 
fifty-six years by Suetonius’ calculation, he could discuss much legislation, 
comprising perhaps as many as two hundred laws.13 His opening phrase points 
to a clear differentiation between retractavit and ex integro sanxit.14 The former 
category relates to laws covering subjects on which there had already been specific 
legislation: for example, there were several Republican leges de ambitu;15 Sulla had 
initiated a lex sumptuaria, as had Caesar in 46 BC, and Sulla had probably sponsored 
a lex de adulteriis et de pudicitia, if Plutarch’s mention of a law περ γάμων κα 
σωφροσύνης16 is reliable. According to the jurist Paul, the lex Iulia de adulteriis 
began with an explicit abrogation of several earlier laws,17 which suggests that it 
could be seen as retractare, even if the control that Augustus sought to exercise, in an 
area that had lain mostly in the hands of patresfamiliae, was novel. The formulation 
quasdam ex integro sanxit indicates three things: i) these laws were not numerous, ii) 
they were laws on a novel subject matter, and iii) Augustus was their rogator.18 As far 
exuberance of Suetonius’ citations in the Augustus, displaying the biographer’s expertise on the 
late Republic and early Empire.
13 B Biondi Scritti Giuridici vol 2 (Milan, 1965) 83 = La legislazione di Augusto (Milan, 1939). Cf 
Tac Ann 3 25 2: multitudinem infinitam ac varietatem legum.
14 Cf Vell Pat 2 89 4: leges emendatae utiliter, latae salubriter, for a similar distinction in the 
legislative programme of 28/27. See AJ Woodman Velleius Paterculus. The Caesarian and 
Augustan Narrative (Cambridge, 1983) at 255-256, who accuses Suetonius of “confusing detail”, 
but himself causes confusion by giving retractare the same meaning as emendare. Swan (n 5) at 
369 nicely translates the two verbs as “rework” and “enact”.
15 On ambitus legislation, see J-L Ferrary “La législation de ambitu de Sulla à Auguste” in Iuris 
Vincula. Studi in onore di Mario Talamanca (Naples, 2002) 161-196.
16 Comp Lys et Sull 3 3.
17 Paul Coll 4 2 1-2. Even if this does not prove earlier legislation against adultery, but refers to 
stuprum, because regulations concerning stuprum and lenocinium were important elements of 
the lex Iulia, we are justified in considering the law as at least a partial retractatio. Cf G Rizzelli 
Lex Iulia de adulteriis. Studi sulla disciplina di adulterium, lenocinium stuprum (Lecce, 1997) at 
270-271.
18 Sancire within the Life (cf 29 2, 35 3, 44 2) indicates a lex and points to Augustus’ use of his 
tribunician power in the concilium plebis. However, Tacitus uses sancire of Augustus’ role in 
introducing the leges Papia Poppaea (Ann 3 25 1: de moderanda Papia Poppaea, quam senior 
Augustus post Iulias rogationes … sanxerat). In Res Gestae (8 5: legibus novi[s latis complura 
e]xempla maiorum exolescentia iam ex nost[ro usu reduxi) Augustus makes a noteworthy claim 
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as we know, of all the laws passed during Augustus’ reign, only a small proportion 
bore the emperor’s nomen as leges Iuliae.19 Each of the laws Suetonius lists by title 
does seem to be a lex Iulia, an interpretation shared by the Epitomator of Aurelius 
Victor, whose reworking of Suetonius reads leges alias novas alias correctas protulit 
suo nomine.20 Whether only leges Iuliae are being discussed here is an issue of some 
importance for an understanding of the rest of Suetonius’ passage; in particular 
whether any of the provisions that according to Suetonius were initiated by Augustus 
may stem from the lex Aelia Sentia or the lex Papia Poppaea, laws passed by the 
consuls of AD 4 and 9 respectively. In short, it is not possible to take a purist line 
on Suetonius’ usual approach. For example, in his discussion on Augustus’ actions 
concerning manumission, Suetonius attributes to Augustus the provisions of the leges 
Aelia Sentia and Fufia Caninia,21 so we are not justified in restricting the contents of 
Chapter 34 to the leges Iuliae of 18/17 BC only. 
Back, however, to the introductory sentence: the ut that introduces his list of 
laws makes it plain that Suetonius is being selective. It seems that the list contains 
four laws, his et de adulteriis et de pudicitia being the full title of what is generally 
known as the lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis.22 If this is the case, then only the 
to novae leges (see H Bellen “Novus status, novae leges. Kaiser Augustus als Gesetzgeber” in 
G Binder (ed) Saeculum Augustum vol 1 (Darmstadt, 1987) esp at 308-309), which certainly 
includes all that Suetonius places in his second category, whatever conclusion we come to on the 
lex de adulteriis et pudicitia (see below). Cf. eg, Sen Ben 6 32 1: pater legem de adulteriis tulerat; 
Justinian D 48 5 1: haec lex lata est a divo Augusto. The striking use of novae, for once non-
pejorative, suggests that Augustus envisaged his legislation as an entity (see McGinn “Something 
old” (n 7) esp at 3-4).
19 It is impossible to be precise, given the difficulty of deciding whether to attribute particular leges 
Iuliae to Caesar or Augustus, but the eleven leges Iuliae of Augustus posited by G Rotondi Leges 
publicae populi Romani (Hildesheim, 1967) 439-462, form a reasonable core and the right order 
of magnitude. 
20 Epit 1 18.
21 Aug 40 4. This is a perfectly intelligible consequence of Suetonius’ biographical focus and method 
and does not amount to error or slackness on his part. Were our knowledge of legislation under 
the empire more complete, further attributions of legislative actions to his subjects by Suetonius 
might be linked to specific procedures (cf N 10 1, the abolition of vectigalia). 
22 In the Codex Justiniani there are two references by Domna and Proculus to a lex Iulia de pudicitia 
in a constitution of Severus Alexander from AD 224 (C 9 9 8-9), but the provision they cite 
appears to have been part of the lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis. The paired ets, which are the 
only connectives in the list of laws, suggest either that Suetonius is giving the full title of the 
lex Iulia de adulteriis et [de?] pudicitia or that et de pudicitia is a feeble gloss on de adulteriis, 
perhaps reflecting a late version of the title (see Carter (n 1) at 142), of which there are several 
(see P Csillag The Augustan Laws on Family Relations (Bucharest, 1976) at 223 n 72). The full 
title is more likely, since pudicitia was a major concern of the law (cf A Mette-Dittmann, Die 
Ehegesetze des Augustus. Eine Untersuchung im Rahmender Gesellschaftspolitik des Princeps 
(Stuttgart, 1991) at 71). The suggestion of Fitzler and Seeck (Real Encyclopädie X 354) that 
Suetonius is referring to one compendious law is unacceptable. REA Palmer “Roman shrines of 
female chastity from the caste struggle to the papacy of Innocent I” (1974) 4 Rivista di Storia 
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fourth law, de maritandis ordinibus, is an example of Suetonius’ second category.23 
All four laws can probably be dated to 18 and 17 BC: the leges de ambitu and de 
maritandis ordinibus are given that date by Dio;24 a possible allusion in Horace’s 
Carmen saeculare dates the lex de adulteriis et pudicitia to before the middle of 17 
BC,25 another allusion dates it at no later than 16 BC.26 It is generally held that the lex 
de adulteriis coercendis follows logically on from the lex de maritandis ordinibus,27 
so that too seems definitely to belong in 18 or 17 BC. The lex sumptuaria is the 
hardest to date, since we know little about its contents, but a weak case has been 
made out for 18 BC, on the assumption that Augustus’ alleged advice to Livia on 
dress and adornments, extorted by an eager senate according to Dio, reflect an earlier 
enactment on the subject.28 The order in which the laws appear in Suetonius’ list is 
probably not chronological,29 but determined by the distinction between retractare 
and ex integro sancire. Thus the first three laws belong to the first category and the 
lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus to the second.
3 The lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus
Hanc, with which Suetonius then begins the most debated part of his discourse, one 
that takes up the rest of the chapter, refers only to the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus. 
Suetonius’ handling of Augustus’ legislation is thus highly selective, concentrating 
on one aspect of it. We can to some extent justify his choice because of all the new 
legislation, on which Augustus laid such emphasis in Res Gestae, the lex Iulia de 
maritandis ordinibus was the most striking in terms of what it attempted to regulate 
and the means by which it sought to do so. Moreover, whatever meaning we attribute 
to Suetonius’ words, the frequency with which Augustus was compelled to return 
to the question of the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus marked it out as appropriate 
for particular discussion. Suetonius is not hamstrung by a need to present a flawless 
Augustus: indeed the Life presents examples of unacceptable behaviour not just on 
Antica at 138-140 inferred a lex de pudicitia from Propertius’ lex sublata (2 7 12), more plausibly 
related to a forerunner of the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus (see below), but there are no known 
parallels for such laws. 
23 Swan’s translation ((n 5) at 369) “he reworked the laws, enacting some afresh, for example 
…” is misleading in that it subordinates sanxit rather than according it equal prominence with 
retractavit; for ex integro to provide the correct contrast with retractavit it must mean “from 
scratch”, and Suetonius’ examples are not all from the second group.
24 Dio 54 16 1-2.
25 57-58. See Treggiari (n 7) at 277-278. 
26 Carm 4 5 21-24.
27 See, eg, P Girard “Les leges Iuliae iudiciorum publicorum et privatorum” (1913) 34 Zeitschrift 
der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abteilung at 306 n 1. 
28 See S Riccobono Acta Divi Augusti (Rome, 1945) at 198. 
29 Contra Csillag (n 22) at 220 n 55.
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the part of the young triumvir but also on the part of the senior statesman.30 So here 
we need not be too surprised if the story Suetonius tells focuses more on Augustus’ 
failure to achieve all his aims, on the ways his law was evaded and on the opposition 
it aroused than on its positive aspect.31
It was Paul Jörs who in 1893 first analysed most of the chapter dealing with the 
lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus. He with great intelligence combined the evidence 
of Augustan poets with the more obvious historiographical and legal texts.32 The 
influence of this work on more than one hundred years of classical scholarship 
has been traced minutely by Tullio Spagnuolo Vigorita.33 He shows that English-
speaking scholars were hardly influenced at all by Jörs’ proposed chronology and 
its effect on their research on the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus and the lex Papia 
Poppaea was minimal.34 This reluctance to interact with Jörs continues in the chapter 
by Susan Treggiari on Augustus’ social legislation in the revised Cambridge Ancient 
History and in her important monograph on Roman marriage.35 Needless to say, 
none of the modern commentaries on Suetonius’ Augustus enters into any debate 
with Jörs or recognises the consequences of his views for the study of Suetonius. 
Richard Bauman’s brief discussion of Chapter 34 disagrees in every respect with 
Jörs and fails to mention him,36 while Michael Swan, whose commentary on Cassius 
Dio does engage fully with Jörs, denies that Suetonius makes any reference to 
Augustan marriage legislation of later than 18 BC. I shall attempt to present Jörs’ 
arguments and evaluate them through a close examination of Suetonius and Dio, in 
the process clarifying Suetonius’ references at each stage. The table that follows this 
article presents a synoptic view of the positions taken by Jörs, Bauman, Swan and 
myself on each element of Suetonius’ argument. 
30 See, eg, 27 4, 69 1.
31 I leave only to those who like to resort to psychology, the idea that the biographer whose marriage 
had proved childless (Plin Ep 10 94 2) and had to receive from Trajan a special grant of ius 
trium liberorum (Plin Ep 10 95) enjoyed highlighting the difficulties encountered by Augustus 
in pursuing his matrimonial legislation. In Augustus (eg, 35 1 54) Suetonius frequently mentions 
the obstructions faced by Augustus. 
32 P  Jörs  “Die Ehegeschichte des Augustus” in Festschrift für Theodor Mommsen zum fünfzig-
jährigen Doctorjübilaum (Marburg, 1893) re-issued with lengthy introduction by T Spagnuolo 
Vigorita Iuliae rogationes. Due studi sulla legislazione matrimoniale augustea (Milan, 1985), a 
collection which also includes Jörs’ doctoral thesis Über das Verhältnis der lex Iulia de maritandis 
ordinibus zur Lex Papia Poppaea (Bonn, 1882).
33 T Spagnuolo-Vigorita Casta domus. Un seminario sulla legislazione matrimoniale augustea3 
(Naples, 2010). The first edition was published in 1985. 
34 The exception is T Rice Holmes The Architect of the Roman Empire 27 BC-AD 14 (Oxford, 
1931) at 151-152, who follows Jörs fully on the putative law of AD 4.
35 (n 5) eg, at 60-61.
36 (n 8) at 84-85.
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4  Jörs’ argument in favour of three stages of legislation
Jörs rightly asserts that Suetonius describes three stages of legislation, which he 
identifies as i) the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus, ii) a drastic revision of the 
lex Iulia de maritandis that Augustus failed to sustain, and iii) a less harsh form of 
the revision with smaller penalties, higher rewards and a three-year exemption, a 
measure that was successfully implemented.37 By using Dio’s extensive account of 
AD 938 Jörs creates a scenario for stages ii) and iii): in the spring (μετὰ τὸν χειμῶνα) 
Tiberius returned to celebrate his successes over the Pannonians, but at the victory 
celebrations put on by the consuls the equites demonstrated, demanding the repeal of 
the law concerning the unmarried and the childless.39 Augustus responded to this by 
summoning the equites to the forum and addressing them in two groups, separating 
the minority who were married from the majority who were not. In the course of Dio’s 
version of the address to the latter group Augustus, emphasising his own restrained 
and generous treatment of the equites, mentions two separate periods, totalling five 
years, during which his marriage regulations had not been implemented.40 According 
to Jörs, the equites demonstrated when this period of grace (vacatio) came to an end, 
thus indicating a law passed in AD 4.41 Augustus’ response to the protest is set out in 
the immediate continuation of Dio’s narrative:42
ότε μὲν τοιαῦτα ἀμφοτέροις αὐτοῖς διελέχθη, μετὰ δὲ δὴ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν τὰ τέκνα ἔχουσι 
τὰ γέρα προσεπηύξησε, τοὺς δὲ γεγαμηκότας ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγύνων τῷ τῶν ἐπιτιμίων διαφόρῳ 
διεχώρισε, καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἑκατέροις ἐς τὸ τοὺς πειθαρχήσαντάς οἱ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἀναιτίους 
γενέσθαι προσεπέδωκε. τῶν τε γυναικῶν τισι καὶ παρὰ τὸν Οὐοκώνειον νόμον, καθ’ ὃν 
οὐδεμιᾷ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ὑπὲρ δύο ἥμισυ μυριάδας οὐσίας κληρονομεῖν ἐξῆν, συνεχώρησε 
τοῦτο ποιεῖν· καὶ ταῖς ἀειπαρθένοις πάνθ’ ὅσαπερ αἱ τεκοῦσαι εἶχον ἐχαρίσατο. κἀκ τούτου 
ὅ τε Πάπιος καὶ ὁ Ποππαῖος νόμος ὑπό τε Μάρκου Παπίου Μουτίλου καὶ ὑπὸ Κυίντου 
Ποππαίου Σεκούνδου, τῶν τότε ἐν μέρει τοῦ ἔτους ὑπατευόντων, ἐτέθησαν. καὶ συνέβη 
γὰρ ἀμφοτέρους σφᾶς μὴ ὅτι παῖδας, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ γυναῖκας ἔχειν· καὶ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τούτου 
37 Jörs (n 32) at 49-51.
38 For the enlarged scale and survival of most of the original, see Swan (n 5) at 223.
39 56 1 2: οἱ ἱππῆς πολλῇ ἐν αὐταῖς σπουδῇ τὸν νόμον τὸν περὶ τῶν μήτε γαμούντων μήτε τεκνούντων 
καταλυθῆναι ἠξίουν. Swan ((n 5) at 226) argues that μήτε τεκνούντων need not, as Jörs requires, 
refer to orbi, but to caelibes, who as a consequence of not being married do not have (legitimate) 
children, as Augustus mentions in his speech. 
40 56 7 3: καὶ οὐδὲ ἐς ταῦτα μέντοι κατήπειξα ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τρία ἔτη ὅλα πρὸς 
παρασκευὴν ὑμῖν ἔδωκα, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον δύο. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν οὐδ’ οὕτως οὔτ’ ἀπειλῶν οὔτε προτρέπων 
οὔτ’ ἀναβαλλόμενος οὔτε δεόμενός τι πεποίηκα. Jörs notes credibly that the information on the 
two vacationes could not have been invented and that arguments attributed to Augustus on the 
danger posed by emancipations and foreigners were consistent with his reign and not with Dio’s 
own time.
41 Spagnuolo Vigorita ((n 33) at 74-75) believably identifies this law as a lex Aelia Sentia separate 
from that de manumissionibus, passed in the first half of AD 4, verified directly only by a papyrus 
from AD 138 (PMich 7 438).
42 56 10 1-3.
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ἡ ἀνάγκη τοῦ νόμου κατεφωράθη. (Such were his words to the two groups at that time. 
Afterwards he increased the rewards to those who had children and in the case of the others 
drew a distinction between married men and unmarried ones by imposing different penalties; 
furthermore, he granted yet another year’s grace to those who were remiss in either respect, 
in which to obey him and thus escape the penalties. Contrary to the lex Voconia, according 
to which no woman could inherit property to the value of more than one hundred thousand 
sesterces, he permitted some women to inherit larger amounts; and he granted the Vestal 
Virgins all the privileges enjoyed by women who had borne children. And thus was enacted 
the lex Papia Poppaea by Marcus Papius Mutilus and by Quintus Poppaeus Secundus, who 
were consuls at the time for a part of the year. Now it chanced that both of them were not 
only childless but were not even married, and from this very circumstance, the need for the 
law was apparent.)
Augustus outlined a series of proposals that were then enshrined in the lex Papia 
Poppaea, introduced by the suffect consuls in the second half of the year: i) 
increased rewards for those who had produced children; ii) a distinction to be drawn 
between the penalties imposed on the married who were childless and those who 
were unmarried;43 iii) a further period of grace (vacatio) of one year for both groups 
before the provisions of the law came into effect; iv) the exoneration of women from 
the lex Voconia, which had restricted their rights to inherit and make wills; and v) 
the Vestal Virgins to be granted the privileges secured by women in terms of the 
ius trium liberorum. So Jörs’ most important contribution is to have posited a law 
passed in AD 4 that increased the severity of the terms of the lex Iulia de maritandis 
ordinibus, so much so that Augustus was forced to make a series of concessions, 
which were incorporated in the lex Papia Poppaea. Because Dio’s narrative for AD 
4 is very abridged, there is no trace of the legislation in it, but every reference in 
Book 56 to earlier legislation is consistent with such a law.   
Ostensibly greater difficulties arise when Jörs applies the framework that he 
has extracted from Dio’s chronological work to Suetonius. He rightly asserts that 
two cums, hanc cum … emendasset and cumque etiam … sentiret, provide the basic 
structure for Suetonius’ discussion: the law that people tried to evade by extended 
betrothals and serial divorces was identical with hanc, namely the lex de maritandis 
ordinibus, for which he found confirmation in words from Dio’s account of 18 
43 According to Jörs ((n 32) at 55-57) this is the crucial piece of evidence: he argues that in our 
existing legal texts, punishment for the orbi, that is for the married men who had no children, 
is associated only with the lex Papia Poppaea (eg, Gaius 2 111, 286), not with the lex Iulia de 
maritandis ordinibus, so that the equites’ protest against the punishment of orbi must refer to a 
law that predates the lex Papia Poppaea and which introduced a harsher penalty than the known 
prescription of the lex Papia Poppaea: caelebs nihil, orbus dimidium capit.
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BC suggesting the same evasion.44 The demonstration by the equites interrupts the 
logical flow of the argument.45
5 Evaluating Jörs’ approach
I propose to consider, through a phrase-by-phrase discussion of Suetonius’ account, 
whether it is Jörs’ or alternative approaches that make best use of the literary, legal and 
historiographical evidence available and how that affects our view of the biographer. 
Although the reference of hanc to the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus as enacted 
in 18 BC is undisputed, the meaning of the rest of the clause cum aliquanto severius 
quam ceteras emendasset and its relationship to the enacted law is wide open to 
dispute. Jörs has no problem in finding here a reference to a harsher law, but he 
rightly realises that, once the cum clause looks forward to legislation postdating the 
enacted lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus, then quam ceteras becomes problematic, 
because there is no known reworking by Augustus of any of the laws in Suetonius’ 
list other than the lex de ambitu.46 He therefore considers that these words may be 
understood as quam ceterae latae erant or even be relegated to being a gloss on 
severius. Both these suggestions seem to me to be problematic. Rather, the reference 
may be taken as looking backwards in one of two ways. If Suetonius is saying 
that Augustus’ proposed changes to republican practice in relation to what would 
become the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus were harsher than those in relation 
to ambitus, luxury or even sexual misconduct, then the difficulty disappears. Most 
scholars would agree that the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus affected more people, 
particularly the elite, more severely than, for example, the lex Iulia de adulteriis 
coercendis.47 Alternatively, as Bauman and Swan do, we can take this to mean that 
Augustus circulated a draft text of the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus (and his 
44 Jörs (n 32) at 37. Dio 54 16 7: ὡς δ’ οὖν βρέφη τινὲς ἐγγυώμενοι τὰς μὲν τιμὰς τῶν γεγαμηκότων 
ἐκαρποῦντο, τὸ δὲ ἔργον αὐτῶν οὐ παρείχοντο, προσέταξε μηδεμίαν ἐγγύην ἰσχύειν μεθ’ ἣν οὐδὲ 
δυοῖν ἐτοῖν διελθόντων γαμήσει τις, τοῦτ’ ἔστι δεκέτιν πάντως ἐγγυᾶσθαι τόν γέ τι ἀπ’ αὐτῆς 
ἀπολαύσοντα.
45 Bauman ((n 8) at 85: “irrelevant part”) also acknowledges that the demonstration is inserted 
awkwardly by Suetonius. 
46 (n 32) at 49-50; cf Csillag (n 22) at 33. With reference to 8 BC Dio (55 5 3) narrates changes to 
electoral practice that may plausibly be connected with heightened measures against ambitus. He 
does not, however, indicate if the measures of 8 involved a law. Tacitus’ plural “ambitus Iuliae 
leges” (Ann 15 20 3) is not conclusive. Jörs sees in the vague reference of Aulus Gellius to an 
edict of either Augustus or Tiberius recorded by Ateius Capito (2 24 14: esse etiam dicit Capito 
Ateius edictum – diuini Augusti an Tiberii Caesaris non satis commemini–, quo edicto per dierum 
uarias sollemnitates a trecentis sestertiis adusque duo sestertia sumptus cenarum propagatus est, 
ut his saltem finibus luxuriae efferuescentis aestus coerceretur) a later exacerbation of the lex 
Iulia sumptuaria, but Gellius makes it clear that this edict was a loosening of the restrictions of 
the lex, not “eine Verschärfung”.
47 See PA Brunt Italian Manpower (Oxford, 1971) at 560.
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other laws) in 18 BC in order to elicit comment.48 Dio mentions with reference to 
27 BC but in a general context, that public comment was elicited regularly.49 John 
Rich limits the consultation process to senators, positing that the senatorial advisory 
committee, Augustus’ consilium, was initially set up to aid the formulation of the 
moral legislation.50 Rich’s exclusion of other input is unfounded, unless the equites’ 
demonstration in AD 9 at ludi is taken as evidence that they had no other way of 
influencing legislation, rather than that such public demonstrations were highly 
effective. Indeed, Dio’s contrast of ἔστι μὲν ἁ καὶ ἐς τὸ δημόσιον and τὸ δὲ δὴ πλεῖστον 
… would seem to exclude Rich’s interpretation. Moreover, Augustus’ publication by 
edict of the speech by Q Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus de prole augenda51 in 
the context of the lex Iulia of 18 BC, if its appearance there in Livy’s summary is 
reliable,52 demonstrates wide promulgation of Augustus’ justifications and, by easy 
extension, of the proposed measures themselves. Seen in this light emendasset can 
retain its regular sense of revise.53 So far, then, the balance of difficulties probably 
lies against Jörs’ understanding of cum ... emendasset, although his construction 
does enable us to see that orbi, whose capacitas to inherit was not affected under the 
lex Iulia de maritandis of 18 BC, were treated more harshly later.54
48 Jörs ((n 32) at 50 n 3) rules out any idea that Augustus had treated any of the material of the 
lex de ambitu or sumptuaria earlier. If Jörs means actual legislation, then as long as we cannot 
analyse the general statement by Velleius Paterculus (2 89 3) his assertion cannot be disproved. 
See Bauman (n 8) at 84, Swan (n 5) at 370. 
49 53 21 3: οὐ μέντοι καὶ πάντα ἰδιογνωμονῶν ἐνομοθέτει, ἀλλ’ ἔστι μὲν ἁ καὶ ἐς τὸ δημόσιον 
προεξετίθει, ὅπως, ἄν τι μὴ ἀρέσῃ τινά, προμαθὼν ἐπανορθώσῃ· προετρέπετό τε γὰρ πάνθ’ 
ὁντινοῦν συμβουλεύειν οἱ, εἴ τίς τι ἄμεινον αὐτῶν ἐπινοήσειεν, καὶ παρρησίαν σφίσι πολλὴν 
ἔνεμε, καί τινα καὶ μετέγραφε. 
50 JW Rich Cassius Dio: The Augustan Settlement (Warminster, 1990) at 154.
51 Aug 89 2: populo … per edictum saepe fecit.
52 Livy Per 59.
53 The only other use of emendare in Suetonius is a reference to Domitian sending agents to 
Alexandria to transcribe and emendare manuscripts in Alexandria (Dom 20 1), which is not 
the sense required here. Thesaurus Linguae Latinae V 461 24-41 provides few useful parallels 
of emendare used with lex, notably Tert Apol 4 6: errare in lege condenda … Lycurgi leges 
emendatae; Claudian 8 505-6: priscamque resumunt / canitiem leges, emendantur vetustate /
acceduntque novae; CJ 6 51 1 1: lex Papia ab anterioribus principibus emendata fuit et per 
desuetudinem abolita. Here the main sense seems to be “revise”, in the sense of “bring up to 
date”, to suit a new situation. Swan ((n 5) at 370) insists that emendasset should be translated as 
“reform” rather than “amend”, whereas Brunt ((n 47) at 559 n 1) notes: “I take this to mean that in 
Suetonius’ view Augustus’ law was an ‘amendment’ of earlier enactments.” For its broader use in 
the Digest, see E Grupe Vocabularium iurisprudentiae Romanae vol 2 (Berlin, 1933) at 468-469, 
and in the Codex Justiniani, see R Mayr Vocabularium Codicis Iustiniani (Hildesheim, 1965) at 
921-922.
54 See Swan (n 5) at 231. Dio confirms the legal texts.
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6 Does Suetonius refer to legislation before 18/17 BC?
We have next to deal with hanc … prae tumultu recusantium perferre non potuit nisi 
adempta demum lenitive partium poenarum … . Bauman leaves open the possibility 
that the opposition expressed by Suetonius was to a piece of legislation known only 
from Propertius’ elegies: gavisa est certe sublatam, Cynthia, legem / qua quondam 
edicta flemus uterque diu / ni nos divideret.55 The date, nature and legal status of 
this measure have been the subject of prolonged debate: whether it belonged to the 
triumviral period or to the laws enacted by Augustus between 28 and 26 BC at the 
beginning of his principate proper; whether the measure was primarily financial 
or sought to regulate the right to marriage of free-born Romans, and whether the 
measure was a law that was fully enacted (lex), and then abrogated, or a bill that was 
merely promulgated (rogatio) but not passed. The key to the debate is the precise 
meaning of Propertius’ lex and edicta: Badian, perhaps the most influential discussant 
of the passage in the English-speaking world, argued that Propertius was referring 
to a triumviral decision with the force of law that imposed financial penalties on the 
unmarried and that the expression lex sublata never refers to a withdrawn rogatio.56 
However, in non-legal texts the use of lex for rogatio is unexceptional and Caesar 
provides a pertinent example in which sublata priore lege means a bill withdrawn 
in the face of opposition.57 Although Augustus was prevented from passing this law, 
he succeeded in transferring some of the clauses of his intended legislation into 
other measures that were passed in 27 BC: for example, career priority for those 
who were married and had children was enshrined in the lex annalis and/or the lex 
de provinciis of 27 BC.58 Although the historicity of this earlier Augustan rogatio 
now seems beyond dispute, is this the rogatio that Suetonius refers to in perferre 
non potuit? 
If that identification is to be accepted, the events of c 27 BC and those of 18/17 
BC must in effect be seen as a single piece of legislative activity spread over a 
long period. The only clue to the duration of the process is demum. Unfortunately, 
Suetonius’ usage is so varied as to provide certainty only in respect of the chronological 
sequence of events discussed.59 Jörs himself takes demum to indicate a lengthy period, 
which he identifies as that between AD 4, when he believes Augustus enacted his 
55 (n 8) at 84. Propertius 2 7 11-12.
56 E Badian “A phantom marriage law” (1985) 129 Philologus 82-98.
57 Caes BCiv 3 21 1. See P Moreau, “Florent sub Caesare leges. Quelques remarques de technique 
legislative à propos des lois matrimoniales d’Auguste” (2003) 81 Revue Historique de Droit 
Français et Étranger at 461-467.
58 See Moreau (n 57) at 468-469.
59 Suetonius uses demum frequently (x 33) and sometimes with reference to a short period, eg Aug 
10 4 of two days. Where there are no other chronological indications the periods in question, 
where they can be ascertained, may range from a few days (Tib 51 2, Cal 9) to a few months 
(N 2 3) or even to a year or more (Iul 23 1, Ve 2 2). Suetonius’ other use of demum, simply to place 
events in a sequence may be most relevant here (Tib 61 1, Cal 38 3, Cl 5 1).
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severe law, and AD 9, when the lex Papia Poppaea was enacted. However, the only 
protest against the putative law of AD 4 that resulted in changes took place five years 
after the passing of the said law, which is not the sequence that Suetonius envisages. 
Moreover, perferre naturally means “carry [into law]” and Suetonius must be taken 
to mean that the measure was not “carried into law” in the form Augustus wanted.60 
The most likely time when a relatio was withdrawn is the period leading up to the 
enactment of the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus, the nineteen months between 
Augustus’ return to Italy in October 19 BC and May 17 BC.61 This identification 
provides us with a context in which Augustus himself presented a rogatio, withdrew 
it in its original form, but persisted and passed a lex that bore his name (like the other 
laws explicitly mentioned by Suetonius), although it was not as severe as he had 
originally intended. 
7 Dating Augustus’ concessions
Nisi adempta demum lenitive partium poenarum et vacatione trienni data auctisque 
praemiis according to Jörs refers to the concessions that were incorporated into the 
lex Papia Poppaea, for the alternative view they were incorporated in the lex Iulia 
de maritandis ordinibus. In attempting to evaluate the differing arguments, we face 
two problems, firstly that Suetonius provides us with insufficient detail on the first 
and third concessions to enable us to know what he means, and secondly, the equally 
insurmountable problem that the legal sources providing the bulk of the detailed 
information on the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus (whether we take this as the law 
of 18 BC or that of AD 4) and the lex Papia Poppaea for the most part treat them as 
one law.62 Likewise, to determine what might have been in the draft version of the lex 
60 For Jörs it cannot mean “carry into law”, because it is fundamental to his case that there was a 
lex (nómo) in AD 4. It must therefore have a non-technical sense of, for example, “see through 
to completion” ((n 32) at 50: “Sueton spricht von einem zweiten, die lex de maritandis ordinibus 
verschärfenden Gesetz, und von diesem sagt er, Augustus habe es nicht durchbringen können”). 
Of the eight other uses of perferre in Suetonius none has even a vaguely legal sense (see AA 
Howard & CN Jackson Index Suetonianus (Cambridge Mass, 1922), so Jörs’ view cannot be 
excluded on linguistic grounds, but remains improbable.
61 The termini are fixed: Augustus’ return was commemorated formally on 12 Oct 19 BC (Fast 
Amit); a senatorial decree of 23 May 17 BC contains an explicit mention of the lex Iulia de 
maritandis ordinibus (CIL 6 32323 ll 57ff: qui lege de marita<andis ordinibus tenentur>).
62 Eg, Bauman (n 8) 85 n 9; Carter (n 1) at 143; Mette-Dittmann (n 22) at 162-165; and above 
all R Astolfi La lex Iulia et Papia4 (Milan, 1996) esp at 15. Although Spagnuolo Vigorita ((n 
32) at xviii-xix) rightly emphasises Jörs’ achievement in his doctorate in differentiating the two 
laws, there are still large gaps in our knowledge. For a handy summary of the various ways 
the relationship between the two laws can be set out, see AM Kemezis “Augustus the ironic 
paradigm: Cassius Dio’s portrayal of the lex Julia and lex Papia Poppaea” (2007) 61 Phoenix 274 
n 14.
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Iulia de maritandis ordinibus we would need to work backwards from the provisions 
of the enacted law. 
Key provisions involving restrictions and penalties in the laws were: i) unmarried 
men aged between twenty-five and sixty and unmarried women between twenty and 
fifty could not receive inheritances outside the sixth degree of their agnatic family; 
ii) a disbarred heir had one hundred days in which to acquire a spouse; iii) divorcees 
within the age limits had six months, and widows a year, in which to remarry under 
the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus and twice as long under the lex Papia Poppaea; 
and iv) one surviving child exempted a man from the limitations of the law, and 
three surviving children exempted a woman. In theory the provisions relating to 
any of these four topics may have been more severe in the previous version of the 
legislation required by each view, but it is only in respect of the third provision that 
we know this was so. 
The second specific concession, Suetonius’ vacatio trienni, was linked by 
Jacques Cujas with Ulpian’s testimony concerning the time within which the lex 
Papia Poppaea allowed a woman to remarry after the death of her husband.63 His 
interpretation has been influential, as befits one of the greatest renaissance scholars, 
but requires an unnecessary emendation of Ulpian64 and takes us too far from the 
original lex Iulia, whose provisions concerning the period allowed for remarriage are 
known to have been stricter than those of the lex Papia Poppaea. Rather this vacatio 
is a three-year moratorium, or period of grace before the provisions of the lex came 
into effect, a sufficient period for not only marriages but also the birth of children, in 
order to free couples and individuals from the law’s restrictions. Jörs connects this 
with the three-year vacatio that Augustus in AD 9 claimed he had granted after the 
passing of an earlier law, that of AD 4.65 The other view connects the vacatio with the 
lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus of 18 BC.66 Here it seems that Jörs has a stronger 
case, because the acta of the Ludi Saeculares contain a senatus consultum passed in 
May 17 BC, permitting those banned in terms of the lex de maritandis ordinibus to 
attend the Ludi Saeculares.67 If a three-year vacatio had been incorporated in the law, 
as Suetonius’ text would suggest, then there would have been no need for the Senate 
63 J Cujas Opera omnia vol 1 (Turin, 1758) at 319; Tituli Ulpiani 14: lex autem Papia a morte viri 
biennii [tribuit vacationem]. The notion is still held by Treggiari ((n 5) at 73-74) and Mette-
Dittmann ((n 22) at 132). Rich ((n 50) at 193) understands three years as the maximum length of 
an engagement.
64 Astolfi (n 62) at 84 n 59. For the standing of Cujas, see, eg, DR Kelley Foundations of Modern 
Historical Scholarship: Language, Law, and History in the French Renaissance (New York, 
1970) at 112-115. 
65 56 7 3: ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τρία ἔτη ὅλα πρὸς παρασκευὴν ὑμῖν ἔδωκα, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον δύο. See 
(n 32) at 57-58. 
66 See Real Encyclopädie X 345; Carter (n 1) at 144; Swan (n 5) at 230-231.
67 CIL 6 32323 l 57: magistri s(acris) f(aciundis) [ed]ent, s(ine) f(raude) s(ua) spectare liceat ieis 
qui lege de marita[andis ordinibus tenentur].
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to pass a decree.68 Moreover, all that Dio can find in the draft lex Papia Poppaea 
is a vacatio of one year.69 To validate Suetonius’ testimony, we would need to posit 
that either the actual lex Papia Poppaea contained a vacatio of three years or that 
Augustus subsequently authorised one.70 
Suetonius discusses the third concession, relating to increased rewards, too 
briefly to allow us to reach any definite conclusion. The range of praemia available 
under the lex Papia Poppaea for the married who produced children was substantial: 
seniority in collegial offices for the married man with more children; advancement 
in relation to the leges annales for magistracies; exemption from the duty of 
guardianship or curatorship; the right of husband and wife to inherit from each other, 
and more than 25% of the amount secured by the aerarium for those who initiated 
prosecutions under the law.71 Of these praemia, only the right of spouses to inherit 
from each other was probably extended in the lex Papia Poppaea and the financial 
benefits for delatores introduced.72 
8 Identifying and dating the protest by the equestrian 
order
The next issue is the major demonstration by the equites:73 Do Suetonius and Dio 
describe different protests and what their likely context is? If, as Swan appears to 
argue correctly from the similarity of language (publico spectaculo = θέας ἐπινικίους; 
pertinaciter postulante equite = οἱ ἱππῆς πολλῇ ... σπουδῇ ... ἠξίουν; abolitionem = 
καταλυθῆναι), Suetonius and Dio refer to the same protest by the equites, this incident 
68 Swan ((n 5) at 370) argues that not all the law’s provisions were subject to the moratorium. It 
would be surprising if the major penalties of the law were suspended, such as the restriction on 
inheritance, while minor penalties were left intact. 
69 56 10 1: καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἑκατέροις ἐς τὸ τοὺς πειθαρχήσαντάς οἱ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἀναιτίους 
γενέσθαι προσεπέδωκε.
70 Such a notice could have appeared in the lacuna in the narrative or in relation to urban affairs in 
AD 9 and 10. Certainly no reference to a vacatio survives in the epitomised versions, but they also 
omit any mention of the one recorded by Dio at 56 10 1.
71 Treggiari (n 5) at 66-75.
72 Contra Carter (n 1) at 144. Priority in the consular fasces, attributed by Gellius (2 15 4) to the lex 
Iulia and Ulpian (Vat fr 197) generally confirms that priority in magisterial fasces was covered 
by the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus; advancement in terms of the leges annales was legibus 
cavetur according to Ulpian, hence also covered by the lex Iulia; immunity from tutela for free 
women with three children goes back to 18 BC (Gaius 1 145), but for freedwomen with four 
children only to AD 9 (Gaius 3 44; Ulp 29 3); freedmen were exempted from the operae to their 
patronus in 18 BC if they had two children; the married woman who produced the requisite 
number of children could wear the toga instita from 18 BC. 
73 Spagnuolo Vigorita ((n 33) at 106) wrongly understands Suetonius’ singular eques to refer to 
an individual protestor, but where the biographer uses the singular without an accompanying 
adjective Romanus it refers unequivocally to the order of equites (often in contrast with the 
Senate) (cf Cal 26 4, N 11 1, 12 3, Ve 9 2, Dom 4 5, 8 3).
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is linked by the clear chronological detail in Dio to the victory parades in honour of 
Tiberius’ Pannonian success. This was celebrated in spring AD 9, before the passing 
of the lex Papia Poppaea at some time during the second half of the year when M 
Papius Mutilus and Q Poppaeus Secundus were suffect consuls. According to Jörs 
and Spagnuolo Vigorita, Suetonius had the equites protesting against the lex Papia 
Poppaea itself, even though it embodied concessions. Thus the biographer describes 
a later, different demonstration from the one referred to by Dio, who cannot be held 
to have dated his demonstration incorrectly.74 According to Spagnuolo Vigorita, the 
demonstration took place during the one-year vacatio granted after the passing of the 
lex Papia Poppaea in the first half of AD 10.75 Suetonius’ testimony that Germanicus 
had many children suggests a date some time in AD 9.76 Thus Augustus would have 
been able to refer to Germanicus as a perfect example, since Germanicus’ marriage 
to Agrippina probably took place in AD 4 or in AD 5 at the latest, and was splendidly 
fertile. Jörs’ argument that Germanicus did not return to Rome in time for the spring 
games depends solely on Dio’s statement that Germanicus announced the final 
Tiberian victory over Dalmatia in late summer or early autumn, just before news 
of the Varus disaster reached Rome, but his presence in Rome earlier in the year is 
not excluded.77 Suetonius’ opening two words sic quoque may indicate where he 
believed the protests to have taken place. Swan argues convincingly that they must 
mean “despite this” or “even so”, namely despite the concessions.78 If, according 
to Swan, the concessions were included in the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus of 
18 BC, Suetonius’ reference to a demonstration, which he knew occurred in AD 9, 
to illustrate opposition to it, involves his “overlook[ing] the chronological leap”,79 
and thus the demonstration becomes chronologically separate from the material on 
both sides of it. In Swan’s view, Suetonius’ treatment of Augustan legislation on 
marriage stops in 18 BC, and the law that features most prominently in the literary 
74 (n 32) 52. So also S Demougin L’ordre Equestre sous les Julio-Claudiens (Rome, 1988) 573.
75 (n 33) 64-66, 77.
76 At this stage Germanicus had at least two children: his sons Nero and Drusus were born in AD 
6 and 8 at the latest. Unless partim … partim is rhetorical exaggeration for just two children, 
another child may well be indicated. Agrippina bore their sixth child Caligula in Aug AD 12; of 
the intervening three, the third and fourth children died infantes and the fifth Gaius survived a 
little longer (Cal 7). Only the third is likely to have been alive in spring AD 9, the baby Tiberius 
(CIL 6 888). See T Mommsen “Die Familie des Germanicus” (1878) 13 Hermes at 247-248; JW 
Humphrey “The three daughters of Agrippina Maior” (1979) 4 American J of Ancient History at 
137 n 12; and H Lindsay “A fertile marriage: Agrippina and the chronology of her children by 
Germanicus” (1995) 54 Latomus at 6. Spagnuolo Vigorita ((n 33) at 61) conjectures that there may 
have been four living sons in the first half of AD 10, but the expression may also relate to just three 
sons.
77 56 17 1. See Swan (n 5) at 239-240 on the interpretation of ἐν τούτῳ (56 11 1) 248.
78 His paraphrase “even though the law was mitigated in this way, the equites …”; cf Jörs (n 32) at 
51: “trotz der Milderungen”. In addition to the parallels cited by Swan (Aug 78 2, Tib 65 2 and 
Cl 24 1); see Iul 70. 
79 (n 5) at 370. 
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and legal sources, the lex Papia Poppaea, is totally ignored. If, however, the final 
two parts of Suetonius’ discussion refer to the lex Papia Poppaea (or the lex Aelia 
Sentia), then the equites’ demonstration is not isolated in the context of the rest of 
the chapter: Augustus is portrayed as responding actively and logically to the abuse 
of his legislation and firmly ignoring protest.
9 Augustus’ final measures
Do the measures that Suetonius attributes to Augustus accord with what we know 
of the lex Papia Poppaea? Firstly, Suetonius says that when Augustus realised 
that men were evading the provisions of the law by entering into betrothals with 
immature girls, he reduced the period allowed for betrothals (tempus ... sponsas 
habendi coartavit). Dio’s treatment of the topic appears inconsistent: for 18 BC he 
records an order that restricted betrothals to no more than two years and concludes 
that the minimum age for girls at betrothal was ten;80 but in the speech he attributes 
to Augustus in AD 9, Augustus says that he has done nothing to prevent the betrothal 
of girls too young for marriage.81 Treggiari argues that there was no restriction before 
the lex Papia Poppaea; Astolfi and Mette-Dittmann assert credibly that changes to 
the lex Iulia were included in the lex Papia Poppaea.82 The latter law certainly set at 
two years the maximum length of a betrothal that would enable the parties to count 
as married, which entailed that the minimum age for a fiancée who helped the man 
evade the penalties of the law became ten years.83
Secondly, Augustus imposed some limitation on divorce (divortiis modum 
imposuit). This cannot refer to the number of divorces any man might initiate: “there 
is no evidence or likelihood that Augustus could restrict freedom to divorce”, indeed 
Seneca complains about frequent and trivial divorces and Martial jokes about the 
frequent marriages of Telesilla.84 It is likely that the regulations were tightened up in 
some way, although it is impossible to know what restrictions were introduced, given 
the brevity of Suetonius’ comment and the absence of any relevant information in the 
legal sources. Some sources suggest that what is meant is that seven witnesses were 
needed for a divorce, which would have been a new form of divorce procedure.85 
Other sources refer to a restriction on freedwomen who wanted to divorce their 
patrons (surely a rare occurrence)86 or measures concerning the dowry, for example 
80 Dio 54 16 7.
81 Dio 56 7 2.
82 Treggiari (n 5) at 65; R Astolfi (“Il fidanzamento nella lex Iulia et Papia” in Studi in onore di 
Eduardo Volterra vol 3 (Milan, 1971) esp at 682-685; Mette-Dittmann (n 22) at 163-164.
83 If the testimony of post-classical jurists is relevant, the absolute minimum age for betrothals was 
seven (D 23 1 14).
84 Treggiari (n 5) at 453; Sen Ben 3 16 2-4; Martial 6 7.
85 Jörs (n 32) at 38; Astolfi (n 62) at 194.
86 Eg, E Levy Der Hergang der römischen Ehescheidung (Weimar, 1925) at 49-51.
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permitting the husband to retain a part of the dowry when either the wife or her 
paterfamilias initiated the divorce,87 or reducing the time allowed to the ex-husband 
to repay the dowry when he had initiated the divorce,88 or limiting the time stipulated 
before a divorced woman had to remarry or lose the privileges of the married.89
10 Conclusion
If this examination of Suetonius’ treatment of a key element of Augustus’ social 
legislation has accurately identified the stages and measures that the biographer 
discussed, then it appears that Suetonius did not focus only on the legislation of 18/17 
BC, but, appropriately, demonstrated Augustus’ concerns and activities up to AD 9, 
when the lex Papia Poppaea was passed. If this is so then Suetonius’ understanding 
of the provisions of the latter as a tightening up of the lex Iulia resembles that of 
Tacitus, who in a famously cynical survey saw the lex Papia Poppaea as a pernicious 
law that gave free rein to delatores and plunged all into terror.90 The biographer, 
however, lets no shadow fall on Augustus – there are no comments on the continuing 
ineffectiveness of the marriage legislation. Rather he depicts the paradigmatic 
emperor as persisting in upholding traditional morality and above all the institution of 
marriage, although the weakness of others forced him to be less strict than he would 
have wished. Suetonius depicted Augustus as remaining resolute, citing examples of 
good moral conduct that could be followed and closing loopholes when he saw his 
own legislation being circumvented.
Suetonius Jörs/Spagnuolo Vigorita Bauman Swan Wardle
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87 See M Humbert Le remariage à Rome (Milan, 1972) at 136-137.
88 A Söllner Zur Vorgeschichte und Funktion der actio rei uxoriae (Cologne, 1969) at 117.
89 Treggiari (n 5) at 454.
90 See Ann 3 25 1. That Suetonius included among the creditable works of Nero (N 10 1) a reduction 
in the rewards payable to delatores under the lex Papia Poppaea may suggest a degree of coolness 
towards that aspect of the law, but no criticism can be discerned in the Augustus.
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Abstract
The Emperor Augustus’ so-called social or moral legislation features prominently 
in legal and historical discussions of his principate. His biographer Suetonius 
concentrates into one chapter a discussion of Augustus’ leges rogatae, which has 
never been analysed phrase by phrase by any scholar of Roman history or law since 
Paul Jörs in 1893. This article sets out to explain how Suetonius orders his discussion, 
chooses precise vocabulary, highlights key stages in the legislative programme, 
and does not conceal opposition to the legislation. The most controversial law, on 
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which Suetonius centres his discussion, is the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus, key 
provisions of which were amended in the lex Papia Poppaea of AD 9. I argue that 
Suetonius comments not only on the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus, but also on 
later amendments, whether in the putative lex Aelia Sentia of AD 4 or the indisputable 
lex Papia Poppaea. There is, however, no reference to any abortive moral legislation 
of 27 BC. Suetonius presents an emperor concerned with major social issues, careful 
in the formulation of his laws, but also suitably responsive to societal pressure.
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Tamás Nótári Law and Society in Lex Baiuvariorum 
(Schenk Verlag, Passau, 2014, pp 288,  
ISBN 978-3944850-25-2, Euro 39.90)
In this monograph, Tamás Nótári investigates certain legal and socio-historical 
aspects of the lex Baiuvariorum, but also gives ample space to a philological analysis 
of its Medieval Latin.
The first chapter (Historical and social background − Bavaria in the eighth 
century), examines Bavaria’s history and society during the first half of the eighth 
century. Specifically, it deals with Bavaria’s home and foreign affairs and church 
organisation, and certain issues pertaining to the structure of society, namely, 
the evolution of the Bavarian nobility and the status of freemen and slaves. It 
furthermore analyses the end of the independent Bavarian Dukedom, focusing on 
the dethronement of Tasilo III, the last duke of the Agilolfing dynasty, and the legal 
background of the dethronement.1
The second chapter deals with the history of the compilation of the lex 
Baiuvariorum; and more specifically discusses such issues as dating it; possible 
connections between the content of the narrative in the Prologus and the process of 
drawing up the code of laws; the significance of the first two titles of the code in terms 
of dating it; and problems relating to editing the lex Baiuvariorum. In the course 
of this discussion, with regard to the final version Nótári accepts Peter Landau’s 
hypothesis that monks who compiled it must have belonged to the St Emmeram 
1 On the philological aspects of the sources analysed in this chapter see, also, T Nótári Bavarian 
Historiography in Early-Medieval Salzburg (Passau, 2010) (hereafter Nótári Bavarian 
Historiography); T Nótári “An Early-Medieval ‘Show Trial’ – Tasilo IIIs Dethronement” in L 
Beck Varela, P Gutiérrez Vega & A Spinosa (eds) Crossing Legal Cultures (München, 2009) 141-
158 (hereafter Nótári ‘Show Trial’).
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monastery located at the duke’s seat in Regensburg; and that to date the compilation 
between 737 and 743 is supported by the ecclesiastical influence apparent in the lex 
Baiuvariorum, far exceeding that of Bavarian folk laws. At the same time, the author 
emphasises that it is almost impossible to draw any conclusions that are appropriate 
in every respect on the authenticity of the Prologus; in other words, its content can 
hardly enable us to date the code of laws accurately. He does, however, agree with 
Heinrich Brunner’s hypothesis that certain parts of the lex Alamannorum and the first 
two titles of the lex Baiuvariorum may be traced back to a lost Merovingian statute. 
The first two titles of the lex Baiuvariorum, on the one hand, constitute an integral 
whole in terms of their structure and language and the manuscripts left to us, whilst 
on the other hand these titles and the provisions of the lex Alamannorum on the 
Church and the ruler clearly overlap. It is, therefore, possible that at least these titles 
were integrated as a single unit from the very start; since the editors of the code could 
hardly, every time the code was revised, go back to the statutes that were the sources 
of the first two titles, namely the Codex Euricianus and the lex Alamannorum.
In the third chapter (Public and private law in the lex Baiuvariorum) the 
author deals with issues of criminal law. In early medieval German laws a dogmatic 
distinction between criminal and private law was not apparent. The author starts by 
discussing issues of criminal law in an attempt to extract the “general provisions” 
(allgemeiner Teil) of the criminal law of the Bavarian lex. He defines the “special 
provisions” (besonderer Teil) and systematises the sanctions of the code. The section 
on the private law of the lex Baiuvariorum examines procedural law, family law, the 
law of property and the law of obligations – more specifically, issues concerning sale 
such as required formalities, validity and warranties. It also touches briefly on other 
contracts and discusses the law of inheritance as reflected in the sources.2 In the next 
chapter the private and criminal-law position of slaves is analysed, with reference to 
issues of terminology, slaves as the subject of legal transactions, transactions entered 
into by slaves and the nature of peculium, damaging of servi alieni and the problems 
of sanctioning crimes committed by slaves. 
The author then states that among German Volksrechte it is the lex Baiuvariorum 
that contains the greatest number of contractual provisions – and the most flexible 
ones, specifically with a view to the requirements of practice. Their prime aim 
indicated expressis verbis in the code is to ensure the continued validity of concluded 
contracts and the security of transactions. These Bavarian statutory provisions are 
mainly derived from Visigothic patterns; however, lawmakers did not copy them 
slavishly, but modified them in accordance with their own experience. With regard 
to provisions on slaves, it should be made clear that the lex Baiuvariorum (in spite 
of its significant contribution on this subject), as compared to other German folk 
2 Cf T Nótári “Criminal law in Lex Baiuvariorum” (2013) 2/1 Acta Universitatis 
Sapientiae Legal Studies at 67-90; Nótári Bavarian Historiography (n 1) passim; Nótári 
‘Show Trial’ (n 1) at 141-158.
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laws, did not make any significant attempt to improve the position and acknowledge 
the humanity of persons deprived of their freedom. Thus it seems that the words 
mancipium, servus and ancilla may also be translated by the word slave, instead 
of the usual terms servant and maidservant that are further removed from the legal 
content.3
The fourth chapter analysed by Tamás Nótári deals with the language, sources 
and impact of the lex Baiuvariorum. The first section, which discusses the German 
linguistic elements of the code, focuses on the general characteristics of the German 
phrases of the lex Baiuvariorum; the problems of the ex asse Bavarian phrases of 
the text of the code; further (possible) Bavarian phrases; the scope of Bavarian 
personal names; expressions corresponding to the lex Alamannorum; terms that may 
be presumed to be of Bavarian origin, and other German phrases. An attempt is 
then made to draw conclusions from the foregoing discussion. Most of the German 
phrases of the lex Baiuvariorum appear in the text as ancient, extremely characteristic 
compounds: firstly, they explain or supplement the Latin text; secondly, they convey 
the appropriate Latin terms, with a German technical term usually constituting an 
independent part of the sentence; and thirdly, they appear as independent phrases 
with or without a Latin explanation. Several of the German phrases of non-Bavarian 
origin were borrowed from the lex Alamannorum. Certain words are also found in 
the lex Salica. However, it should be pointed out that several Salian Frankish terms, 
absent from the lex Salica, may be found in the lex Baiuvariorum. They may derive 
from later laws, capitularia. In addition, numerous words demonstrate the linguistic 
relation between the Edictus Rothari and the lex Baiuvariorum, whilst some words 
overlap only partially. Thus the question remains whether the scales should tilt 
towards borrowing or towards overlapping because of common German roots. 
The analysis of the use of sources by the compilers of the lex Baiuvariorum 
touches on possible secular and ecclesiastical sources of the code, the Visigothic 
influence and the relationship to Alemannian laws, which make it possible to draw 
several conclusions. In analysing the sources of the lex Baiuvariorum, Nótári points 
out that the editors of the lex Baiuvariorum drew mainly from the Codex Euricianus 
and specifically the titles De commendatis et commodatis, De ventitionibus, De 
furto and De terminis ruptis. Except in the chapter on contract law, it cannot be 
determined to what extent the compilers of the lex Baiuvariorum made use of the 
Codex Euricianus. The editors of the lex Baiuvariorum made a conscious selection 
from the Visigothic prefiguration, and instead of slavishly copying, adapted parts 
to the circumstances of Bavarian life. However, they modified them with regard to 
several topics; in accordance, for example, with the status of the persons concerned. 
In respect of other sources, especially the lex Alamannorum, Nótári probably 
presumes that  the two codes did not impact on each other, but rather that a common 
3 See, also, T Nótári “Personal status and social structure in Early Medieval Bavaria” (2009) 50 
Acta Juridica Hungarica at 85-110.
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antecedent (presumably from the Merovingian period) was used by the editors of 
both codes. The canon law collections, which cannot be determined specifically, 
were also used as sources by the compilers of the lex Baiuvariorum according to 
their own needs; in other words, they tried to introduce passages from them into the 
fabric of the Bavarian code as organic elements.
In the next chapter, Nótári makes a comparative analysis of the factual elements 
of grave robbery, and considers to what extent elements of Roman law, canon law 
and especially German customary law are found in specific codes. In this context, the 
author also analyses the Gothic, Burgundian, Langobardic, Frankish, Alemannian and 
Bavarian laws. With regard to all these codices Nótári concludes that the formulation 
of the facts of the robbery or desecration of a grave and the related sanction in the lex 
Baiuvariorum may be traced clearly to Roman and canon-law roots and that neither 
the system of sanctions, nor the images related to it imply any genuine connection 
with ancient German (pagan) thought and religion.4
In the last chapter on the history of the influence of the lex Baiuvariorum one 
circumstance is highlighted, namely the influence of the Bavarian lex on the laws of 
King Stephen I. The relevant sections analyse the tradition and the surviving texts of 
King Stephen I and the main characteristics of his legislation; the issues of continuity 
and discontinuity in the first Hungarian decreta; the ways in which eastern and 
western sources were used; the main subjects of the regulations of the decreta, and 
which text demonstrates the influence of the lex Baiuvariorum on the laws of King 
Stephen I. This analysis shows that where the laws of King Stephen I borrow from 
the lex Baiuvariorum, the two often overlap. This is to be seen partly in the structure, 
partly in the preamble, and partly in several particular loci of the law. Regarding 
particular loci of the law, borrowing seems probable with regard to the topics of 
Sunday rest and of abduction. Borrowing is certain, however, in respect of arson and 
high treason; in other words, the treatment of these topics confirms that the author 
of the first Hungarian laws was familiar with the content of the Bavarian code and 
made use of it. This makes it highly probable that it was also used in the other cases.5
Magdolna Sič
Associate Professor, University of Novi Sad
4 Cf  T Nótári “The state of facts of robbing a grave in Early Medieval German laws” 2012 (53) 
Acta Juridica Hungarica at 236-254. 
5 See also, T Nótári “Remarks on the Decreta of the first Hungarian King, Stephen I” 
(2012) 18(2) Fundamina at 108-118. 
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Janwillem Oosterhuis Specific Performance in German, French 
and Dutch Law in the Nineteenth Century – Remedies in an Age 
of Fundamental Rights and Industrialisation 
(Martinus Nijhof, Leyden, 2011, pp 635,  
ISBN 9789004202283, US $172)
It is often stated in comparative essays and studies that one of the fundamental 
differences between the common law and civil law with regard to obligations lies in 
the remedy of specific performance. According to this view, specific performance is 
the primary remedy in civil law where there has been a breach of contract, since the 
innocent party has a right to fulfilment of the contract. In the common law, on the 
other hand, specific performance is a secondary remedy, the primary remedy being 
a claim for damages. Against this background, this historical analysis by Oosterhuis 
is an important addition to the body of work on this subject in the English language. 
The author also gives an in-depth account of changes to this remedy during the 
nineteenth century, which was a very formative time for the civil law in Europe, 
especially the three countries studied in this work.
The description on the book’s cover very aptly summarises its contents as 
follows:
The current French, German and Dutch law of contract each offer a remedy of specific 
performance to creditors suffering from breach of contract. This book analyses the alterations 
to this remedy during the nineteenth century on the substantive, procedural and enforcement 
levels. Fascinatingly, there is a link between changes to the remedy and the development 
of early human rights and the mass industrialisation of society. The latter had the effect 
of actually converging the national remedies of specific performance in the examined 
systems: damages and rescission became more accessible as remedies at the cost of specific 
performance. The book demonstrates the interdependency between law and society and 
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provides vital background information to the harmonisation of a controversial concept in the 
European Law of Obligations.
The book is a reworked version of the author’s doctoral thesis. Unlike many 
such works, this one does not read like a typical thesis and has been successfully 
transformed from a thesis to a monograph, even though it remains a challenging 
read. 
In his introduction, Oosterhuis remarks quite correctly that the choice of remedy 
for breach of contract will depend on a variety of factors such as the particular 
rules of the applicable legal system, difficulty of enforcement, the effectiveness of 
enforcement apparatus in the particular legal system, relative impossibility, social 
and economic conditions, the scarcity and value of the goods or performance, 
and lastly the uniqueness of the goods. He then argues that the preference for a 
particular remedy and how often it is applied in practice may eventually affect its 
legal functioning and status as a remedy in a particular legal system. This important 
hypothesis is dealt with in detail, and amply proven in chapters four and five.
Chapter 2 starts with an overview of the remedy of specific performance before 
the nineteenth century. There is a brief but informative account of it in Roman law, 
and during the periods of the glossators, commentators and canonists. The author also 
traces its use in customary European law, especially in France, and developments 
in Roman-Dutch and Roman-Frisian law. Finally, there is an account of it in early 
modern natural law and the usus modernus. The chapter ends with the conclusion that 
two conflicting principles had emerged at this time: The first was that all obligations, 
regardless of their nature or intended object, had to be performed in specie. This 
was the primary remedy. The second principle was that certain obligations were 
from the outset excluded from the scope of specific performance. The first principle 
emerged under the influence of early modern natural law; the second under the 
influence of burgeoning humanism. The first principle also found its way into several 
codifications and drafts at the end of the eighteenth century.
The third chapter deals with the formative influence of the fundamental changes 
to society and the economy in Europe during the nineteenth century. Oosterhuis 
convincingly argues that rising awareness of fundamental rights and the right to 
personal freedom, as well as the increase in trade through industrialisation of the 
economy, diminished the status of specific performance as the primary remedy, even 
though it remained entrenched in practice. However, the discussion of the influence 
of fundamental rights promised in the title of the work does not fully materialise. 
This chapter first shows that at the beginning of the nineteenth century, specific 
performance was regarded as the primary remedy in the three countries that are 
compared in the book. It then describes how that paradigm came under increasing 
pressure during the course of the century because of the changes mentioned above. 
At first, only a few very restricted exceptions were recognised, and the remedy was 
widely applied in practice. Despite some doctrinal differences in the three systems, 
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commentators seemed generally agreed on the primacy of the remedy, in accordance 
with the first principle mentioned above.
Chapter 4, entitled “Damages as Rule”, describes how in the course of increasing 
change in society and the economy, there was a gradual shift from the strict 
application of specific performance as the primary remedy to the stage where more 
exceptions were allowed; and the increasing importance of damages as a remedy 
started to diminish the role of specific performance in practice. During this period, 
cancellation of the contract together with a claim for damages became the preferred 
remedy for late performance, particularly in commercial sales law. Oosterhuis 
remarks that “timely delivery became more important than delivery itself”. He 
traces the development of a choice of remedies in German law under the Allgemeines 
Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch. In the case of late performance, however, a creditor 
had to afford the debtor a reasonable period of time (Nachfrist) to perform. This 
particular construction has survived into modern times and even found its way into 
the provisions of the Vienna Convention for the International Sale of Goods, 1980. 
The increasing importance of damages as a remedy in France and the Netherlands 
during this period, despite the prevailing doctrine at the beginning of the century, is 
also described. In practice it also became commonplace in trade sales to include a 
specific date for performance, with the intention that the creditor would be entitled 
to rescind the contract immediately upon default. Increasingly the courts came to 
recognise and enforce this approach. This review can hardly do justice to the detailed 
and nuanced discussion in this chapter and the richness of the text. It concludes with 
the finding that in the course of the societal and especially economic changes during 
the nineteenth century, damages became the primary remedy in practice, particularly 
in respect of generic goods. In time, the influence of these practices in the law of sale 
permeated to other areas in the law of contract as well. Oosterhuis remarks that the 
change was most obvious in German law, although similar trends could be observed 
to a lesser extent in French and Dutch law.
Chapter 5 shows that specific performance became an exceptional remedy during 
the latter part of the nineteenth century. In French and Dutch legal doctrine, specific 
performance was still viewed as the primary remedy, but no longer in practice. 
However, specific performance continued to be important in two areas, namely in 
respect of unique goods and in respect of personal acts. This chapter also describes 
changes during this period, when awarding damages became increasingly important 
and sophisticated, not only in practice but also in doctrine. The approaches in the 
three different systems under review became increasingly diverse, and Oosterhuis 
manages to convey effectively what he describes as the disintegration of the law of 
obligations during this period.
The book concludes with a handy summary of the contents and findings. In a 
way, this overview is a good starting point for the reader who might otherwise get 
lost in the complex and detailed discussions in chapters 2 to 5. The conclusions 
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are consistent and provide a fitting end to a fascinating study. I fully agree with 
the following remarks by Jacques du Plessis (University of Stellenbosch) about this 
book (http://www.brill.com/specific-performance-german-french-and-dutch-law-
nineteenth-century):
This work contains very interesting insights about the relationship between law and practice, 
as illustrated by the history of the remedy of specific performance in certain private law 
systems in the nineteenth century. It is of particular significance that the study is not confined 
to a mere analysis of statutory provisions and academic literature, but also contains detailed 
discussions of the relevant case law.
John MacLeod (University of Glasgow), in another review, states correctly ((2012) 
16 Edinburgh LR 285) that the title of this work sells the range and depth of this 
study rather short, since its scope is not restricted to the nineteenth century, and the 
analysis goes beyond mere contract law, in that it also considers relevant aspects of 
property and civil procedure. There is certainly a depth and breadth of discussion in 
this book, making it a valuable but challenging read.
It is a valuable contribution to our understanding of modern contract law, 
and more specifically the remedies that are available, even in South Africa. It will 
certainly be a valuable read for anyone interested in the law of contract, especially 
since the remedies for breach have not been as well researched and debated as has 
contract formation.
Sieg Eiselen
Professor, University of South Africa
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With the passing of Professor AB Edwards, South Africa lost a great legal scholar. I 
lost a mentor and a friend.
I first met Professor Edwards (as I continued to call him after his retirement) 
in 1984 when I was appointed as a research assistant in the then Department of 
Legal History, Comparative Law and Legal Philosophy. One of my first tasks was 
to assist in checking references for his work on Paulus Voet, which would later be 
published as The Selective Paulus Voet (Fundamina Editio Specialis, University of 
South Africa, 2007). During that time, I translated chapters from his PhD Thesis 
(University of Cape Town, 1984) from English into Afrikaans – a daunting task for a 
young research assistant, but giving me my first glimpse of the great scholar that he 
was. Two years later, I became a permanent member of the Department with Professor 
Edwards as its Head, and sometime later he became my doctoral supervisor. All in 
all, I had known him for thirty odd years, yet when I was approached to write this 
obituary, I realised at once how much and how little I knew about him. 
Professor Edwards was a very private person. I know very little about his life 
history, save for a few facts that had emerged through the years. I know that he 
came to law somewhat late in life, having first trained as a scientist and worked as 
a pharmacist on the Zambian copper mines. It was during that time that he started 
studying law through the University of South Africa, where he would later become 
a Professor of Law. Considering the age difference between us, as well as our very 
different backgrounds (he being of Scots origin and my having grown up on a farm 
in the Eastern Cape with Afrikaans as my mother tongue), it is quite remarkable 
that we forged not only a very good professional relationship, but also a lasting 
friendship based on what I now know was huge mutual respect.
Professor Edwards was a true scholar. Well versed in legal history, legal 
philosophy and many other areas of the law, he relished the challenges posed by 
private international law, a subject area that can be baffling yet immensely rewarding, 
for the patient researcher. He understood that private international law could not be 
mastered in a hurry. He once said that Theo van Wijk, erstwhile Vice-Chancellor 
of Unisa, had written the following comment on one of his assignments (while he 
was studying for his BA LLB through Unisa): “Read more, think more, write less.” 
Professor Edwards’s scholarship in private international law encapsulates this: his 
writing reveals the intricacies of cross-border litigation, yet he advances his views 
with the clarity and authority that come from having carefully and systematically 
thought through a myriad potential permutations. His greatest contribution lies in 
the thorough historical and comparative research that informed his views on private 
international law questions. Professor Edwards expected high standards of his 
students, both undergraduate and postgraduate, but he set the bar much higher for 
himself. 
He made a substantial contribution to South African law and legal literature. 
He was responsible for the chapters on “The Idea of Law”, “Legal Theory”, “The 
FUNDAMINA_21_1_15.indb   214 2015/06/10   13:26:15
215
OBITUARY
History of South African Law”, “Sources of South African Law” and “Public and 
Private International Law”, as well as, in conjunction with Professor Joan Church, 
the chapter on “Introduction to Indigenous Law and the Comparative Method”, 
in the 1500 page tour de force, Introduction to South African Law and Legal 
Theory (2nd ed, Butterworths, Durban,1995 (repr: 1997)). He also authored the 
monographic LAWSA title, Conflict of Laws (Butterworths, Durban, 1993). Apart 
from numerous articles (including his inaugural lecture, “Choice of law in delict: 
Rules or approach?” (1979) 96 SALJ 48), notes and case comments, he participated 
in a number of Festschriften, which saw him unearth gems like Hughes v Wrankmore 
((1813-1814) Court of Appeals for Civil Cases at the Cape of Good Hope), an early 
international insolvency case. The Selective Paulus Voet (in collaboration with 
Dawie Kriel and with assistance from Paul du Plessis, Rena van den Bergh and 
Gardiol van Niekerk), was his last academic publication and perhaps the greatest of 
them all. The final published work contains a translation of those sections of Paulus 
Voet’s De Statutis Eorumque Concursu Liber Singularis (Amstelodami, 1661) that 
are relevant to modern conflict of laws. These sections are placed in historical 
perspective within the context of the rise and fall of statutism in Western Europe, 
Great Britain, the United States of America and South Africa. The work concludes 
with a brief appraisal of Paulus Voet’s legacy in South African law.
Professor Edwards worked very hard – there is no other way to state this fact. 
When he received funding to travel overseas for research purposes, he spent very 
little time away from that research. I recall his once explaining to me that he was 
unable to attend the Wimbledon final, which, having been rained out on the Sunday, 
had been moved to the Monday. Although he could have gone on the Monday (his 
ticket was valid), he had to get back to his research. Such was his commitment, 
though I think in later years he regretted missing that final!  
Professor Edwards was my academic mentor. He would probably not have 
described our professional relationship in those terms, since there was no official 
appointment as mentor, but the impact he had on my career was immense and his 
scholarship will continue to influence my writing. He was meticulous in commenting 
on everything I wrote early on; how I now regret not having saved just one of those 
handwritten notes. When he decided that the title of my thesis should be all of 
twenty-two words long, I did not object – although it was quite impossible to print 
the full title on the back! 
In later years, he became a very dear friend, whom I would visit when I was in 
Cape Town. He loved to reminisce about the “Unisa days” and was still very much 
interested in everyone’s life and career. He remembered my birthday, without fail. I 
shall miss him.
Elsabe Schoeman
Professor, University of Auckland
FUNDAMINA_21_1_15.indb   215 2015/06/10   13:26:15
216
Doi:  10.17159/2411-7870/2015/v21n1a13
Print ISSN 1021-545X/ Online  ISSN 2411-7870
© Unisa Press
OBITUARY
Basil Edwards  
1930-2014
The passing of Professor AB Edwards in January 2014 was a sad moment − not only 
for his family, but also for his friends and former colleagues, and particularly those 
formerly and presently at the University of South Africa. As one of the latter I am 
honoured to write a tribute in memory of him and the thoughts of him that I share 
are written in that vein.
As was the convention in the erstwhile faculty of law at Unisa, Basil Edwards, 
together with compatriots John Middleton and Pierre Brookes (like him they were 
later to become professors), began his career as an academic assistant in 1969 after 
successfully completing the then post-graduate LLB degree. Soon afterward he 
became a lecturer and subsequently senior lecturer and professor in the Department 
of Legal History, Comparative Law and Legal Philosophy. It was at this time that I 
met him, first when I was a student in the early seventies and appointed (in the then 
conventional fashion) as a junior lecturer in Private Law, and later as a colleague of 
his in the Department of Legal History, Comparative Law and Legal Philosophy. 
As a junior colleague I particularly valued our conversations concerning his field of 
expertise which was Private International Law, and under his guidance completed the 
compulsory dissertation for the LLB on the question of the matrimonial domicile. 
He was appointed as Head of Department in 1982 and obtained a PhD from the 
University of Cape Town in 1984. In the same year he and Sybil Meston were 
married.
The scholarship of the late Professor Edwards has been outlined in a further 
tribute in this journal and I would like to highlight some more personal moments 
in my memory of him. He was a fine conversationalist at office get-togethers and 
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parties at my home as well as at those held during the meetings of the then Society 
of University Teachers of Law where in the wee hours of the morning, at late after-
parties, his keen sense of humour was shared with colleagues and friends from sister 
universities.
He retired in 1995, but returned to work in the Department on various research 
projects, notably as collaborator on the mammoth The Selective Paulus Voet of 
which mention is made elsewhere in this journal. Some two years later he and Sybil 
moved to Cape Town. Here he continued his research and honed his golf, first at 
the Clovelly Golf Club and later in the southern suburbs of the Mother City. After 
a final move to an apartment in Kenilworth, I am told he became a dab hand at the 
game of croquet. Although Baz and I remained good friends over the years, always 
remembering one another at Christmas and birthdays, I was able to maintain a more 
regular and personal contact once we moved to Cape Town some six years ago. 
While we often revisited the past together, he was always eager to hear the more 
recent news of his alma mater and erstwhile colleagues there.
I was privileged to keep in touch with Sybil during his short but trying illness 
and very sad to hear that he had passed on. I am honoured to have known him as a 
colleague and friend. 
Joan Church
Professor Emeritus, University of South Africa
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